the information and analytical resources of the supporters of traditional Islam are much weaker than those of the Islamists. It should also be noted that the traditionalists, in contrast to the fundamentalists, are not engaged in propaganda in social networks popular with young people. It should be stated quite clearly and unequivocally that the secular character of the Russian state is not a matter for discussion, just as the subjects of introducing the Shariah law, polygamy and the rule of Islam in Russia or in any of its regions. These subjects are anti-constitutional. The Administrative Code and the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation should regulate all discussions of these matters. The atmosphere of intolerance should be created around the Islamists and the "Wahhabi lobby," otherwise they will be victorious and their victory may be followed by dire consequences.
"CAUCASICA "- proceedings of the Institute of Political and Social Studies of the Black Sea and Caspian Region. Moscow, 2011, pp. 273-281.
Dugurkhan Kokorkhoyeva, Ph.D. (Hist.) (Ingush State University) INSTITUTIONALIZED DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN
The experience of the development of the institutions of power in the Republic of Tatarstan is important for understanding the forms of consolidation of a higher political status and the correlation of the trends of centralization and decentralization of power in Russia.
Regional power has certain specific features. It is a subsystem of general state power which promotes the introduction of innovations. Regional power also expresses the interests of local society, smoothes down directives and signals coming from the Federal Center, and
supports its own autonomy. Regional power maintains the balance of political interests and takes into account the requirements of the local community for political decisions. Thus, the legitimate character of regional power for the local population and state power is ensured.
The impetus to the institutionalized variety of the systems of power in the republics of the former U.S.S.R. began in the summer of 1990. Former autonomous republics and autonomous regions of the Russian Federative Soviet Socialist Republic raised their status to national-state parts of the Federation. A number of republics (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Tyva, Yakutia, Chuvashia) claimed supremacy of their power and legislation in relation to the federal ones. A separatist regime has established itself in Chechnya, which threatened the integrity and security of the Russian state and assumed an ethnocratic character.
The choice of the level of claims presented by the republican elites, and methods and institutionalized forms of the realization of their interests depended on the volume of the resources of influence and on interethnic relations in each region. Tatarstan has become one of the initiators of non-violent "sovereignization" and a reference point for importing political institutions by other republics.
The higher status of the bodies of power and their structure uncontrolled by the Federal Center was sealed by Tatarstan's legislation in 1990-1993. The trend of "confederalization" began to be seen during the preparation of the "Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic," which was preceded by heated debates. After compromises agreed on at the end of August 1990 the Declaration was adopted by the republican Supreme Soviet, which determined the development vector of the institutions of power and created conditions for "confederalization."
After the failure of the attempt at coup d'etat in August 1991, the political process in Tatarstan destabilized. A parliamentary crisis
emerged by the end of 1991. In 1992 the Milli Majlis was set up in the republic as an organ representing the interests of the Tatar people and having the right to form alternative bodies of power. It began to claim the functions of parliament; on June 19-21, 1992 a World congress of Tatars was held in Kazan initiated by Taratstan's President M. Shaimiyev. The Congress was supposed to become not only the priority form of ethnic consolidation, but also an institution to adopt decisions of administrative power.
In the conditions of ethnopolitical mobilization Tatarstan's elite preferred the legal methods of the institutionalization of power. A referendum on the status of the Republic of Tatarstan was held on March 21, 1992. Having gained support of 61.4 percent of voters, the confederative draft became legal. The republic refused to sign the Federative treaty of March 31, 1992, in contrast to other regions of Russia. The Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan of November 6, 1992, fixed the key premise characterizing "confederalization": "The Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject of international law associated with the Russian Federation - Russia on the basis of the Treaty of mutual legislative delegation of powers and competence."
Meanwhile, the establishment of strong presidential power in the Russian Federation after the crisis of September 21 - October 4, 1993 and the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation on December 12, 1993, have increased the resources of central power. The regional ruling elite did not have to support radical ethnic movements, and it took a course to a compromise with the Federal Center. The economic crisis that followed proved the unproductive character of the republic's isolation. This was why transfer began to federalism, though decentralized at first. The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan "On Delineation of Competence and Mutual Legislative Delegation of Powers between Bodies of State Power of the
Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan" was signed on February 15, 1994. The treaty had a compromise character and gave the Republic of Tatarstan a higher asymmetrical status. For example, the land, its subsoil and all property were recognized as public domain of the multinational people of Tatarstan.
Tatarstan was granted the right to enter into international relations, establish ties with foreign states and conclude treaties and agreements with them.
Beginning from the autumn of 1999 the political conditions of federative construction in Russia changed radically. The treaty on delineation of authority was replaced with the restoration of the uniform system of power and coordination of the regional legislation with the federal one. Due to political conditions asymmetry changed into a new centralized scheme, that is, the "Center - regions" system. The integration of republics in the uniform political area of the Russian Federation was a lawful expression of a model of symmetrical constitutional federalism. At the same time the political elite of Tatarstan continues to protect, although cautiously, a special status of the republic. For instance, in July 2007 the State Duma of the Russian Federation endorsed the "Treaty on Delineation of Subjects and Authority between Bodies of State Power of the Russian Federation and Bodies of State Power of the Republic of Tatarstan."
The institutional organization of power in Tatarstan has certain specific features. According to its Constitution, the President of the Republic is not included in any branch of power, either legislative or executive. Under Article 89 of the Constitution, the President of the Republic of Tatarstan is "the head of state and the supreme official functionary of the Republic of Tatarstan." He is not included in the system of executive bodies, but is the head of executive power. Article 94 of the Constitution says that the President "heads the system of the
executive bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan." He determines domestic policy and spheres of foreign activity of Tatarstan. The federal law does not envisage the office of prime minister and establishes that the supreme official functionary of the part of the Russian Federation is the head of the higher executive body of power of the part of the Federation. But the offices of the President and the head of government in Tatarstan are separated.
The President of the Republic of Tatarstan has dominating positions in both legislative and executive branches of power. The President has a strong support of a majority of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan - the "United Russia" faction. The system of parliamentary control over the President and the executive power bodies is rather weak. The cabinet of ministers is responsible to the President. The government is answerable to the State Council on certain questions. There have been no attempts to sack the government on the initiative of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan.
Tatarstan's President is elected by the population by direct elections (not always alternative), which is fully in line with his political role. But beginning from 2005 it was the President of the Russian Federation who submits the candidacy of the supreme official functionary for endorsement by the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan. The repeal of direct elections of the President of Tatarstan and participation of the President of the Russian Federation in appointing the head of the republic have lowered the level of the autonomy of power in Tatarstan, just as the resignation of M. Shaimiyev in 2009. The new President of Tatarstan, R. Minnikhanov, does not have a high personal prestige and he supports the initiatives of the Federal Center more actively.
And so, the main stages of the institutionalized development of political power in Tatarstan are sovereignization ("confederalization")
in 1990 - 1994, decentralized federalism of 1995 - 2000, and unitary federalism. The organization of the institutions of power in Tatarstan has certain specific features. One of them is the dominance of presidential elements among the elements of a parliamentary system in the conditions of federal interference in the mutual relations of the branches of power in the republic. This form of the organization of power could be termed "over-presidential." It is characterized by imbalance of the branches of power, weak counter-balance, very strong power of the President of the republic, and the growing interference of the federal institutions of power. The political institutionalization of the bodies of power in the Republic of Tatarstan confirms the important role of the domination of executive power in the system of the division of power.
"Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, " Volgograd, 2011, series 4, No 2, pp. 184-186.
Leila Almazova,
Ph. D. (Philosophy), Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan (Kazan) THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN MODERN BASHKORTOSTAN
In the mid-1990s a number of independent spiritual boards of Muslims appeared in the Russian Federation due to the stepping up of national, religious and political processes. Among them the spiritual boards of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Republic of Bashkortostan, which were not accountable to the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia. The Republic of Bashkortostan is a unique phenomenon, inasmuch as there are two spiritual boards working simultaneously on its territory: The Muslims living in the northern and north-western parts