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RELIGION IN SOCIETY
IN SEARCH OF AN APPROPRIATE MODEL OF STATE-RELIGION RELATIONS FOR POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: LESSONS FROM THE RECENT EVOLUTION OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY
Galym ZHUSSIPBEK
Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Suleyman Demirel University (Almaty, Kazakhstan)
ABSTRACT
Secularism may take different shapes and forms in different contexts, from aggressively hostile toward religion to accepting and standing for the public visibility of religion. The latter model, which is depicted as passive secularism, can be qualified as a human rights-oriented and democracy-friendly model. Secularism in Turkey is undergoing fundamental transformation from assertive to passive, and the process is still going on. The continuing evolution of the "Turkish secularism" model cannot be understood properly without taking into ac-
count the peculiarities of the "internally-driven" and gradual evolutionary transformation of the Turkish elites, social forces, and society, including the "Ozal and AKP factors," which have been crucial in liberalizing political, economic, and sociocultural life in Turkey.
In this respect, recent Turkish experience constitutes a striking example for postSoviet Central Asia. On the whole, passive secularism would be a better choice for the Central Asian countries in building a tolerant, stable, and viable society.
Volume 14 Issue 4 2013
CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS
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KEYWORDS: Passive secularism, assertive secularism, public sphere, post-Soviet Central Asia, Muslim politics.
Introduction
After the collapse of the Soviet system, which was inherently anti-religious, religion turned into a significant component of identity for the citizens of the post-Soviet counties, especially in Central Asia. Consequently, the role played by Islam in the personal, as well as social life of Central Asians, regardless of their ethnicity and nationality, has increased considerably and will increase further in the future. Along with the religious revival, discussions have emerged about an appropriate model of state-religion relations in the region's countries. Therefore, for a while, the implications of resurgent religion for public life and politics have been under discussion in Central Asia. It must be admitted that contrary to the expectations of the secularization theory prophesying the end of religion, or at least its disappearance from the public sphere, religion has continued to play a significant role in social life. Sacralization (return of religion), instead of secularization, has been going on since around the 1970s. On the whole, the secularization theory has lost its paradigmatic position as the significance of religion rises in the contemporary age.1 "The decline of religion in terms of loss of faith, a decrease in religious participation, and the individualization of religion, with its waning public importance," has not been proven.2
The increasing role of religion in public life has posited a serious challenge to political scientists in the West, who have generally left studies on religion and politics to historians, theologians, and philosophers.3 This challenge seems to be more formidable for the post-Soviet academia that inherited the heavy legacy of the Soviet regime, which did its best to eradicate religion as a social phenomenon and consequently negated all studies concerning religion except those serving the needs of the regime. Even now, after two decades have passed since the fall of the Soviet system, there are still very few studies that examine state-religion relations in the Central Asian countries, while most of the available research about religion is focused on Islamic revivalism, radicalism, or counterterror-ism. The significance of this article is also derived from the fact that there is no literature about the benefits of the passive secularism model for the post-Soviet states, which can be regarded as "human rights-friendly." All the post-atheistic countries need scholarly information to support and solidify the democratic gains in the field of religious liberties and to further these gains with the aim to build a model of state-religion relations that would be more suitable to the contemporary norms pertaining to the protection of human rights. In this respect, the ongoing transformation of Turkish secularism from assertive to passive constitutes a striking example for Central Asia, if only because both Turkey and the Central Asian countries have been pursuing similar secularist modernist policies in their recent history imposed systematically by the state.
On the other hand, there is little information in the post-Soviet countries about the ongoing fundamental transformation of state-religion relations in Turkey. In essence, the Turkish model of state-religion relations (actually "assertive secularism" or "laicism"), as it was developed and shaped during the Republican period, hardly presents a good model for other Muslim-majority countries,
1 See: F. Bilgin, Political Liberalism in Muslim Societies, Routledge, New York, 2011, pp. 47-48.
2 J. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London, 1994.
3 See: A. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, p. 1.
especially in the context of the 21st century. The "classic republican" Turkish model is anti-democratic, not neutral, toward lifestyles and is aimed not only at controlling religion but even at shaping and molding religion to the needs of the secularist, elitist, and oligarchic state apparatus.4 However "aggressive secularism," which has been dominant in Turkey for almost seven decades, began fading as its proponents ("assertive secularists") were defeated in elections and pushed back in civil society, the media, and the bureaucracy.5
There is a lack of proper information in the post-Soviet countries about the recent problems in state-religion relations in Turkey, for instance concerning the anti-democratic regulations adopted after the 28 February, 1997 "soft coup," which disenfranchised religious citizens (such as the ban on headscarves in educational and other public institutions) or directly persecuted state officials and academicians because of their personal or family religiosity, etc. These illegal regulations can be wrongly perceived as "the Turkish model of secularism," moreover, they may be wrongly presented as an example to justify depriving religious people of their rights and persecuting them on the "grounds of secularism."
Different Models of Secularism and the Reign of Assertive Secularism in Kemalist Turkey and the Soviet Union
Although state-religion relations may take different shapes and forms in different contexts (from theocracy to an atheistic regime), this article focuses on secularism. In essence, secularism means two things; first, separation between the state and religion, and second, neutrality of the state toward different religious and secular lifestyles. Surely, there is no absolute secularism, as in each country secularism is relative, imbued with other elements of social life and certain historical traditions.
The ongoing discussions in post-Soviet countries concerning state-religion relations in general and the rights and freedoms of religious citizens, in particular, underscore the value of exploring different contemporary models of secularism. Specifically, since in the post-Soviet countries the proponents of de-liberalization of state policy in religious affairs and the supporters of the "ideological secularist" approach, which is hostile to religion, invoke the concept of secularism, it is necessary to consider different models of contemporary secularism in order to determine a model more suitable to today's reality.
Several classifications of secularism models have been formulated in the academia. As Kuru classifies, there are "assertive" versus "passive" or "combative" versus "pluralistic" secularisms. "Assertive," or French-style, secularism wants to exclude religion from the public sphere and confine it to the private domain, whereas "passive" or pluralistic secularism allows for the public visibility of religion.6 Traditionally, the French and Turkish governments have maintained the state's neutrality
4 See: H. Yavuz, J. Esposito, "Introduction. Islam in Turkey," in: Turkish Islam and Secular State, Syracuse University Press, New York, 2003, pp. xiii-xxiii.
5 See: A. Kuru, "The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: Fears of Islamism, Kurdism and Communism," Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2012, pp. 37-57.
6 See: A. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey, pp. 10-14; idem, "Passive and Assertive Secularism. Historical Conditions," World Politics, No. 59, 2007, pp. 568-594.
toward religion, while greatly limiting, even forbidding, reflections of religion in the public sphere. The public sphere, as defined by Taylor, is "a common space in which members of society are destined to meet through a variety of media: print, electronic, and face-to-face encounters, to discuss matters of common interest, and thus to be able to form a common mind about these."7 According to Habermas, the public sphere is "a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens..."8
The United States, on the other hand, being neutral toward any religion, has not only been tolerant of public expressions of religion, but even encourages believers to play an active role in social and political life. It should be stressed that the practices of secularism in secular states generally vary between these two ideal types.
In the recent past, there has been a current of aggressive secularism in many Muslim countries represented by various individuals, groups, and elites in the form of an ideology or a comprehensive doctrine aimed at eliminating religion or religious manifestations, not only in the political arena, but also in the social sphere. One of the best and most successful examples is Turkey's Kemalism, which can be seen as a secularist political ideology filled with statist and nationalist meaning.9 In other words, Turkish society was secularized from the top down by secular elites who championed strict secularist policies as the sole way to modernize and westernize the country. Also the official policy of Kemalist Turkey of the 1930s tried to monopolize Islam and attempted to construct a state version of Islam (Lausannian Islam), marginalizing, vilifying, and even criminalizing other Islamic interpretations.10 For this reason, the main rationale behind the established and state-run institutions like Diyanet (the Directorate of Religious Affairs) and services provided by the state like public funding of the imams (all are civil servants) or obligatory religious instruction in schools is to take Islam under state control and create a particular model of believer. Therefore, some scholars argue that Kemalism was not "true" secularism as it prohibited "religious freedoms" rather than guaranteeing them.11
As for post-Soviet Central Asia, it is a region that was exposed under the Soviet regime to the most inhumane modernization, which does not have any comparable analogue in world history and which destroyed to a considerable degree the classic settled and nomadic Central Asian civilization. Extreme secularist ideology was exemplified by the Soviet ideology nourished in the hands of the Soviet Communist Party.
As can be seen, there are a lot of parallels between modern Turkish and Central Asian societies since both have undergone rapid, forceful, and anti-religious modernization.
As a result of their decades-long official domination, both Kemalism in Turkey and Soviet atheism in the post-Soviet countries were able to produce a number of conscious and unconscious followers, some of whom may be depicted as secularist fundamentalists. Soviet legacy is one of the main reasons why secularism in the post-Soviet states tends to be perceived in the line of French combative secularism (laicism).
It is quite logical that the elites of post-Soviet countries similar to the Kemalists may regard assertive secularism as the only way to "strengthen independence" and "build a coherent national identity." Nor is it surprising that in the recent past outdated Turkish assertive secularism, especially some premises concerning the control of religion and keeping religion out of the public sphere, pre-
7 Ch. Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, Duke University Press, U.S.A., 2004, p. 83.
8 J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989, p. 136.
9 See: F. Bilgin, op. cit., pp. 41-43.
10 See: I. Yilmaz, "Towards a Muslim Secularism," Turkish Journal of Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2, Winter 2012, p. 41.
11 See: T. Parla, A. Davison, Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey, Syracuse University Press, New York, 2004,
p. 6.
sented a non-democratic (in essence backward) example or source of inspiration for some Jacobin groups in some post-Soviet countries in their attempts to formulate a policy for regulating state-religion relations.
The Evolution of Turkish Secularism
Nowadays, a considerable portion of the political and intellectual elites and public in Turkey strongly supports the shift to passive secularism. Moreover, it seems that Turkey is gradually evolving in the direction of post-secularism. After touching briefly on the signs of the ongoing transformation, this article will shed light on the underlying reasons for the transformation process.
At present, the two main premises of Turkey's political system, on which state-religion relations have been built, first, assertive secularism and, second, military tutelage over elected politicians (with the aim to protect assertive secularism from "Islamist encroachment"), are no longer relevant.12 The military has played the role of guardianship of secularism in Turkey since the republic's establishment.
The rights of the non-Muslims, which were also seriously constrained by assertive secularism, have improved considerably.
Several attempts have been made to permit the wearing of Muslim-female headscarves in official institutions. For instance, the Higher Education Board (YOK) lifted a ban on the wearing of headscarves on university campuses in 2010; the directive banning headscarves in public service was to be canceled in the fall of 2013.
The Turgut Özal Factor
In general, Turkey has been experiencing a gradual redefinition of its secularism model from combative to passive/democratic since the late 1980s as part of the greater liberalization process launched by Turgut Ozal. The prospects for building a strong civil society and liberalizing political and social life in Turkey became a reality as a result of Ozal's reforms aimed at making the oligarchic economic and political system more just and participatory.
Ozal's liberal reforms, which weakened state monopoly over economic and sociocultural life, facilitated the rise of different social groups and movements, private media, and education. That led to the strengthening of civil society, the diversification of social, cultural, and political life, and the emergence of a conservative bourgeoisie and counter-elite (in contrast to the hegemonic secularist elite) in Turkey.13 Ozal personally presented an example of an individual who could combine personal piety with a democratic outlook and liberal stance in politics and the economy. "As a Westernist and a pious Muslim, Ozal accommodated his Islamic understanding to Westernism." On the other hand, Ozal believed that if Turkey became integrated with the West, it would be advanced in terms of democracy and economy.14
12 See: A. Kuru, "Muslim Politics without an 'Islamic' State," Policy Briefings, Brookings Doha Center, 2013, p. 2.
13 See: A. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey, p. 230.
14 S. Laciner, "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism," available at [http://www.turkishweekly.net/ article/333/turgut-ozal-period-in-turkish-foreign-policy-ozalism.html], 15 September, 2013.
By and large, Ozal paved the way for the eventual evolution of passive secularism in Turkey, and the Justice and Development Party, which came to power in 2002, essentially followed Ozal's logic in politics and reexamined state-religion relations.
The Evolution of Turkish Islamism
Turkey should be regarded as the best example for Muslim countries that have experienced forceful secularization policies regarding the reemergence, profound moderation, and liberalization of political Islam. Turkey's Islamists and pious politicians, despite being repeatedly outlawed and ejected from power, rejected violence, embraced pluralism and the democracy discourse, and by moving into the political mainstream adopted "conservative democracy." Most of these conservative democrats joined the Justice and Development Party (the abbreviation in Turkish is AKP).
Despite some serious interruptions experienced in the course of the 1990s, the liberalization process started by Ozal was accelerated after the AKP came to power. The AKP defends secularism but opposes the aggressive version of secularism (Kemalism).15
As Kuru highlights, AKP's pragmatic understanding of "Muslim politics" is compatible with "passive secularism." By "Muslim politics," Kuru means "politics conducted by pious Muslims who consciously seek to reflect their Islamic values and principles without pursuing the idea of an Islamic state."16 "Muslim politics" in Turkey can be seen as one of acceptable forms of political expression since in the Muslim context religious views are expected to be active in civil society and the public sphere.
In general, Turkish conservative democrats consciously avoid prioritizing religious discourse and, on the contrary, have adopted a political strategy aimed at inclusiveness to embrace all strata of Turkish society. In this respect, it can be argued that Turkish conservative democrats are closer to Ozal's vision than to the philosophy and mentality of the Islamist "Milli Gorus." However, as Yilmaz highlighted, similar to the Kemalists, the "classic" Turkish Islamists have the idea of top-down social engineering and a state-centric view of religion, as well as envisioning that Islam has the privilege of enjoying hegemony in the public sphere at the expense of other religions and lifestyles.17
The AKP has championed Turkey's accession to the European Union and turned pro-EU reformist as no other political group in the country.
On the whole, the AKP can be seen as the main political driving force behind a shift in the official discourse from assertive to passive secularism despite some recently emerged problems in accepting genuine pluralism in society, such as bipartisanship of some AKP followers aimed at alienating other-minded people in Turkey's social fabric.18
While the AKP governments have done a lot to liberalize political life, the AKP is still criticized by liberals for not being full reformist since the status of Diyanet has been preserved and freedoms encompassing those other than the majority Sunni Muslims groups, such as the Alevis, have not been enacted yet.19
15 See: A. Kuru, "Secularism in Turkey: Myths and Realities," Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2008, pp. 101-102.
16 A. Kuru, "Muslim Politics without an 'Islamic' State," p. 10.
17 See: I. Yilmaz, op. cit., p. 46.
18 It seems that this kind of problem in Turkish politics ensues from the deviation of some AKP's politicians from conservative democracy and their (probably) unconscious immersion into the Islamist Milli Gorus's divisive perception of the world and harsh rhetoric.
19 See: A. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey, p. 171.
It must be stressed that Turkey's path to passive secularism and specifically the AKP's reforms aimed at liberalizing political life in the country would not be possible without Ozal's legacy in politics and the economy. For instance, the development of capitalism in the country led to the emergence of the "entrepreneurial Muslim bourgeoisie." These so-called Islamic Calvinists have been more concerned about maximizing their profits, creating access to international currency markets, and ensuring political stability than about introducing Islamic law. The rise of "conservative democrats" in the relatively free environment has gradually moderated the radical elements within Turkish political Islam.20
A number of liberal intellectuals and associations are the major allies of the conservatives in developing passive secularism in Turkey. However, to perceive the evolution of Turkish secularism properly, it is indispensible to consider the role of civil society in Turkey.
The Role of Civil Society
The activities of civil society institutions established and run mainly by faithful and religion-driven individuals have contributed the most to nourish the ideas and mold the social fabric to a degree conducive to developing political and social pluralism and passive secularism in the country. It is one of the most important features of the Turkish way to democratize and build a more inclusive, more civic, and egalitarian society instead of one confined within the strict boundaries of an officially imposed secularist, statist, and exclusivist identity.
An Appropriate Model of Secularism for Post-Soviet Central Asia
Although a model of state-religion relations adopted by a particular state is contingent on certain historical conditions, we suggest that in today' s world the main criterion for determining an appropriate model of state-religion relations has to be the notion of "protection of human rights." Furthermore, a distinction should be made between secularism as a constitutional norm governing state-religion relations and secularism as an ideology (producing an aggressively secularist state) in post-Soviet countries. A secular state is expected to be neutral toward religion and secular lifestyles, whereas a secularist state is inherently antireligious.21 Similar to Turkish secularists, in Central Asia some portions of the political and intellectual elite misperceive secularism as a constitutional norm, interpreting secularism wrongly as a secularist ideology to be imposed on citizens. However, secularism as a lifestyle and worldview is not a constitutional principle in any Central Asian country, therefore a secular state cannot impose any secular or religious view on its citizens.
Passive secularism can be seen as a way to prevent any state religion or secularist ideology from being imposed on citizens, on the one hand, and as a way to guarantee the religious freedoms and liberties of believers, including religious minorities, on the other. Secularist policies are not a better choice for any post-Soviet society that has experienced the most totalitarian system in history.
20 See: O. Taspinar, "Turkey: The New Model," Brookings Papers, 2012, available at [http://www.brookings.edu/ research/papers/2012/04/24-turkey-new-model-taspinar], 16 September, 2013.
21 See: A. Kuru, "Secularism in Turkey: Myths and Realities," p. 103.
In contrast to the conventional perception of secularism in many Muslim countries (which tend to be understood as "la-diniyyah"—irreligiosity), within the scope of passive secularism, a secular state is not anti-religious, but guarantees religious freedoms.22 Contrary to the classic Islamist perception of state-religion and society-religion relations, "passive secularism, which guarantees basic human rights and freedoms, could provide a wider framework for Muslims to practice their religion comfortably and for other religious minorities to also benefit from human rights."23
Public visibility of religion is important for post-Soviet societies as they have largely abandoned the atheism-based "code" and been searching for moral underpinnings of their societies by invoking "their traditional civilizations" shaped mainly by their respective religions until the coming of Soviet rule. Moreover, Islam in Central Asian societies is expected to increase its influence as Muslims of the region endeavor to repair their identity "shaken" during the Soviet period. Therefore, an appropriate model of state-religion relations in the region is expected not only to guarantee indispensible rights such as freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, but also to accept the visibility of religion in the public sphere and its role in shaping public morality. It seems important for the Central Asian elites to enter a "civic contract" with Islam in the public sphere,
■ first, to solve the problem of politicization of religion and radicalism (since the more religion is threatened by hostile secularism and expelled from the public sphere, the more political religion becomes) and,
■ second, to build a really stable and peaceful society.
On the whole, it can be argued that in the Central Asian context, contrary to France or Russia, there is no substantial reason to claim the existence of a historical bloc or forces heralding the inherent necessity of assertive secularism. In the history of the region's indigenous people, there were no omnipotent centers of clericalism comparable to the Catholic Church in France or the Russian Orthodox Church in the Russian Empire.
■ First, in Sunni Islam there is no category comparable to the Catholic or Orthodox clergy and no institution like the Catholic or Orthodox Church.
■ Second, in contrast to the Shi'a doctrine, the religious authorities in general in Sunni Islam context and specifically in the Central Asian Sunni Muslim context have usually been controlled by secular rulers.
Some can claim that the threat of religious radicalism in the region necessitates the imposition of assertive secularism in the Central Asian countries. However, this assertion is Orientalistic and devoid of objective research on the nature and reasons of radicalism in the region.
Passive Secularism is to Solve the Problem of Radicalization
Religious radicalism not only poses significant threats to the security of the Central Asian countries, but also negatively influences the evolution of state-religion relations. Specifically, radicalism
22 See: I. Yilmaz, "Egypt, Pakistan, Islamic Secularism," Todays Zaman, 2 November, 2011, available at [http://www. todayszaman.com/columnists-261690-egypt-pakistan-islamic-secularism.html], 18 September, 2013.
23 I. Yilmaz, "Halal Secularism," Todays Zaman, 13 April, 2012, available at [http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists-277370-halal-secularism.html], 18 September, 2013.
undermines the sustained development of "human rights- and democracy-friendly" models of secularism, on the one hand, and provides a sense of legitimacy to the claims of those who aim to reintroduce "Leviathan" (a monster-state) in Central Asia, on the other. However, political and religious pluralism inevitably curbs radicalism, since a competitive market of religious ideas would oblige religious figures to moderate their discourse,24 on the one hand, while the public would prefer moderate interpretations, on the other. The more religion is threatened by aggressive secularism, the more political religion becomes. It is a vicious circle: an aggressive secularist policy aims to extricate religion from public and social life, but over time this policy draws religion ever more into politics. The secularists relentlessly attacked religion, and, in turn, religion relentlessly tried to protect itself; in the process, both views embraced politically unreasonable positions.25 However, after the state abandoned its secularist policies and secured religious liberties, religion withdrew from the political scene.26 Similar to what Back has highlighted in recent years concerning Turkish secularism,27 we can argue that one of the problems of post-Soviet Central Asian secularisms is their lack of a functional dialog with Islam.
The leading fundamental reason for the rise of religious radicalism in Central Asia is the absence of a dynamic religious education system and the lack of proper information about Islam. At first faced with information about Islam from literalist, radical groups, radical Central Asian Muslims later naturalized this literalist perception of Islam because of the lack of conventional information and religious education venues. In other words, a great majority of those entrapped by radical ideas found literalist (breeding radicalism) interpretations as their first systematic Islamic knowledge.28
Nevertheless, we need more nuanced approaches to the principles of neutrality and equidis-tance of the state to religious faiths if we take into account the semi-official preference (which is supposed to be a measure of "last resort and limited in time") of the Central Asian states of the Hanafi school (madhab) over literalist schools. The latter form the ideological basis of religious radicalism in the region. In other words, with respect to the necessity to neutralize radical interpretations, the main ideas of the passive secularism model may be supplemented by the necessity to give preference to conventional religious teachings over radical with the aim of building sustained peace and stability.
Actually aggressive secularism poses threats to religion not only by claiming to expel religion from the public sphere, but also by threatening religion much more by pushing religious believers into instrumentalization of religion in politics. In fact, the politicization of religion essentially impoverishes and threatens its survival as a divine teaching. If we analyze recent history, it can be seen that the most oppressive regimes in Muslim countries adopted an extremely combative Jacobin understanding of secularism and even embarked on the "securitization" of Islam. "Securitization" or "threat construction" means a discursive practice of defining a phenomenon that does not necessarily belong to a security realm as a security threat.29
The Turkish example shows that the rise of conservative democrats in a relatively free environment could moderate and neutralize the radical elements within political Islam.30 The abandonment
24 See: F. Bilgin, op. cit., p. 110.
25 See: Ibid., p. 59.
26 See: Ibid., p. 65.
27 See: G. Bacik, "The Fragmentation of Turkish Secularism," 2011, p. 17, available at [http://www.academia. edu/853070/The_Fragmentation_of_Turkish_Secularism], 18 September 2013.
28 See: Interview by the author of anonymous members of the executive staff of Kazakhstan's Muftiyat, imams, and instructors at the Nur-Mubarek Islamic University in Almaty.
29 See: M. Omelicheva, "Islam in Kazakhstan: a survey of contemporary trends and sources of securitization," Central Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2011, p. 244.
30 See: O. Taspinar, op. cit.
of aggressive secularism could be possible as a result of liberalization enacted by the AKP as a requirement of the accession process to the European Union. The demise of the aggressive secularism model in the country has considerably moderated the political Islamists' discourse. As has been highlighted, "the more religion is threatened by hostile secularism, the more political religion becomes" and vice versa.
To conclude, it is not the lack of a strict policy confining religion in the private life of believers, but, on the contrary, secularist policies threatening the survival of religion that renders religion political and radical. In Central Asia, this is also catalyzed by the absence of a dynamic Islamic education system and Islamic intellectual platforms.
What Can Central Asian Countries Adopt from Turkish Experience?
The softening and moderation of assertive secularism, on the one hand, and the growing role of Islam in the public sphere, on the other, make Turkey an extremely interesting example for both post-atheistic countries and Muslim countries with the strong presence of political Islam.
While the defense of secularism (in the sense of passive secularism) by conservative democrats, liberals, and former Islamists makes it problematic and uneasy for the Arab world to follow the Turkish example, it sounds good to the Central Asian countries. 31
Since Turkey has recently embarked on adapting its model of state-religion relations to universal standards, the positions of those who want to promote the assertive secularism model in the postSoviet area will considerably weaken.
It must be underlined that, after two decades of independence, substantial differences have emerged among the Central Asian countries, particularly in terms of political and economic models and the protection of human rights, especially religious liberties, social, and cultural rights. Nevertheless, the development of economic and political liberalism and the strengthening of civil society in Turkey present a good example not only for the Central Asian, but also for all Muslim-majority countries.
Since the Turkish model of evolutionary development from assertive to passive secularism is based upon the formation of the conservative bourgeoisie and educated strata of people who embrace different lifestyles, including religiosity of different level and formats, the Central Asian countries should also develop a class of small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, strengthen civil society, and diversify education.
All the Central Asian countries, regardless of the adopted model of state-religion relations (actually Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are more pluralist in terms of identity-building and more liberal in religious affairs), can draw the proper lessons from the civic initiatives of Turkish Muslims operating strictly within the confines of democratic rules. Turkish civil society plays a substantial role in nourishing a pluralistic lifestyle and molding social fabric (the public opinion and expectations of the people as well of the elites) in the direction of building a more inclusive identity supported by passive secularism. Central Asian Muslims also have to contribute to building a genuine civil society by helping to develop education and healthcare systems and raising social, cultural, and economic pluralism in their countries.
31 Nevertheless, after the tragic events unfolded in Egypt in the summer of 2013, it can be assumed that the Arab Islamists will rethink their stance toward (passive) secularism and embrace it at least in principle.
However, the Central Asian countries cannot directly take on the model for forming a party comparable to the AKP because all of them are post-atheistic countries, therefore their social fabric is fundamentally different from Turkey's. It is quite premature to talk about the existence of a level of religious education and religious consciousness and culture in the Central Asian countries conducive to producing political Islam that could transform into conservative democracy like in Turkey. The instrumentalization of Islam in politics and downgrading it to the level of a political ideology in a post-atheistic society leads to the emergence of a phenomenon that can be named "premature" or "early political Islam," causing disastrous results in Central Asia.
This article argues that political Islam can evolve into conservative democracy only in societies with a solid conventional religious education system that inculcates tolerance and acceptance of others. The evolution of former Turkish Islamists into the mainstream of the political spectrum constitutes the best example of the opportunities presented by political liberalism to moderate the "harsh discourse" of the Islamists.
The Turkish example also demonstrates the possibility of pursuing "Muslim politics" that do not follow the idea of establishing an Islamic state and are compatible with passive secularism. Therefore, this notion does not threaten the secular underpinnings of the Central Asian countries and provides a good alternative to political Islam.
Last but not least, the development of passive secularism is dependent on building more inclusive national identities instead of exclusive. One similarity can be drawn between pre-reform secularist Turkey and those post-Soviet states that adopted a Jacobin attitude toward religion. In both cases, building an exclusive national identity was enacted by the state and was implemented by the officials and regime's intelligentsia. In the Central Asian countries, the political and social groups promoting "assertive secularism" aim to create a homogeneous national identity; these groups are generally from the nationalistically inclined "extremely patriotic" strata, who feel a deep suspicion toward "others" and regard them as endangering the "social coherence" of society.
The moderation of assertive secularism in Turkey can hardly be achieved without adopting more inclusive national identity perceptions (e.g. acceptance of the rights of the Kurdish people). Consequently, the sustained development of passive secularism in the Central Asian states is possible by building more tolerant and inclusive national identities. 32
Conclusion
In the contemporary world, religion continues to play a significant role in public life. In non-Western contexts, especially in the case of Islam, the disappearance of religion as a phenomenon is totally absent. However, the debate on state-religion relations is one of the most sensitive and unresolved in social sciences.33
The recent Turkish experience of the gradually evolving transformation of the secularism model from assertive to passive is of utmost importance to the post-Soviet Central Asia. A number of stereotypes and misunderstandings about secularism, which are still common in post-Soviet societies, have been shaped to a degree by the influence of outdated Turkish assertive secularism in the 1990s.
On the whole, the passive model of secularism allowing public visibility of religion and ensuring the rights of believers in the public sphere would be an appropriate choice for the Central Asian
32 See: G. Zhussipbek, "Exclusivist Identities in Central Asia: Implications for Regional Cooperation and Stability," in:
Nationalisms and Identity Construction in Central Asia, ed. by M. Omelicheva, R. Hanks, Lexington (forthcoming).
33 See: I. Yilmaz, "Towards a Muslim Secularism," p. 42.
countries. It seems that at the present time in the region, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are gradually leaning toward this model of secularism.
The aggressive form of secularism tended to be problematic as it undermines neutrality of the state toward secular and religious lifestyles and renders religious believers and religion increasingly political, which is a precursor of religious radicalism. Moreover, so-called secular fundamentalism can be just as disruptive as religious fundamentalism,34 although it is less articulated.
Certainly there is no need to repeat Turkey's historical experience in order to gain some benefit from the recent transformation of Turkish secularism. Although each Central Asian country has its own conditions, a number of lessons can be learned from the Turkish example of the evolutionary change in the secularism model based on the liberalization of economic life, opening up to foreign markets, strengthening of civil society, diversification of education, and providing access to world-quality education.
As for the impediments to the development of passive secularism in Central Asia, "premature" or "early political Islam" in a post-atheistic society can be regarded as the biggest factor behind the re-imposition of combative secularism in some countries in the region.
Certainly we cannot expect the fast and swift adoption of passive secularism in Central Asia given, first, the heavy legacy of the atheistic period, and second, the substantial problems caused by "early political Islam," which has entrapped Tajikistan and especially Uzbekistan in recent history. Nevertheless, we are hopeful that in the foreseeable future, at least in some countries of the region, the political and intellectual elites will internalize a soft discourse of passive secularism toward religion.
This article argues that "Muslim politics" (which in no way pursue the idea of an Islamic state) can find an appropriate place within the confines of passive secularism in Central Asian countries where the elites are proud of their "Muslimness" but are extremely wary of political Islam. In a society with a diversified social fabric, strong and well-established political and legal institutions, a market economy, and internalized notions of the rule of law and human rights, "Muslim politics" might be seen as an acceptable form of political expression. Consequently, it can be assumed that religious people will not be marginalized in the formation of public morality or disfranchised by secularist undertakings in post-Soviet Central Asia. Furthermore, in line with what has been put forward about the optimistic prospect of applying the ideas of political liberal thinkers like Rawls in Muslim societies,35 we are hopeful that a liberal political conception of justice can be institutionalized and a democratic society built by mainstream religious believers in post-Soviet Central Asia. The ground must be prepared for the rise of a new generation in Central Asia that will be liberal-minded and pluralistic, on the one hand, and "religion-friendly" (whether it has a secular or religious outlook on life), on the other, which will relieve "Central Asian secularisms" of assertive elements. Development of a strong civil society, economic liberalization, and world-quality education (without posing a threat to long-term social coherence of society) are indispensible in nourishing both a new type of citizen in the region and in diversifying social, cultural, and religious life.
34 See: F. Bilgin, op. cit., p. 43.
35 See: Ibidem.
