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IN THE SHADOW OF DECEMBER 19: BELARUS-EU RELATIONS
Dzianis Melyantsou
Summary
In 2011, Belarusian-European relations developed in the framework of a reaction to the presidential elections and the events of December 19, 2010. The European Union returned to their previous policy of sanctions, though leaving open the possibility to restore the dialogue under the condition that all political prisoners are released and rehabilitated. After the failure of informal negotiations with the EU and a disappointing summit of the Eastern Partnership, which occurred during a deep economic crisis in Belarus, official Minsk preferred a more intensive economic integration with Russia and simultaneously strengthened repressions inside the country. Thus, relations with the EU appeared again in the shade of the Kremlin stars.
Trends:
• The European Union returned to the policy of sanctions in relation to Belarus;
• Belarusian authorities, disappointed with the absence of the expected financial help from the EU and angry about the expansion of sanctions, preferred the further integration with Russia;
• Foreign policy imbalance towards Russia forced Minsk to search for possibilities to return to the dialogue with the EU but with a minimum of concessions from its part in order to keep the power and prestige in the country.
Returning to the policy of sanctions
The "great political year" of 2011 did not begin on January 1, but on December 19, 2010, when the dialogue of Belarus with the European Union had been unilaterally suspended and Belarusian authorities had returned to their habitual repressive practice in relation to political opponents and the civil society. Reaction of the EU didn't take long to appear and it was naturally negative. The European leaders however restricted themselves to general terms by stating that it was not clear what had happened during the protest action and who was guilty of it. The Belarusian government tried to join this information war as soon as possible and pursued a preemptive tactic, having spread the shots of the storm of the House of Government and having explained the necessity of tough suppres-
sion of the action by the desire to protect an important governmental object.
At this stage one thing was obvious to the European politicians: Lukashenko had broken the promises he made to the commissioner Ftle, ministers Sikorski and Westerwelle and other EU representatives before the elections. It not only meant an inefficiency of the European strategy of retraction in a short-term prospect, but also a crash of personal diplomacy of Sikorski, Westerwelle and other politicians that had invested political capital and put their image at risk by agreeing with the Belarusian president.
Belarusian authorities lost the information war at the European stage as soon as independent journalists, bloggers and opposition leaders entered the fight. In the middle of January the representatives of opposition, human rights activists and relatives of the arrested visited the European capitals and had highlevel meetings with some European politicians and EU officials. These meetings together with hearings on Belarus organized in party groups and an emergency meeting in the European Parliament on January 121 predetermined unprecedented tough decisions under the resolution from the political groups of the European Parliament.
However, after the consultations with experts and general debates deputies of the EU Parliament corrected their position and adopted the resolution that differed greatly from the suggestions of the parliamentary groups. Formulations concerning the suspension of the participation of Belarus in the Eastern Partnership, introductions of pointed economic sanctions, a suspension of macro financial help, and boycott of sports actions became more lenient (it was suggested just to consider these possibilities). Besides, the final version of the document did not include paragraphs about an interdiction for contacts with the higher government officials, freezing of the Joint Interim Plan, the sanctions against Beltekhexport. But there was a requirement of urgent and unconditional release of the political prisoners after which personal sanctions should have been removed.
What is meant is the special session of the EU Committee on Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the Subcommittee on Human Rights, the Delegation for Relations with Belarus and EU Parliament Delegation held in the Euronest. The session was dedicated to the Belarusian situation after the events of December 19.
To prevent or at least to soften potential sanctions, the Belarusian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Martynov visited several European capitals in January. He tried to inform EU colleagues about the governmental version of what had happened in Belarus. According to some mass-media it was typical that S. Martynov actively used a "geopolitical map": he spoke about the Russian trace in events on December 19 and about the increase of the Russian pressure. However, the arguments of the Minister were not welcomed by the EU.
On January 31, the EU Council of Ministers adopted the Conclusion on Belarus2. The document appeared even less rigid than the Resolution of the European Parliament of January 203. The Council confirmed visa interdiction and the freezing of action in relation to 158 people responsible for political repressions in Belarus. It was decided to increase the help to the Belarusian civil society and to simplify the visa regime for Belarusian citizens. The international conference "Solidarity with Belarus" which took place on February 2 in Warsaw under patronage of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski, became a logical continuation of the decisions of the EU Council. The result of the conference was to allocate EUR 87 million for needs of the civil society in Belarus, to develop democracy, and to help the repressed.
On March 10, the European Parliament adopted one more resolution that called for stricter measures in relation to those who were involved in infringement of human rights in Belarus. And on March 21, the EU Council expanded the list of Belarusian citizens to whom the sanctions could be applied. The same day the Belaru-sian Ministry of Foreign Affairs promulgated the introduction of the return sanctions: a list was introduced (a secret one) of people that are not permitted to enter Belarus, as well ass a tougher control concerning illegal foreign financing of political activity.
On May 12, the European Parliament adopted the next resolution on Belarus which called for introduction of pointed economic sanctions4. The same day, the information was spread that in case
See: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/documents/news/ council_conclusion_ru.pdf.
Resolution of the Council of Ministers on Belarus of January31, 2011 [Electronic resource]: http://www.ej.by/news/politics/2011/01/20/ evroparlament_prinyal_sanktsii_protiv_belarusi.html. European Parliament resolution of 12 May 2011 on Belarus // [Electronic resource]: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type = TA&reference = P7-TA-2011-0244&language = EN.
of introduction of economic sanctions by the European Union, Belarus would send away a number of EU ambassadors from the country and would forbid 200 oppositionists to leave Belarus. Later this information was disavowed by the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On May 23, the EU Council returned to the "Belarusian question" and added 13 new surnames to the black list of persons banned from entering the EU. The next expansion of sanctions happened on June 20, when the EU added 4 new surnames and the black list contained then 179 persons. Also the EU imposed an embargo on the delivery of some technical equipment to Belarus in order to prevent its use for political repressions. And, at last, after numerous months of discussions, the EU imposed sanctions against three Be-larusian enterprises: Joint-Stock Company Beltekhexport, Joint-Stock Company Sport-pari and unitary enterprise BT-Telecommunications.
Ales Byalyatski's case became an occasion for further expansion of restrictive measures against Belarusian government. Taking into account the resolution of the European Parliament on October 10, the EU Council added 16 new surnames to the list of those who are banned to enter the EU and demanded the urgent release of Byalyatski and other political prisoners. It occurred against the background of numerous anti-European statements and materials in the state mass-media of Belarus. Special attention was paid to the media mini-conflict with Poland and A. Lukashenko's charges of the Polish government, which surprised even those who were accustomed to the rhetorical creativity of the Belarusian president.
On November 24, the head of human rights center Vesna Alexander Byalyatski was sentenced to four and a half years of imprisonment in a reinforced regime colony with confiscation of property. On December 16, the EU included two more names into the black list of Belarusian officials who had been in charge of A. Byalyatski's adjudgement. Thus the black list totals 210 names today.
Secret diplomacy and its results
Despite the general trend of deterioration of relations with the EU, there were some events in 2011 that were directed at a search for a way out of this awkward foreign policy situation. On June 17, there was an appointment of the head of the EU Delegation in Belarus in the rank of the ambassador. It was Maira Mora who had headed the diplomatic mission of the Latvian Republic in Belarus earlier. It is
important to notice that the question of appointment of the EU ambassador in Belarus had been suspended for a long time. Therefore, this event became a certain message of official Minsk about its readiness for a constructive dialogue with Brussels.
Belarusian authorities directed a number of messages to the EU in order to defreeze relations. Criminal cases concerning some op-positional politicians were stopped, the majority of the condemned for the Square event were pardoned (except for A. Sannikov and M. Statkevich, who were key figures), judicial proceedings against newspapers Nasha Niva and Narodnaya Volya were stopped. Moreover, A. Lukashenko said about the possibility to solve the problem with political prisoners completely, and also voiced the invitation to the EU to take part in a national round table in Belarus. As it became known later, these statements had been made as a result of confidential agreements of the Belarusian president with the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Nickolay Mladenov who had secretly visited Belarus for informal negotiations with Minsk.
However, very soon the fact of the visit and its details became known to the public. Such an approach to the "Belarusian question" caused a wave of indignation and condemnation both in the EU and in Belarusian opposition. The fact of revealing secret measures to restart the dialogue and the absence of a fast positive reaction from the EU to the steps of Minsk led to the fact that Lukashenko disavowed the promises he had made to Mladenov and suspended the process of release of political prisoners.
This experience (as well as the one of Javier Solano's visit in 2009) showed that the process of a direct dialogue and negotiations with the Belarusian leader can become the tool of achievement of such aims of the EU as the release of political prisoners and softening of repressions in Belarus. However, one of the main conditions of an effective dialogue is its private character, which is very important for Lukashenko and his reputation, but which is unacceptable for the European society and Belarusian opposition.
Eastern Partnership: an epilogue?
During the second year of the Eastern Partnership the stagnation of this initiative became obvious as well as the necessity to give a new impulse to its development. Negotiations on the conclusion of agreements on association with the member countries were delayed greatly, dates of signing of the Agreements on DCFTA with Ukraine
were postponed a lot of times (and the negotiations with other countries of the region hadn't even been started), the process of visa liberalization appeared to be much more difficult than it had been expected. The Euronest Parliamentary Assembly took long time to start its work5. In other words, it seems that the fulfillment of the tasks of the Eastern Partnership is still very far away.
Against the background of repressive actions of Belarusian authorities, the heads of the political groups of the European Parliament decided on February 10, 2011 to "defreeze" the question on Euronest and to call its first session without delegates from Belarus. The constituent meeting of Euronest took place on May 3. Thus, after two years of negotiations with Minsk on the participation format of the Belarusian side the inter-parliamentary platform began its work without the "problem delegation". This event did not become something extraordinary against the background of general deterioration of relations: However, it clearly caused an irritation on the side of the Belarusian authorities, who were left out in the cold.
The summit of the Eastern Partnership which took place on September 29 — 30 in Warsaw became one of the most essential events of the year. For Belarus it was marked by a number of diplomatic scandals. It was initiated by the organizers of the summit who invited the Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Martynov as a head of the official Belarusian delegation, instead of the president A. Lukashenko (as the latter is on the list of those who are banned to enter the EU territory). Step-down of the level of participation in the summit came as a reaction of official Minsk to such "discrimination measures": Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Belarus to Poland V. Gaisenok was appointed as head of the delegation. The organizers considered such a level as insufficient and limited the participation of the Belarusian delegation in the summit. As a result, the representatives of official Minsk had left the summit before its formal end and refrained from signing the final documents.
The reasons of such behavior of Minsk lie in the deep disappointment over the Eastern Partnership and in the understanding
Euronest is Parliamentary Assembly of the Eastern Partnership. It was founded in 2009 but had not started its work because of the problems with the Belarusian delegation. The European parliament does not recognize the National Assembly of Belarus as a democratically elected parliament.
of the fact that Belarus cannot receive short-term benefits from the participation in it. It is necessary to note an exceptionally high level of reception of the Belarusian oppositions during the summit. In Warsaw, the delegation of the Belarusian opposition met German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Minister of State for Europe David Lidington, the Prime Minister of Poland to Donald Tusk, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Thomas Hammarberg. During the meeting the European leaders paid even more attention to the opposition from Belarus than to the heads of the member countries. Angela Merkel, for example, talked to the leaders of opposition for an hour and a half, and to the president of Ukraine Victor Yanukovich — only 10 minutes. Such an approach also confused official Belarusian delegation and the government of the country in general.
Against the background of a general disappointment over the summit results, the package of the financial help to Belarus suggested by Donald Tusk looked especially ambitious and sensational. The Polish Prime Minister offered EUR 9 billion to the Belaru-sian government in case it complied with three conditions: release and rehabilitations of political prisoners, organization of a dialogue with opposition and carrying out of parliamentary elections according to OSCE standards. According to Tusk, this money should have gone to reforms in Belarus, and it should have come from different sources including the IMF, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and other financial tools. At the same, time there was no condition of A. Lukashenko's resignation. "Tusk's Plan" reminds of Sikorski — Westerwelle's suggestion of the previous year which had also been too general.
At the Warsaw summit, the organizers did not manage to include the point on Belarus in the final declaration. Eastern European member countries were against it. As a result, the EU delegates had to accept a separate statement on condemnation of the situation in Belarus. This circumstance testifies both the professionalism of Belarusian diplomats and (first of all) the fear of other EU member countries to appear in "Belarus's shoes" in future. Such a consolidation of the "Eastern European Six" becomes an important structural factor that limits the EU possibilities in the Eastern Partnership.
The summit of the Eastern Partnership and the context in which it passed underline the discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
policy of the European Union in relation to Belarus. On the one hand, there is an attitude to the economic crisis in the country as to a window of possibilities to overthrow the regime by means of revolution, and on the other hand there is an ambitious offer of the financial help to the government. But also: on the one hand, they count on the opposition and the exceptionally high level of its reception in the EU, and on the other hand there are secret negotiations with A. Lukashenko. And finally: on the one hand, there are pointed economic sanctions, and on the other there are joint projects with state institutions (for example, the general protection of borders, struggle against illegal migration, etc).
Conclusions
All the above-mentioned specifies that the European Union cannot decide on its aims and tasks concerning Belarus: either it is the change of the regime or its gradual transformation through integration projects and work with the society. These purposes provide different toolkits of influence. Accordingly, to decide on strategy and tactics, it is necessary to define the aims.
For the present, the European Union abstains from formulation of a strategic approach to the "Belarusian question" because of different reasons: discrepancy of approaches of the countries friends, a weak interest in the region as a whole, absence of experience of transformation of authoritative regimes, etc. This means that Brussels will continue to use the tested mechanisms of interaction with official Minsk, such as symbolical sanctions in a combination with programs of technical help and support of the civil community.
