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Conclusions:
1. The religious factor is important even in such secular country as Russia and one should take it into consideration.
2. In many countries of the world the political parties are legalized based on religion so there are sufficient reasons to state a question on granting a charter for the Russian religious organizations to establish their political parties.
3. Nevertheless, the Russian experience shows that the parties based on religion weren't effective. The religious organizations preferred and prefer acting either by means of contacts with the representatives of power or though the social organizations.
4. Power is ready to cooperate with the religious organizations and come to meet them, however, clearly prefers the ROC or the other "traditional" religious organizations (in some subjects of the Russian Federation).
"Mir i politika", M., 2010, N 7, p. 86-90.
S. Sergeev,
political scientist (Kazan)
A. Salagayev,
political scientist (Kazan)
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PROVINCIAL
SOVIET TATARIAN NOMENCLATURE
INTO THE REGIONAL RULING ELITE OF TATARSTAN
The study of the ruling elite of Tatarstan (RT) raises at least two related problems. In what way the elite for a short historic period (for 2-3 years) was able to ensure the actually monopolistic control over economic and political spheres of life in the republic?
The regional regime installed in Tatarstan in the beginning of the 1990s does not match one of the four types of regional regimes mentioned by V. Gelman. Resembling to a larger extent the type, called "the victor gets all", the regional regime of RT differs from it in actual absence of elite changes and in rapid tempo of cessation of the undetermined situation and restoration of the control over the region by the elite.
In Saratov region, used as a research field for determination of the regime's type, it was installed by the middle of the 1990s following for a rather long period the struggle among elite groups. Really, the rapid victory was possible thanks to the internal regional features, including unity of the victorious elite? To what extent this monolithic feature was kept further and is it the specific feature of the ruling elite of Tatarstan? First, it is necessary to answer the question about the reasons of the rapid and complete victory of the ruling elite of RT and the defeat of its rivals on the eve of the 1990s; later one should analyze its structure for the 2000s.
The peculiarities of both the transformation processes in the republic itself and of the contemporary structure of the elite in Tatarstan are connected with the specifics of "Soviet heritage" in the Tatarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Like in other industrial-agrarian regions, for the last Soviet period in TASSR the differentiation of the nomenclature elite was determined mainly by the spheres of activities of one or other nomenclature segment; and this nomenclature was as follows: the functionaries at the republican level (obkom), the administrators at the republican level (Council of Ministers); the directors of industrial enterprises (two groups - the directors of the enterprises in the oil industry and the directors of agricultural enterprises); the agrarian sector's managers; the city functionaries.
The leading positions were occupied by the republican functionaries, but in 1989 the division of power was changed for the
benefit of the leading managers in the economic sphere. In September 1989, following the departure of G. Usmanov to occupy a high post in Moscow, former Chairman of the Council of Ministers and former minister of land-reclamation for 14 years M. Shaimiyev became the first secretary of obkom of the CPSU. This life vector of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers was quite logical: the republican Council of Ministers was mainly in charge of agriculture, since 80% of republican industrial enterprises were subordinates to the federal authorities, 18% -subordinates to RSFSR and only 2% (trade, transport and agriculture) were in charge of the Council of Ministers of TASSR. Owing to the specifics of the resources kept under control by "the party functionaries" they maintained close contacts mainly with directors of industrial enterprises, while the functionaries of the Council of Ministers maintained contacts with the agrarians.
Probably, the great change of correlation of forces might not have taken place, but the democratic movement rendered assistance to M. Shaimiyev to get rid of his rivals. In February 1990, as a result of "regional revolutions" secretaries of the CPSU obkom A. Bulatov (formerly the head of holding "Myasoprom RT") and A. Rodygin (formerly deputy director of Kazan radio-electronic institute) lost their posts. The Supreme Soviet of TASSR, elected in 1990, comprised many city and local party functionaries (25% of deputies), but the majority of deputies were secretaries of rural districts. The coalition of industrial and agrarian managers was formed. But what position was occupied by the directors of industrial enterprises and of the city functionaries?
The directors of industrial enterprises officially were subordinated to the Union and Russian structures but actually they were dependent on the regional leadership (obkom functionaries) in terms of decisions concerning priorities of the republican economic development
and the control over industrial management. The obkom party functionaries got additional authorities in governance of regional economy due to their greater role in the sphere of coordination of economic development officially controlled by numerous departments. As a result, the effect of the strong departmental subordination was displayed in Tataria in a different way comparing with other Russian regions marked by strong departmental feature, where the directors of big enterprises in many respects occupied the status, which was higher than the status of party organs. In TASSR the level of inter-regional autonomy of the most economic actors depended on the success of their mutual actions with the party elite.
The configuration of the actors raises questions about the events on the eve of the 1990s. If the level of mutual action between regional party functionaries and the directorate was so successful, why at the crucial moment of transformation the directorate rapidly lost its influence and a chance to have an impact in the favorable outcome for it? One should take into account some events, including the elections of people's deputies of the USSR in 1989. The directorate's representatives took an active part in the elections and .. .confronted a vehement opposition of the new democratic movement. Many activists of this movement regarded the word "director" as a synonym of wordings "member of nomenclature" and "party bureaucrat", - the word, which was transformed into the negative label.
It is difficult to say whether this phenomenon was an element of the conscious political game or it was a spontaneous result; but the directorate turned out to become the functionaries' vanguard against the democratic mass movement; and this vanguard was greatly weakened and demoralized. For a long time a chance was lost for any mutual action of the directorate and the democratic movement against functionaries or agrarians.
Thus, the groups of the directorate and of the city functionaries submitted to the victors and to a large extent were integrated with them by the year of 1990. The pre-condition of this integration was slackening of the directorate (and in August 1991 - also of the city managers). The issue of an equal alliance or cartel was hardly probable as a matter for discussion, although some vital interests of the subordinate groups were respected.
Thanks to the wave of this support on 12 June 1991, the leader of the "integrated" elite was rather easily elected to become the president of the republic without any alternative. And what is more, the republican leadership, basing on the consolidated party-economy elite and enjoying support of the union center, was able not once to challenge the Russian leadership, which under the existed conditions lacked power to respond to them (August 1990 - adoption of the Declaration on Sovereignty of the Republic, which might be interpreted as an aspiration for sovereignty outside the framework of RSFSR; May-June 1991 - the refusal to take part in elections of the President of Russia). Therefore the behavior of the leadership of Tatarstan in the events of August 1991 was quite predictable: it supported the GKChP. Only on 19 August M. Shaimiyev had a meeting with G. Yanayev and on 20 August he made the following declaration to the leadership of the city and republican organizations: "I am repeating again: the laws, the Constitution and all decisions of the State Committee for Emergency in the country and the directions of the President of the Republic are valid and operate... Those, who will act differently, will be responsible for their actions according to the laws of the state of emergency".
The directorate was ready to follow the functionaries and the agrarians, supporting the republican sovereignty, the demand of the union status, the boycott of the Russian leadership and approval of the GKChP, but not the separation from Russia and proclamation of the
state independence of Tatarstan. A part of the directorate disapproved these intensions, and for the period of 1991-1992 this fact was evident in the course of voting on key decisions in the Supreme Soviet. And what is more, a certain split took place in the directorate corps.
In October 1991, when a group of activists of ethnic-national organizations tried to take by storm the building of the Supreme Soviet and the issue of independence of Tatarstan was put on the agenda, some directors and their deputies formed the group "Soglasie" (Consent) , which represented "a broad front" of all partisans of Russian orientation. At the same time, "it was an open secret in the Supreme Soviet that Bekh, the general director of "Kamaz", provided nationalists with money after a telephone call of his superiors", according to deputy of the State Duma V. Mikhailov.
The stimuli constituting the burden on the directorate in the opposite direction, probably, were stronger, and the resistance on the part of a group of directors against the republican functionaries remained a rise in rebellion "forced to their knees". The republican functionaries were able to propose to the directorate the way to keep their interests and enrichment in some cases. This way supposed a complete obedience of the directorate to the functionaries and noninterference in political line of the latter. This way, recognizing personal interests of one or other director, was incompatible with recognition of common interests of the directorate as a special actor or a separate group.
This way supposed at the first stage the transfer of the enterprises from the union and Russian subordination to the republican subordination, although they remained the state enterprises. As a temporary option the regional state property suited both republican functionaries and the directorate. Probably, at that moment some directors might prefer to see their enterprises as a state property. But,
on the one side, Russia did not display any interest for this turn of events, and, on the other side, the authorities of Tatarstan threatened the recalcitrant directors with all possible sanctions.
The following step was the privatization, which was started in Tatarstan at the same time as in other parts of Russia but was characterized by the following specific feature: it was effected by their "own" people for their "own" ones. Side by side the Russian vouchers were circulated simultaneously with privatization vouchers of Tatarstan (commissioned also in September 1992), while the trade of state shares started in 1993. It is impossible to assert that privatization in Tatarstan was executed exclusively according to the schemes of insiders. It was carried out mainly according to these schemes, and "aliens" were able to acquire a part of republican property usually only by decision of the president and only at the reciprocal basis, having proposed something valuable to the elite of Tatarstan. This course of events suited most directors: they got a part of shares and actually used the enterprise's assets without outside control, since they were guaranteed from the sale to an outside investor by the control package of the state or by "the golden share" possessed by the republican organ of power.
As a result, by the middle of the 2000s, the republican leadership kept all republican enterprises under its complete or partial control. (If the state possesses less than 50% of shares, the rest of them belong to the companies of the leading republican functionaries or their relatives; the state has its definite part of shares in these companies).
Following the signature of the agreement between the state organs of the RF and the RT in February 1994, a threat on the part of the Center and on the part of outside economic actors was reduced to the minimum; the president basing on the support of agrarians and oil industry managers excluded from the political sphere, first, the democratic opposition and, further, the Communists and Tatarian
ethnic-nationalists. The ruling elite remained as a matter of fact the sole significant republican political actor. Exactly at this time, the ruling elite became subject to the political scientists' analysis.
A number of the mentioned characteristics of the RT regional elite remain valid up to the present time. As early as at that time, the ruling elite of the RT was mainly mono-ethnic (over 80% were Tatars). About 90% of the present political elite of Tatarstan occupied the former nomenclature posts (former party and state officials accounted for 60%). For the beginning of the 1990s, the representatives of the second and the third echelons of nomenclature came to power in Moscow, while in Tatarstan the first echelon still is the unlimited ruler composed mainly by the people coming from rural districts.
The specific rural culture brought by the ruling elite to the power relations includes the traditional norms of respect for rank, the internal rejection of the opposition and heterodoxy, the patronage of the people coming from their milieu and mainly of fellow-villagers, the suspicion to "aliens", particularly representatives of educated strata, the perception of their own infallibility etc. Almost all members of the local elite have higher education mostly in the sphere of agriculture (about 50% of the elite representatives graduated from agricultural and veterinary higher education institutions). Most representatives of the elite are the middle-aged people (40-60 years old).
At the same time, the main stable characteristics of the RT elite should be corrected to some extent. Since 1998, the group of "young financiers" (graduates of the Kazan financial-economic institute and members of the team of the prime-minister) gained in importance. The cadre changes in 2005, particularly since April 2005, when I. Metshin at the age of 40 years became the mayor of Kazan, promoted rejuvenation of the elite. However, the main body of the elite remains
as a whole quite stable without big changes since 1998 up to 2008 inclusively.
For a long time, the regional elite of Tatarstan might be regarded as a typical elite of the republics in the RF: the rural group by its origin, the nomenclature according to the former type of activities, the authoritarian-patriarchic group characterized by its political culture, the mainly mono-ethnic groups characterized by existence of clanship relations (the accent on personal loyalty in relations among the groups' members). At the same time, at present, the RT elite is characterized by its monolithic character and homogeneity in relation to the external environment.
A more thorough study of the biographies and mutual relations of the RT elite's members results in another conclusion. The RT elite actually is not as much monolithic as on the ace of it. It is united but consists of several groups, which are the elite groups of the second echelon (the subelite groups), to the author's mind, or "the clans" characterized by their internal hierarchic structure. Each of them has its own leader with the indisputable authority and an example for the group's members. These groups are separated from each other and sometimes are rivals. For the 1980s, the regional nomenclature to a large extent was structured according to the spheres of their activities; at present, the RT elite is structured according to the personal-direction principle, and economic managers, officials of the law enforcement bodies and mass media professionals may be members of the same group etc.
This model may be characterized as a "united but segmented elite", as an intermediate option between the model of the monolithic elite and the split of elites: within the framework of the united elite, there co-exist sub-elite groups, where some elite may cooperate with each other and create "the coalition", while the other groups try to question their hegemony and to defend their interests.
For the first half of the 2000s, it was possible to mention five sub-elite groups in the RT elite. Besides the group of M. Shaimiyev, a certain influence was enjoyed by the group of F. Mukhametshin (the speaker of the State Council of the RT), by the group of R. Minnikhanov (the prime minister), the group of R. Muratov (the vice-prime minister), and the group of K. Iskhakov ("Kazan group"). In January of 2009, M. Shaimiyev, who was included in the list of candidates for the post of the president of the RT, refused to accept this nomination. D. Medvedev proposed to the State Council the candidature of R. Minnikanov, the prime minister of the RT, who on 4 February was elected the president of the RT. Following designation of K. Iskhakov to the post of the representative of the President of the RF in the Far Eastern Federal District, some members of his group were included in other groups, while others were designated to the official posts in the Far Eastern Federal District. At the same time, the leaders of the groups are included in the main republican group headed by M. Shaimiyev. The unity of the elite is kept in this way, despite contradictions among the leaders of the sub-groups (it is not excluded that quarrels among them are caused intentionally to give the great leader a chance to play the role of the principal arbiter and to let an ambitious second-rate leader down a peg, which happened not once with K. Iskhakov).
The other close milieu is composed of friends of "the family" (R. Minnikhanov, his brothers, minister of internal affaires of the RT A. Safarov).
Since the year of 2006, the RT elite was going on through the period of the most rapid consolidation; its level of consolidation surpasses its consolidation in the period of 1995-1997. It succeeded to minimize the influence of K. Iskhakov group and of other opposition outside groups, which are deprived of the chance to influence not only
the process of taking political decisions but also the political process as a whole.
By the time of forming by the leadership of "United Russia" the list of candidates for the post of the president of Tatarstan to be presented to the president of Russia (December 2009) it was possible to speak about three representatives of the regional elite, who had a chance to be the successors of M. Shaimiyev: the chairman of the State Council of the RT F. Mukhametshin, the prime minister of the RT R. Minnikhanov, the mayor of Kazan I. Metshin. The two of them are the leaders of the sub-elite groups. The choice of R. Minnikhanov as a successor of M. Shaimiyev was not accidental owing to the structure of the RT elite. The president of the RT is the leader of one of the strongest elite's sub-groups, who is known as an efficient manager having his own team and not associated with the epoch of struggle for sovereignty in 1990-1994. The leaders of other sub-groups either do not have a strong team ("clan") or have lost it, or have been too closely associated with the beginning of the 1990s. Probably, the move of R. Minnihanov from the second highest post to the first highest post in the republic will accelerate further evolution of the regional elite, particularly its rejuvenation, and will ensure its smooth evolution.
For the 2000-2009, the elite in Tatarstan was marked by existence of some sub-elite groups, where their members are connected usually by common origin, which determines cultural and mental nearness and loyalty to the leader. The latter feature is particularly significant; the groups are identified by the family names of the leaders: the groups of Shaimiyev, Mukhametshin, Minnikhanov, Muratov. The interests of the elite groups may not coincide with particular issues; "the intermediaries"- the people, who are members of two elite groups simultaneously, provide the ruling elite with additional links.
The sub-elite groups in economy of Tatarstan to a large extent are congruent with the political elite groups: the economic managers connected with M. Shaimiyev have the most influential position; there are groups of enterprises connected mainly with R. Minnikhanov, F. Mukhametshin and R. Muratov. Therefore one may speak about a high level of universality of elite groups of Tatarstan (except the counter-elite, probably). Membership in the political elite automatically ensures an access not only to the power structures but also to economic resources. The period of formation of the regional elite, which consisted of a part of the old party elite, the relatives and friends of the clan as well as its new members, actually terminated by 1995. By this time the opposition actually sustained a defeat.
The lack of "external enemy" resulted in emergence of internal elite contradictions: in 1998 there appeared a split in the ruling elite (R. Altynbayev and others), and opposition further was expelled from the ruling elite of the RT. The first half of the 2000s was characterized by a latent opposition between the republican leadership and the administration of Kazan: the conflict between the group, headed by K. Iskhakov and the groups headed by R. Minnikhanov and R. Muratov. The success of K. Iskhakov group at the municipal elections in October 2005 became the precondition of its disappearance. By the end of 2005, the unity of the national elite was restored (by liquidation and partial integration of K. Iskhakov group); at the same time the stabilization was installed being the main slogan of the elite in the RT. The trend to rejuvenation and renovation of the elite in the RT is preserved, which was clearly reflected in the designation of R. Minnikhanov as a new president of the Republic of Tatarstan
"Politeks: politicheskaya ekspertiza ", S-Pt, 2010, t. 6, N 2, p. 31-57.
