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BELARuS-Eu: NORMALIzATION IN SMALL STEPS
Denis Melyantsov
Summary
In 2017, Minsk kept seeking gradual normalization of relations with the West, trying to take maximum advantage of the transformation of the EU's approaches to Eastern Europe, as well as its new role as a facilitator in resolving the conflict in Ukraine.
There were no significant events in 2017 that could bring bilateral relations to a qualitatively new level. One of the mechanisms for overcoming this stagnation, according to official Minsk, could be the launch of the 'Minsk Process' for the de-escalation of international tension (also known as Helsinki-2). At the same time, the EU-Belarus cooperation agenda was expanding and getting more profound. New opportunities for trade and investment opened up.
Trends:
• The practical bilateral agenda was expanding and getting more profound;
• Belarus showed Europe greater openness in a cautious manner;
• Negotiations on important bilateral agreements were dragged out;
• Belarus used existing threats to regional security to improve its international reputation.
Achievements and goodwill of the parties
Early in the year, Minsk made an unprecedented step in the history of Belarusian diplomacy: entry visas were abolished for nationals of 80 countries, including the Eu, on condition that foreigners enter the country by air through the Minsk national airport and stay for up to five days. This was a demonstration of the goodwill of the Belarusian authorities primarily in relation to the Eu. Also, it was an appreciable step amid the protracted talks with Brussels on simplification of visa regulations and additional political demands put forward by the union.
The Belarusian Foreign Ministry showed enthusiasm when describing the progress of bilateral relations in its foreign policy review-2017. according to the MFA, the dialogue with the Eu
became well-structured and economically intensive, the parties continued to step up political contacts, and the streamlined cooperation efforts were steady and fruitful.1
The 26th Summer Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) in Minsk reflected the changing image of Belarus in the region. The fact that the PA turned down Lithuania and Sweden's resolutions criticizing Belarus was a diplomatic success of the host. At the session, Alexander Lukashenko once again voiced the idea of a new Helsinki process aimed at overcoming existing contradictions and building new constructive relations in the OSCE region.
In 2017, for the first time, representatives of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry took part in the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum held October 26 in Tallinn. Before that, Belarusian officials preferred not to show up at the venue intended for NGOs. Andrei Bushilo, head of the MFA's Pan-European Cooperation Department, said at the Forum that "there are no disagreements in the Belarusian government concerning cooperation with the European Union, and that all departments are interested in improving relations."2
Another important event took place during the Eastern Partnership summit: Lukashenko was invited for the first time. It was a symbolic, yet indicative gesture. Before, invitations had been sent to the whole country, because the Belarusian leadership was subject to personal sanctions imposed by the EU. Brussels explained that the international image of Belarus had changed and Minsk should be "encouraged" for its position on the conflict in Ukraine. Lukashenko declined the invitation, saying that his schedule was tight and that Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei was better prepared for the summit.
"Annual Review of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Belarus and Activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2017." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Pepublicof Belarus. Wfeb. 3 Apr. 2018. <http://mfa.gov.by/en/publications/ reports/e2c551f8f077f5fe.html>.
«Представитель МИД: позиция госаппарата по вопросу сотрудничества Беларуси с ЕС монолитна.» Naviny.by. 26 Oct. 2017. Web. 3 Apr. 2018. <http://www.naviny.by/new/20171026/1509035305-predstavitel-mid-poziciya-gosapparata-po-voprosu-sotrudnichestva-belarusi-s>.
For the first time in its history, the Eastern Partnership summit was totally predictable, and no one expected historic decisions or heated debates. The delegations adopted '20 Deliverables for 2020', which, upon a closer view, were not that deliverable. The final declaration of the summit contains more pragmatic provisions, as Belarus wanted. However, it is far from the maximum that Minsk hoped for when signing the Prague Declaration in 2009.
Endurance test: protests in Belarus and reaction of the Eu
In February-March, normalization of relations with the EU was put to a severe test. Police brutality during street protest actions against the 'law on parasites' and arrests in the White Legion case could bring Belarus-EU relations back to sanctions.
Europe's response to the events in Belarus turned to be low-key because of a number of factors. First, Belarusian agencies (primarily the Foreign Ministry) conducted a massive information campaign focusing on security, and refrained from aggressive rhetoric. Second, the government acted quite flexibly: having brought down the protest wave, they did not aggravate the situation by sentencing political opponents to long prison terms. Third, in recent years, Minsk has established itself as a neutral negotiation venue on ukraine that caused external political players to makes adjustments to their actions in relation to Belarus.
The joint Belarusian-Russian army exercise West-2017 was another test for Belarus' relations with the West in general and the Eu in particular. Amidst a sharp increase in international tensions and mistrust towards Russia, the exercise triggered a wave of alarmism and worrisome forecasts in the EU. They said it was quite possible that Belarus would be occupied and used as a beachhead for attacks on neighboring NATO members. Media tied Belarus to Russia as its closest military ally, posing a real threat to the image of Belarus as a neutral state.
However, Minsk took a proactive stand and neutralized this negative information outburst to a certain extent by ensuring transparency and openness to Western observers. Following the
exercise, Western media described it as a purely Russian stunt, or emphasized the greater openness of Belarus in comparison with Russia and Minsk's desire to pursue its own independent foreign policy.3
The fact that the crackdown on the protests against Decree No.3 and the large-scale Belarusian-Russian army exercise did not ruin Minsk-Brussels dialogue suggests that their relations have reached a high degree of stability, and that both sides are interested in continuing normalization. Considering Belarus' previous attempts to establish more effective cooperation with the West, it looks like the country's leadership has learned how to act flexible and proactive. Since the onset of the conflict in Ukraine, the EU has readjusted its attitude to 'Belarusian stability' and pays more attention to security issues, rather than to promoting democracy and liberal reforms.
Practical interaction is expanding
Belarus persistently worked on a transformation of the bilateral agenda towards a more pragmatic and depoliticized approach that has led to an increase in the number of projects of interest to both parties (border and environmental protection, infrastructure, transport, etc.). The European Investment Bank received its first mandate to work with Belarus, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development launched a new country program.
Participants in the fourth session of the EU-Belarus Coordination Group held in December assessed cooperation in 2017 in 12 areas: economics and finance, privatization and industry, transport, customs, education, research and development, trade, agriculture and sanitary and phytosanitary standards, environmental protection, energy, digital economy, and labor market and social protection. They agreed on a new sectoral dialogue on transport and measures to step up customs cooperation. Next year, Belarus will appoint a customs attaché to the
См. Мельянцов, Денис. «"Запад-2017": проиграла ли Беларусь информационную войну?» Минский диалог. 29 Sent. 2017. Web. 3 Apr. 2018. <http://minskdialogue.by/research/memorable-notes/zapad-2017-proigrala-li-belarus-mformateionnuiu-vomu>.
embassy in Brussels. Cooperation in environmental protection was intensified. A National Plan for the Implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate was adopted early in the year.
After signing and ratifying the agreements on the financing of the EU cross-border cooperation programs Poland-Belarus-Ukraine and Latvia-Lithuania-Belarus, Belarus was granted access to EU grants on a competitive basis in the amount of EUR 282,7 million until 2020.
On December 14, the European Investment Bank Council approved its first project in Belarus on the reconstruction of the M7/E28 highway and the border crossing point Kamenny Log. Belarus was permitted to cooperate with the EIB after the EU sanctions were lifted. The Bank was the last key financial institution of the Union, which had no presence in Belarus.
sanitary and phytosanitary standards topped the agenda of the Coordination Group. Belarus was not happy about the protracted talks and vagueness of the requirements regarding the EU standards. In turn, European officials believe that the problem is in the standards of the Eurasian Economic Union, which differ from European ones. In a more general sense, Minsk would like to have guaranteed access to the European market provided that all requirements are met and standards are adopted, whereas the EU wants the standards to be met first, and then, probably, the access will be granted. The EU also wants a different attitude to itself: opened market without additional conditions that, naturally, irritates Minsk.
In 2017, the trade turnover with the European Union increased 30.3% to USD 14,5 billion (23.0% of Belarus' total turnover). Exports were up 39.8% to USD 7,9 billion, and imports increased 20.6% 6,6 billion. The surplus totaled USD 1,2 billion. Germany, Great Britain, Poland, the Netherlands and Lithuania were Belarus' leading trading partners in the Union.
Disappointed expectations
Despite the action-packed project schedule in 2017, Minsk failed to achieve progress on the landmark agreements on visa facilitation and on partnership priorities. Belarus also failed
to persuade the Eu to start negotiations on a partnership and cooperation agreement.
According to Belarusian diplomats, the Minsk-Brussels talks on the partnership priorities are nearing completion. The agreement is meant to be some sort of a roadmap for 2018—2020 in four areas: strengthening of the public administration system; economic development and market opportunities; transport communications, energy, environment and climate, and human contacts. In the next three years, the EU plans to allocate EUR 112 to 136 million in grants for these projects under the country technical assistance program alone.
Belarus and the EU have defined all issues on the agenda, but no decisions have been made yet. For instance, partnership priorities cannot be agreed on due to Lithuania's tough position on the Belarusian nuclear power plant, and the visa talks stalled, among other things, because the parties cannot reach a consensus on a suspension of this agreement in case the EU resumes sanctions, or for some other reasons. Since these obstacles are political, one should not expect a rapid progress in the negotiations.
Brussels links the signing of the partnership and cooperation agreement with progress in the field of human rights and implementation of reforms in Belarus. In particular, head of the EU Delegation to Belarus Andrea Wiktorin and head of the Division for Bilateral Relations with the Eastern Partnership Countries in the European External Action Service Dirk Schuebel made statements on this point at the Minsk Forum on November 16. Belarusian officials insist on the priority of the economic component.
Formalized instruments of interaction with the EU remain discriminatory towards Belarus. On October 31, Kiev hosted the sixth session of Euronest (Eastern Partnership Parliamentary Assembly). Representatives of the Belarusian opposition were invited. The official delegation of Belarus to Euronest stays away because the EU dismissed the parliamentary elections in Belarus as undemocratic.
The Annual Report on Human Rights And Democracy in the World in 2016 approved by the EU Council on October 16 states that systematic violations of human rights continue to be
tolerated in Belarus: restrictive laws impacting on fundamental freedoms have not been amended, the death penalty is still applied, freedom of association and freedom of expression are severely restricted. At the same time, the Belarusian government has been more open to engaging with the EU on human rights questions. The parliamentary elections took place 'in a more open atmosphere with greater possibilities for opposition candidates to run.'4 At the level of formal declarations, the EU's approach did not change much. Political demands are still there in statements regarding Belarus.
Conclusion
In 2017, the Belarusian government was proactive in building a new image of the country as a peacemaker and a donor of stability in Eastern Europe. The EU's restrained reaction to the crackdown on street protests in February and March demonstrated stability of the normalization process and that the EU and the Belarusian leadership learned the lesson of 2010 and now act more flexibly and carefully.
A breakthrough in the political dimension of bilateral relations is unlikely in the near future. Nevertheless, positive results in the form of small steps in areas of mutual interest will be achieved.
«Ежегодный отчет ЕС по правам человека и демократии в мире за 2016 год.» European Union External Action. 16 Oct. 2017. Web. 3 Apr. 2018. <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34150/ ежегодный-отчет-ес-по-правам-человека-и-демократии-в-мире-за-2016-год_т>.
