Научная статья на тему 'Will the Caucasus stand the last chance in 2020?'

Will the Caucasus stand the last chance in 2020? Текст научной статьи по специальности «Социальная и экономическая география»

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Текст научной работы на тему «Will the Caucasus stand the last chance in 2020?»

factors, the creation of the strategy of realization of positive scenarios opens great chances.

"YugRossii: Problemy, prognozy, resheniya", R. n./fl, 2010, p. 108-117.

Aleksey Malashenko, doctor of historical sciences WILL THE CAUCASUS STAND THE LAST CHANCE IN 2020?

The attempt to have a look at the North Caucasus (NC) in the future of 10 years ahead confronts a number of difficulties. First, the contradictory, even incompatible trends constantly exist in this part of the Russian Federation (RF); second, it is necessary to take into account the subjective factor, i.e. the activities of individual politicians, who take decisions. The personal factor plaid always a very great, often exclusive, role in the semi-traditional Caucasian society. For any reasons one could hardly expect that any scenario whether optimistic or inertial (which should be regarded as negative) will be able to proceed successfully. The situation in NC is inseparably connected with the situation in RF itself, but the perspectives for the nearest decade are marked by a great uncertainty. Recalling the prognoses of the beginning of the 1990s, one has to say that gloomy suppositions turned out to be nearer to the truth: for this period two wars and some local conflicts took place in NC. On the other side, the most tragic variant - the exit of NC from the RF structure and the total civil war - nevertheless, did not occur. For the period of twenty years ago, the pessimistic prognoses prevailed, and they usually discussed the crisis and the way of its development. In 2010, the power proposed a variant of exit out of the

north Caucasian crisis. Thus, the "bi-scenario" approach to some extent was justified.

In the end of 2009, Moscow declared "reloading" of the policy in the Caucasian direction. The president of the RF declared the creation of a new North-Caucasian Federal District (NCFD) and nominated A. Khloponin as the political representative of NCFD, having restored the almost disappeared hopes for improvement of the situation in the region. Indirectly, this step demonstrated that the Center recognized the failure of the former course and intended either refute or correct it. The creation of NCFD with the regions of similar problems gives hope of their complex solving, including political tension, existence of armed opposition and radical Islam. The selection of A. Khloponin, the governor of the Krasnoyarsky krai for the post of the political representative was determined by two circumstances: first, his successful activities as the governor, second, his non-involvement in the Caucasian political intrigues. Thanks to his independence of the local elites he should take self-dependent decisions, keeping aside from the shaped clannish, bureaucratic and corruptive schemes. The high post of the vice-premier of the Russian government contributes to the authority of Khloponin. The new course and nomination f Khloponin were originally related to certain negative aspects. The lack of work's experience in the Caucasus is not only an advantage of Khloponin but also his disadvantage. At the same time, not all politicians in the North Caucasus expressed his support to creation of the new district. The local politicians expressed their concern about extensive authorized power of "Moscow governor-general" and his additional control over their activities, including the financial sphere. It should be worth mentioning R. Kadyrov, the head of Chechnya, who had created confidential and informal relations with premier V. Putin; Khloponin

for Kadyrov is an additional and unnecessary "intermediate" step in contacts with the highest leadership of the country.

The expert community views on a chance to change the regional situation are marked by the evident division. The analysts, close to the power, express their expectation in favor of inevitable positive changes, while independent experts express skepticism. They regard creation of the new district and nomination of Khloponin as a palliative: the replacement of politicians instead of actual modernization. The official optimism relating to NCFD and nomination of Khloponin do not seem to be convincing. The "new course" seems rather to demonstrate how the power cherishes a desperate hope that a newcomer to the Caucasus with his magic wand suddenly will be able to use "the golden key" to solve its problems. It seemed that Putin-Medvedev tandem in this way wanted to replace the liability for the Caucasus to the outside successful manager. Nevertheless, creation of NCFD and nomination of Khloponin were the starting point of the probable optimistic scenario. His alternative remains the inertial scenario, i.e. the existing situation in NC. In the beginning of 2010, an impression might emerge that the new course consists of two parallel directions: first, - the social-economic, innovation direction, while the political representative is liable for it; the second, - the maintenance of stability, the struggle against terrorism, which continues to carry out its activities. The power enforcement bodies are liable for the second direction.

In January 2010, the president of the RF D. Medvedev at his meeting with the head of the North Ossetia T. Mansurov said that the key of solving the problems of the district and its regions consists not in raising passions and constantly repeating talks on the rooted in the region problems: criminality and terrorism...The key exists in the social-economic development. The president spoke also about advisability of achievement of the first results already in 2010. The

"Khloponin scenario" did not suppose a detailed elaboration of the new approach to stability's maintenance. Meantime, it is difficult to expect stability without elaboration of new measures, and it is impossible to carry out a new social-economic course without stabilization.

First, the question is the limitation of the forceful component of the federal policy. The stress on forceful actions has been kept since the second Chechen war; but if in the beginning of the 2000s it was justified, today it has been reduced to zero. The special operations of the local and federal law enforcement bodies cause enmity and fright of the great part of the population promoting the rise of hidden and evident sympathies to the fighters. The peaceful population suffers often due to forceful actions. It is very significant to minimize the number of victims among civil persons.

Second, it is important to make officials of the law enforcement bodies comply with the law, to exclude unlawful detainments and use of tortures, to forbid practice of "collective punishments", when punitive measures are applied to relatives of the participants of the armed resistance.

Third, it is necessary to find out a certain form of recognizing the radicals as an opposition and to adopt a differentiated attitude towards the participants of the protest movement.

Fourth, there should be created normal conditions for contacts and dialogue with the differently thinking Muslims, with bearers of non-traditional Islam, including those, who share fundamentalist and other ideology. This kind of informal experience has been already accumulated. The reduction of the high level of passions is promoted by consent initiatives of local politicians, for instance of Yunus bek-Evkurov, the president of Ingushetia, who addressed to Khloponin with the request on pardon or release of those, who went to underground but

did not commit grave crimes and was ready to return to normal and peaceful life.

Fifth, of significance is the establishment of practice of public judicial processes over participants of the armed underground. It might provide the power with an additional argument for justification of its truth and simultaneously to deprive extremists of the halo of heroic fighters for justice.

Sixth, finally, the Administration should admit its mistakes and the people, who are liable for these mistakes, should be punished. It is able to raise its low level of authority in the eyes of the population.

It is evident that after the long-term opposition and mutual cruelty it is very difficult to make concession and to stress consent so much, as under the conditions of the uninterrupted terrorist activities. G. Khan, an American researcher on the basis of his analysis of Russian published materials demonstrated the dynamics of terrorist acts in NC. For 2010, the activities of terrorist not only intensified but after a decrease for some years were extended outside the borders of the region -in March two terrorist acts in Moscow subway resulted in 40 assassinated persons. In November 2009, the train "Nevski Express" Moscow-St.-Petersburg was exploded. In the region itself the terrorist acts became almost daily occasions: for the period of 2009-2010, the attempts at life of the heads of three Caucasian republics took place, in July 2010 the terrorist act took place at the Baksanskaya GES in Kabardino-Balkaria. It shows the permanent high potential of extremist both in military-technical and human resources terms. In some sense, the terrorist intensified activities may be considered as the response to the declared new policy of Moscow in the North Caucasus. The radicals are afraid not of more rigid forceful measures, since they have learned how to respond to them, but they are afraid just of their

weakening, since it leads to marginalization of the fighters and complicates recruitment of their new supporters.

It is useless to try to achieve a complete unification of Islam under the aegis of local Spiritual Departments or to try to strengthen the prestige of local Spiritual Departments of Islam to direct their activities for the sake of separation of the region's Muslim from extremists. Islam always combined different trends in terms of theology and ideological aspirations. Therefore the optimistic scenario supposes not even the consensus among various trends but the transfer of discussion mainly into the theological framework. It is impossible to de-politicize Islam completely, the more so, since certain secular politicians, for instance, R. Kadyrov, urge towards politicization. The measures mentioned above may help to decrease tension, i.e. to approach to realization of the optimistic scenario, although this bargain may look to be naive and not attainable in the nearest time. The risks are very high, and the main risk is as follows: the enemies of the power may regard it as a display of the power's weakness. On the other side, for the next decade a complete victory over the radical religious opposition seems to be impossible. The main real probable aim is weakening of the protest movement, its deprivation of new recruited young supporters. Given wise actions on the part of the authorities, the terrorist acts will cease to be committed systematically. One may reckon also that it would be possible to stop the practice of strikes delivered on infrastructure started by the fighters since 2009.

The inertial scenario supposes that the stress on the dominant forces will be kept, while the mentioned measures will not be used. The continuation of the former (slightly corrected) policy will mean the existence of the same responded reaction on the part of the fighters. The events will go on in a circle "challenge-response-challenge"; the enmity of the local population and disbelief in the ability of the

authorities to stabilize the situation will grow. In May 2010, Khloponin declared that he is interested in taking part in the process of nomination of any federal officials. A new staff of officials of the law enforcement bodies was formed in NCFD under his guidance. His advisor was nominated A. Edelev, while E. Labezin kept the post of the head of the Principal Department of the MIA of the RF for NCFD. Moscow seems to let Khloponin be in charge of purely economic affairs, leaving the issues of security to the competence of the adepts of the old policy. Some declarations of federal politicians, including Khloponin, cause concern, since the latter said that under the mask of terrorism and religious extremism. there tried to work the bandits' organized criminal groups, which were engaged in re-distribution of property. The similar words are comprehended in the Caucasus as follows: "on the top" the region is perceived as a bandits' hotbed. As a result, the option of the inertia scenario only increases.

The liquidation of the leaders of the radical group by itself does not permit to change the situation in NC. Evidently, the law enforcement bodies will not renounce this tactic, and there will be a lot of words about liquidation of the fighters' leaders and of total band formations. The polemics on the choice between the force priority and the more subtle and "soft" line confronts the direct question: is it possible the very rigid policy carried out by R. Kadyrov to spread to the whole Caucasus? Most politicians and experts consider that application of the Chechen experience of "pacification" to the whole region is fraught with the responded force and public disturbances. According to G. Khan estimates, in Chechnya there were killed 34 fighters in 2008 and 98 fighters - in 2009. In August 2010, the minister of internal affairs of Chechnya R. Alkhanov informed that since the beginning of the year there were liquidated 48 and detained 128 fighters. The number of fighters participating in military actions against Kadyrov is

unknown, but it is evident that they enjoy support of a part of the population, including the close circle of Kadyrov himself.

On the other side, both in Moscow in and the Caucasus there exists a kind "enchantment" by successes of Kadyrov, who owing to his cruelty was able to achieve certain stability, unlike events in Dagestan and Ingushetia, where armed forceful acts take place actually every day. It is possible to hear in these republics that in Chechnya the order has been installed though and in due time even more rigid measures might be needed in other republics. In case of Dagestan it will lead to a tragedy. Given this development of events, the inertial scenario will become a catastrophe; instability acquires a deep chronic characteristic. The social disturbances will spread to the still rather fortunate western part of the region, where the significant pre-conditions have shaped for their emergence. Thus, the Chechen experience of "pacification" remains an exception, while the extraordinary measures are connected with the need to overcome the consequences of two wars. The federal power will need at best some decades to solve social-economic problems. It is impossible to expect that as a result of gradual improvement of economic situation religious extremism will disappear by itself and the contradictions between the power and society will disappear. The reciprocal relation between policy and religion, macro-and micro-economy, unemployment is evident but not direct. The terrorist acts emerge not among people, who delve into garbage cans .. .The terrorists are not the people, who have problems with search for employment. They join the groups of radicals, since they lack political realization, mentioned analyst S. Markedonov. The decision to reckon on economy, which is the sole "locomotive" able to put the Caucasus to the right way, is totally incorrect. The modernization of NC has to be started under conditions of its continuing de-modernization.

The optimistic scenario pre-supposes principal changes just in politics. The main of them is overcoming the gap between society and the local and federal power. For attaining of this aim of great significance is the need of transparency in work of local authorities, participation of the leaders in public "round tables" and their accessibility - a chance to keep a dialogue with them and to put questions to them in Internet. The development of events on this way supposes that the officials are liable for their actions before the population, that the legislative structures function more efficiently and the existing parties are less connected with local clans. The normal conditions should be created for activities of non-governmental organizations. The distribution of financial means, primarily of the means coming from the federal as well as from local budget, should be kept under the strict control.

In 2010, at the conference of United Russia in Kislovodsk deputy of the City Duma O. Timofeeva said to the prime-minister that a half of money coming to NC would be again stolen, while V. Putin kept silent. (B. Yeltsin in his time publicly complained that he did not know where the money allocated to the Caucasus had disappeared). The optimistic scenario supposes that compliance with the federal law will help to put a barrier to "disappearance" of financial means.

The relations between the power and society are regulated by law; the rigid compliance with it determines the social-economic development of the region. The arduous task consists in making the laws function under very unfavorable conditions for their compliance with the laws. The federal center plays the main role in this respect. The compliance with the laws hinders corruption. The allotment of Khloponin with "unprecedented authorities", according to A. Kravchenko, the chief of GUVD for Volgograd region, was made with the view of "liquidation of the corrupted component". The level of

corruption in NC turns out to be inevitably higher than in the other parts of Russia due to the traditional feature of society, due to regarding from force of habit an administrative post as a source of material wellbeing, as well as due to the clannish system of loyalties. The corruption is inseparably connected with existence of the shadow sector, which in the former SFD, the forerunner of the NCFD, accounted for 40%-60% of economy (twice larger than in Russia).

In 2004, the uncontrolled incomes in the SFD were comparable with the amount of the state assistance delivered to the subjects of the District. For the last five years, the size of the shadow economy not only did not diminish but, probably, rose. Exactly this sector, not estimated by the official statistics, to a large extent ensured the survival of the population. The lack of economic collapse in the region is explained by functioning of the shadow economy. It is necessary to take into account the role of shadow economy for maintenance of relations with the subjects of the region. Being engaged in bargaining with the Center relating to the size of financial assistance, the local leaders deliberately keep silent about the role of the shadow economy trying in eyes of Moscow to present their republics as poorer entities than they actually are. It is necessary to legalize a great (greater?) part of the shadow sector and to make corruption "predictable". The similar experience exists in Chechnya. Thus, mentioning a success (partial) one should imply not liquidation of negative trends but their reduction and introduction into the determined framework. In this way it seems to be possible to achieve a result.

It is not worth describing in detail the impact of the inertial scenario. Some evident circumstances should be mentioned. The reciprocal enmity of the people and the power will grow. The laws, as usual, will not function, the systemic corruption will exist and will transform, side by side with clanship, into the main mechanism of

distribution of material resources and of administrative posts. Under these conditions, the shadow sector will cover the whole economy, and economy itself will finally become "a black hole" swallowing money of the federal budget.

The control of the Center remains nominal, and it is realized by means of personal connections between the representatives of the Moscow and local elites, while the position of the latter increase radically. In spite of the grown self-dependence of local elites, the separatist trends remain marginal and do not step out of the limits of "great policy", but at the same time there forms a phenomenon of "internal separatism", i.e. the existence of semi- or non-governed at all territories within the frameworks of the country. Sooner or later the Center will comprehend this circumstance and will try once more "to restore the order in the Caucasus", but at that stage the large-scaled use of forceful methods will be extremely painful and may result in a long-term armed conflict.

The issue relating to the inter-republican borders and to the borders inside certain subjects remains unsettled. First, the question is the border between Ingushetia and North Ossetia. For the last two years, the presidents of both republics with participation of the Center exerted great efforts to regulate the territorial dispute connected with Prigorodny district. The optimistic scenario supposes achievement of the decision to solve finally this problem, and in principle it is possible to do. The present consensus between the Ossetian and Ingushi elites, as well as the fatigue of society due to permanent tension promotes such outcome: the level of reciprocal enmity has decreased comparing with the situation for the 1990s. The borders between Ingushetia and Chechnya as well as between Chechnya and Dagestan remain dangerously explosive. However, until the local politicians will not be evidently interested in aggravation of the situation, the border issue will

not play a great role at all. Should such agreement be achieved, at the internal republican level the issues of creation of ethnic enclaves will be regulated as soon as it will be needed; the constant contacts will be maintained with the organizations representing interests of ethnic minorities. Thus, the inter-ethnic contradictions in some republics go away to the periphery of political life, emerging from time to time as a result of provocations on the part of some radical individuals.

According to the inertial scenario the border issues transform into the most acute inter-ethnic clashes and destabilize the situation in the whole region. The Ossetian-Ingushi conflict provokes a wide opposition involving Chechnya, where discussions on restoration of the Soviet borders of Checheno-Ingushetia (with dominance of Chechnya) emerge periodically. The conflict may assume also the religious form, since the majority of Ossetians are Christians. The restoration of Checheno-Ingushetia becomes one of the main slogans of the Chechen leadership; its ambitions grow, and demands started to be heard about the change of the border between Chechnya and Dagestan. The former residents of South Ossetia (Kudarts), who played a significant role in the tragedy of 1992, are being involved in the resumed Ossetian-Ingushi conflict. The idea of "Great Ossetia", i.e. creation of the Republic of Ossetia as a united subject within the borders of the RF is being reanimated. The feelings in favor of establishment of the Republic of Cherkessia as a separate subject of the RF are supported by a part of Cherkessians (except Cherkessians themselves, these views are shared by Kabardins, Adygs, Shapsugs, Ubykhs and Abkhaz). The more radical appeals have been proclaimed: to establish "The Great Cherkessia".

The tension in the inter-ethnic relations grows among Cherkessian peoples and their neighbors in Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the

opponents of Cherkessians and Kabardins - the Karachais and Balkars have been Islamized to a greater extent, while their jamaats maintain contacts with the authoritative leaders of Imarat of the Caucasus. As a result, the Russian-Georgian relations deteriorate further. All this has a negative impact on the international situation of Russia: the blame placed for intention of annexation of a part of Georgia will be added to the reproaches of recognition of separatists. The Russian leadership is being accused of its failure to solve internal problems and of its readiness to take a great risk for the sake of support given to Ossetians and Abkhaz. The border issue is easily used by different forces to aggravate the situation in the region and outside it. The preparation for the Olympic Games in 2014 has led to aggravation of the so-called Cherkessian issue, which seemed to some observers to have been lost its acuteness. Some organizations of Cherkessians came forward against Olympic Games, which, from their point of view, is arranged "on Cherkessian graves" (the places of graves of dozens of thousands of the relatives of migrants, who left the Caucasus for the XIX century).

The optimistic scenario provides for alleviation of this problem and decrease of the tension connected with protests of the Cherkessians. At present, a chance exists to reduce passions and to prevent transformation of the conflict into a direct clash. The efforts of the local and the federal powers will be needed for this outcome. It should be comprehended that the Cherkessian peoples very painfully accept some episodes of their history. But at the same time, the aggravation of the inter-ethnic relations in Karachai-Cherkessia and in Kabardino-Balkaria should be prevented by all means, particularly, if it concerns the distribution of administrative posts.

In case of the negative development of events, the Olympic Games in Sochi become an additional destabilizing factor. If the federal power ignores the feelings of the Cherkessians, it will aggravate the

negative attitude to the Games and will provoke its enemies to start more resolute actions. The more probable manifestations will take place more often as the time of the Games will approach, including a more radical reaction, right up to terrorist acts on the eve of the Games and in the course of the Games. The coordination of actions between Imarat of the Caucasus and the radical Cherkessian groups might be probable. Up to the present time, the cooperation of this kind was not observed, since the appeal for creation of "Great Cherkessia" on the basis of ethnic common feature contradicts the principal aim of the leaders of Imarat -to unite the Caucasus on the basis of Islam. However, the existence of a common enemy in the name of the Russian power may provoke their united actions. Should this, if temporary, mutual action emerges, it may jeopardize the arrangement of the Olympic Games or may result in tragic excesses in the course of the Games. The terrorist acts directed against the Olympic Games, the acts, which could be prevented with very great difficulty, according to experts, will discredit the policy of Moscow in NC and will question its ability to ameliorate the situation in the region. Russia will be considered as "a weak link" in the world international struggle against terrorism. It is difficult to overestimate the damage suffered by the Olympic direction due to the negative scenario. Although the question is the probable events before 2020, their negative consequences will be marked by a long-term feature.

The future of NC may not be prognosticated without taking into account the rapidly growing influence of the local tradition. In NC the ethnic-cultural tradition, religion (Islam) is inseparable from politics, and one will be under great delusion to expect in the observed future and all the more in 2020, that secularism will be established there. In case of the optimistic scenario, the influence of the tradition on the social and political situation will exist and remain a rather great phenomenon even in time of successful modernization of economy,

restoration of legality and order, reconstruction of education etc. However, in case of the favorable situation, when the all-Russian legislation functions and the authorities strive for ensuring social justice, when the population sees that the power actually protects the interests of the people, the appeal to the tradition is limited and the influence of the tradition is restricted and has an impact mainly on the family sphere and ethic of behavior. Under these conditions, it is possible to reduce politicization of Islam and its protest potential.

The creation and sustainable functioning of the contemporary tourist sector not only involves dozens of thousands people (the construction of only five mountain-skiing centers may create 160 thousand jobs), and the population of the region obtains a chance to get acquainted with modern technologies, to extend its mental outlook, to have contacts with new people. The federal power also thinks about a chance to use efficiently the local tradition: the initiative of D. Medvedev was aimed at this direction, when in 2010 he charged A. Khloponin with establishment of the Council of Elders in NCFD. The wise and delicate use of the tradition will help to involve the Russian population in the Caucasian affairs. The question is not the return of the Russians, who have left this region, but the attraction to the Caucasus of specialists from other regions, like it was done in the USSR for the 1950s, with the distinction: those, who may go to the Caucasus for higher wages, will not settle there for ever. Within the frameworks of the optimistic scenario it is possible to postpone the process of return to the traditional custom and to find out an optimal balance between tradition and modernization. This sustainable symbiosis ensures stability in society, promotes overcoming the identity crisis. The all-Russian civil values will be accepted in the Caucasus more adequately and favorably, while the region itself ceases to be regarded as an "other/alien" territory (loses the dubious glory of

"internal abroad") and becomes a valuable part of Russia with its specificity, though.

The inertial scenario means a non-reversible process of return to the tradition, which becomes the main mechanism of regulation of public relations. The de-modernization of society will pass the point of non-return, and the region will finally transform into an "other-alien" space ("internal abroad"). The influence of shariat will grow, since just shariat represents by itself a total legislative system in all spheres of life. The federal laws are applied quite formally or are not applied at all. (At present, use of adat and other traditional laws challenges the Russian Constitution). The existing in Chechnya and Dagestan Sufi tarikats (Nakshbandiya, Kadyriya and Shaziliya) become the main and most important political players. Their political influence acquires additional legitimacy, since many politicians in Dagestan are myurids (adepts) of Sufi sheikhs. The secular power is replaced by traditional institutions - shariat courts, councils of elders etc., or merges with them.

At the same time, this power itself appeals to the tradition as a convenient instrument to keep society under control. The state actively interferes in the religious affairs. Since the middle of the 2000s, R. Kadyrov pursues this course in the most consecutive way. Yunus-bek Evkurov expressed openly his interest to traditional institutions (in 2010 he suddenly expressed his interest to them and said that exactly the tapes might make their input into development of tourism and keep under their control the reconstruction of famous Ingishi towers). Although the competition between the bearers of non-traditional (salafit, fundamentalist) and traditional Sufi Islam goes on, it accompanied more often by cooperation of the rivals for the sake of achievement of the common aim - Islamization (shariatization) of society. This hidden cooperation goes on already now and becomes

systematic and public. All this creates favorable conditions for Islamization of the opposition. The society starts to be polarized: not all people share the idea of Islamization (all the more shariatization), but the supporters of the secular state remain in minority. (The phenomenon of the growing impact of tradition is not an exception. The same process takes place in the Central Asian countries -Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, where the influence of Islam on society as well as on politics becomes more noticed. In Tajikistan the re-traditionalization has passed the point of non-reversibility, according to experts).

The tradition, primarily religious tradition, is completely self-sufficient; its supporters do not want to be limited by the legal and cultural frameworks of the RF, and the tradition gradually transforms into an instrument of opposition to the Center. The greater is the influence of the tradition, the greater difficulties experiences the power to keep under its control the affairs in the region, the actions of some politicians, for instance of Kadyrov, whose public declarations sometimes are marked by provocative characteristic. Although the ruling elites keep loyalty to Moscow, the idea of a probable return to the political sovereignty of the 1990s model is taking root (it seems to be kept under the condition of the present level of financial support of the federal budget).

It s worth regarding development in the social-economic sphere according either to the optimistic or the inertial variant only in connection with successes or failures in the political sphere. At the same time, the social-economic development is inseparably connected with the characteristic of relations between the power and society, as well as with the level of stability, the degree of involvement of Islam, precisely of various trends of Islamic ideology in public-political life.

Given the ignorance of mutual relations of these factors, any economic and social strategy becomes utopia and wishful thinking.

In January 2010, at the meeting on the issues of NCFD development A. Khloponin defined five priority directions: 1) elaboration of the complex strategy in the region and of the clear plans for each republic on its basis; 2) adoption of special decisions on improvement of the investment climate, creation of regional and industrial parks; 3) elaboration by the federal structures and natural monopolies of special investment programs on development of infrastructure; 4) improvement of the quality of life and accommodation of the people; 5) arrangement of the order in the state apparatus and in the power structure.

It is possible to speak in addition also about other problems mentioned not once by the Center and the political representative: rapid decrease of unemployment, modernization of the agrarian sector, purposeful mobilization of local resources, creation of the All-Caucasian market, formation of special economic zones, improvement of education system. The proposals about development of tourism with allocation of 480 billion rubles were described in detail. It should be stressed that the arrangement of the order in the state affairs was mentioned by Khloponin as the last, fifth point. Evidently, after some months followed his appointment the political representative comprehended that the political issue is the main one. However, his initial feeling clearly shows the inadequate account and simple misunderstanding of the Caucasian specifics. At the inter-regional conference of "United Russia" the republican leaders proposed immediately 126 projects (20 of them were determined as the priority projects and 6 - of high priority. The excessively long list of the immediate projects raises concern and feeling of the lack of the clear conception of reconstruction of the Caucasus.

Certainly, the optimistic scenario does not mean fulfillment of all planned. It will be possible to speak about movement in the needed direction as far as the following tasks are achieved: creation of the reliable investment climate, primarily of ensuring sustainable state guarantees to private investors; creation of 400 thousand jobs promised by Putin; commission of a powerful tourist cluster; radical improvement of the situation in agriculture; creation of conditions for small business. Solving other problems depends on achievement of these first-rate tasks. In case of success, the efficiency of republican economics will grow, the internal investments will appear and various local industries will emerge, including agricultural production. The local economic activities will promote reduction of unemployment. Against this background, it is possible to expect the rise of level of living of the local population, emergence of chances for development of local social infrastructures, amelioration of the situation in the sphere of culture and sport. The settlement of ecological issues may also start from the dead point; at present, the environment is in the state of catastrophe, particularly in Chechnya after war and in Dagestan. As a result, it is possible to reckon on reduction of migration of the Caucasian youth to the central regions of Russia. The general success, which was expected for a long time, will be a break of negative trends, realization of postponed anticipations, emergence of the faith in the future.

The inertial scenario means that the above mentioned tasks remain unachieved. And one should mention the circumstance, which may play a malicious trick on those, who count on tourism. The gigantic and unique tourist cluster may be created in the North Caucasus. The intention to build a network of highways in the region of Mineralnye Vody, Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria testify to its large scale. Khloponin spoke about construction of three

stars hotels for the mass tourism. However, even if the corresponding infrastructure is created, it is impossible to predict whether the local tourist industry will be able to attract Russians to come and whether the services of the local tourist industry will be competitive. The Caucasian hospitality is not equal to professional servicing provided for clients, while the prices for a qualitative rest in Turkey and Europe often turn out to be lower than in Russia. Therefore the positive outcome of the tourist complexes may turn out to be far lower than the expectations. Evidently, apart from the two extreme scenarios there exists the intermediate one: the stagnation, as well as de-modernization, somehow reduced inflows from the federal budget, which may acquire sluggishly passing forms and may continue endlessly. This is the scenario of permanent instability marked by negative trends and a slow movement to a collapse. Thus, the intermediate scenario turns out to be nearer to the inertial scenario, being actually its prolonged stage.

The development of the situation in NC should be regarded in a wider historic and political context, including the position of NC in the USSR. The Soviet policy in NC was principally different from the present policy, in particular, it leveled the specifics of the inter-ethnic and religious relations, arbitrarily determined the internal borders, expatriated the peoples on the brink of their extermination. The modernization in Soviet times promoted development of the region, but was, like in the whole country, characterized by its limits and finally led it to a cul-de-sack. The transformation of society slowly but surely turned into out to become stagnation. Many problems were not solved but postponed waiting for its time. This time came after the disintegration of the USSR.

The present events in NC are not unexpected, thinks political scientist I. Yakovenko. According to him, it would have been strange, if they did not occur. The appeals "to live in peace and friendship" and

invocations about inseparable destinies are senseless, he thinks. Up to present, the central Russian power has not been able to propose the exit fro the deadlock, where NC turned out to be. And not only the Center is to blame, since its policy in the region was marked by many mistakes, including criminal ones; the local elite is responsible for its own mistakes, since it was concerned about its own well-being, ignored the social problems and relied on Moscow considering that it is its liability. The Caucasian politicians underestimated, more precisely, did not want to recognize the religious-political opposition, trying to convince themselves and Moscow Center that they confront the criminal groups, simply "bandits". The long-term period, which will be not limited with life of one generation, will be needed for solving the problem of the Caucasus. One of the most important reasons is the circumstance that, according even to the point of view of optimists, the terrorist activity will not become less for the next 15-20 years. The terrorism enveloped in the religious form is the logical product of historic process, the result of numerous mistakes, made by Muslim, European, American and Russian politicians.

The NC is the concentration of many problems, which relate to economy, internal policy and security; this list may be supplemented by the inter-ethnic relations, the identity crisis, the collisions in Islam as well as relations with the Center. The thorough and competent study of the whole complex of the problems is the must to comprehend the future of NC and its place in the widest sense within the framework of the new Russian state. The optimistic scenario of 2020 may turn out to be the last chance for the region.

"Pro et Contra", M., 2010, Iyul-Oktyabr, p .96-110.

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