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national and state unity. The assessment of the role of Russia in inter-civilizational cooperation is impossible without examination of the problems of interethnic and interconfessional dialogue in Russia. A study of the role of geopolitical development factors of parts of the Russian Federation in the conditions of globalization and regionalization processes makes it possible to form an integral and systemic idea about the specific features of the influence of modern challenges and threats to Russia and possible approaches to evolving measures to overcome the political and economic asymmetry of its parts.
Internal political stability of Russia largely depends on drawing closer the interests of the peoples inhabiting it, creating conditions for their all-round cooperation, and implementing well-thought-out nationalities and regional policy. A comprehensive approach to tackling these tasks should form the basis of domestic policy of the state ensuring its progress as a multinational and democratic federative state.
"Mir i politika. ", Moscow, 2012, No 12, pp. 130-134.
D. Mulyukova,
Political analyst
FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL
POLITICAL MYTHS IN MODERN RUSSIA
(On the example of the Republic of Tatarstan)
In the early 1990s the people of Russia came across not only with changes in the institutionalized sphere, but also the need to revise radically the values and standards which dominated their life for many years. In the political sphere there was the change of communist ideology to new socio-political myths answering the requirements of post-Soviet society. Perestroika began with the myths ("it's impossible
to live the old way"), was carried on accompanied with the myths ("there is no other way"), and finished under the chord ("market will regulate everything"). The formation of political mythology in the latest history of Russia proceeded at two levels: federal and regional. Local myths were created in answer to the crisis of identity: the leadership of the newly-emerged parts of the Russian Federation had to legitimize its power ideologically. It was easier for the parts formed on the national principle, inasmuch as by that time they had already had certain experience in the creation of their own statehood, and their population had already realized their national identity. In other regions and territories similar processes were not so smooth, sometimes they were accompanied with many difficulties, and uniqueness of one or another region was based on the specific features of its geographical position, historical development, stability of administrative-territorial division, etc.
This article examines the Republic of Tatarstan from the point of view of the formation and distribution of regional political myths on its territory. In connection with the specific features of the political regime which took shape in Tatarstan back in the 1990s and had certain features of authoritarianism, and also due to the fact that the republican elite had in its possession all material and information resources, the region remains the place where all these myths are created and distributed by the local ruling group. From the point of view of mythologizing the political area, the Republic of Tatarstan is of special interest in terms of creating and distributing these myths. First, there are unique relations between the republic and the Federal Center in the sphere of legislation, imposition of taxes, and institutional construction. In many respects this uniqueness contributed to the formation of the present-day federative structure of Russia with its inherent asymmetry and contractual nature. Second, in contrast to many other national
republics within the Russian Federation, the rulers of the Republic of Tatarstan undertook an attempt to create "on top" an official ideology called for helping to form a new regional identity.
In the 1990s, when in the conditions of a total social crisis the development of the political consciousness of the absolute majority of the people of Russia was unable to follow the rapidly changing events, people demanded the maximally simple and understandable explanation of the current processes, which led to the actualization of traditional myths like the "golden age," "our own - alien," etc.). The ideal picture of reality given by a political myth is received by the poplar masses much better than the actual reality full of cares, concerns and problems.
The researcher V. Achkasova singles out the following main components of regional mythologies which, in our view, were represented in the political life of Tatarstan in the 1990s.
The historical component presupposes laying emphasis on public attention toward some or other symbolic periods of local history. Thus, in the 1990s the republican leadership, in its campaign for sovereignty, was striving to single out the "golden age" of independent statehood associated in the consciousness of the ruling elite with the epoch of the Bulgar Kingdom, the Goden Horde and Kazan Khanate.
Missionary activity as an element of local mythology makes it possible to single out the region from a dozen of other administrative-territorial units and emphasize its importance for the entire country. After signing the treaty "On limitation of subjects and competence and mutual delegation of powers between the bodies of the state government of the Russian Federation and those of the Republic of Tatarstan" in 1994, the political elite of the republic began to create an image of a trail-blazer and the leader in the emergence of Russian federalism, and pass its experience for some ideal which should serve as an example for other parts of the Russian Federation, as well as the
Federal Center in particular, in resoling the conflict with the Chechen Republic.
The geopolitical component forms the foreign policy of the region. An important element of the foreign political activity of the Republic of Tatarstan is the spreading and popularization of the ideology of Euro-Islam which is a combination of the ideas of reformist Islam, which is closer in spirit to western civilization. This concept is out to protect the image of the republic from labeling it as a region on whose territory the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism and extremism are spreading, and thereby to increase its investment attraction. T. Akulov, Director of foreign relations department under the President of Tatarstan, has said the following at a meeting of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation: "We believe that modern Tatarstan has succeeded to create a community and religious theory which could be an effective link in Russia's relations with the Muslim world, and the Muslim world with western traditions." In other words, the regional elite once again emphasized the important role of the republic in the implementation of Russia's foreign-policy strategy.
Utopian project-making lends a purposeful character to regional mythopoetry, mobilizing the local community for reaching one or another image of the future. Here it would be worthwhile to mention the myth about national sovereignty as the panacea for all problems, which became widespread throughout Tatarstan in the 1990s. The relations with the Federal Center have always exerted a profound influence on all political processes going on in the republic. Up to the early 1990s Tatarstan was an autonomous republic within the U.S.S.R. and had no legal privileges which the Union republics enjoyed. In the conditions of democratization of political and public life, which began in Tatarstan, many people from among the local population began to demand that the status of the republic be raised and its rights
broadened. The political elite, feeling that these demands might increase its power, unfolded a broad and noisy propaganda campaign.
The image of an enemy and the image of a hero. The regional mythological schemes explain failures of reforms and unpopular political decisions by interference of the "main culprit causing all woes" - the Federal Center. In this context the ruling elite of Tatarstan began to implement its own policy of a soft entering into market from 1992, in contrast to the Russian "shock therapy," thus assuming the role of the "protector of its fellow-citizens from the shock therapy and total uncertainty which reigned supreme in the entire country." As to the image of the hero, it was the myth about M. Shaimiyev as the best leader of the republic which was being spread from year to year among the people of Tatarstan.
Regional political myths directly depend on the character of the federative relations which have taken shape in the country. The construction of the "vertical of power," which was going on in the 2000th lent a specific character to the formation process of new political myths in various regions of Russia. Some analysts began to talk of disappearance of regional myths from the political scene. In our view, this conclusion is rather premature. The federative relations in present-day Russia have more than once been subjected to radical changes in the past two decades, this is why there is a possibility of reviving the practice of direct elections of the heads of regions in the foreseeable future, which was pointed out by the former President D. Medvedev at one of his news conferences. Returning to direct elections will put on the agenda the problem of the formation of national identity policy. Consequently, one can expect revival of the demand for regional political myths.
The reforms of the 2000th have transformed the character of the functioning of regional political myths. Now their main aim is not the
legitimacy of the power of governors and the creation of an image of the enemy in the person of the Federal Center, but the formation of a favorable social background in the republic in order to pursue a maximally advantageous policy, get financial donations from Moscow, and draw foreign investments, while creating an image of maximal loyalty to the Federal Center. In the conditions when national and regional policy are confined exclusively to economic development, local mythology becomes more rational and aimed at reaching economic result. If contradictions and differences arise between the Federal Center and certain regions in the political sphere, in the economic sphere the regions position themselves as part of the great Russian area. It is due to the assistance of the Federal Center to concrete regions reaching economic achievements. Thus, the range of the recipients of regional political myths becomes broader, and it is joined by foreign partners, transnational corporations and world banks.
In the 2000th' in view of the changed development course of federative relations, the main tasks of regional political myths also changed to a certain extent. The No1 task for the local elite was legitimacy of power not for the republican population, but for the Federal Center because of direct dependence on it. For one, along with the change of the political leader of the republic, the notorious heroic myth idealizing the first President of Tatarstan was put into the background. He was replaced not by "a politician, but by an economic manager," in the words of M. Shaimiyev himself. In his first address to the State Council of the republic the new President R. Minnikhanov did not touch purely political problems, including those of the republican relations with the Federal Center. He said unequivocally that Tatarstan is a part of the Russian Federation, just as any other republic and it does not claim any special position. He hinted that he needed political support of the Federal Center and the President of Russia personally
and gave it to understand that loyalty brings financial and other bonuses. According to this tendency, in the evolution of the nationalterritorial structure of the country the idea of sovereignty emphasizing the interests of mainly the titular nation was not so clearly expressed in the discourse of the political elite of Tatarstan as before. Despite the significance of the ethnic problem for the basic subjects of local policy, official propaganda in Tatarstan is now actively upholding the idea of the multi-ethnic composition of the republican population.
Nevertheless, while emphasizing their status as an equal part of the Russian Federation, regions are not always satisfied with their relations with the Federal Center. For example, the elite of Tatarstan regarded unjust certain actions of the Federal Center in the nationalities sphere, which demanded revision of some premises in the new version of the Constitution of Tatarstan aimed at lowering the status of the republic and leveling its certain national specific features.
An analysis of the transformation of some subjects of regional political myths of Tatarstan in the 2000th makes it possible to conclude, among other things, that the change of the vectors of the regional development of political myths can provide new knowledge about political processes in the regions, and also to reveal the most significant values for the local elite, understand their strategies, as well as trends and phenomena in the political and ideological life of parts of the Russian Federation.
"Ucheniye zapiski Tatarskogo Universiteta "Gumanitarniye Nauk", Kazan, 2012, vol. 154, book 1, pp. 240-244.
