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Alla Yazkova,
D. Sc. (Hist.) (Institute of Economics RAS) THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS: STRATEGIC RISKS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA
The history of the Russian state and the experience of the past two decades convincingly show the exceptionally important role of the North Caucasian region in the economic and political situation of Russia. The problems and contradictions in the development of the national republics in this region, as well as the policy and methods of resolving them give rise to risks for the security and stable development of Russia as a whole in the near future and further on. Hence, a great urgency of the comprehensive and objective study and understanding of the situation in the North Caucasus, which is far from satisfactory. This article is an attempt to shed at least some light on the state of affairs in the region.
The North Caucasian region occupies a territory of 355,000 square kilometers, or slightly over two percent of Russian territory. At the same time the share of its population in the population of the entire country is much higher - 12 percent, and its density is also higher -about 50 people per square kilometer. The North Caucasus unites seven national republics: Adygea, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Karachay-Chercessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia and Chechnya, and also
Krasnodar and Stavropol territories and Rostov region. All republics and territories of the North Caucasus are part of the Southern Federal district of Russia, which is, in the opinion of most experts, the most complex region from the point of view of socio-political instability.
The low development level of the region is due to the depressive character of its economy, the degradation of big enterprises and the infrastructure, shortage of investments, and a high level of unemployment. The region is also distinguished by its growing militarization, ethnic contradictions, mass migration and organized crime - corruption, smuggling, drug trafficking, and the sale of arms. A merger of local administrative power and business becomes ever more noticeable, which breeds crime and induces the local population to turn increasingly to the ideas of "Wahhabism" (or "pure" Islam).
The region suffers from a destructive influence of a whole range of crisis situations of an internal political character - from the prolonged armed conflict (two wars) in Chechnya to numerous conflicts in Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. After the armed conflict in August 2008 came tension in the relations with Georgia, the problems of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as Azerbaijan on the "Lezghin" problem. A special concern is also caused by the fact that Russian state policy in the North Caucasus for the past two decades lacked strategic approaches to tackling complex problems, which resulted in grave errors and failures in economics and politics.
The events of the past two decades have confirmed that a sharp deterioration in the economic conditions of the population inevitably leads to growing social tension and conflicts, which had a negative effect on the situation of the North Caucasian republics. Social stratification in most ethnic formations became especially noticeable against the backdrop of mass unemployment, total corruption, criminalization of economic activity, and the low level of
administrative management. The people's requirements for democracy, political freedom and national independence have acquired the form of interethnic contradictions and conflicts.
The economic development indices for the national republics of the North Caucasus are the lowest in Russia (except certain types of agricultural products). The traditional industries (coal, oil and gas extraction), as well as engineering, metallurgical, chemical and food industries are in a deplorable state. After 1991 their deterioration proceeded especially rapidly.
The destabilization of the socio-economic situation during the past fifteen years had an adverse effect on the entire economic complex of the North Caucasian region. The break-up of economic ties after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., low competitiveness of the state-run economy, the war in Chechnya, and the "creeping" conflicts continue to influence all spheres of life in the region.
The "shadow" (or "black") economy becomes an ever more important sector of regional economic development. Among the main branches of the "shadow" turnover in the North Caucasus, which took shape in the 1990s, are the unlicensed output of oil products, homemade production of caviar and sturgeon and their sale through illegal channels, unlicensed production of alcohol, smuggling of ethyl, etc.
This "informal" economy creates opportunities for employing a certain part of the population and raising its incomes. Practically one in every three inhabitants of the region is engaged in illegal business. By the most modest estimates, the state suffered enormous losses from the "shadow" economy in the North Caucasian region in 2004 - about 50 billion rubles, whereas the state financial donations to it amounted to 47 million rubles.
This could not have been possible without the help to and participation in illegal business of highly-placed officials within the
framework of the well-organized clan system. The corporative communities of these people formed in almost all administrative bodies of power monopolized practically all economic and political resources of the region. Most leading posts in the North Caucasian republics are occupied by persons related to one another (some of them are even close relatives). Such system breeds corruption which has become widespread all over the region.
One of the results of the clan system in the North Caucasus is the practically uncontrolled growth of unemployment which is much higher than the average level for Russia. According to unofficial data, up to 80 percent of young people (under 30) do not have permanent jobs, which is due not only to the crisis situation in the economy, but also to the low level of school education and professional training.
Mass unemployment among young people greatly raises the level of social tension, exacerbates the crime situation and increases the influence of extremist and armed groupings. Hundreds of thousands of fire arm and cold steel units are on hand among citizens of the region, almost in every house, and this makes it possible to turn accumulated contradictions into armed confrontation.
Experience shows that the acuteness of risks and crises in the national republics of the North Caucasus is determined by the multitude of factors, some of which we have already mentioned, but their level also depends on the geographical position of the sub-regions - eastern (Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia) and western (North Ossetia, Karachay-Cercessia, Adygea). Kabardino-Balkaria is in the center, but some experts refer it to the eastern part by the level of factual instability.
The Eastern sub-region is characterized by a much higher degree of Islamization, however, the main criterion of the difference between the two parts is the political situation which has emerged after the
disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and exists to this day. The "East" is "stably unstable," whereas in the "West" conflicts exacerbate sporadically, from time to time. Chechnya is not the "champion" of instability any longer, the situation in Dagestan is more explosive now.
Kabardino-Balkaria is on the borderline not only due to its geographical position, but also by instability of the situation. Problems in the relations of the two title national groups in the republic -Kabardians and Balkars - have been growing in the republic for several years already. The peak of the contradictions was reached in the 2000s when the armed clashes in Nalchik, the capital of the republic, put it to the brink of a civil war. The armed phase of the crisis was rapidly suppressed, however, it has not yet been overcome. It is a classical example of a "creeping systemic crisis" periodically exacerbated by flare-ups of violence and socio-political and interethnic contradictions.
The national groups of the republican population try to find a way out of the existing socio-economic situation in stepping up ethnic isolation and gaining privileges. A direct consequence of this was the creation of nationally-tinted political parties and socio-political movements. In most ethnoses it is connected with the restoration of historical and cultural values which directly influences the processes of ethnopolitical mobilization.
For the past two decades a tendency has been growing in the North Caucasus, known as the "differentiating function of conflict." It is manifested in the disintegration of the previously existing unity into parts with a subsequent polarization of relations. This is evident on the example of two North Caucasian republics - Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cercessia, each of which is inhabited by two national groups. In Soviet times they were arbitrarily united in unified administrative frameworks without due consideration of ethnic and
linguistic features, way of life and numerical strength of each of these ethnic groups.
The lowering of the general conflict level in the North Caucasus is only possible on condition of the stabilization of the socio-economic situation and implementation of economic reforms with due account of the specific features of the long historical development of this region. Direct financial support from Moscow does not preclude the spreading of the seats of conflict and the growth of separatist feelings which are often taken for "manifestations of Islamic radicalism." In actual fact, they often represent the bitter struggle of local clans for the redistribution of property and power and the establishment of control over financial flows in the republic.
In recent years the North Caucasus has turned into a source of constant troubles and alarm not only for the powers that be in Russia, but for the entire Russian society. Manifestations of instability in Chechnya were taken as something almost in the right way, whereas the constant worsening of the situation in other republics causes growing alarm. The increasing Caucasus-phobia is no less dangerous, for it gives rise to unhealthy elements in the public consciousness of Russia. Public polls present a general conclusion that there is a systemic crisis in the country which is difficult to resolve (if it's only possible).
Respondents to the poll pointed to a whole range of reasons for the existing situation, among which religious intolerance, the influence of radical Islam, unwillingness of some people to live in the Russian state, suspense in resolving socio-economic problems, erroneous policy of the Russian authorities, and fabulous corruption of the local administrations. Only one-fifth of respondents believe that the Russian authorities will be able to restore law and order, another one-fifth maintains that some of the North Caucasian republics will secede from Russia.
According to the data of the Ministry for the Interior, the total number of armed combatants and their supporters operating in the North Caucasus amounts to some 800. This is not too many, but they are constantly being replenished by "reservists" from among unemployed young people or mercenaries from abroad. Young people's joining the bandits is conditioned by the presence of unresolved socioeconomic, ideological and ethical problems in the North Caucasian region.
The illegal military formations are opposed by rather big contingents of the troops of the Ministry for the Interior and regular troops of the North Caucasian military district. Nevertheless, according to official data, the number of terrorist acts in the North Caucasus has considerably increased. It is indicative that terrorism in the region is taking a political form and turning into a confrontation between the authorities and the opposition.
Political figures, political analysts, journalists and scholars in the North Caucasian republics energetically demand changes in the approaches of the federal Center to Caucasian policy. It should be based on the principle of the recognition of the value of human rights, above all, the right to entrepreneurship. As long as a local official, or one appointed by the Center manages or owns local enterprises, the bitter struggle for power and the redistribution of property will continue and separatist tendencies will continue to persist.
In this context it would be appropriate to emphasize that people living in the North Caucasus, just as in other southern regions of Russia, for that matter, are particularly bent on economic freedom and freedom of entrepreneurship. This is why it would be necessary to evolve a program of self-government at the community level and create instruments and institutions allowing man to realize himself as a citizen. In these conditions the solution of the socio-economic
development problems comes to the fore. A no less important matter is to form professional and responsible bodies of power in the North Caucasian national republics.
President D. Medvedev of the Russian Federation ordered to work out new organizational forms to combat terrorism in the North Caucasus in August 2009. He proceeded from the premise that militarization, which was not supported by social programs, would be unable to normalize the situation in the North Caucasus. This approach is absolutely correct.
What are the achievements of federal power in the North Caucasus in the past ten years?
First, the war in Chechnya has been stopped, which was largely due to the establishment of a dialogue with part of the separatists and a split in their ranks. But it is too early to speak of "new forms of relations," in the view of military experts, inasmuch as in some mountain districts of Chechnya the regime of counter-terrorist operation still exists, and the relations between Moscow and Grozny are largely built on "personalization of politics."
Secondly, calls for separatism are heard less frequently, although new risks and crises should not be excluded. The problems of internal borders and disputed territories are still unresolved. The border between North Ossetia and Ingushetia remains a matter of conflict. There are disputed territories between Dagestan and Chechnya, and in Kabardino-Balkaria the question has again been raised on inter-district borders and the restoration of Balkar territories in accordance with the laws of the U S S R. and Russia.
Thirdly, the federal Center supported the process of firing the former unpopular managers and administrative officials rejected by local people and appointing new ones who will try to establish sound
connections between the authorities and society as the only possible basis of stability.
On the whole, it can be admitted that the national republics of the North Caucasus, just as the entire region of the south of Russia, remain part of the Russian Federation and the economic and political system of Russia is valid there, too. The difference is that the region is closer to traditional society living by its own laws (ideas and standards) and striving to limit the interference of the Center in its internal affairs. This is why it is necessary to take into account specific features of Caucasian mentality which was formed under the impact of a number of factors during many centuries. Among these factors are:
Confessional -prolonged confrontation between paganism, Islam and Christianity, which largely determines the present situation in the North Caucasus;
Personal orientations and everyday-life values - neglect of this factor can lead to serious conflicts between inhabitants of the North Caucasus and those of other regions of Russia;
Historical memory - the factor conditioned by the wars waged by the Russian Empire for the conquest of the North Caucasus.
Up to the early 1990s the influence of Islam in the North Caucasus, especially in its western part, was insignificant. Traditions of mountain dwellers were always more weighty than Islam, all the more so since the process of Islamization, which began in the 19th century, was interrupted in 1917. But in the latter half of the 1990s, in the conditions of the growing social protest, which was not properly understood and dealt with by the authorities, the place of democratic movements which began in the epoch of perestroika was taken by religion. The network of radical religious organizations became bigger, and now it can safely be said that its cells function in most national republics, including their bodies of power.
By the early 2000s the Moslem population of the region was about four million, and the influence of Islam differed in its different parts. The positions of Islam were stronger in the eastern part (Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia) and weaker in the western part (Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cercessia). In eastern districts, above all in Dagestan, despite persecution in the years of Soviet power, the tradition of Arab Islamic culture still existed and its center was in Derbent. At the same time, it is in the east of the North Caucasus that foreign missionaries unfolded their activity after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. which was aimed at radicalization of Islam and its slow entry into politics.
Political leaders of the North Caucasian republics at first preferred not to go deep into the essence of religious arguments, supporting Moscow's position formulated under the influence of the Caucasian opponents of the non-traditional forms of Islam (Wahhabism, or "pure Islam," and Salafism). But soon they began to see in the activity of preachers a threat to their political positions and support of those who were dissatisfied with the situation, after which mass persecutions of Wahhabi supporters began. People of the older generation reared and educated in Soviet times in the spirit of atheism regard accusations of Wahhabism preposterous, whereas these accusations provoke young people who joined Islam to conflicts with the authorities. Besides, for some of young men the revival of Islam is not only the restoration of historical and cultural traditions or religious outlook, but also the restoration of the way of life based on high morality and responsibility.
Taking into consideration the complex character of the socioeconomic situation and the interethnic confrontation in the North Caucasian region, the local and central authorities will, sooner or later, be forced to come to the conclusion that it will be more reasonable to
preclude the further spreading of Islamic extremism along the road of public dialogue than to combat it by forcible methods.
The acute character of the relations of several North Caucasian republics with the federal Center of Russia is largely determined by the increased interethnic and inter-personal differences and conflicts of the value orientations of the peoples and elites of the North Caucasus and the central regions of Russia. Emerged against the backdrop of the military hostilities in Chechnya and the terrorist acts outside it Caucasus-phobia has acquired a stable character in the mass consciousness of Russians and began to exert an indirect influence on the policy pursued toward that region. Many preceding achievements of national policy were discarded for they did not pass the test of the rapid change of orientation, democracy and reforms of the 1990s and the subsequent establishment of authoritarianism.
What determines the value orientations of the inhabitants of the national districts of the North Caucasus and what is the reason for their conflicting character? Ethnologists have studied these problems for quite some time, and today they are formulated in a whole number of published works. The peoples of the Caucasus (both South and North) have evolved historically and interacted in the conditions of a multilingual, inter-civilizational and inter-confessional dialogue and therefore they were open to all and sundry influences and impacts of various value orientations and systems., Caucasian identity has taken shape of real elements of material, standard, and everyday-life cultures of different ethnoses, having imbibed Islamic and Orthodox Christian mentality, traditions and customs and habits of mountain and plain cultures, and traces of Greco-Roman, Arab and Slav civilizations. In new and contemporary times a great role was played by the integration processes of the Caucasus in the Russian and then Soviet area.
The image of a Caucasian had a positive and negative tint in different historical periods. As to the present unfriendly attitude of some Russians toward representatives of the Caucasian peoples (including those from the North Caucasus), it has become a touchstone of the ill-being of Russian society, which manifests the features of aggressive nationalism and xenophobia, previously alien to it.
There are more profound reasons for the conflict of value orientations of the inhabitants of the Russian central regions and people from the Caucasus. As we have already mentioned earlier, the latter, as a rule, are distinguished by a bent to entrepreneurship, trade and side businesses in order to keep large families with many children and old people. They strive for good living with high incomes. The Caucasians proved more adapted to market reforms by their customs and habits, mentality and psychology. In general, their behavior in everyday life is much more active. This irritates inhabitants of the other regions of Russia, causes protests on their part right up to demands to drive away the "dark-skinned" and liquidate their property.
This engenders serious problems and contradictions. The dislike of the indigenous people of Russian plains for people from the mountains who actively tried to entrench themselves in the Russian economic sphere gave rise to interethnic conflicts. As a result, their reasonable desire to realize their possibilities proved unclaimed and ultimately both sides gave in to ethnic nationalism. Thus, discrepancy in ethnic value orientations can become a serious obstacle on the road of strengthening the unity of the Russian Federation, and in this connection one cannot fail to notice the growing outflow of the Russian population from the North Caucasian republics.
Russian people began to leave the republics of the North Caucasus in the latter half of the 1980s and in the early 1990s this process increased immeasurably, which could be explained by the
destruction of the economy, science and culture in the years of the acute crisis in the country as a whole, and in the North Caucasian republics in particular, the strengthening of the positions of ethnic clans and the emergence of many interethnic conflicts. As a result, in the early 2000s no more than four percent of Russians remained in Chechnya, one percent in Ingushetia, and about five percent in Daghestan. More Russians stayed in Kabardino-Balkaria - 25 percent, North Ossetia -23 percent and Karachay-Cercessia - 33 percent. Mention should be made of the fact that the number of Russian people slightly increases due to the arrival and stay of federal servicemen and their families in the North Caucasus (this especially concerns North Ossetia).
The historical memory of the North Caucasian peoples retained a whole number of episodes on the road of their coming closer to Russia, which were accompanied by diplomatic contacts, bloody warfare and direct arbitrary actions of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. In the 19th century the 5 0-year-long Caucasian war of Russia first against the Chechens and Avars, and then Circassians resulted in that these mountain peoples saw in Russia a generalized "image of the enemy." In the course of the war a considerable part of the indigenous population was physically destroyed or driven out to countries of the Middle East, and whole ethnic groups ceased to exist.
But the leaders of the mountain people, including Imam Shamil were unable to induce all the population of the North Caucasus to raise the banner of revolt against Russia. Historians explain this by the fact that despite the grave errors of St. Petersburg's policy toward the North Caucasus, Russia's pragmatism gained the upper hand. The Russian authorities discarded hasty attempts to change the life and municipal management in the mountains on the pattern of Russian gubernias and confined themselves to minimal interference in the life of the mountain people.
After the October 1917 revolution the Bolsheviks successfully used historical inertia of the relations with the Caucasian peoples, and in the years of the Civil war the North Caucasian periphery became a convenient springboard for suppressing freedoms in the South Caucasus. However, the subsequent measures - forcible collectivization, frequent revision of borders between the North Caucasian autonomous republics, and direct crimes of Stalin's regime against the local people (mass deportations of whole ethnic groups to Kazakhstan and Central Asia) had a very a negative effect on the formation of mentality of the next generations.
"Historical justice" could have been restored by mutual concessions and compromise decisions, but it was impossible at the time in the conditions of the exacerbation of contradictions, first at the stage of the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and later in the Russian Federation. Other forms of ethnonational self-determination (national and national-cultural autonomies) were not taken into consideration either by the Russian leadership or the national elites, and it is still a long way to the formation of polyethnic civil society in the North Caucasus. This situation led to greater tension in the national districts of the North Caucasus, especially against the backdrop of their economic stagnation and unresolved social problems.
Assessing the situation in the region as a factor of strategic risks for the development of Russia, one should not ignore the apprehensions repeated over and over again in recent years concerning the threats to the territorial integrity of Russia in its existing borders. The situation in the national republics of the North Caucasus with its hidden (or "creeping") separatism against the background of economic depression was emphatically described as the gravest threat. In practice it means that the population, imitating outward loyalty to the present authorities becomes ever more alien to them and finds solutions to its problems
within the framework of traditional society. The system of government in the Caucasian region is inefficient, economic and legal ties between the republics of the region and the federal Center are weak, they are isolated from one another in terms of receiving all necessary information. The regional authorities are corrupt through and through, they are often incompetent and bound hand and foot by the clan structure. The practical loss of control over observance of federal laws means the loss of control over the territory, even if there are no separatist tendencies.
The republics of the eastern part of the North Caucasus -Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan - form a type of a subregion in which the dominating Vainakh ethnos is the connecting link between Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan. It is not accidental that the administrative borders of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia with Stavropol Territory and North Ossetia are regarded and guarded as state borders. The western subregion - the republics to the west of North Ossetia - Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cercessia and Adygea are relatively more stable. There are more Russians in the population of these republics (in Adygea - up to 70%). As a rule, these are skilled specialists who serve as a factor of social and political stability even when they are isolated.
All national republics of the North Caucasus are distinguished by systems governed by clan communities in which almost all important posts in the bodies of power and big and important enterprises and offices are taken kinsfolk. The clan-corporative unions are not interested in closer ties with rank-and-file citizens or in a dialogue with them.
On the basis of the above-said one can make the conclusion that not a single republic of the North Caucasus is able to overcome the present financial and economic crisis independently. Even given a
serious support of the federal Center through investing money in the most promising economic branches and granting donations and subsidies to deteriorating industries, the rupture of the previous economic ties and the existence of whole groups of unemployed people do not allow to draw an optimistic conclusion concerning the nearest future of these republics - whether they will succeed in overcoming the crisis phenomena and achieve self-sufficiency. The preservation of all these unresolved problems in the North Caucasian region will mean increased strategic risks for the development of Russia.
Strategicheskiye risk razvitiya Rossii: Otsenki i prognoz. Moscow, 2010, pp. 195-218.
L. Aristova,
Political analyst
MODERN KAZAKHSTAN: ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
One of the key tasks in the present-day world is the establishment of mutually advantageous cooperation, or interaction, in various spheres of the economy within the framework of the integration process. In the epoch of globalization and rapprochement of different countries and growing international competition, conditions emerge for the setting up of economic alliances. The emerging problems and prospects for a dialogue between Asian and European countries are often connected with ideological confrontation, and first and foremost, Islam and the ideology of western countries. The word "Islam" in the modern world is for many people a key one, irrespective of their religious feelings. For some it has a positive meaning, for others it is connected with terrorism. Islam is not simply religion. According to some data circulated in the mass media, Muslims have the image of
