CC BY
22
Dmitri Popov,
Ph. D. (Law), Head of the Urals Regional Information-analytical Center, Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (Yekaterinburg)
PARTICIPATION OF CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES IN SUPPLYING THE U.S. TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN (Conclusion)
Air Corridor through Central Asia
In addition to land communication lines the United States has obtained the opening of an air supply channel through Central Asia, necessary mainly for transporting manpower and important and valuable cargoes. The importance of this channel has grown after the United States has begun to use new transport aircraft C-5M Super Galaxy with the operation range of 5,000 nautical miles without refueling with a complete load of 122,000 pounds1, which enabled them to make transpolar flights to Afghanistan.
In July 2009 Washington signed an agreement with Russia on air transit of troops and armaments, and in 2010 similar agreement was signed with Kazakhstan. Parallel with this, agreements have been reached with the governments of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on the use of "Manas" and "Navoi" airports.
The agreement allowing U.S. military and transport planes to use the international "Manas" airport in Bishkek was endorsed by Kyrgyz parliament in December 2001. In summer 2009 the republican leadership headed by K. Bakiyev ignored the position of its partners in the CSTO and SCO and prolonged the mandate of the U.S. air base up to July 2014. The object was renamed - Center of Transit Transportation, and the lease rent was raised to $60 million a year.
The center plays an important role in servicing the military campaign in Afghanistan. As reported by its press service in September
2012, 4,700 refuelling flights were made from the "Manas" airport annually, and up to 1,500 men and officers were transported in both directions. The center is the nearest of the three U.S. bases capable to make refueling operations in the air space of Afghanistan.2 From there infil-exfil operations and evacuation of cargoes and personnel, as well as special operations in the region are made. More than a thousand of American servicemen are permanently deployed on the base (the 376th air expeditionary wing), with about 300 employees of western contractual bodies, and up to 700 Kyrgyz people servicing this U.S. military object.3
In September 2012, during a meeting with President V. Putin of the Russian Federation, President A. Atambayev of Kyrgyzstan mentioned the intention to turn "Manas" airport into a civilian object after 2014. The U.S. Department of State understood this as a pretext for a prolonged bargain in the future. The U.S. foreign-policy office emphasized that it would do everything in its power to retain the base in Central Asia. According to R. Blake, assistant of the Secretary of State on South and Central Asia, it will be necessary to continue military support of military operation in Afghanistan after 2014.4
The closing down of the Center in Manas in June 2014 would violate the plans prepared by the American-Kyrgyz agreement earlier. Transportation operations of the United States with a view to withdrawing the basic western groupings from Afghanistan should also rotate the remaining units there. At present the "Manas" base will handle great quantity of secret cargoes.
In March 2012, after a visit of the head of the Pentagon L. Panetta to Bishkek, "The New York Times" reported that Kyrgyz officials unofficially gave their U.S. counterparts to understand that they were ready to discuss the conditions of further cooperation on "Manas."5 The words about turning the airport into a civilian object
have given a certain hope to the United States military department to retain the base when U.S. servicemen are replaced by the personnel of private paramilitary and transport companies. Washington's desire to grab the chance and preserve "Manas" as a base is shown by the fact that already in 2012 the U.S. trade and development agency announced competition among American companies to compile a business-plan to develop the "Manas" airport into a commercial transport hub, although on the whole the United States is rather skeptical concerning this idea.6
The White House has several trump cards in its negotiations with Bishkek. The airbase remains a big source of currency for both the republic's treasury, and the local elites. The aggregate expenditures on using the transportation center greatly surpass the fixed lease rent ($60 million), in 209 amounted to $108 million, in 2010 - $131.5 million, and in 2011 - 150.6 million.7 In 2009 this sum included expenses for modernization of the infrastructure of the airport ($30.6 million), for contracts with local contractors ($24.7 million), and for payment for airport auxiliary services ($23 million). Fuel was bought on a separate payment article ($230 million).8 Transfer of part of military hardware and equipment from Afghanistan to Central Asian countries can serve as an additional material incentive. Besides, it is expected that in the course of negotiating the future of "Manas" the United States will use the power of all network structures, scientific development and production centers, the mass media, and the agents of influence created in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.
In case of failure in Kyrgyzstan the Pentagon may try to transfer the air base from Manas to another country of the region, although Washington excludes such scenario at an official level. The Uzbek airport "Navoi" is regarded a convenient place for redeploying the object. It has been used for transportation of American cargoes to
Afghanistan for several years already on commercial flights with the mediation of South Korea.
In 2008 the Korean Airlines and the Transport Command of the U.S. armed forces carried out marketing research on the prospects of the use of "Navoi" for Afghan transit, after which the Korean corporation signed a contract with Uzbekistan for a thorough modernization of the airport. The agreement presupposed increase of the store infrastructure capacity up to 300 tons of cargoes a day by the end of 2009, and the capacity of fuel reservoirs up to 1.42 million gallons.9 The company has received a credit from Seoul amounting to $200 million, and another $83.4 million were earmarked by Uzbekistan.10 Parallel with this, in November 2008 the head of the Transport Command of the U.S. armed forces General D. McNabb visited Tashkent, where he had talks with the Uzbek leadership concerning the inclusion of the "Navoi" airport in the supply system of the American troops in Afghanistan. This object will be a transshipment point for the United States situated some 400 kilometers from the border of Afghanistan in a safe district, which has convenient access to important motor roads and railway lines and can be used for landing any types of aircraft. Uzbekistan planned to channel through "Navoi" NATO cargo flows, and contribute to increasing its capacity and the development of the adjacent free economic zone where supplies for western troops could be purchased.
It was officially announced about the transshipment of cargoes through "Navoi" in May 2009. Details of the contract have not been made public, however, as follows from the "Uzbek dossier" of WikiLeaks, the agreement allowed transit of non-lethal cargoes only, and prohibited the presence of U.S. servicemen or military aircraft in Navoi. Direct air communication with Afghanistan was also banned.11 Cargoes had to be brought to Navoi by the "Uzbekistan Airlines" or
"Korean Airlines, after which they had to be reloaded on to land transport and taken to Afghanistan by Uzbek government corporations (Uzbekiston Temir Yullari (railways) and Urta Osiyo Trans (truck transportation).12
The scheme offered by Tashkent, as can be seen from the same sources, did not suit the American command, which announced its intention in June 2009 to arrange only two cargo flights a month, which is too little for a reconstructed airport fit for servicing up to twenty cargo flights daily.13
Nevertheless, American diplomats did not abandon their attempts to reach agreement with Uzbekistan on opening the Navoi airport for direct cargo flights to Afghanistan. This would be more convenient for the Pentagon, inasmuch as it would allow the United States to ship to Afghanistan more cargoes and military personnel without transshipment or reloading, overlap the functions of "Manas," and besides, it opens the prospects of flying U.S. military transport planes to Uzbekistan. In February 2010, on the eve of President I. Karimov's visit to Seoul, the influential South Korean newspaper "JoongAng Ilbo" reported about the intention of President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea, according to an unofficial request of the United States, to ask the President of Uzbekistan, with whom he had friendly relations, for permission to use "Navoi" as an air corridor between Central Asia and Afghanistan. The alternative air bridge was necessary for the Pentagon in case of worsening relations with Kyrgyzstan which was under a strong influence of Russia.14
In return the United States, which planned to withdraw the main part of its military contingent from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, promised to give the Uzbek hub many transport orders. The latter circumstance is quite timely for "Navoi," which handled about 50,000 tons of cargoes in 2011, according to official data, and expected
to increase the figure to 60,000 tons in 2012, which was only half of the planned capacity of the terminal (110,000 tons).15 It is not excluded that the commercial potential of the air transport hub opened under political pressure from above, was initially overrated.
It is supposed in the Uzbek expert circles that President I. Karimov makes a pause in his talks with the United States on the future of "Navoi" at the moment, waiting for solution of the situation around "Manas." According to this view, the possible loss of the U.S. positions in Kyrgyzstan will enable Uzbekistan to bargain for more advantageous conditions in redeploying the American air base to "Navoi." A favorable conclusion about the possibility to deploy troops, hardware and equipment was made by American military engineers in 2002. The new concept of Uzbekistan's foreign policy adopted in 2012, which bans the deployment of foreign military objects on the territory of the republic, will create no obstacle in an authoritarian state for taking the principal decision by the head of state on the opening of a U.S. base.
However, this scenario will hardly be possible due to the fear of the Uzbek leadership concerning the possible strengthening of the western positions in the republic, as well as the previous negative experience connected with Washington's reaction to the events in Andizhan in 2005, when the United States was expelled from the "Karshi Khanabad" air base.
Prospects and Significance
of Northern Transit
In the conditions of still existing distrust toward Islamabad the United States will withdraw part of its troops from Afghanistan via Central Asian communication lines. According to the calculations of the Central Command, in 2013-2014 about 29,000 units of transport and
24,000 containers with American property should be withdrawn from Afghanistan (for comparison's sake, the total volume of cargoes of all ISAF countries planned for withdrawal is estimated at 70,000 units of transport and 120,000 containers).16 By 2013, the U.S. Command was supposed to curtail the armed grouping from 66,000 to 32,000 men and officers.17
After 2014 the Pentagon plans to leave a limited contingent of troops numbering 13,600 servicemen in Afghanistan (the figure was given in the U.S. Senate in March 2013).18 The final decision on the subject should be taken by President Obama on agreement with Kabul.
Plans to use Central Asian routes for withdrawing troops from Afghanistan have been revised and figures reduced. It was partly due to the problem in the functioning of the Uzbek stretch, resumption of the work of the Pakistani channel in early 2013, as well as the Pentagon decision to diversify transit with the inclusion of multimodal centers in Dubai and Jordan. Accordingly, if it was intended to load 70 percent of cargoes at the beginning of 2013,19 in the middle of that year - already 30 percent,20 and by the beginning of 2013 - less than a quarter (or 7,200 containers and 4,800 units of the rolling stock in 2013-2014).21 In reality by the middle of 2013 only four percent of American cargoes from Afghanistan went through Central Asia, which could not but cause disappointment in Uzbekistan.21
NATO's agreement with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on using their territories for the withdrawal of the means of transport and military hardware and equipment was reached in June 2012.22 In contrast to the British, the Americans refused from return transit through Tajikistan, about which representatives of the Department of State officially announced in the spring of 2013.
Transportation of main volumes of cargoes from Afghanistan via Central Asia is made by railway transport in the direction of
Uzbekistan - Kazakhstan - Russia, and also through the southern corridor to Kazakhstan's port of Aktau and further on across the Caspian Sea to the Caucasus. The air bridge from Afghanistan passes through "Manas" in Kyrgyzstan.
In April 2013 the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev, speaking at a conference on Afghanistan in Alma-Ata said that the republic intended to increase the NATO cargo flow through Aktau. The capacities of the port which Kazakhstan would like to turn into a big international transport hub by 2020 were lying idle after sanctions imposed on Iran. In answer to society's fear caused by the opening in Kazakhstan of a "sea analogue" of Kyrgyz "Manas," the republican authorities stated that bringing additional containers to Aktau would not presuppose the deployment of foreign military installations there, and the object itself was openly used for organizing supplies to Afghanistan from 2011.23
At the same time the broader possibilities of Aktau can become a platform for the development of relations between the defense departments of Kazakhstan and the United States, which will potentially increase the volumes of NATO cargoes transported through the Caspian basin and the Caucasus, bypassing the territory of Russia. The latter circumstance will raise the risk of uncontrolled deliveries of American weapons to the Transcaucasus.
It would seem that the United States will not abandon its attempts to organize new intermodal transshipment points in Central Asian countries, which would allow it to combine routes and types of transport. Its NATO allies go along this path, particularly France, which gained the right to use the Shimkent airport in the south of Kazakhstan in early 2013.
Parallel to this, the Pentagon began negotiations on concessions in giving certain types of military property to be withdrawn from
Afghanistan over to Central Asian countries. This would make it possible for the United States to reduce expenses on the transportation of obsolete types of military hardware and equipment, which could later be used for training personnel, repair and servicing, that is, would ensure its long-term presence in the military-technical sphere of the region. In January 2012 the Obama administration lifted the ban on foreign military supplies to Uzbekistan, and in a year's time had secret consultations with representatives of the republic in Washington.
According to information which has leaked to the western press, the Uzbek side has shown interest in a broad range of arms and ammunition, including mine detecting sets, bulletproof vests, night-vision instruments, armored vehicles, helicopters, drones, etc.24 In February 2013 the Department of State officially reported to Congress that the United States would supply Uzbekistan with some of the hardware and equipment mentioned, which cannot be used against the peaceful population, including drones of certain modifications (most probably, light reconnaissance unmanned vehicles). Discussions in the U.S. Congress has shown that there is a powerful group of supporters of turning Uzbekistan into a "full-fledged military ally of the United States, like Saudi Arabia" in the foreign-policy establishment of the United States.25
In February 2013 Washington's initiative was backed by Britain, whose Secretary of State for Defense Philip Hammond confirmed the plans to transfer to Uzbekistan Leyland DAF trucks and Land Rover spare parts to a sum of $700,000.26
Another result of the functioning of the Northern Distribution Network was a sharp rise of the Pentagon's expenditures on Central Asia. The cargo flow through the Network amounting to 39,000 containers in 2012, average expenses on paying transit taxes and for the services of transport companies were estimated at a sum from
$685 million to $billion and more.27 A greater portion of this money was remitted to accounts of government transport operators and to the budgets of Central Asian countries, supporting their high interest in the NDN.
In addition, the Pentagon increased its expenses for purchasing commodities necessary for its troops in Afghanistan sevenfold in 2012, on which Central Asian governments have long insisted. This made it possible for the United States to reduce its transport expenses and partly solve its fuel problem, as well as it increased attractiveness of cooperation for the local elites. From the sum mentioned Turkmenistan received $820 million (mainly on fuel and lubricants), Kyrgyzstan -$218 million, Kazakhstan - $137 million (also on fuel and lubricants), Uzbekistan - $105.9 million, Tajikistan - $11.7 million.28 That very year the U.S. Agency on Logistics placed its representatives in the U.S. embassies in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and Astana, and Kyrgyzstan opened a portal of republican enterprises, promoting tenders for supplies of Afghanistan among Kyrgyz companies. In 2013 the trend to increasing purchases in Central Asia continued to develop, on which the Pentagon assigned $1.3 billion in its budget.29
On the whole, the White House has not only diversified supplies for its grouping in Afghanistan through Northern transit by lowering its dependence on Pakistan, but also created conditions for spreading its military infrastructure in Central Asia and intensifying its military-political contacts with the region. Despite the existing difficulties at least to the end of 2014, Northern transit will be used by the United States for resolving its military and political tasks in the region. Along with the curtailment of cargo transportation, its significance will diminish, according to forecasts. However, it can be expected that further on the United States may come out with an initiative to prolong the operation of the Central Asian transport corridor in a new format,
taking into account the desire to leave military objects in Afghanistan permanently and ensure their supply.
As follows from a report to the U.S. Senate by J. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, in March 2013, the U.S. administration will take into account the fact that the preservation of the military presence in Afghanistan after 2014 without the UN mandate may prompt Russia to curtail cooperation with the NDN.30 Without Moscow's consent, cargo operations will only be possible along the southern stretch of the route passing through Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, if these countries agree to exacerbate their relations with the Kremlin.
Thus, the Russian leadership will have to solve the problem whether it is worthwhile to continue to support Northern transit, which not only facilitates the functioning of the long-term military bases of the United States in Afghanistan, but also plays the role of a catalyst in Washington's military-political cooperation with Central Asia.
Notes
Bissell J. B. Moving Logistics Forward / J.B. Bissell // Military Logistics Forum. 2012. April. Vol. 6, issue 3, pp. 23-24.
Kyrgyzstan: The withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan transfer the center of "Manas" to the regime of return transit // EurasiaNet.org: Internet-site. 2012, September 24. URL.: http://russia.eurasianet.org/node/59611 Ibid.
Blake R. U.S. Engagement in Central Asia: Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia / Robert Blake, Assistant Secretary of State. Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs // House Committee on Foreign Affairs: website. 2012. July 24. P. 4. URL.: http://archives.repub-licans .foreignaffairs .house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA14-WState-BlakeR-2012024.pdf Bumiller E. Kyrgyzstan wants military role to end at U.S. Base / Elizabeth Bumiller // The New York Timis: website. 2012. March 13. URL.: http://www.nytimes.com/ 2012/03/14/world/asia/planeta-meets-with-military-officials-in-kyrgyzstan.html?
2
3
4
5
Kyrgyzstan: Manas Intl Airport Business Plan / United States Trade and Development Agency // Federal Business Opportunities website. 2012. August 22. URL.: http://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=5bba8ddbe23708ac 4f4f24aa7e4c44&tab=core&_eview=0
Nichol J. Central Asia: Regional developments and implications for U.S. interests: CRS Report for Congress / Jim Nichol: Congressional Research Service. 2012. May 18, p. 38.
Nichol J. Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, p. 10. Uzbekistan: Transcom Delegation Discusses Transit with GOU: Viewing cable 09TASKENT6698 // WikiLeaks: website. 2009. May 7. URL.: http://wikileaks. org/cable/2009/05/09TASHKENT669.html
Panfilova V. America searches refuge in Uzbekistan / Victoria Panfilova // Nezavisimaya gazeta: Internet-site 2009. June 10. URL.: http://www.ng.ru/cis/2009-06-10/1_Uzbekistan.html
Uzbekistan Supportive on Afghanistan Transit Concepts: Viewing cable 08TASHKENT1382 // WikiLeaks: website. 2011. November 26. URL.: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TASHKENT1382.html
Instructions to sign transit arrangement with the Government of Uzbekistan: Viewing cable 09STATES31078 // WikiLeaks: website. 2009. March 31. URL.: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09STATES31078.html
Uzbekistan: uscentcom on the eve of construction: Viewing cable 09TASHKENT1245 // WikiLeaks: website. 2009. July 17. URL.: http://wikileaks. org/cable/2009/07/09TASHKENT1245.html
Seo Seung-wook. President Lee will seek Uzbek base for U.S. forces / Seo Seung-wook // Korea JoongAng Daily: website. 2010. February 10. URL.: http://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2916469 See: data of the official website of "Navoi" airport: Uzbekistan Airways: International airport "Navoi": Internet-site. 2013. April 10. URL.: http://www.navoi-airport.com/ru/ - ru/content/cargo_service/introduction/ Kramer A.E. As NATO Prepares for Afghan Withdrawal, Uzbekistan Seeks War's Leftovers / Andrew E. Kramer // The New York Times: website. 2013. January 31, URL.: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/world/asia/uzbekistan-wants-natos-leftovers-from-afghanistan.html?ref=uzbekistan
Obama: the war in Afghanistan will be completed by the end of 2014 // "Golos Rossii" Radio: Internet-site. 2013. February 13. URL.: http://ria.ru/world/ 20130213/922594992.html
After 2014, 13,600 U.S. servicemen should stay in Afghanistan // RIA Novosti:
information agency. 2013. March 6. URL.: http://ria.ru/defense_safety/
20130306/9260197909.html
Kelly T.P. Op. cit.
Felbab-Brown V. Op. cit.
7
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
21 Kuchera J. Only four percent of American military cargoes are withdrawn via the Northern Network / Joshua Kuchera // EurasiaNet.org: Internet-site. 2013. June 26. URL.: http://russian.eurasianet.org/node/60168
22 NATO signs deal to move Afghan equipment via Central Asia // BBC News: website. 2012. June 4. URL.: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18326970
23 NATO weapons will not be loaded or unloaded in the port of Aktau; it will handle furniture and utensils - Kazakhstan's Foreign Ministry // Novosti-Kazakhstan: Internet-site. 2013. May 20. URL.: http://www.newskaz.ru/comment/ 20130520/5106484.html
24 Kramer A.E. Op. cit.
25 See, for example, video recording of a statement by Dana Rohgrabacher, Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threat // House Committee on Foreign Affairs: website. 2013. February 27. URL.: http://foreign affairs.house.gov/ hearing/joint-subcommittee-hearing-islamist-militant-threats-eurasiahttp
26 See: address by Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Defense; Ministry of Defense // UK Parliament: website. P.2. URL.: http://www.parliament.uk/ documents/commons-vote-office/February_2013/13-Feb-2013/1 .Defense-Afghani-stan-Lines-of-Communication.pdf
27 UK to bring Afghan equipment home via Uzbekistan // Dawn.com: website. 2013 February 13. URL.: http://dawn.com/2013/02/14/uk-to-bring-afghan-equipment-home-via-Uzbekistan
28 Lee G.. P. 13.
29 Kuchera J. Op. cit.
30 Ibid.
31 Clapper J. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community / James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence // Statement for the Record. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: website. 2013. March 12, p. 24. URL.: http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf
«Problemy Natzionalnoi strategii», Moscow, 2014, No 1, pp. 62-80.
