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enough to settle these contradictions, particularly in the circumstances of intensification of activities of local extremists and international terrorist organizations. The coming change of generations of the political leadership in most states of Central Asia also contributes to the lack of determination of the perspectives of the situation's development in the region. The course of this development may make corrections both in bilateral and in multilateral formats of relations among them. Therefore the security's ensuring in Central Asia remains one of the most complicated and important problems of the region's states and of other countries connected with them by common interests.
"Mirovye derzhavy v Tcentralnoy Azii", M, 2011, pp. 91-100.
Dmitri Furman,
D.Sc. (Hist.)
Sanobar Shermatova,
expert in CA countries
The REASONS OF DOWNFALL "SHORT CYCLES"
AND OF RENEWAL OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
IN KYRGYZSTAN
The Kyrgyz usually like to talk about their democratic traditions and of "nomadic democracy". F. Kulov said: "Even in ancient time the people elected their khan, and if the people did not like him, he was replaced. In this sense the Kyrgyz had the genetic and historic memory". A. Akayev mentioned: "In essence the way of life of the Kyrgyz supposed the democratic organization... Our democracy came down from Tien Shan Mountains". K. Bakiyev uttered: "The Kyrgyz always governed the state by means of people's democracy. A thousand years ago our people lived under conditions of people's democracy.
The Kyrgyz did not ever allow dictatorship and usurpation of power..." It is possible to cite dozens of such meanings.
Actually, unlike Uzbeks and Russians, Kyrgyz never had despotic statehood. Strictly speaking, they lacked the shaped statehood, and their tribes were governed by the tribal aristocracy ("manaps" in the north and "Beks" in the south) and by the pre-state tribal institutions (people's assemblies, kurultais), which were divided to clans and families. These tribes had some common Kyrgyz identity and were connected with each other by the idea of origin from common ancestors and by complicated (semi-real and half-mythical) genealogical relations, but they lacked power institutions, constantly seized cattle and pastures from each other and sometimes waged mutual bloody wars for a long time. For the XIX century khan Ormon, (a monument to him was erected in Bishkek) was elected by the common kurultai of the tribes but failed to establish his dynasty. Unlike the Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz lacked any structure above the tribes and the aristocracy of sultans - Chingizids.
The historic memory prevents the attempts of creation in Kyrgyzstan of authoritarian systems. The authoritarian power confronts difficulties in finding its basis in history of the country, since the Kyrgyz do not accept it as a natural and traditional form of power. On the contrary, the contemporary national-democratic ideology bases itself on the memory of "nomadic democracy" and presents it as a proto-image of modern democracy (as it is seen in the above citations). The Kyrgyz anti-authoritarian movements naturally appeal to the ideologically reconstructed and embellished past time, they regard authoritarian rule as an antinational order and accused Bakiyev of the attempts to restore the rule of Kokand khanate, which oppressed the Kyrgyz.
The tribal system is not only the past, which has an impact on historic memory and the determined directions of acceptance. To a
large extent it is the present time.
* * *
The passage from the contemporary model of demographic reproduction took place in Kyrgyzstan only for the 1980s and later rather fast (despite superfluous post-Soviet archaic development) after the declaration of sovereignty. For the period of 1969-1970, the index of birthrate of Kyrgyz women attained the level of 7.7 for one woman (5.9 - in cities and 8.1 - in rural districts), while most babies survived under the conditions created by the Soviet power. Therefore the type of Bakiyev family (seven brothers and two sisters) is quite normal for the present Kyrgyz generation. (For instance, Otunbayeva has eight brothers and sisters, prominent politician A. Mamadurov - seven, M. Akayeva - three sisters and two brothers). Leaving aside cultural and "valuable" factors, such families by their size engender "the central attention" of individuals to family affairs, since even minimum participation in life of sisters and brothers demands much time and efforts, particularly in difficult moments.
The question is not only the size of families but also the cultural and "ideological" value and consolidation of family ties. The Kyrgyz joke says: "If you marry a Kyrgyz woman you marry all her relatives". Since each Kyrgyz theoretically should know his ancestors up to the seventh generation, while many actually know them, the family ties become more extensive kin and tribal relations. Any Kyrgyz biography or autobiography with obligation contains the genealogical and tribal belonging.
The Soviet modernization and Soviet policy directed to eradication in Kyrgyzstan of kinship and tribe's relations and of loyalty
(to a large extent, continuation of the tsarist power's policy) failed to liquidate them. These ties play a significant role up to present, while for the post-Soviet epoch, under conditions of permanent crisis when people are in need of support, given the general trend to rebirth of old national traditions, these ties even strengthen. The tribal kurultai was restored. As another example of this archaic displays is restoration in Akayev time of court of aksakals as well as the semi-official practice of polygamy among representatives of the elite, and in Bakiyev time a proposal was expressed to legalize this practice. It is characteristic that Bakiyev parted to exile not with his official Russian wife but with his second (or even the third) hidden Kyrgyz wife with her children. Otunbayeva mentioned that polygamy became fashionable after new elite's coming to power. The mono-national homogenous Kyrgyz society returned to its past: recognized polygamy, the abduction of the bride by custom, obligation to pay wedding ransom, getting married to sisters of dead wives etc. The big, successful and relatively united family (like Bakiyev family) may appeal to kins, tribal and regional loyalty by use of wives' relatives and of friends and clients connections and may mobilize a colossal support.
The connections and loyalties limit the authoritative power, since each Kyrgyz always may rely on support of "his people", and the authorities confront not atomized individuals, like in Russia, but rather big and rallied communities. It is possible to ignore individuals, but it is impossible not to reckon with clans. "The clans represent a real political power, which could not suit our former . leaders, who were accustomed to exercise complete sway over the people", once uttered the head of an influential southern family Bekmamat Osmonov.
The clannish and tribal aspect is present in the Kyrgyz political life. The system of majority districts strengthened the clannish type of elections: it was senseless for any candidate to participate in elections
in the alien district of another tribe, particularly in rural districts. "According to this principle each candidate to a deputy seeks to be elected only in the place of his origin and of the origin of his tribe. Each summer and probably each spring every candidate explores his genealogy", Otunbayeva spoke about the parliamentarian elections in 2005.
The clannish struggle whimsically is interwoven with ideological-party struggle: if the party ideologies may be amorphous, the distinctions among them and the devotion to them is doubtful, the support of prominent figures as the party leaders given by "their people" is definite and natural. The people, who supported Kulov and Beknazarov in Akayev time or Isakov or Beknazarov in time of Bakiyev, came forward not for their political ideas but instinctively rendered assistance to the offended "their people". The members of the Kemin tribe kept their devotion to the Akayev family and their deputy Aidar Akayev after the revolution of 2005, and they greeted Bermet as a princess, who visited them. And Bakiyev was supported both in 2005 and in 2010 by his relatives and other people in Jelalabad.
Naturally, the "tribal" aspect was presented in Kyrgyz revolutions. Bakiyev with typical for him simple-mindedness showed in his book in public the role of hic clan in victory of revolution in the south in 2005: "B. Asanov, A. Beknazarov, J. Jenbekov, Jusup, Janush, Kanybek, Adyl, Marat Bakiev and many other revolutionaries made a great contribution to the victory". The strong tribal and regional connections weaken the power not only by the fact that they force to reckon with them, but also by the impact of this pressure, which imparts to it itself a specific clannish characteristic.
The presidents strive somehow for keeping clannish balance in making designations (the Soviet local and also Moscow power reckoned with it) but finally always violated it. Transformation of
power into its clannish model goes on naturally in itself even without particular patronage of "the own people" on the part of the president, since the accelerated carriers of his relatives do not demand his interference (the presidential circle itself understands that the president appreciates the situation when his nearest and dearest people are appreciated and promoted), and therefore, irrespective of any sphere or post occupied by one of his brothers or nephews, leaving aside his children, he becomes the non-formal "curator" of this sphere.
The presidents can not cease to protect their "own people", since they like their nearest and are "normal Kyrgyz" and are subject to colossal psychological pressure on the part of their "own people". Besides, they see that in time of difficulties they may lean only on their "own people" and designate them to the "key" posts, where personal devotion is of particular need. Bakiyev talked a lot till the end of his rule about the struggle against clannish power, and he hardly strived for making his rule a clannish power, but he could not be indifferent to his brothers and children, he appreciated their qualities and he therefore charged them with governance of financial and security service authorities.
The power becomes limited due to the need to keep balance, but violation of balance and support given to "the own people" also weaken the power for the following reasons: first, the ruler has relations not with traditional patriarchal families marked by unconditional subjugation to the elder but with families characterized by contemporary relations among relatives, when its is difficult to construct "a vertical power", second, the support of the relatives and people of the same clan hinders perception of the power as "national entity" and causes protests of other clans; it was not accidental that both Kyrgyz revolutions took place after a great number of the presidential relatives came to power. In time of rule of Akayev and Bakiyev their
closest relatives were not afraid of them and took personal actions, conflicting with each other (in time of Akayev, his son Aidar and his son-in-law Adil had "difficult" mutual relations and seemed to wage struggle for the property; the time of Bakiyev was marked by the conflict of generations between "the uncles" with old "views" and modern "boundless nephews"), which sent contradicted signals to the bureaucracy. The similar conflicts took place also in the families of
Nazarbayev, Aliyev and Rakhmonov.
* * *
The limited clannish loyalty in certain situations may be replaced by wider loyalty. The rivalry within smaller groups may step aside in case of rivalry among bigger groups, if they belong to them. The individual comes forward as a representative of his family, which may struggle for the influence against other families, but he advances as a member of the clan in relation to the people of other clans, as a representative of the tribe in relation to representatives of other tribes, finally, he comes forward as a representative of the south against the northerner.
The division of the Kyrgyz to the southerners and northerners is the contemporary form of ancient tribal division to the group of tribes "of the right wing", living in the north, and the "left wing" living in the south jointly with the separate group of tribes Ichkilik. Further, the ancient division acquired a cultural and sub-ethnic characteristic. The differences between more Islamized and earlier becoming settled agriculture tribes in the South (the South was part of the Kokand khanate and was subject to a strong Uzbek influence) and the nomadic and pre-Islamic culture and later more Russified and urbanized and becoming more cultured and wealthier North (analogous with division of Ukraine to west and east) are of great significance for Kyrgyzstan. In
Soviet time, Moscow, probably, taking into account the division of Kyrgyzstan into two main regions, established the order of alternation between southerners and northerners for designation of the first secretaries of the Central Committee. For the post-Soviet period, such alternation was achieved in a revolutionary way.
It is significant to avoid exaggeration and description of Kyrgyz revolutions simply as skirmishes between southern and northern tribes (as it is impossible to consider the Kyrgyz parties as a mere camouflage of clannish groups). Kulov is a northerner, who conflicted with northerner Akayev and was imprisoned by him. Beknazarov and Tekebayev are the southerners, who struggled against Bakiyev regime. But the regional factor plays its significant role. In both revolutions a big role was played by concentrated in Bishkek intellectuals, subject to European influence, of different tribes. But the massive support given to the revolutionary movements in 2005 and in 2010 was even opposite. In the revolution of 2005, which overthrew the rule of northerner Akayev, the protest of intellectuals in the capital was supported by southerners, who felt themselves having been deprived, who not only liquidated the power of Akayev authorities but also sent columns of autobuses under the slogan "Bishkek Stand Firm!" rendering assistance to Bishkek opposition groups. But in 2010 the revolution got the main mass support in the north against governance of southerner Bakiyev, who, on the contrary, had to flee to his native village Teit and tried to mobilize his forces in the south.
Much stronger the clannish and regional connections are, naturally, weaker become the all-national ties. In the past, the constantly alien to each other tribes came forward as a union only in time of conflicts against "the aliens" or against an aggression of foreigners or, vice versa, they united in military actions against these foreigners. At present, the national consciousness to a large extent is
displayed in "a savage" form of opposition to "aliens", when in the deeply divided society for a certain period emerges the sense of blood unity. It was characteristic that the first demand proclaimed in 1990 by the students' youth was the demand not to provide Armenian refugees with housing in Frunze. The mass political crises both in 1990 and in 2010 were accompanied by notorious Uzbek massacres with greater number of victims than caused by the Kyrgyz revolutions themselves and by local massacres of small nationalities - Dungans and Kurds. The internal separation of the Kyrgyz , the moral and physical weakness of
the state as well as these massacres - are all inter-connected events.
* * *
The lack of national authoritarian tradition and strong tribal and regional connections in Kyrgyzstan facilitate resistance to authoritarian rule. The Kyrgyz do not have special piety to their rulers and the authorities and are not afraid of them to a large extent. They think nothing of arranging meetings and of carrying out semi-meetings-semi-conferences called traditionally by the term "kurultai", they stop up roads, organize "marches to Bishkek" etc. The Kyrgyz revolutions represent the outcome of this attitude to the power.
Although at present any protest and any riot in terms of ideology are formed as a struggle for democracy, the Kyrgyz love of freedom and inimical attitude to the authoritarian rule have rather "pre-historic" and "pre-national" roots and are far away from democracy, which is formed as a result of the long-term state's and law's development. The real democratic consensus is being gradually shaped in the political elite, while big masses and crowds participating in revolutions lack the principal support of democracy and opposition to authoritarian rule. Theoretically they might be ready to have an authoritarian rule. According to a poll arranged in 2000, the majority of the population
(81%) considers that "the steadfast man should install the order in the country". But any own particular authoritarian power causes a protest. It lacks the needed respect and does not engender the needed fear. The authoritarian rule is not so much turned down in principle but it simply "fails to turn out".
The Kyrgyz with difficulties subjugate to the authoritarian power. But they submit to legislation even to a lesser extent. The total Kyrgyz corruption is a kind of the seamy side of the Kyrgyz "tribal free thinking", the dominance of family and tribal values over the formal value of law. (It is a shame to fail to arrange designation of "your own person" to a profitable post or to help him to avoid judicial proceedings; it is a shame to leave him without assistance in hard time.) The land seizures for housing construction constantly occur in Kyrgyzstan. The riots and disturbances in Kyrgyzstan represent the natural consequence of the elections: if the failed candidate is unable to come to agreement with the election committee or the court, he may arrange a demonstration of his relatives to protest against the result of the election, he may give some money to unemployed people and beggars in order to organize riots. "Up to present, the ties of relatives and the tribal connections are very strong, and any candidate is able to ensure participation of two thousand his relatives in the protest demonstration", considers Bermet Akayeva. It is easier for Kyrgyz to arrange a revolution than to conduct free and honest elections, which still have never taken place in independent Kyrgyzstan.
If the society is not ready to submit to the authoritarian rule and easily comes forward against it, but if simultaneously it lacks strong psychological and cultural preconditions for the legal democratic state, inevitably we see in Kyrgyzstan the cycles of weak and non-sustainable quasi-democracies, replaced by weak and non-sustainable authoritarian regimes, later overthrown by revolutions, which start a new cycle. As it
is shown by examples of many countries of "the third world", it is very difficult to get out of the similar cycles, and it is much more difficult to do it than to liquidate a certain authoritarian regime.
* * *
Any authoritarian stabilization (in Kyrgyzstan or any other country) in essence may be only a temporary phenomenon, and the later destabilization will become an inevitable payment for it. But the relative and temporary authoritarian stability, like in neighboring countries, where up to certain time such phenomenon makes it possible for society to accumulate forces and to develop till the moment of the regime's final collapse, such stability does not turn out in Kyrgyzstan.
Kyrgyzstan has passed already through two different forms of authoritarian regimes (softer and harder), and its harder form turned out to be weaker and shorter than the softer form. Actually, still another attempt to create the authoritarian presidential system would result in a new revolution and continuation of the cycles ruining society. But since the authoritarian regime "does not turn out" and does not produce even relative stability, the exit out of Kyrgyz cycles may be found out only on the way of establishment of democracy.
The establishment of democracy in various countries confronts different problems, and the problems in Kyrgyzstan to a large extent do not resemble them in other countries, for instance, Russia. The main objective tasks in Kyrgyzstan on the way to democracy are as follows: placing the tribal and local loyalty to the joint level of democracy and lawful order (the liquidation of these ties and loyalties is impossible and not needed, since in a milder and civilized form these ties may even provide the needed stability and sustainability for the party system), to move the Kyrgyz free thinking to the lawful democratic channel, i.e. to transform the Kyrgyz cycles of revolutions, chaos, authoritarian
regimes and new revolutions into the cycle of elections and democratic rotation of power. In principle, it is possible to fulfill this task, as it was done in other countries, for instance, in India, where the cultural level of the population is lower than in Kyrgyzstan and the original internal separation of the population is not less, and where relatively sustainable democratic systems were established. The colossal difficulties are connected with fulfillment of this task.
The leadership of Kyrgyzstan sees the need to achieve this task and the difficulties related to its achievement. The sad experience of the post-Soviet history in Kyrgyzstan and of the revolution in 2005, which had no clear aims and plans, except the overthrow of Akayev and an abstract strive for democracy, and which was reduced to the change of one bad regime for the worse regime, had its effect for the leadership and, evidently, for the most conscientious part of society in Kyrgyzstan. As early as in 2006 Otunbayeva said: "We want to get not only the mere change of power. We want to change the political paradigm! We are in need of the change of the whole algorithm of power... We will prove that a democratic country may exist even in Central Asia". The present Kyrgyz leaders - Otunbayeva, Tekebayev, Atambayev, Beknazarov and Sariyev - are the people, who accumulated a great personal political experience of participation in political life since the time of reconstruction, participation in power activities, experience related to persecutions, arrests, attempts and of two revolutions. We will not be able to find out politicians with such experience in other post-Soviet countries. And their devotion to democracy is deeper and more apprehended than superfluous, imitated and "lighthearted" democracy on the eve of the 1990s. The establishment of democracy is as the justification of their life and of history of Kyrgyzstan. It is the question of national self-assertion and of national pride.
The serious nature of democracy proclaimed by revolutionaries in 2010 was proved by the proposal of "the revolutionary junta" to designate as the prime-minister and "the president for the provisional period" (to the end of 2011 and without the right to participate in the presidential elections) of R. Otunbayeva as an evidently non-authoritarian, non-clannish and uncorrupted figure and only one woman among revolutionary leaders. But the most significant matter is the wish of the new power to lay its principles into the basis of the state order. The idea of the parliamentarian republic periodically was advanced by Kyrgyz opposition leaders-democrats since the time of Akayev. But after the experience of authoritarian degeneration and after fall of two presidential republics it acquired a rather defined form of consensus. The text of the draft of the new constitution was prepared rather fast without discussions on the basis of the proposed principles.
According to the new constitution (Tekebayev was his main author), Kyrgyzstan becomes a parliamentarian republic with the president obtaining minimum powers, who is elected for five years and who has no right to be elected for the second term. The president does not possess the right for immunity and may be deprived of this post, and proceedings may be instituted against the president "on the basis of the prosecution of the president accused of the crime supported by the conclusion of the General Attorney". The elections will be held only on the basis of party lists, which will weaken the role of local clannish interests. The barrier of 5% has been installed for election of the party members in the parliament for five years, and no party is allowed to obtain monopoly, the constitutional majority, in the parliament: more than 65 votes out of 120, irrespective of the percentage of votes received at the elections. (Such norm does not exist anywhere in the world, and it is the achievement of the Kyrgyz legislative creation emerged on the basis of the experience accumulated after elections to
the parliament in Bakiyev time and, probably, of the experience of other post-Soviet countries.) The government shall be formed by the majority of the parliament's deputies. The constitution is the original and considered, not imitative document, which emerged as a result of comprehension of the national experience and which puts a significant barrier to authoritarian feeble efforts.
But if the new leadership has become better prepared for construction of real democracy than the victors of 2005, it has confronted greater challenges. The two consecutive revolutions finally have shaken loose the vertical state and respect for power. After the suppressed first wave of chaos and wild outburst of pillage the events in the south, which surpassed the massacre of Osh in 1990; and coming from the underground the supporters of Bakiyev headed by his brothers and nephews evidently provoked this massacre trying to wreck the constitutional referendum. Hundreds of assassinated and thousands of wounded people were the victims of weakness of Kyrgyz state and Kyrgyz anarchic free will. The cessation of pillages, liquidation of chaos becomes the main task, which objectively pushes to the background all other tasks, including the tasks of democratic construction. The colossal chaos is a good ground for a new authoritarian rule, which may be accepted by society as a salvation, which actually will signify the continuation of Kyrgyz cycles and will not solve the problem but will postpone its solution.
"Kyrgyz tsykly", M, 2011, pp. 64-78.
