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major directions and stages of the project and confirming the readiness of the countries concerned to expand and diversify their mutually advantageous trade and economic cooperation, including the fuel and energy sector, agriculture and fisheries, tourism, and the sphere of transport and telecommunications.
The implementation of these plans depends on the political and financial stability in the world, as well as in the negotiating countries. Today, in connection with the slump of economic activity in Kazakhstan and the neighboring countries most projects will be frozen.
Islamsky factor v istorii i sovremennosti.
Moscow, 2011, pp. 188-198.
M. Shumilov,
D.Sc. (Hist.)
THE ROLE OF KYRGYZSTAN IN REALIZATION OF THE USA STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA
The events of 11 September were used as a convenient information cover for consolidation of the American military presence in Afghanistan, which became for them a strategic springboard to ensure the control over Central Asia (CA) as a whole. In the end of the same month the USA asked the leadership of the Kyrgyz Republic (KR) to provide the air space for operations in Afghanistan and got the positive answer. On 11 December the parliament of the KR confirmed the decision of the government to put international airport "Manas" at the disposal of the USA air force. This decision was coordinated with the partners of DKB and ShOS. Thus, the airbase in size of 224 hectares was created in December 2001 in the KR for military actions and humanitarian assistance within the framework of the USA anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan as a United Nations mandatory 28
sanction. It was decided to locate in the air base about 40 airplanes and 4000 servicemen. They started to come to the republic since the middle of December. The intergovernmental agreement, including the exchanged American and Kyrgyz official documents, served as a legal foundation to place foreign troops in the republic. In May 2003, the commanding officer of the airbase signed the agreement with the government of the KR on the lease of additional land to locate its equipment.
The USA further paid great attention to its national strategy. On 30 July 2010, the official representative of the State Department proclaimed in Washington in the Carnegie Center five main directions of American policy in the CA: security, energy, promotion of political liberalization, consolidation of market economy, prevention of emergence of ungrounded states. According to the CENTCOM commandment, Americans will stay in the CA "as long as it is needed". The genuine aim of the American operation in Afghanistan is as follows: to deprive China and Russia as the main continental countries of the strategic rear - the defense springboard in the CA, according to V. Sokor, an analyst of Jamestown Foundation. The operation of western forces headed by the USA in the CA means a geopolitical global revolution, according to him. Armenian political analyst I. Mudyan regards that the USA plans in the CA (including the Caucasus) are constructed with the vector against Russia and China. Professor of the Columbian University R. Legvold considers that Chinese more than Russians are inclined to regard the deployment of the USA forces not only as a feeble idea but as a direct threat to their national security. A. Bolshakov, a known Russian expert considers that in the sphere of political conflicts in the post-Soviet space the USA pursued their definite aims in the CA and formed the pro-American orientation of the region, restrained influence of China and Russia,
created conditions for open clash between Russian and Chinese interests, used the regional capacity for a long-term dialogue with the Islamic world. S. Sultanov, the head of the Center for Strategic Studies "Russia and Islamic World" came to the conclusion that the aim of the American policy in the CA is as follows: to provoke a conflict among Russia, China and the countries of the Central Asian region (CAR) and further to transform this chaos into a directed process, like in the Balkans after disintegration of Yugoslavia.
In spite of periodic promises made by the USA not to create its permanent military presence in the CA and to withdraw its forces after termination of the active phase of battles in Afghanistan, the general trend of the situation's development is directly opposite. The formation of the Washington's foreign policy is influenced by activities of neo-conservators, who regard that their main task is to prevent integration of Eurasian countries round Russia as the emergence in the Eurasian space of the significant strategic entity. The American military-political presence in the CA objectively (despite the wish of Washington, the CA countries and Moscow) consolidated the significance of the USA in the post-Soviet space primarily at the expense of Russia. At the same time, Washington suppressed the negative attitude of the bulk of the population of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to deployment of foreign servicemen on their territories.
Since the end of 2001, the USA participates in "democratization" of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the two CA states, which accepted its military contingents. On 20 August 2002, the State Department of the USA issued the special information report, which contained the following tasks of its Bureau for democracy affairs, human and workers rights: to promote formation of political parties in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan by means of grants for shaping and developing parties of democratic orientation; to promote creation of typographic abilities in
these countries, which would ensure the access to free and independent information sources; to give support to the program of consolidation of "responsible journalism" in these countries.
In this connection it becomes quite clear that the created in this way "democratic opposition" with support of "responsible mass media" should sooner or later start a real struggle for power in both states, where the USA deployed its military contingents. Thus, it is clear that the Administration of the USA decided to replace the regimes of Karimov and Akayev by its pro-American clients.
It is not excluded that such pro-American governments of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan may after coming to power question their participation in CIS and ShOS and, in case of Kyrgyzstan, in the Treaty of Collective Security. As a result, the shaped pro-American alliance would probably be marked by stronger anti-Russian feeling than GUUAM. Consequently, the American policy, proclaimed in autumn 2002 relating to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, represented a significant challenge to Russian national interests and might result in a new confrontation between Russia and the USA in the southern flank of CIS.
The embassies of the USA in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan took actions in this direction. The American embassy in the KR openly supported the opposition's actions against president A. Akayev and the government of the country in March-May of 2002. Following the pre-term resignation of the government of the KR, the State Department of the USA expressed its readiness to render assistance to the government in taking more specific measures to extend the dialogue with civil society for the sake of elimination of accumulated contradictions.
The USA periodically criticized official Bishkek for violation of human rights and freedom of speech, for corruption of officials, actually taking actions against its multi-vector foreign policy course
and diplomacy. Simultaneously the USA demonstrated its favorable attitude to Akayev, recognizing his key role in maintaining bilateral relations. In September 2002 the president of the KR enjoyed a warp reception in Washington. The joint declaration of two countries mentioned development of their mutual cooperation directed to strengthening of security and stability in the region, continuation of democratic reforms in Kyrgyzstan and assistance to its economic development by the USA. The clan of Akayev enjoyed financial support given to it by the USA, particularly via charitable foundations controlled by M. Akayeva - the wife of the president.
The creation of Russian air base Kant at the distance of 14 km from Bishkek in October 2003 had a great impact on the state of relations between the USA and Kyrgyzstan. The unique situation emerged in Kyrgyzstan: the military contingents of political competitors were located at the distance of 30 km. As was mentioned by A. Knyazev, the director of the Bishkek branch of the Institute for Affairs of CIS countries, the realization of American strategy demanded the greater guarantees than the balanced policy of A. Akayev. Poor and open Kyrgyzstan could play in the best way the role of a springboard of American interests in the region, while the good geographic situation as well as a small sum of financial contributions and the weakness of local authorities opened to western influence should have promoted it. The complete governance role plaid by the USA in Kyrgyzstan should have guaranteed the achievement of a number of its geopolitical aims. The creation of the alternative object questioned these guarantees.
In March 2005 the disturbances on a mass scale took place in the KR, and their organizers accused supporters of the president of numerous violations in the course of elections. The opposition with the financial and information support of the USA, of various foundations
and non-governmental organizations succeeded to seize the official buildings and to replace the group headed by A. Akayev by a rather pluralistic power with participation of southern clans. Akayev failed to keep his power, left the country with his family and got asylum in Moscow. He accused of his misfortunes the USA and a number of American public organizations, including international human rights organization "Freedom House", which established in Bishkek an independent printing-works headed by M. Stown within the framework of the project Center in charge of support of independent mass media in Kyrgyzstan. Although the Center is considered as a Kyrgyz NGO, the post of its chairman is occupied usually by an American senator.
This interpretation of these events is not unfounded. In October 2004 the American ambassador in Bishkek expressed his wish that A. Akayev should not propose his candidature for the presidential post for the fourth time. In the end of December by request of M. Stown, a former minister of foreign affairs and former ambassador in the USA, the leader of opposition movement "Ata-Jurt" ("Fatherland") R. Otunbayeva appealed to Russia to stop to support Akayev's regime.
According to G. Mikhailov, the correspondent of information agency Regnum, A. Akayev once expressed his intention to withdraw base "Manas" from the country, and soon afterwards a group of Kyrgyz opposition politicians, including K. Bakiyev, visited the USA and had a meeting with officials of the State Department. In March 2005, the opposition, having received a big financial assistance, arranged the "tulip revolution", and Akayev left the country but the base stayed at its place. As writes known expert A. Knyazev, in November-December 2004 in the course of secret negotiations between the USA and Kyrgyzstan the American representatives wanted to get an agreement on location in airport "Manas" of airplanes E-3A with system AVAKS to arrange regular reconnaissance flight along the border with China. At
that time the Kyrgyz party with great difficulty succeeded to refuse to accept these proposals of the USA, and the president intended to initiate his proposal to the new parliament on withdrawal of the American base from the territory of the republic.
However, participation of external forces in the events of 2005 was not so evident comparing with Ukraine and Georgia. An attempt of coup d'etat and not a revolution took place in Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, the Russian party stressed its readiness to cooperate with the Kyrgyz opposition, which came to power, and expressed its hope that the victors would keep the situation under control. The American ambassador Kyrgyzstan confessed of his sympathy to the opposition but qualified Russia as a significant factor in development of situation in the RK. He expressed his assurance that the USA would maintain close cooperation with Russia. At the same time, the American ambassador admitted that by that time the USA invested in the KR the biggest sum per capita of the population than in any other CA state.
It is a mistake to underestimate the role of external forces in provoking and developing of the situation in March of 2005, A. Knyazev thinks. He considers as the main causes of the coup d'etat not only the weakness of the power but also the direct interference of external forces, primarily of the USA, in the course of events. For the preceding period the USA formed and commissioned the specific mechanism of support to the alternative elite by foreign financial assistance. By means of the education centers and NGO's the USA destructed traditional social mechanisms, including foundations of the people's world outlook, promoted shaping in public opinion the rejection of existing situation, stimulated the rise of level of expectations and claims to life, which were not supported at all by real conditions in the republic.
S. Sultanov makes a more critical estimation of the events in March; according to him, the trans-national Central Asian narcotic structure, primarily, narcotic traders of Osh, plaid the key role in the overthrow of Akayev and Bakiyev coming to power. By the eastern tradition, Bakiyev decided to get himself rid of his supporters in Osh. Some of them were killed, others lost their legal business. Bakiyev's relatives successfully increased their share in the narcotics transit. In any case, the events of March 2005 interrupted the legitimate political process in the KR and started chronic instability, permanent vacuum of power and authoritarian family-clan aspirations of the ruling personalities, who make unreal any positive political project, which might be proposed to the republic. In the sphere of definition of the interest of the KR and consequently of its policy in relation to the USA Bakiyev continued his former policy, i.e. he did not step out of the limits of commercial wishes. Kyrgyzstan did not construct any political, economic or other interests. In June 2005, acting foreign minister of the KR R. Otunbayeva and State Secretary of the USA C. Rice discussed the perspectives of further development of relations between the two countries. C. Rice stressed the interest of the USA in strengthening the bilateral partnership with the KR.
On 5 July 2005, the summit of the ShOS proposed to the USA to define the final date of provisional use of infrastructure objects and deployment of military contingents on the territory of member-states of the ShOS; on 11 July the president of the KR Bakiyev declared that the leadership of the republic would consider the issue of expediency of location on its territory of the USA military base; on 26 August 2005 the parliament of Uzbekistan took the decision on withdrawal of the USA military contingent from airdrome "Khanabad" (the American air base was closed in November 2005), and Tashkent started to restore its cooperation with ODKB. The USA reacted to these political
declarations and started to advance the geopolitical conception of "Great Central Asia" (GCA). The main idea of GCA elaborated by John Hopkins University and published in magazine "Foreign Affairs" (July-August 2005) was reduced to creation of the Partnership for Cooperation and Development of GCA as a regional forum for planning, being alternative to EvrAzES and ShOS, for coordination and implementation of the whole series of American projects. The Partnership provided for creation of the united military-strategic and geopolitical entity, including Kazakhstan, the post-Soviet republics in the Middle Asia and Afghanistan, and further creation of the union with the "Great Near East" under the aegis of the West.
The other aim of the project consisted in involvement in the program of Turkey, Pakistan and India, in separation of this enlarged region and in its withdrawal from influence of Russia and China. Pentagon and NATO were defined as the most important instrument of implementation of this American strategy. Under the cover of GCA Washington strived to impose external governance on the CA, a certain soft form of protectorate, creating appearance of "geopolitical pluralism", promoting illusion in Moscow and in Beijing of their significance in the region by giving them the status (side by side with the West and after it) of guarantors and donors for the modernization process.
In 2007, the State Department started the process of the full scale involvement of the KR in NATO Program "Partnership for Peace". In the same year the KR joined NATO program PARP (Process of Analysis and Planning) for the sake of extension of its militarytechnical cooperation with NATO, participation in its peacemaking missions and in actions in zones of armed conflicts. However, for the period of 2005-2008 the USA achieved rather limited successes in the CA. The policy of "aggressive realism" carried out for the second term
of presidency of G. Bush junior created difficulties in the USA relations with most countries of the region, thinks scientific researcher of MGIMO A. Kasantsev. As a result of visit to Bishkek of Minister of Defense of the USA in July 2005 the agreement was concluded on keeping by the USA its military presence in "Manas" as long as its is needed for the military operation in Afghanistan. Pentagon promised to increase its payment for the lease of the base and to give the credit of $ 200 million. R. Otunbayeva expressed her gratitude to the USA for the support and stressed the interest of the KR in keeping American military presence, the annual American contribution of $ 45 million for the lease of the base and $ 25 million for re-fueling of airplanes.
The visit of C. Rice to Bishkek in October 2005 was aimed at neutralizing "the Russian factor", mainly the agreement on extension of Russian air base in Kant and the dialogue of Russia with Uzbekistan. C. Rice succeeded to get agreement of the KR to locate in airport "Manas" the American infrastructure and servicemen withdrawn from Uzbekistan. Having said that Kyrgyzstan had no reason to make choice between Russia and the USA, the State Secretary on 11 October signed the joint declaration of the USA and the KR on presence of American troops in Middle Asia. Both parties expressed their support of presence of the coalition forces on the territory of the KR up to liquidation of terrorism in Afghanistan - the operation supported by United Nations.
On 19 April 2006, Bakiyev in his TV speech warned the USA about a possible withdrawal from the bilateral agreement on location of American military air base in airport "Manas". By his blackmail Bakiyev wanted to get a sustainable source of contributions to the republican budget. As a result, on 14 July 2006, the compromise agreement was achieved. Further, the issue of the American air base was used by him not once as an object of bargaining between the USA and the KR. In this connection, the following conclusion of A. Knyazev
seems to be quite reasonable: K. Bakiyev coming to power became a failure of American policy; owing to some subjective reasons Bakiyev to a larger extent than Akayev directed his foreign policy to Moscow and simultaneously to Beijing and Tashkent. It was not a surprise that the USA started to prepare its revenge, since the political uncertainty of Bakiyev behavior had a direct impact on uninterrupted functioning of the military air base in the airport "Manas".
On 3 February 2009, as a result of negotiations in Moscow, Bakiyev made public the decision of the government of the KR to close the American military base. The following day the parliament of the KR received a draft on denouncement of the note of ministry of foreign affairs of the KR in return to the note of the USA embassy of 4 December 2001, forming together the agreement between the government of the KR and the government of the USA. Soon the agreement with the USA on deployment of airbase "Manas" was denounced, and on 20 February the note of the foreign ministry of the KR on withdrawal of the base was transferred to the American ambassador in Bishkek. The reasons of the taken decision were as follows: the ambiguous position of the American party on economic compensation for the American presence in the KR as well as the killing of a Kyrgyz citizen by an American serviceman. The withdrawal of 1000 servicemen (95% Americans) should have occurred not later than 20 August of the same year. The American mass media with pessimism and irritation against Moscow reacted to this information and concentrated on finding out the amount of damage in relation of the airbase's loss, on other options of cargo deliveries to NATO forces in Afghanistan via other CA countries, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.
Not long afterwards, Bakiyev declared that the issue of withdrawal of American servicemen from base "Manas" remained open
and that negotiations with the USA may be resumed. In its turn, the USA demonstrated its readiness to pay a higher rent for its base to the KR. The American embassy in Bishkek informed on 1 June "Eurasia Net" about secret negotiations with the government of the KR on the affairs related to the base. Meantime, the Chinese party did not insist on withdrawing of the American base from the KR. France plaid a certain role in keeping the base, performing at that time the mediator functions in Middle Asia.
One should not say that these negotiations had a negative impact on Russian-American relations. On the contrary, taking into account the increased difficulties for deliveries of cargoes to Afghanistan by traditional way via Pakistan and the plans of new president of the USA B. Obama to enlarge significantly the American contingent in Afghanistan, Russia rendered assistance to solve the problem of transit via its territory of American non-military cargos. The unloading of American ships started in the ports of Latvia, and further the cargoes were transported by the railways. The transportation corridor of cargo deliveries to the coalition forces was joined by Kazakhstan, which agreed for the transit of exclusively civil goods by land transportation through its territory to give a rear support to the military contingent of the USA in Afghanistan. In this context, the USA and Tajikistan agreed to construct the second bridge over the bordering river Pyanj in the route to Afghanistan. Later both bridges will be used for transportation 24 hours per day. Tajikistan promised to provide its air space for transportation of cargoes and personnel of NATO countries to Afghanistan.
At the same time, Turkmenistan agreed to create an air corridor for transportation of civil goods and of personnel, belonged to NATO, to Afghanistan, while Uzbekistan agreed to allow transport of them through its territory in two directions. First, it was the route by railway
via Tajikistan and further to North Afghanistan, where, according to NATO plans, up to 200 railway containers should be shipped every week; second, it was the land corridor via southern Uzbek city Termez to Afghan Khairaton, located at the distance of 100 km from the city of Mazari-Sharif. Probably, these friendly steps taken by Ashkhabad and Tashkent in favor of Washington pursued the aim to balance influence of Russia in the Central Asian gas market. It was significant for G. Berdymuhamedov to alleviate international isolation of Turkmenistan after death of president S. Niyazov; I. Karimov intended to soften the sanctions imposed for bloody Andijan events in 2005.
On 11 May 2009, I. Karimov confirmed the utilization of the cargo airport in the city of Navoi as a staging post for air transportation of non-military cargos of NATO for coalition forces in Afghanistan. As mentioned American journalist D. Tynan, the agreement on Navoi left the Kremlin in a deadlock and might be considered as a clever move of the State Department. For the last years, Moscow fixed as a main geopolitical aim the liquidation of American military presence in the region and succeeded to get in this direction certain successes by means of financial assistance in exchange for withdrawal, attained with the Kyrgyz leaders in the beginning of 2009. Probably, the rigid declaration of Karimov against deployment of the Russian base in the south of the KR under the aegis of ODKB should be considered in the same context. The foreign ministry of Uzbekistan in its official declaration stressed that the Uzbek party does not see any need and advisability in realization of the plans of deployment in the south of Kyrgyzstan of an additional contingent of Russian forces. The memorandum on military cooperation signed on 1 August by the presidents of the RF and the KR had the same content. The position of Tashkent was supported by the USA.
The above said confirms the conclusion made by A. Kazantsev that for the period of the 2000s the geopolitical rivalry between the RF and the USA in the region repeatedly resulted in changes of the correlation of their forces: weakening of influence of Russia led to about equal rise of influence of the USA and vice versa... For the second part of the 1990s, the USA and Russia more often started to play "the game which is not worth the candle", since the interest of both powers to the CA increased rapidly and simultaneously but the way of harmonic cooperation was not discovered. As a result, American (and, as a whole, western) influence in correlation with Russian influence started to resemble "a swing". For the period of the 1996-1999 and the 2001-2003 the western influence was growing, while the period of 1999-2001 and 2004-2008 was marked by the rise of Russian influence. As a whole, under conditions of great uncertainty and of significant unsettled issues the policy of the USA in the CA for the 1991-2008 was marked by rather low consistency and efficiency. The constant change of the situation in the CA and "reshuffle" of different American projects results in the lack of stability of hierarchy of the USA interests in the region. One should agree with the meaning of I. Muradyan that by the present time neither Russia nor the USA succeeded to consolidate their positions in the CA.
On 7 April 2010, on the wave of anti-government disturbances another coup d'etat occurred in the KR. The group of Bakiyev lost its power. The opposition formed the provisional "government of people's confidence", headed by a former foreign minister R. Otunbayeva. Russia rendered assistance to the provisional government. In this way it expressed its attitude to the overthrown regime of Bakiyev, which kept in the KR the military American base despite the promise to get rid of it in exchange for the Russian material assistance.
Under these conditions, the State Secretary of the USA H. Clinton supported the ally of the anti-terrorist coalition and offered humanitarian assistance to the KR. On 12 April the State Department supported the intention of R. Otunbayeva to ensure governance of the country and return to democracy, proposed to arrange international investigation and engagement of police detachments of OSCE in the zone of conflict, and promised to give financial support to the KR. On 23 June the special representative of the Parliamentary Assembly of OSCE for the CA proposed at his press-conference in Bishkek to send international police forces to the KR.
The meeting of the foreign ministers of 56 member-states of OSCE, held in Alma Ata in July 2010, took the decision on sending of international police forces to the KR (52 peacekeepers and further 50 officers) for the initial period of four months with probable extension of their presence depending on the situation in the regions of Osh and Jelalabad. Indian political analyst M.K. Bhadrakumar made the conclusion that the decision of OSCE was the key element of regional policy of the USA, which drafted the scenario of ensuring regional security for the period after the war in Afghanistan, of renovation of OSCE with certain advantages in preventing and regulating conflicts in the CA and promoting working out the complex and multilateral policy of the USA in the CA, which consisted up to present of separate bargains and which would additionally attract attention to Afghanistan.
The president of Uzbekistan I. Karimov supported the proposal of international investigation of events in the KR. As was mentioned by pro-American Kyrgyz politician B. Beshimov, many public organizations in Uzbekistan, controlled by the authorities, addressed themselves not to Russia but to United Nations, OSCE, to the president of the USA and to the leaders of European Union with the appeal to
carry on international investigation of the situation in the KR. As a result, the KR became closer to the USA, and new closer relations emerged between the USA and Uzbekistan with a perspective of regional cooperation. Kazakhstan changed its attitude to the western intervention in Kyrgyzstan from cool reticence to open support. As a result, Russia turned out to be in "the gray" zone. Having abstained from interference in the crisis in the KR and being unable to mobilize ODKB for this interference, Moscow made false signals of its emergence relating to cruel Islamists and narcotics mafia threatening regional security and lost the chance to come forward against decisions of OSCE, M. Bhadrakumar concluded.
Stressing its loyalty to the USA, the provisional government of the KR arranged the constitutional referendum and transformed the country into a first state with parliamentary regime in Middle Asia. The term of the agreement with the USA on the air base "Manas" was prolonged, transforming the base into a Pentagon center of transit shipment with the purpose of support of the international coalition's operations on the territory of Afghanistan. The USA informed about its readiness to render assistance to the KR in liquidation of consequences of mass inter-ethnic disturbances in the region of Osh. And in August 2010 the USA declared that it intended to construct the second military base in the south of the KR - "Osh training ground" - to cover the rear of American servicemen in case of destabilization of the situation in the region. At the same time, the USA continued to ignore the idea of forming a system of mutual action with ODKB, proposed by Moscow.
Despite refusal of Moscow to recognize OSCE as a principal guarantor of security in the KR, Washington sticks to this plan and, on the contrary, stubbornly intends to realize it. Washington carries on its offensive against traditional leading position of Russia in Kyrgyzstan and at the same time asserts constantly that it works in cooperation with
Moscow, notes M. Bhadrakumar. The USA succeeded to prevent in September 2010 the conclusion of the significant agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan on the long-term presence of the Russian army in the KR. The American mass media with big intention discussed the issue of the payment for the lease of land provided for location of foreign objects, comparing the annual payment of $ 4.5 million by Russia with $ 60 million annually paid by the USA.
The meeting of the presidents of the USA and the KR in September 2010, held in New York, was devoted to discussion of the situation in Afghanistan and the common aims in the sphere of development and security. B. Obama thanked R. Otunbayeva for the contribution of the KR in achievement of these aims. Highly estimating her actions in restoration of democratic institutions in the republic, he expressed optimism in connection with agreement of Bishkek on deployment of the police consultative group of OSCE composed of 52 persons and on creation of the international commission, which would investigate the causes of the tragic events in June.
Actually, the USA gave support to the regime of "the parliamentary republic", which under conditions of the clannish structure of society can not be either strong or efficient. What is more, as S. Sultanov considers, as a result of the thoughtful and well organized operation, with the connivance of Americans, the political forces based on the resources of the international narcotic mafia came to power in the KR. According to him, the key group of the "enraged population" storming the government's offices was composed of the fighters armed by modern arms, including sniper rifles (with holographic rear-sights), who quite professionally suppressed fire of the special force. The opposition, which came to power, would hardly be able to organize it. Exactly the Osh detachments with the support of masses of people organized by the official opposition threw down
Bakiyev. The position of the American party was marked by elements of a new policy directed to transformation of the CA into a territory of chaos with further governance of regional conflicts and crises, thinks S. Sultanov. The USA, according to him, will count on disappearance of the existing state structures, with probable exception of Kazakhstan characterized by special relations with the USA. As far as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and other countries are concerned, the Yugoslavian model becomes quite probable. The question is that the USA count on the long-term governance of the crises, the expert regards.
Despite these evident successes of American diplomacy, the conservatives in the USA regard as inadequate the efforts taken by the Administration of B. Obama. In particular, a senior researcher of Heritage Foundation A. Cohan made the proposal to reconsider in general the USA policy relating to Russia and the post-Soviet republics on the basis of realistic appraisal of the Russia's intentions and actions. To his view, the American national interests demand as follows: weakening of the growing influence of the Kremlin in the Central Asian region, extension of the military-political cooperation with the countries of the CA, including training and delivery of arms, preparation of the ground for creation in the center of Eurasia of new sphere of security, strengthening of projects for laying trans-Caspian gas pipelines and of Nabucco pipeline in cooperation with the countries of European Union, as well as promotion of openness, democracy and legal power, of responsible state governance in the region. Expressing the point of view of foes of "resetting" of American-Russian relations under conditions of Moscow, he insists that the most important task of Pentagon in the shaped circumstances is the appraisal of chances for deployment of advanced military bases in the states of the CA and for barring the transferal of base "Manas" to Russia.
However, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the American successes in the KR. It is sufficient to say that the new prime minister of the KR A. Atambayev made his first foreign visit to Moscow, where on 27 December 2010 he was received by prime-minister V. Putin. Having noted "strategic partnership" of two countries, Atambayev mentioned the intention of his country to join the Customs Union together with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Expressing the negative attitude of the new government to the American military base, he also declared that it would probably be closed soon. In his turn, V. Putin promised to render financial assistance in the size of $ 25 million as well as to provide deliveries of 1.4 million tons of grains.
And what is more, appraising the situation in the KR as a whole, it is important to stress that it is characterized by a high level of uncertainty. Owing to various reasons Kyrgyzstan maneuvers among the interests of Kazakhstan, China, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and periodically makes declarations about strategic partnership with the RF, the USA and the countries of the EU. As was marked by one of French journalists, Kyrgyzstan lacks a strong power: the lawful state and calm democracy, the authoritarian president or the dominant external force. Being alone, the system may deviate at any time in the most unexpected direction. At present, the feeling of unstable balance prevails in the country being mixed with the fright of a new explosion of forceful action. I. Muradyan considers that the KR is in need of a very strong economic and military-operative guardianship and that its leadership confronts the task of preservation of the state integrity. For this reason, A. Knyazev thinks, any thoughtful and tested foreign policy strategy does not exist. It is replaced by a pragmatic tactical approach displayed in "multi-vector direction" of foreign policy and in the wish of the ruling political elite to keep a comfortable space for reciprocal actions in the external world. All foreign policy steps of the Kyrgyz leadership,
concludes A. Knyazev, demonstrate its firm intention further to look for getting a profit in contradictions among external actors, showing the full absence of strategic political thinking and the short-lived pragmatism.
"CredoNew", St.-Petersburg, 2011, N3, pp. 242-267.
Rano Ubaidullayeva,
Academician of the UAS, the Director of the Center for Public Opinion Research SOCIETY AND FAMILY IN UZBEKISTAN
The republic of Uzbekistan as a sovereign independent state is on the threshold of its 20th anniversary. The previous period was the time of dynamic consolidation and development enjoyed by the support of great masses of people and numerous institutions of civil society. A significant place in the system of civil society is occupied by the social institution of family, which may be considered as a quality state of society produced by social actions of individuals within the framework of a particular culture. In this case it is worth mentioning the point of view of a well known scientist J. Toshchenko, who considered social society in the aspect of "sociology of life". To the mind of the scientist, civil society should be defined as an "aggregate of historically organized forms of common activities of life as well as the common human values, which are used by the people as the guide to action in all spheres of social life... Just therefore civil society should be regarded in the light of "phenomenon of human being". The public opinion poll carried on in February 2011 concludes the analysis of the results of the research in dynamics for 2009 and 2011. The sample aggregate consisted of 4000 respondents from all regions of the country.
