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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Jannatkhan EYVAZOV
Ph.D. (Political Science), Deputy Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus, Executive Secretary of Central Asia and the Caucasus, a journal of social and political studies (Baku, Azerbaijan).
CENTRAL EUROPE, THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS, AND CENTRAL ASIA: CONFESSIONAL STRUCTURE AS A FACTOR IN REGIONAL SECURITY RELATIONS
Abstract
To what extent is it important to take the specifics of confessional structures into account when assessing the vectors and dynamics of interstate relations in
regional security systems? The author has analyzed the regional systems of Central Europe, the Central Caucasus, and Central Asia to answer this and related questions.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the 21st century religion and security cannot be discussed separately, which prompts the question: To what extent should confessional structures be taken into account when discussing the functioning of regional security complexes (RSC)1 as a whole and their members’ securitization, political behavior, and relations in the security sphere in particular. I have taken three postSoviet RSCs as an example—Central Europe (CE),2 the Central Caucasus (CC), and Central Asia (CA).
Seen as either homo- or heterogeneous their confessional structures are very different: while the degree of their ethnic heterogeneity can be compared, their confessional content makes them very different indeed. In any case, religion is still one of the factors to be taken into account when assessing the dynamics of regional conflicts. The very obvious differences in the confessional structures of the three RSCs discussed here suggest the logical conclusion that this factor has a different effect on the
1 For a detailed discussion of the regional security complexes, see: B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p. 190; B. Buzan, O. Weaver, J. De Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, Rienner Publishers Boulder, London, 1998, pp. 10-19.
2 Here I use the concept of Central Eurasia and Central Europe formulated by Eldar Ismailov, according to which Central Eurasia includes three post-Soviet regions: Central Europe (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine); the Central Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) (for more detail, see: E. Ismailov, “Central Eurasia: Its Geopolitical Function in the 21st Century,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 2 (50), 2008, pp. 7-29).
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
process of securitization in the member states. It remains to be seen to what extent it can affect their political behavior and the security relations between them and outside actors.
The classical theory of security complexes suggests that, in defining the shape and structure of the RSC, cultural (religious and racial included) patterns may be an important contributing factor,3 though they come second to political patterns.
The initial structuralism of the RSC theory (RSCT) is obvious: political relations and distribution of power among the RSC states stimulate the corresponding amity/enmity vectors.4 By introducing the category of securitization and the thesis that the process is an autonomous one, B. Bu-zan and O. Weaver5 have moved away from the initial excessive structuralism of this theory. The latest RSCT modernizations suggest that confessional factors are not mere catalysts but at times act as independent determinants of securitization in the RSC states and the corresponding security relations among them.
The thesis of the autonomy and the relative nature of securitization casts doubts on the priority of the structural-political factors in RSC; more than that: this can be proven empirically. The question is: Is this related to the RSC of Central Europe, the Central Caucasus, and Central Asia? It is extremely important to assess the degree to which religious closeness/differences affect interstate and inner conflict potential in the RSC states in the post-Soviet period and the way they perceive the amity/ enmity existing among them and between them and external actors as factors of their foreign policy orientations.
Confessional Structure and Relations within the RSC
The realities of the post-Soviet Caucasus are obviously dominated by the regional states’ political agenda (in their conflicts, in particular).
Out of the four large-scale post-Soviet armed conflicts—the Armenian-Azeri, Georgian-South Ossetian, Georgian-Abkhazian, and Russian-Chechen—only the latter exhibited an obvious religious component. It cannot, however, be described as the conflict’s determining factor in the context of the Chechen rebels’ political aim: independence from the RF for the sake of state independence. Of the remaining three conflicts the Armenian-Azeri conflict alone can be described, at a stretch, as confessional merely because the conflicting sides belong to two different confessions—Christianity and Islam—and because the sides claim the same stretch of territory of Muslim Azerbaijan with a predominantly Christian Armenian population (see Table 1 on p. 22-25). In this case, too, it is not easy to fit the Armenians’ political demands (independence from Azerbaijan and forming an independent state) into the Procrustean bed of religious differences.
Two other regional conflicts—the South Ossetian and Abkhazian—on Georgian territory cannot be described as products of confessional disagreements since, on the whole, there are Orthodox Christians on both sides; the prevailing demands of the Georgian autonomies are purely political.
Judging by the specifics of the confessional structures (see Table 2 on p. 26) of the RSCs discussed here, the CC makes the most promising subject for those resolved to identify confessional security determinants and the religious roots of the local states’ conflict-prone behavior. It is a region in which there is not only relatively balanced shares of the prevailing confessions—Islam and Chris-
3 See: B. Buzan, op. cit., p. 197.
4 See: Ibid., p. 190.
5 See: B. Buzan, O. Weaver, Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 86-87.
Confessional Structure of Central Eurasia: Dominant and Non-Dominant Confessions in the CE, CC, and CA States6
Dominant Confession Non-Dominant Confessions (main)
No. State Religion Share of the total population strength (%) Religion Share of the total population strength (%) Description of Trends
1. Afghanistan Islam 99.0 — — Both trends of Islam are present; the majority of the Muslims are Sunnis (80%)
2. Armenia Christianity (Gregorian) 94.7 Christianity (Orthodox), Yezidi 5.3 The larger part of the Armenian population belongs to Gregorian Christianity; there are followers of the Armenian Catholic Church and the Eastern Nestorian Church. Orthodoxy is widespread among the Russians (0.5%); there are Yezidi Kurds (1.8%)
3. Azerbaijan Islam 93.4 Christianity (Orthodox, Gregorian) 4.8 Both Islamic trends are present: the majority of the Muslims are Shi‘a (about 75%). The main Christian trends are Orthodoxy (mainly Russians, 2.5%) and Gregorian (Monophysitism)—2.3%, mainly the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh
4. Belarus Christianity (Orthodox) 80.0 Western Christianity, 20.0 The major part of the Christian population is Orthodox (80%, mainly Belorussians,
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’ The Table is based on the figures quoted by the CIA WorldFactbook 2008 and the author’s personal calculations.
Dominant Confession Non-Dominant Confessions (main)
No. State Religion Share of the total population strength (%) Religion Share of the total population strength (%) Description of Trends
Islam, Judaism Russians, and Ukrainians); others are Roman Catholics and Protestants (mainly Poles). Sunni Islam is popular among the local Tartars
5. Georgia Christianity (Orthodox) 83.9 Islam, Christianity (Gregorian) 14.6 Christianity is represented by Orthodoxy—Georgians, Russians, Ossets, and some Abkhazians (about 83.9% of the total population); there are followers of the Armenian Apostolic Church (3.9%) and Catholics (0.8%); Islam has its followers among local Azeris and Georgians (Ajarians)— 9.9%
6. Kazakhstan Islam 47.0 Christianity (Orthodox), Western Christianity 46.0 The Kazakh population, as well as certain ethnic minorities (Uzbeks, Tartars, and Uighurs), are Sunni Muslims; the local Christians are mainly Orthodox Russians (44%); there are Protestants (Germans, 2%)
7. Kyrgyzstan Islam 75.0 Christianity (Orthodox) 20.0 Most of the population are Sunni Muslims (Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Dungans, and Uighurs). Christianity is represented by Russian Orthodoxy
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Dominant Confession Non-Dominant Confessions (main)
No. State Religion Share of the total population strength (%) Religion Share of the total population strength (%) Description of Trends
8. Moldova Christianity (Orthodox) 98.5 Judaism, Western Christianity 1.5 The Christians of Moldova are mainly Orthodox believers (Moldovans, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauzes, and Bulgarians—98% of the total population); there is a small number of Baptists (0.5%). The Jews comprise the largest non-Christian community
9. Tajikistan Islam 97.0 Christianity (Orthodox) 2.7 Sunni Muslims form the larger part of Muslim population of Tajikistan (Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Kyrgyz). Shi‘ism is popular among the Ismailites of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (about 1% of the total number of Muslims). The non-Muslim population is small; it consists mainly of Christians, the largest number of them following Orthodoxy. There are small communities of Catholics, Protestants, and Bukhara Jews
10. Turkmenistan Islam 89.0 Christianity (Orthodox) 9.0 The bulk of the population consists of Sunni Muslims (Turkmen and Uzbeks). Russians predominate among the followers of Orthodox Christianity
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Dominant
Confession
Non-Dominant Confessions (main)
11.
Ukraine
Religion
Christianity
(Orthodox)
Share of the total population strength (%)
83.7
Religion
Western
Christianity,
Judaism,
Islam,
Christianity
(Gregorian)
Share of the total population strength (%)
12.8
Orthodoxy is the dominant branch of Christianity divided among three churches: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (50.4%, mainly Ukrainians); the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (26.1%, mainly Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians); and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (7.2%, mainly Ukrainians). The smaller share of the population consists of Uniates (8%, mainly Ukrainians), Roman Catholics (2.2%, mainly Poles and Hungarians), and Protestants (2.2%). Islam is popular mainly among the Crimean Tartars (0.5%). About 0.6% of the total population is Jewish
12. Uzbekistan
Islam
88.0
Christianity
(Orthodox)
9.0 Practically the entire population
is Sunni Muslim (Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, Tartars, and Uighurs). Christianity is mainly represented by Russian Orthodoxy; there are small communities of Bukhara Jews
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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
tianity—but also a variety of trends within them.7 It should be said that it is not easy to look at religion as something more important than one of the multitude of factors involved in the security relations among the regional actors. No matter how varied these factors are it seems that the classical RSC theory is quite right when it describes the political factor as the dominant one—this is fully confirmed by the functioning of the Central Caucasian RSC.
Table 2
Confessional Balance in the CE, CC, and CA RSCs
No. RSC y ian oxy risti odo (%) hri rth ( Ch Ort y nt ia ni O s ^ Gr Chr n er t s e We y m, m) ity ism is n i ti an ic nt ) ti li a ist hol sta (% ri th e h at t C C ro (P m la sl ) I ni (% n u S m la Isl ) I % JO — hi S
1. Central European 88.8 0.2 10.6 0.4
2. Central Asian 18.6 0.2 0.5 80.0 0.7
3. Central Asian (plus Afghanistan) 12.0 0.1 0.3 80.4 7.2
4. Central Caucasian 27.1 20.6 0.2 15.2 36.9
5. Central Caucasian (plus the Northern and Southern Caucasus) 34.3 7.7 0.2 19.1 38.7
The Central European and Central Asian RSCs differ greatly from the Central Caucasian RSC where its confessional structure is concerned. Table 2 shows that one confession dominates both of them while the others are reduced to insignificant shares. Orthodox Christianity dominates CE while Sunni Islam prevails in CA. This “unbalanced” confessional structure does not allow religion to develop into a dividing factor in the competitive political context. In other words, under these conditions religious mobilization at the national level, spearheaded against a “religiously alien” state that might affect the security sphere, is next to impossible. This happens for the simple reason that all RSC states belong to the same confession and the same trend within it.
This circumstance keeps CC apart from the other two RSCs. In the Central Caucasian security complex (even if the Northern and Southern Caucasus are excluded from the discussion) the confessional specifics of Orthodox Georgia, Gregorian Armenia, and Muslim Azerbaijan are conducive to their isolation from each other and the neighboring states. Despite their shared Christianity the titular
7 Even if we do not deal with the Caucasus as a whole but concentrate on the Central Caucasus, the differences in the shares of the main religions are much smaller than in the CE and CA regions (irrespective of whether Afghanistan is discussed or excluded) (see Table 2).
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nations of Georgia and Armenia belong to trends that are different enough to totally exclude mutual religious mobilization against one another, to say nothing of Muslim Azerbaijan.
In the CE and CA states a confessional split could happen at the sub-national level. It is hardly possible that Belarus will experience social mobilization against Ukraine for religious reasons or that the same might happen in Uzbekistan in relation to Tajikistan or Tajiks. At the same time, mobilization for ethnic reasons is much more possible.
Confessional Structure and the Relations between the RSC States and Foreign Actors
The confessional factor betrays itself in the relations of the RSC states with foreign actors for the reasons described above. In fact, this sphere is even more open to the impact of structural-political factors.
Let’s have a look at the amity/enmity perceptions in relation to foreign powers that have developed in the states of the Central Caucasian RSC. Indeed, does the religious kinship/foreignness factor come into play when the regional states identify their friends and foes beyond their borders? Had the religious factor played the main role Russia would have become Georgia’s closest friend because of their predominantly Christian Orthodox population. Reality is different—Georgia regards Russia as its main enemy and a source of security threats. Russia’s ideas about Georgia are very similar. The tension between the two states has never subsided since late 2003.8
The relations between Azerbaijan and Iran, states in which Shi‘a Islam predominates, confirm the above. However, instead of an alliance there are far from unambiguous ideas about one another and far from unambiguous political behavior on both sides, which could better be described as enmity than friendship. Azerbaijan finds it hard to share Iran’s ideas about regional politics. A student convinced that the confessional factor dominates politics will find it strange to discover that Christian Gregorian Armenia, in a state of war with Islamic Azerbaijan, is the closest regional ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Despite its shared religion with Azerbaijan, which is at war with Armenia, Iran cooperates, on a wide scale, with Armenia in the transport, trade, energy, and military spheres.9
The relations between Georgia and Russia and between Azerbaijan and Iran are the most graphic proof that political rather than religious factors form the amity/enmity vectors within the Central Caucasian RSC. Less graphic examples are numerous; it is much more difficult to find confirmation of the predominance of confessional rather than political structures. The Armenia-Turkey duad is the most pertinent example while all other examples known to us merely refute the connection between religious kinship/foreignness, on the one hand, and amity/enmity and corresponding behavior, on the other, thus confirming the primacy of political factors in the functioning of RSC.
I have already written above that religious differentiation in the Central Asian states is more likely to take place at the sub-national level between the titular ethnos and the local Russian population. In view of the latter’s share in the total population (Table 1), its compact settlement, and geo-
8 Early in August 2008 the sides were drawn into armed hostilities. Georgia tried to restore its sovereignty over South Ossetia, to which the RF responded with military actions in Georgian territory with the use of its land forces, Black Sea fleet, and aviation.
9 In 2007, Iran’s share in Armenia’s foreign trade turnover was 4.1 percent of its total volume (see: H. Khachatrian, “Armenia: Economy,” Central Eurasia 2007, Analytical Annual, CA&CC Press, Sweden, 2008, p. 56. The two countries discuss military-technical cooperation among other things during the frequent visits of top officials (including the presidents) (see: S. Minasian, “Armenia: International Affairs,” Central Eurasia 2007, Analytical Annual, p. 68).
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graphical pattern, active domestic conflict dynamics can be expected only in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, religious mobilization in the two countries at the national level is more probable in relation to their two neighbors—Russia and China. In this case, too, its impact on the behavior of these two Central Asian states in the security sphere will probably be corrected by the power elites for political reasons: they need positive relations with stronger actors and stability at home. In principle, however, we can expect religious mobilization and its influence in the security sphere in bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Russia, Kazakhstan and China, Kyrgyzstan and Russia, and Kyrgyzstan and China. This may happen if the inner confessional conflict potential in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan begins rapidly unfolding all of a sudden. This will undermine their system of political institutions since uncontrolled conflicts among domestic ethnoconfessional groups will spread to neighboring ethnically and religiously kindred states.
The same can be said of the Turkmenistan-Iran duad: religious differentiation will follow the Sunni-Shi‘a line. These developments are much less likely than the conflicts in the Kazakhstan-Russia, Kazakhstan-China, Kyrgyzstan-Russia, and Kyrgyzstan-China duads for the simple reason that Turkmenistan and Iran are both Muslim states. Nevertheless, we should not completely rule out the possibility of social mobilization at the national level because the two Islamic trends are different. History knows of many examples of interstate conflicts in which a great, or even the main, role belonged to the differences between trends of the same religion. This happened for example in the 16th and 17th centuries when the Ottoman (Sunni) Empire fought the Safavid (Shi‘a) Empire. In the event of radicalization of one of them, say the Islamic trend, when it becomes a rigid state ideology (Iran is a relevant examples), this prospect turns from a probability into a possibility.
The confessional structure of Central Europe, which on the surface looks very much like that of Central Asia, has a specific feature that, at least theoretically, should have created more moderate dynamics within its RSC. I have in mind the specific confessional kinship with the powers outside it. I have already written that in CA religious differentiation with political repercussions is more possible at the sub-national level, between the Muslim population (in the large majority in all CA countries) and the local Orthodox Christians. At the national level, on the other hand, the securitization of the religious factors and its outward manifestation could be limited to the relations between the regional states and external powers (Russia and China). This is predetermined by the degree of confessional kinship/foreignness of the system and its environment, which is different than in CE.
In the case of CA, the system with a dominant Muslim population has a protracted land border with the two largest Eurasian powers—China and Russia10 —countries with dominating confessions—in which Sunni Islam has no important role to play. The CA RSC has its confessional specifics in the south where it borders on Iran.11 As distinct from the CA countries, the Iranian state ideology is based on Shi‘a Islam.
The confessional differences between the CE RSC and the external political actors are less obvious because, first, its land border separates it from societies in which Christianity is the dominant religion. Turkey is the only geographically close Islamic country (in terms of its social nature), separated from RSC by the Black Sea. Second, the longest stretch of the land border of Christian Orthodox Central Europe separates it from countries with the same confessional specifics: about 64 percent of the land border of the CE RSC separates it from the predominantly Christian Orthodox countries— Russia and Rumania.
This means that if we exclude the external powers from the RSC structure but analyze their involvement through penetration mechanisms as the TRSC suggests, the relations between the CE and
10 The border with Russia and China comprises about 76 percent of the total stretch of CA land border.
11 The total stretch of the land border between Turkmenistan and Iran is 992 km; together with the border between Afghanistan and Iran, the land border between CA and Iran is twice as long—1,928 km.
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CA countries and external centers of power will develop under obviously different confessional conditions. If we accept religion as a factor that can affect the securitization processes and the relations within the RSC, we should surmise that the confessionally kindred external powers will find it easier to penetrate CE than CA (which is especially true in the case of Orthodox Russia). The real picture is different: the RF and China find it much easier to penetrate CA with its Sunni Islamic majority than Orthodox Russia—Orthodox CE. This confirms the already stated thesis that the confessional factors play a secondary role in the functioning of RSCs, at least in the discussed regions.
In the Central European RSC confessional closeness does not often bring about political closeness; the same can be said about the relations between the CE countries and their environment. The amity/enmity vectors are determined by factors far removed from religious kinship/foreignness. The region supplies the best example of the primacy of policy over all other spheres. The United State of Russia and Belarus12 is one of the few examples of political consolidation of religiously identical states even though the relations between the two countries are far from easy. The Transnistria and the Crimea are two examples that confirm the opposite; in both cases Orthodox actors are involved in the conflicts. In the case of Transnistria there are Christian Orthodox subjects on both sides: Moldova and the separatist Transnistrian Republic, which is supported by Orthodox Russia. In the case of the Crimea Orthodox Ukraine and Orthodox Russia (which does not conceal its designs in relation to the peninsular) are on the opposite sides.
Anybody insisting on the primacy of confessional structures will find it hard to explain the relatively high variety of foreign policy preferences and rejections in the CE RSC. In this respect the Central European RSC is closer to the Central Caucasian than to the Central Asian RSC despite the fact that the confessional structures of CE and CA are very close indeed. In the Christian Orthodox RSC the pro-Russian political bias of Belarus, which is involved in several post-Soviet structures (the United State, CSTO, EurAsEC, and others) looks very different from the pro-Western orientations of Ukraine and Moldova. A similar, albeit more balanced, contrast can be seen in the CC with its pro-Russian Armenia and pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan. In the totally Muslim CA all post-Soviet states (with the exception of neutral Turkmenistan) tend toward a pro-Russian political orientation.
What Minimizes the Stimulating Function of the RSCs Confessional Specifics?
The fact that the states of the three Central Eurasian RSCs remain secular explains why the political agenda dominates in all of them. More than that: this principle was accepted as the guid-
12 The treaty was signed in December 1999. The united state was set up to lead to the creation of a single economic expanse that was expected to ease the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor, and establish equal conditions for the economic entities in both countries, etc. This structure, however, has not yet gone any further than economic cooperation; their political integration is limited to setting up formal structures and formal activities within their frameworks. There is the Supreme State Council, the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Committee of the United State, the Border and Customs Committees, and the TV Corporation of the United State. There are united or joint structures of ministers and other republican structures of state administration of Belarus and Russia (see: Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Belarus, available at [http://www.mfa.gov.by/ru/foreign-policy/bilateral/cis/a234583eeb210b12.html]). The regular meetings of representatives of the two countries within the structures enumerated above have not yet shown any tangible progress toward political integration. The future status of the two subjects within the single state is the greatest obstacle: Russia wants Belarus to join the RF as one of its subjects or an autonomous republic while Belarus wants an equal status within the single state (see, for example: A.Iu. Plotnikov, “Soiuznoe gosudarstvo Belorussii i Rossii: sovremennoe sostoi-anie i perspektivy razvitia,” in: Belorussko-rossiiskie otnoshenia v kontekste evropeyskoy integratsii. Tezisy vystupleniy belorusskikh i rossiiskikh ekspertov—uchastnikov VII “kruglogo stola” po voprosam sozdania Soiuznogo gosudarstva. 13-14 Aprelia 2004 goda, available at [http://soyz-2004.narod.ru/plotnikov/]).
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ing one from the very beginning; it became a sort of political tradition that survived and was developed during their quasi-state existence within the Soviet Union. Their long existence as part of the excessively secularized Soviet state (which sometimes went as far as suppressing the flare-up of religious identities of the local people) left its imprint on the societies of the Soviet successor states.
The possibility cannot be excluded that in the 1990s the Soviet republics reached the threshold of their independence on the crest of the wave of national self-awareness with religious undertones. More than that: religion was used to mobilize society during conflicts. It should be said, however, that, first, any changes in traditions that took decades to form (or, rather, in the culture of secularism) needed time, at least the span of one generation. These changes might take place if religious factors are consistently encouraged inside and outside the country and if these societies remain isolated from the social and political standards of the West, which won the Cold War. In this context no rapid development of religious feelings in the post-Soviet countries could be expected within the still very short period of time. In fact secular culture and the impact of the state’s “Western standards” proved to be much stronger than the religious renaissance.
Second, it was secular political leaders who exploited the mobilizing functions of religion for purely political purposes. We should bear in mind that in most of the post-Soviet states the Soviet political elite remained in power at the first stages of independence. This is especially true of the presidents; in some countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Tajikistan) Soviet leaders returned to power after a short interval. In most of the newly independent states, however, the regime was stabilized when the former Soviet leaders (the elite educated under conditions of harsh Soviet secularism) regained their place at the helm. This was merely one of the factors that prevented the use of religion as a political instrument inside and outside the country. The “old new” leaders defeated the political elite that had come to power at the height of the national upsurge under the slogans of independence and national revival sometimes blended with religious feelings. This meant that the use of religion for political purposes was fraught with many dangers. In most cases the religious sphere was placed under strict control while secularist traditions were encouraged.
In the political context, therefore, the confessional factors were kept on the back burner, which found its reflection in the relations between the political and religious structures. The political elites of all of them (Afghanistan being the only exception) have declared and are insisting on their intention to create secular states. This is true of Armenia and Georgia, two Christian states, and of the Islamic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, etc.): these statements were obviously not mere declarations. In fact, the political elites wanted to prevent, as efficiently as they could, the possibility of religious mobilization. Strange as it may seem, that was particularly true of the countries with predominantly Muslim populations. On the other hand, the logic is obvious if we look at the domestic political developments in the newly independent states. To remain in the mainstream of my subject I shall limit myself to several comments.
The transition from a single system to a multitude of different state systems (as far as religious legacy is concerned, among other things) obviously and naturally caused political turmoil. The stakes placed on religious identity could have served as a unifying factor for the newly independent states, which suddenly found themselves in an ideological vacuum, but it was obvious that this process could have gone in the wrong direction to cause social and political cataclysms. (This happened in Iran in 1979 and in Afghanistan when the Taliban came to power.) This, and similar developments in Tajikistan at the early stages of its independence, showed the political elites of the other newly independent Muslim states with what excessive reliance on religion as an instrument of social consolidation was fraught. Today, with the stage of extreme social and political instability safely behind them, the regional elites, aware of the risks, remain cautious when dealing with religion as a consolidation instrument; they are especially careful when it comes to security issues of key importance. The postSoviet development of these states demonstrated that sometimes the elites abandoned restraint and moved to the actual or declarative use of force against domestic religious movements potentially able
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(in the near or distant future) to stimulate religious mobilization at the national level. I have already mentioned Tajikistan; post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan supplied more examples of the same— the Batken events of 1999 and the Andijan events of 2005.13
The stakes placed on limiting the influence of religious factors on social consolidation in the region’s Islamic countries is part and parcel of the logic of the domestic political struggle. The authors of the Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia (2001) have written: “Regional political elites are likely to remain resistant to political Islam, at least in the near future. ... In periods of disorder, Islam may attract opposition leaders, particularly those without strong regional or tribal power bases, or others, ... as it did Muhammed Solikh in Uzbekistan and Nadir Khachilayev in Daghestan.”14
This inevitably affected the process of securitization in the newly independent states, which still fails to concentrate on the targets, goals, and stimulants of the confessional threats.
Can the Confessional Factor Play a Stronger Role?
The traditions of secularism, influence of the West, and what the political elites are doing in the CA states, which goes as far as open use of force, restrained, to a certain extent, social consolidation within the religious context. Does this mean that these temporary results will survive?
The answer is: it would be wrong to ignore the confessional factor even though today it is kept under a lid—in the future, confessional structures could move to the fore to affect the regional actors’ political behavior. This conclusion is based not only on the well-known civilizational conception of Samuel Huntington.15
Most of the regionally active factors, both endogenous (social and material inequality; the administrative crisis that hit the traditional religious trends; the imperfect regulatory mechanisms of the relations between the state and religion, etc.) and exogenous (the steadily expanding seats of armed conflicts between the United States and the Eurasian Islamic states—Afghanistan, Iraq, and probably Iran), as well as the fact that Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan are actively exploiting the religious factor to gain political influence in CC and CA, make it possible to say that Islam is developing into a political instrument in the countries of these regions, while the process of securitization is acquiring religious aspects.
This might be caused by those methods used by the political elites to bridle religious processes in the post-Soviet period. For example, the excessive cruelty with which the nontraditional religious trends were suppressed (mainly in CA) could produce counter-productive results some time in the future: “Regimes throughout the region have been careful to distinguish between mainstream (traditional.—J.E.) Islam, which they support, and radical Islamic currents. But careless actions against the latter could affect mainstream attitudes and discredit the officially accepted hierarchy of the faith.”16
The developments of the 1980s-1990s in Afghanistan might prove instructive: excessive military interference and the use of force to bring about secularization (or, rather, to set up a system of
13 It is not quite correct to seek the roots of what happened only in the religious sphere, however the government exploited the slogan of struggle against the radical political Islamic groups to add legitimacy to what was being done at home and abroad.
14 Ch. Fairbanks, C.R. Nelson, S.F. Starr, K. Weisbrode, Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, 2001, pp. 19-20.
15 See: S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Touchstone Books, New York, 1998.
16 Ch. Fairbanks, C.R. Nelson, S.F. Starr, K. Weisbrode, op. cit., p. 20.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
relations between the state and religion patterned on the Soviet one) caused severe social opposition that finally developed into the radical Islamic regime of the Taliban. The experience of the civil war in Tajikistan and the events in Batken and Andijan suggest that similar developments might be expected in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and, probably, in Kyrgyzstan.
The confessional specifics of the former two (where Islam is much more socially prominent than elsewhere and where the Muslim population is much larger than the non-Muslim) create the risk of their becoming Islamic states. The situation in Kyrgyzstan is less acute, but it could develop into a seat of religious conflict that will undermine the republic’s weak political system.17
Significantly, if this variant is realized in CA—if any of the regional states where traditional Islam predominates becomes a state close to Afghanistan under the Taliban (where non-traditional Islam predominates), the confessional factor may acquire a greater role in the securitization process. I have already written, in particular, that confessional homogeneity in CA (in all countries Sunni Islam is the main religion) objectively prevents national mobilization on the basis of confessional differences. If, however, in one of the countries the regime changes and brings to the fore a nontradition-al Islamic trend (which has already happened in Afghanistan),18 the current homogeneity will be undermined to a certain extent. In this situation states with different dominating paradigms of Islam will have to coexist; from this it follows that social mobilization against a religiously alien regime (state) cannot be excluded.
The already existing “alien” Islamic regimes are seeking radical political changes in the neighboring states irrespective of whether they are Islamic, Christian, or belong to other confessions. Iran in the wake of the 1979 revolution and Afghanistan under the Taliban are relevant examples: both states insisted on spreading their political ideology (Shi‘a Islam in the former case and radical Sunni in the latter) as an important component of their security policy. As a result, some of their closest neighbors look at Iran and Afghanistan as threats to their security (Iraq, Turkey, and Afghanistan in the case of Iran and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and Iran in the case of Afghanistan under the Taliban).
C o n c l u s i o n
Today (and in the near future) it is still premature to seriously discuss the possibility of greater impact of the confessional factors on securitization in the states of CE, CC, and CA, as well as on the dynamics of their mutual security relations. There are strong objective regional limitations, as well as those created by the local political elites. Today we can describe them at best as catalysts rather than determining factors.
17 The religious situation in Kyrgyzstan is remarkable not only because Orthodox Christianity is fairly strong there (Kazakhstan is another republic where Orthodox Christianity is just as strong) but also because the position of Islam is also very specific. The republic’s southern and northern parts traditionally differ from one another where the role of Islam is concerned. The south has been and remains Islamic; this is especially true of the areas adjacent to Uzbekistan with a great share of ethnic Uzbeks in the local population: in 15 years the number of mosques in Kyrgyzstan grew 43-fold, most of them (545) are found in the Osh Region (see: A. Sukhov, “Post-Soviet Radicalization of Islam in Kyrgyzstan: Hizb ut-Tahrir,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 6 (42), 2006, pp. 102-110; N. Borisov, “Revolutionary and Post-Revolutionary Processes across the Post-Soviet Expanse: Can They Be Compared? (Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan),” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (41), 2006, pp. 71-80).
18 The radical Islamic organizations in Central Asia are working toward cardinal political changes (this is true of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir) and, specifically, toward an Islamic state (Caliphate) in the Ferghana Valley (see: A. Sukhov, op. cit., pp. 107-108; M. Abisheva, T. Shaymergenov, “Religious-Political Extremism in Central Asia: Why and How It Is Spreading,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 6 (42), 2006, pp. 51-52; Islamskoe dvizhenie Uzbekistana i Hizb ut-Tahrir: Vozdeystvie Afghanskoy kompanii, International Crisis Group, Report on Central Asia, Osh/Brussels, 30 January, 2002, available at [http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/central_asia/ russian_translations/imu_and_hizb_final_russian.pdf], 22 September, 2006).
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Today confessional factors have not yet developed into stimulators of securitization at the national level in their own right. Their specific features (kinship/foreignness) will determine the degree to which the more important securitization stimulators turn out to be stronger and more sustainable. It goes without saying that religious specifics may also become an object of manipulation on the part of the political elites of states for, say, social consolidation needed to create a strategy of attaining political interests.
Hypothetically, an objective confessional structure of the CC might add vigor to the confessional factor, which means that this specific feature should, together with others, be used to explain why the dynamics of security relations in the post-Soviet period was rooted in a conflict context to a much greater extent than in the other two RSCs. No matter how stable, these dynamics may change under the pressure of the current domestic sociopolitical, socioideological, and external geopolitical processes and the greater role of the confessional factors in securitization in the CA states. We have already seen how regional political regimes were partially transformed into those based on non-tradi-tional Islamic trends. The Taliban’s advent to power in Afghanistan suggests that this alternative is more than a mere hypothesis.
Zaza PIRALISHVILI
D.Sc. (Philos.),
professor at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University
(Tbilisi, Georgia).
GLOBALIZATION AND THE GEORGIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
Abstract
The author discusses the place of the Georgian Orthodox Church and its role in the public and political developments in independent Georgia; he traces the changes in the Georgians’ religious feelings during the transition period and assesses the responses of the religious com-
munities to the challenges of globalization. Prof. Piralishvili concludes that today, for most of the Georgian Orthodox population, traditional religious values remain the best tool for preserving the nation’s identity while political instability adds weight and influence to the religious institutions.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Viewed over the last two or three decades religious life in Georgia can be described as a process during which its religious organizations have been adjusting to the changing historical and social
