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L. Cech
WEST GERMANY’S EASTERN POLICY AND NEW DIMENSIONS OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENT FROM 1969 TO 1974
Л. Чех
«Восточная политика» Федеративной Республики Германии и новые направления ее внешнеполитического курса в 1969 - 1974 годах
Development of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter referred to as West Germany) from its creation until the 1960s was influenced by the limits of its post-war structure. In terms of the international relations theory, post-war development of West Germany can be described as distinctly pragmatic. The political situation in this country corresponded with the political realism theory and the powerful state, as the most important international actor, was brought into the foreground. This actor behaves rationally and assesses its goals. However, if it deviates from this rationality, dictated by a national interest, it will have to change its attitudes, especially in the field of foreign policy.
Government officials of West Germany regarded pro-western orientation of its foreign policy in the post-war period as a fundamental factor determining fulfilment of their strategic goal - reunification of Germany. The paradox was that Atlanticism, which presented the basic principle of West Germany’s foreign policy, the entire pro-Western policy (based on West Germany’s foreign policy) and the Eastern policy as well, was at the same time a certain limit that prevented West Germany from occupying an equal position of a full-fledged subject in the global political environment.
The 1960s can be characterized as the period of “agonizing re-evaluation” of the fundamental values of West Germany’s foreign policy. It was the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) that started the transformation. It suggested that West Germany chose a realistic approach by means of the Eastern policy. As a result, West Germany was supposed to gain more international influence and power that would enable more space for its political manoeuvring and a better position within the Western Bloc.
Social-democratic orientation of West Germany’s foreign policy brought forward audacious plans for reappraisal of its traditional values. These plans and intentions had a huge impact on further development of West Germany’s international influence1.
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Initially, the government of the so-called small coalition did not have an easy task to realise the concept of its foreign policy. After twenty years of positions-of-strength policy, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) left a legacy that could be compared to a threat of international political isolation2.
Helmut Schmidt, a German Social Democratic (SPD) politician, had expressed his opinions on this problem before the Social-Liberal coalition took over the government in 1969: “The German policy in the previous period considerably limited our ability to participate in international affairs. Its makers supposed that the main goal of German policy - reunification of Germany - could be reached by means of pressure on the part of the most powerful western allies. This positions-of-strength policy concept failed a long time ago”3.
The Social Democrats gained valuable experience while being members of the former “grand” coalition government (1966 - 1969). This experience helped them understand that within that government it was not possible to make the steps resulting from the needs of the international political development4. In this connection, Helmut Schmidt expressed the following idea in his book called “Strategy of Balance”: “The grand coalition outlived its usefulness regarding foreign policy by its inability to act”5.
In his book called “A Peace Policy for Europe”, Willy Brandt offered the fundamental theoretical, historical and political principles for foreign policy of the “small coalition” government. What is more, he highlighted the principle element of the West German Social Democrats’ success. According to Willy Brandt, this remarkable success was based on the their ability to assess their own strengths, capabilities and weaknesses, take things as they came and explicitly call them by their proper names. Moreover, they were able to comprehend their role and future tasks in this particular historical period6.
In the chapter called “In the Heart of Europe”, Willy Brandt realistically pointed out one significant factor from the past that presented a burden for the West Germany’s foreign policy. In his opinion, it was not only the burden of responsibility for the crimes of the Hitler’s regime but especially the fact that many people abroad did not believe the West Germany’s desire for peace7.
Therefore, peace efforts made by West Germany were to be proven by its active participation in building and keeping peace in Europe. Brandt thought that even though West Germany did not take part in the real world policy game, its geographic location had placed it in the central position within Europe. He emphasized the fact that the tension could not be eased without West Germany. Furthermore, Willy Brandt claimed that this country was not interested in further deepening of the conflict between East and West and that it should not be oblivious to its further worsening8.
These opinions were adopted by “the small coalition” as its foreign
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policy concept. They were generally formulated in the government policy statement as an attempt to “maintain continuity and further development”9. Continuity was without any doubt sustained more thoroughly in the West Germany’s pro-Western policy despite the fact that this policy had undergone some changes as well. However, the continuity still remained the new West German government’s priority and the main reason for re-evaluation of the previous pro-Western orientation10.
In this regard, the fundamental tactical directive of the new cabinet, formulated by Brandt, should be considered as “harmony and cooperation with the West and mutual understanding between West and East”11. Having expressed this opinion, Willy Brandt launched a new era of breaking the stereotypes of the previous two decades and introducing conditions for equal position of the Eastern policy within the overall foreign policy concept.
In this connection, Brandt often emphasized the fact that “both components of the West Germany’s foreign policy, the Western and the Eastern policies, complemented each other and that there was only one integrated German foreign policy without any contrast between the Eastern and Western policies”12. The speech that Brandt gave after being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize included his government’s attitude towards foreign policy: “Foreign policy cannot be compared to a wardrobe from which any drawer can be pulled out at any time”13. The new element of foreign policy adopted by the “small coalition”, which was based on accepting equality between the Western and Eastern policies, was one of the main decisive factors that increased West Germany’ manoeuvrability in the field of foreign relations policy.
The Social-Liberal Coalition fully understood that its plans to strengthen international political authority and influence of West Germany in the world would not be feasible without modification of the Eastern policy. It based its realistic approach on the West’s attempt to make the relationships between West and East more flexible and on its own ambition to become politically emancipated. Following these goals, the coalition developed and spread the Eastern policy, thus fulfilling a traditional task of Germany as a country that presented the bridge between East and West. It promoted its Eastern policy on behalf of the West. What is more, the coalition intended to create new conditions for solution of German political issues. Ralf Dahrendorf, the former Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, commented on the Brandt’s new foreign affairs policy saying: “Active Eastern policy is understandable only if it is connected with the West. The West German government must focus its policy both on East and West. Loyalty to the alliance and active Eastern policy make up a part of its new self-confidence”14. The Brandt’s government connected its new role of “the main negotiator” with the East with its audacious political ambitions in Western Europe, which became even more accomplishable after Charles de Gaulle left the political scene.
Concerning this, it is possible to see especially connection between
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Western European integration feature of West Germany’s “new western policy” and real steps in the Eastern policy. Willy Brandt confirmed this in his lecture that he gave to German and Danish audience in Copenhagen on 13 February 1970: “Closer mutual cooperation of the Western European countries is a prerequisite for our joint effort to peacefully overcome the contrast between East and West. Taking this effort into account, I consider unification of the Western countries to be a necessary political and material supplement to resolutions made by the NATO allies. Both of these elements form a steady basis for foreign affairs policy of the West German government that I lead”15.
At the meeting of political parties’ representatives held in Oslo on 24 April 1970, Brandt emphasized the fact that the Eastern policy of his government was implemented by means of the Western policy. “I am personally convinced that there is no division between the Western and Eastern policies. The policy referred to as the German Eastern Policy can develop only in connection with alliance of the western countries and Western European integration... Therefore, so-called Eastern Policy of the West German government is a part of the Western countries’ policy towards the East. it belongs to joint effort aimed at leaving the era of confrontation and beginning a new era of negotiation at the end of which we will reach a real balance of political interests”16.
After Brandt was awarded the 1971 Nobel Peace Prize, he made a speech in which he highlighted western political platform of his Eastern policy: “Our policy of relieving tensions, which began in the West, will remain closely bound with the West”17. In his speech delivered in Stockholm on 12 December 1971, Brandt appraised the results that the Union parties had achieved during twenty years of their government, especially strengthening alliance with the West. He claimed that the “small coalition” government had a very important task to fulfill as well: “Building close relations with the East and improving cooperation between all European countries that will help overcome the conflict between the East and the West”18. As a result, the concept of cooperation with the East, included in the first “small coalition’s” government policy statement, has completely different tactical content in comparison to the previous Kiesinger’s cabinet’s concept. Brandt believed that the policy which separated individual controversial issues had led nowhere. Development of cooperation with individual socialist countries with intentional ostracism of the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic did not result in disruption of unity between the socialist countries, isolation of East Germany or negative changes in the Soviet Union’s attitude towards its East German ally.
While the previous coalition excluded “the German problem” from its “eastern policy” concept, the social liberal concept considered the issue of relations with East Germany as very important. The method of direct negotiations was preserved, but with different focus. It contained concurrent dialogues with the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany.
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To improve these dialogues, create the atmosphere of trust and persuade the socialist countries that West German’s peace efforts were sincere, the West German government conditionally approved the upcoming European Security Conference and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Eastern policy was implemented by building diplomatic relations between the governments of West Germany and the Soviet Union. This was happening in the positive international climate when the socialist countries carried out extensive diplomatic and political activities, including preparations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In fact, conferences in the Eastern Bloc were held from 1966 to 1972, when the Declaration on Peace, Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Prague on 26 January. It was adopted by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries and it presented the fundamental principle of European security and relations between countries as well as the structure of future Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In the same year, multilateral negotiations were held with participation of NATO countries, including West Germany, which had already negotiated with the Soviet Union (the leader of the upcoming CSCE) at different levels in the previous years. The course of these negotiations was interesting and it showed transition from confrontational rhetoric to searching for contact points.
Negotiations with the Soviet Union directly followed the previous contacts that both governing parties made in the summer 1969. After Willy Brandt took the chancellor’s office, he made a speech in front of the Federal Council in which he formulated immediate tasks of the Eastern policy and emphasized significance of relations with the Soviet Union. He officially promised that the West German government “will soon respond to the Soviet memorandum on the suggested renouncement of the use of force and suggest the date of negotiations in Moscow that were initiated by the Soviet Union”19.
The negotiations, which began on 30 January 1970, were rather complicated due to different attitudes of the two parties towards many issues. Signing of the Moscow Treaty between the Soviet Union and West Germany in Moscow on 12 August 1970 was undoubtedly a significant political event. The commitment to “renounce the use or threat of force” was significant and exceeded the scope of bilateral relations20. What is more, other commitments also had a positive impact on negotiations over unsolved European political issues. In Article 3, the USSR and East Germany both agreed that “peace in Europe can be maintained only if nobody violates or changes the current borders”. Both parties undertook to fully maintain territorial integrity of all European countries. They declared that “they do not have any territorial claims and shall not lay any claims in the future”. They also agreed that “they regard the borders of all European countries as inviolable today and in the future as they exist on the day when this treaty is signed, including the Oder-Neisse line, the western border between Poland and Germany as well as the borders bet-
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ween East and West Germany21.
Importance of this treaty could not be disputed even by the pronouncement issued by the West German government in connection to the Moscow Treaty which was aimed at defusing the strong disapproval of “the sale of German interests” expressed by the opposition and revanchists. The letter that the West German government addressed to the Soviet Union government on the occasion of the Moscow Treaty signature contained the idea that “this treaty is not in contradiction to West German political goals aimed at contributing to peace in Europe so that Germans can reach unity again in self-determination”22.
However, neither of the ruling parties reappraised early stereotypes of the Eastern policy hastily. Their attitudes had been developed for almost ten years. Nevertheless, initial pace of their implementation was a real surprise.
In this regard, the year 1970 was really a year of great changes. Besides the treaty on renouncement of the use of force signed between West Germany and the Soviet Union in Moscow on 12 August 1970, diplomatic contacts with the German Democratic Republic were initiated and there were further negotiations on improvement of mutual relations held in Erfurt and Kassel. Furthermore, West Germany and Poland signed the treaty on normalization of their mutual relations on 7 December 1970. In March 1971, West Germany and Czechoslovakia began dialogues on normalization of their mutual relations.
Why did the ruling parties believe that it was necessary to secure current status quo in Europe and overcome it in a long-term perspective? It was mainly because they knew the real distribution of power and had realized that the policy of pressure on the socialist countries did not produce any significant results. Helmut Schmidt expressed his social-democratic idea of new “small coalition” tactics by saying: “We would like to reform Europe and Germany. However, it does not mean that the territorial status quo in Europe and the borders have to be changed. To reform means doing much more - it means changing political and psychological conditions and mutual coexistence of European countries”23.
W. Brandt expressed the changes and goals of the West German government in the Situation Report from 14 January 1970: “We have to know the reality and facts and respect them not to resignedly admit existing injustice but to help the European borders lose their division character in the coming years”24.
One year later, the idea of resolving the main issue of the West German foreign affairs became even more exact. In his speech given in Oslo on 11 December 1971, Brandt explained his cabinet’s philosophy in the following way: “To respect the reality means that we must not doubt any country’s territorial integrity and we have to recognise inviolability of borders. When we suggested renouncement of violence, which would be organised by means of treaties, and when we called upon our eastern neighbours to trust us... the logic of our policy expressed the idea that
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inviolability of borders must be valid in relation to the East and also for both states in Germany...”25
The West Germany’s Chancellor was convinced that “tension between peace efforts and self-determination demands, which the German politician had to face during confrontation period, led from heated disagreements to substantial understanding”26. W. Brandt openly explained why called for understanding in the East: “...We have changed our attitude towards Eastern Europe to protect our own national interests”27.
Efforts to change the status quo by its acknowledgement, which seemed to be paradoxical, became logical when Brandt characterized the West German activities as a process “that is seeking all possible ways to relativise the borders”28. As the West German author P. Bender wrote, makers of the Eastern policy assumed that “acknowledgement of the existing state of affairs in Europe does not mean it has to be acknowledged for all time. We have to create conditions so that it can overcome itself’29.
The West German efforts were focused on building friendly relations between the two German states. Within mutual relations, which were regarded as “relations of a special kind”, Bonn’s politicians retreated from asserting the privilege of representation as the main reason of threat of West Germany’s isolation in international relations. This step removed the barriers to consolidating relations with the East Bloc socialist countries and allowed West Germany to accelerate its new global strategy towards the East.
In his government policy statement presented on 14 January 1970, W. Brandt confirmed the change in the “German problem” solution and modification of its goals by saying: “It is not possible by using traditional national means, but it is possible in alliance with others. I believe that in the future there will not be any other important solutions besides alliance, security systems and partnership. It will not be possible to solve serious German issues by national means and in a traditional way, but only through a joint effort to reach the peaceful political environment in Europe”30.
Wilhelm Grewe, the West German experienced diplomat, characterized the period of tactical changes in the West German Ostpolitik by saying: desired changes of the status quo and overcoming the division of Europe and especially that of Germany can be achieved neither by violence nor by peaceful changes. The policy of detente enhances transition to revised goals and methods and it renounces short-term efforts aimed at “liberating” Eastern European countries from communism and resolving the German question through negotiations between great powers. It focuses on long-term internal changes within the Eastern Bloc aimed at gradual transformation of eastern countries’ political and social systems. This concept assumes reduction of Soviet control over Eastern Europe and then particularly reconciliation of two German “partial states”, which it supports. Thus, detente can be understood as a policy of
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long-term peace changes effectiveness of which depends on careful support of political and social evolution tendencies in the East”31.
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Not all NATO allies of West Germany (particularly the USA) accepted new ideas presented by the Brandt’s cabinet with enthusiasm32. The article written by H. Schmidt and published in 1970 October issue of the journal Foreign Affairs was aimed at explanation of the West German’ Eastern policy. H. Schmidt claimed that Ostpolitik included the concept of strong western alliance. It is not an attempt to disrupt this alliance but it is rather .. ,”an endeavour to use the alliance’s political power with an intention to overcome sterile confrontations of the past decade”33. According to Schmidt, Paris Agreements of 1954 and relations between West Germany and NATO remained undoubtable.
Furthermore, H. Schmidt regarded Ostpolitik as a sort of Bonn’s experiment that was supposed to enhance the diversity of the West policy towards communist countries. As a result, he formulated the role of West Germany as a country that should use Ostpolitik to clarify to what extent the East was prepared for compromises and the easing of tensions. H. Schmidt compared the West German activities in the East to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the Soviet Union and the USA because they were both inspired by the same goals. In case of their failure, the West should not have the worse position than in the previous period. “There is no danger that West Germany will turn to adventurism”34.
Schmidt’s article was obviously influenced by Brandt’s viewpoint presented in Bundestag in early 1970, which clarified the West Germany’s perception of Nixon’s idea of “transition from confrontation to negotiation”. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) followed the initial talks between the USA and the USSR held in Helsinki in 1969. The first agreement known as SALT 1 was signed on 26 May 1972. It specified the structure of anti-ballistic missile systems of both parties as well as modernization and limitations of these systems.
Having confirmed irreversibility of the class division in the world, Brandt also pointed out the necessity of building co-existence and mutual understanding. “West Germany is determined to take on its share of responsibility with all resulting consequences”35. Not only did he confirm his government’s determination to undergo this test by Ostpolitik implementation, but he also admitted that “other countries will also undergo this test of truth, objectivity and sense to try to do what is at least possible”36.
The mutual dispute over the meaning of “new eastern policy” culminated in late 1970 and early 1971. It was more and more obvious that American critics were not interested in the changes that the “small coalition” was focused on but in slackening the pace of these changes implementation. In other words, they wanted the “small coalition” to adapt this
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pace to implementation of the global Eastern policy by Western countries, which were much slower in overcoming long-term stereotypes concerning relations with the East.
The first official and comprehensive confirmation of Bonn’s policy was the closing NATO communique from 4 December 1970 that:
- characterized the agreements and treaties between West Germany, the USSR and Poland as a progress in the process of tension easing;
- unified opinions of all NATO countries’ representatives regarding the “Berlin question”, which was considered to be a “touchstone” in the process of improvement of mutual relations between East and West;
- emphasized the significance of “bilateral and balanced reduction of great armies” and the US promise that it would not withdraw its troops from Europe37.
As a result, W. Brandt could deliver his speech in Bundestag on 28 January 1971, in which he presented optimistic opinions on Ostpolitik support: “We feel more encouraged to continue our efforts that we find important because the high representatives of allied countries have not given their consent only in secret...”38 Furthermore, the West German chancellor used his speech to emphasise both important focuses of his foreign affairs policy: “West German cooperation and unity do not prevent us from development of better relations with the East. These two goals should be the basis of our efforts”39. As far as both treaties with socialist countries from 1970 are concerned, Brandt claimed that “in neither article they are in contradiction with our position as a member of the European Community and NATO ally”40. This was position the scope of which West Germany did not mean to exceed at all.
The social-liberal coalition regarded lack of US and other western great powers’ trust in West Germany as completely unfounded. W. Brandt highlighted this fact when he was sending his emissaries to Washington and also when he made his visit to the USA in June 1971. During this visit, he expressed the following idea in the American Council on 17 June 1971: “Those who understand relations in the world policy will agree that the policy of my government is neither individualism nor competition. On the contrary, it presents logical complement and continuation of what our allies are striving for. Our goal is German necessary contribution to the easing of tensions between East and West. Our policy is not about applauding someone for talking about peace. We are asking ourselves what we can do to eliminate tensions so that we can find areas of cooperation and make peace more secure. I believe that it is necessary to call attention to two things. Firstly, our efforts to sign treaties with the East resulted from the treaties signed with the West in the 1950s and that they are the outcome of our experience of confrontation we had to gain in the 1960s. Secondly, the West German efforts are the same as efforts made by our partners and friends. In a certain sense, West Germany is now trying to urge normalization of its relations with Eastern Europe, which is something that its allies have already accomplished”41.
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A few months later, Brandt turned to his allies in Oslo saying: “Nobody should forget the following: West Europe unification, in which we take an active role, remains our priority. We cannot renounce the Atlantic alliance. However, general development of the world policy and particularities of western treaties require also good, normal and, if possible, friendly relations with the Soviet Union and its partners in the Warsaw Pact”42.
The West German chancellor cannot be reproached for his speeches as far as the West Germany’s integration in the West was concerned. However, when he advocated the meaning of his government’s Eastern policy, he also clarified its importance for changes in policy towards the West and its West European integration platform. Even though W. Brandt did not reject the idea of Atlanticism, his opinion on the West Germany’s role within Atlanticism and under new conditions differed from the US opinion43.
W. Brandt described his perception of superpowers’ influence in Europe in one of his articles, where he wrote: “Since the threat of war between the USA and the Soviet Union has reduced, it is possible to develop a certain kind of rivalry between America and Western Europe, which involved parties do not have to assess as a threat of their security”44.
This was an original conclusion that W. Brandt accepted as reality enabling better pursuance of political goals. It included refusal of American doubts about dangers of Ostpolitik and determination to create West German’s own concept of pro-Western policy.
The end of 1972 and early 1973 became the significant milestone of the West German social-liberal government. Its victory in elections in autumn 1972 strengthened its position and confidence in appropriateness of its foreign affairs policy concept. After some time, negotiations over normalization of relations between West and East Germany were successfully completed, resulting in agreements concluded according to the UN objectives and rules.
In this regard, it is necessary to mention one important moment from the period between the first and second Brandt’s governments. From the beginning of the social-democratic government, the right-wing politicians of the West German political scene did all they could to prevent and stop the treaties signed within the West German “new eastern policy”. The conservative parties such as CDU and CSU tried to persuade the ruling coalition members to adopt a resolution against the treaties and W. Brandt. In his Memoirs, Markus Wolf states: “We have obtained confidential information that three members of the Free Democratic Party, including the former chairman Mende, and one social democrat, a member of the German Federation Expellees, have moved on to the other side”45.
The Unionist opposition decided to propose a motion of no-confidence to W. Brandt’s cabinet by “purchased” votes. According to Wolf, the opposition members came to a conclusion that Brandt had to “gain support” so that the treaties could be saved. Before the vote of no-confidence
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on 27 April 1972, the opposition was confident of its victory. However, it lost by two votes. Markus Wolf commented the vote results by saying: “We have helped Brandt so that he would not be overthrown”46.
Even though West Germany expected “European solution of the German question” in the future, this problem was greatly limited by the above-mentioned treaty signed on 21 December 1972. However, Brandt characterized it in his government policy statement from 18 January 1973 as “a new dimension... enabling... taking on more co-responsibility47. Furthermore, the West German chancellor declared that “preparation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe means that development of West Germany’s relations with Eastern Europe has come into its multilateral phase”48.
Focus on a multilateral aspect of Ostpolitik was to calm the USA and ruling parties of Great Britain and France that were jealous of West Germany’s increasing political recognition in Europe. Neither France nor Great Britain was pleased to see West Germany in its new position as the main European great power49.
West Germany pursued also other goals by continuation of its Ostpolitik and following the joint efforts of its allies. To begin with, it wanted to proclaim its efforts to participate in development of the joint foreign affairs policy of European countries that did not consider the bilateral “eastern” treaties as binding50. Moreover, the West German government drew a conclusion that the strategy of bilateral talks was no longer sufficient and had to be completed by multilateralism. Brandt’s government realized that West Germany’s strengthened position within the Western Bloc provided new possibilities for achieving its own national goals.
Walter Scheel, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave an interview to Nova doba (New Age) magazine in 1973 in which he considered the signed treaties as an important contributor to the easing of strained relations between East and West. In his opinion, these treaties, together with the Four Power Agreement and positive development of the Soviet-Ameri-can relations, helped to consolidate the peace in Europe. Consequently, they became a certain basis for so-called multilateral phase of the tensions relief. Moreover, the treaties were necessary for consultations and preparations regarding the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The West German government’s goals were supported by the US increasing tendency towards adaptation to development in Europe and throughout the world. Despite its displeasure, the US government had to accept the nuclear stalemate, substantial economic development of Western Europe and the necessity to resolve its own problems that had been put off, concerning especially the Vietnam War51.
In this regards, at the end of 1972 and at the beginning of 1973, there is a gradual move from necessity to admit changes of American foreign political line to their practical realization.
With more bilateral talks, the USA became increasingly involved so
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that the results of Brandt’s “eastern policy” could be exploited. However, the USA sought to reach the level of relations with the Soviet Union that would enable control over the easing of tensions. It is obvious that this affected also transatlantic relations despite the fact that the USA pledged equality and partnership to Europe within the so-called “Year of Europe”.
During his visit of USA in May 1973, the Western Germany chancellor spoke on behalf of the whole Euopean nations in this sense, notiy-ing that “...new Atlantic impulse may not be realized, if Europe is given an insufficient role, with no resulting duties of global political character”. The fact, that the request of own foreign policy practice ideas of western European countries were spoken by the name of Federal Republic of Germany representative, prove a completely different confidence of western German policy52.
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Evaluation of the foreign affairs policy implemented by the first and second Brandt’s governments reveals some new aspects in its pro-western and eastern dimensions. Tactical modification of the pro-Western policy was brought about by the necessity for new impulses concerning its priorities. What is more, an increasing role played by Western Europe and its integration structures made the incoming “small coalition” government deal with the relation between transatlantic and western aspects of its pro-Western policy.
Without questioning the significance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its relations with the USA within NATO, West Germany saw its position at the forefront of West European movement for new and more co-equal approach towards NATO. New quality of transatlantic relations were supposed to create the space for fulfilling its own economic, political and military ambitions in Western Europe.
One of the means of achieving this goal was the Ostpolitik - “new eastern policy”. By its implementation, the Brandt’s government pursued three fundamental goals, which did not change the strategic focus of the West German foreign affairs policy. Ostpolitik was to:
a) facilitate unification of Germany in a long-term perspective while using the easing of international tension;
b) increase political competencies and enlarge the room to manoeuvre within the peace development in Europe as well as to help hasten the delayed development of relations with the East. Furthermore, Ostpolitik was supposed to provide West Germany sufficient advance, which would give it an advantage in negotiations with its Western allies;
c) encourage further development of pro-western orientation that still remained the fundamental feature of West German foreign affairs policy.
It is, therefore, not an exaggeration to conclude that the “new eastern policy” implemented by the SPD-FDP coalition was a significant feature of its pro-Western policy. Even though Ostpolitk initially caused certain
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worries among West Germany’s allies, especially on the part of the USA, the Western Bloc countries did not dare to reject it openly due to changes in international policy development. By its conditional support of new Bonn’s eastern-oriented initiative, the USA expressed its concerns over the loss of its most devoted ally that would unconditionally defend the US interests concerning European issues and fulfil important tasks against the Eastern Bloc within the scope of NATO regulations.
Obviously, the West Germany’s economic and military growth made other Western European countries worry and wonder where the Bonn’s political emancipation and efforts at West German’s equality among western countries would lead to.
Helping the West German foreign policy get out of the blind alley was a great challenge the meeting of which was considerably influenced by the changing perception of Atlanticism. The onward West European integration required a new quality of relations between the USA and Western Europe that would shift from subordination to partnership and cooperation. The previous American perception of Western Europe as one economic and political entity within NATO had changed. Western Europe - integrated in the European Economic Community - began to play a major role in economic, foreign exchange and financial relations.
Due to international changes, the USA could not prevent different opinions on NATO’s role and missions held by its European partners. The USA underestimated the specific interests and competition between American and Western European capital groups, relying on irreversibility of the common strategy reinforcement on the basis of bipolar division of the world.
Dynamic development of the international political situation revealed unsteadiness of this perception of unity. The strengthened position of Western Europe, changes in distribution of power in the world as well as the nuclear stalemate between the two main superpowers resulted in the necessity for new formulation of the Atlantic Unity and its strategy perception.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the state of affairs in NATO had a fundamental impact on development of the foreign affairs policy implemented by the incoming “small coalition”, especially in its pro-western aspect. This development resulted from the strategic goal of the West German foreign policy, e. i. an effort to unify West and East Germany into one country that would hold an adequate position in the system of international relations. In this regards, the Brandt’s government followed the legacy of the Unionist Parties by confirming continuity in its focus on transatlantic relations.
Besides confirming the basic orientation of the West German foreign policy, the Social and Liberal Democrats focused on new aspects that could help revive the exhausted pro-Western policy and, particularly, increase West Germany’s political influence in the Western Bloc.
Even though further European integration did not continue directly
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and easily, West Germany connected its development with resolution of stagnation concerning the European Economic Community expansion. The first Brandt’s statement already implied that this problem would influence West Germany’s further involvement in the West European integration process. The Brandt’s government intended to find a balance between “Atlantic” and “Western European” policies while securing enough space for its own foreign policy activities. In no way, however, was the European integration meant to be anti-American. West Germany declared that it sought to be “healthy” power in Europe and for Europe.
The Brandt’s government was the first West German government to have focused on increasing the balance between pro-western and eastern aspects of its foreign affairs policy. Besides pro-western activities, it also connected the growth of its political authority in Europe with resolution of political issues with those Eastern European socialist countries which had been spots of potential military conflicts throughout the entire postwar period. In fact, the Brandt’s government connected its “eastern experiment” directly with its traditional pro-western orientation.
The late 1960s and early 1970s brought the easing of confrontation relations between East and West. This period, referred to as detente - the easing, changed the European policy. “The small coalition” led by Willy Brandt considerably contributed to relaxation of international tensions. Its Eastern policy - Ostpolitik - helped to normalise the relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and renew the relations between West and East Germany.
In this regard, the first and the second governments of the SPD-FDP “small coalition”, lasting from 1969 to 1974, appear to be very interesting. This was the period that West Germany used not only on behalf of the peace in Europe, which was approved by the signing of The Final Act at the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, but especially to increase its own authority in international relations and put an end to separation of the German nation. Nowadays, the tactical motto of this period - “Bringing People Together Makes a Change” - is not fully appraised.
With a bit of exaggeration, we can say that the Social-Liberal coalition was ahead of the time and had difficulties finding partners for its policy. Its policy was a clever way how to escape the threat of international and political isolation by means of a new approach and how to strengthen its pro-Western policy, which was the basis of its existence, by implementation of the “new eastern policy”. West Germany, which had been a political midget with giant economic and military capabilities until that period, became more visible and independent in both eastern and western aspects of its foreign affairs policy. To sum up, it became a more equal partner for the USA as well as for its allies in European integration groups.
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Notes
1 Bavendam D. Bonn unter Brandt: Machtwechsel oder Zeitenwende. Wien; Munchen, 1971. P. 145.
2 Grosser A. Deutschlandbilanz: Geschichte Deutschlands seit 1945. Munchen, 1970. P. 458.
3 Сибилев Н.Г. Социалистический интернационал. M., 1980. C. 189, 190.
4 Brandt W., Schmidt H, Kellermeier J. Deutschland 1976: Zwei
Sozialdemokraten im Gesprach. Reinbeck bei Hamburg, 1976. P. 125.
5 Schmidt H. Strategie des Gleichgewichts: Deutsche Friedenspolitik und die Weltmachte. Stuttgart, 1969. P. 13.
6 Brandt W Friedenspolitik in Europa. Frankfurt am Main, 1968. P. 18.
7 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem. P. 17, 18.
9 Bulletin des Presse - und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung. 1969. Oct. 29. № 132. P. 1121.
10 Cech L’. Nemecka spolkova republika a jej zahranicna politika v rokoch prvej a druhej vlady “malej koahcie”. Bratislava, 2014. P. 11-18.
11 Bulletin des Presse - und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung. 1969. Oct. 29. № 132. P. 1121.
12 Sojak V. Zahranicni politika NSR a jeji misto v evropske bezpecnosti a spolupraci // Mezinarodrn vztahy. 1971. Vol. 6. № 4. P. 7.
13 Brandt W. Der Wille zum Frieden: Perspektiven der Politik. Frankfurt am Main, 1973. P. 323.
14 Zundel R. Ostpolitik ohne Zwangsjacke // Die Zeit (Hamburg). 1970. Jan. 23. № 4.
15 Brandt W. Der Wille zum Frieden: Perspektiven der Politik. Frankfurt am Main, 1973. P. 217.
16 Ibidem. P. 221.
17 Ibidem. P. 323.
18 Ibidem. P. 331.
19 Bulletin des Presse - und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung. 1969. Oct. 29. № 132. P. 1121-1128.
20 Dokumenty k politice obou nemeckych stath a k irsiH o normalizaci vztahh v Evrope (1964 - 1972). Praha, 1973. P. 408-409.
21 Ibidem. P. 409.
22 Ibidem. P. 409.
23 Schmidt H. Strategie des Gleichgewichts: Deutsche Friedenspolitik und die Weltmachte. Stuttgart, 1969. P. 24.
24 Brandt W Rede am 14. Januar 1970 im Deutschen Bundestag: Bericht uber die Lage der Nation im gespaltenen Deutschland // Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. 1970. Bd. 71. P. B 839-C 847.
25 Brandt W. Der Wille zum Frieden: Perspektiven der Politik. Frankfurt am Main, 1973. P. 322.
26 Ibidem.
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27 Ibidem. P. 322, 323.
28 Ibidem. P. 322.
29 Bender P. Die Ostpolitik W. Brandts oder die Kunst des Selbstverstandli-chen. Hamburg, 1972.
30 Brandt W. Rede am 14. Januar 1970 im Deutschen Bundestag: Bericht uber die Lage der Nation im gespaltenen Deutschland // Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. 1970. Bd. 71. P. B 839-C 847.
31 Grewe W.G. Spiel der Krafte in der Weltpolitik: Theorie und Praxis der internationalen Beziehungen. Dusseldorf; Wien, 1970. P. 614.
32 Vrabel F. From Henry Kissinger’s undisclosed files // Historicka revue. 2002. № 4(13). P. 24, 25.
33 Schmidt H. Germany in the Era of Negotiation // Foreign Affairs. 1970. № 1(49). P. 45.
34 Ibidem.
35 Brandt W. Rede am 14. Januar 1970 im Deutschen Bundestag: Bericht uber die Lage der Nation im gespaltenen Deutschland // Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. 1970. Bd. 71. P. B 839-C 847.
36 Ibidem.
37 Zaverecne komunike ze zasedam NATO ze dne 4.12.1970 // Vojensko-politicke informace. 1971. № 2. P. 6.
38 Brandt W. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Lage der Nation 1971, abge-geben von Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am 28. Januar 1971 // Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der
Bundesregierung. 1971. № 12. P. 30.
39 Ibidem.
40 Ibidem.
41 Brandt W. Der Wille zum Frieden: Perspektiven der Politik. Frankfurt am Main, 1973. P. 231, 232.
42 Ibidem. P. 323.
43 Gottfried N. Ostpolitik: Phases, Short-Term Objectives, and Grand Design // American Detente and German Politik, 1969 - 1972. Washington (DC), 2004. P. 124-126.
44 Brandt W. Germany‘s Westpolitik // Foreign Affairs. 1972. № 3(50). P. 416-426.
45 Wolf M. Sef spionaze v tajne valce: Vzpominky. Praha, 2004. P. 197.
46 Ibidem. P. 199.
47 Bulletin des Presse - und Informationsamtes der Bundes regierung. 1973. Jan. 19. № 6. P. 55.
48 Ibidem.
49 Нарочницкая Н.А. США и «новая восточная политика» ФРГ. М., 1977. С. 138.
50 SieglerH. Europaische politische Einigung II: 1968 - 1973. Bonn; Wien; Zurich, 1973. P. 214.
51 Regner V. Soucasne trendy zahranicm politiky USA // Mezinarodm vzta-hy. 1971. Vol. 6. № 1. P. 16-19.
52 Cech L’. Nemecka spolkova republika a jej zahranicna politika v rokoch
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prvej a drnhej vlady “malej koaHcie”. Bratislava, 2014. P. 66, 67.
Author, Abstract, Key words
Eubomfr Cech - Doctor of History, Associate Professor, Vice Dean for Science and Doctoral Studies, Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics in Bratislava (Bratislava, Slovak Republic)
lubomir.cech@euba.sk
In 1969, for the first time in the post-war history of divided Germany, the power was assumed by a different political subject than that of the CDU/CSU. The coalition of Social and Liberal Democrats, led by the Chancellor Willy Brandt, took on this challenge in the period when the West German foreign affairs policy was losing its ability to solve new problems concerning the development in Europe and in the world. It launched a difficult transformation process of changes that resulted in a more realistic approach to its new Eastern policy (Ostpolitik). As a result, West Germany gained greater global influence that enabled more space for its political manoeuvring and a better position within the Western Bloc.
International relations, foreign policy, West Germany, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, USSR, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Warsaw Pact, “new eastern policy”, detente process, W. Brandt, H. Schmidt
References
(Articles from Scientific Journals)
1. Regner V. Soucasne trendy zahranicni politiky USA. Mezinarodni vztahy, 1971, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 16-19.
2. Sojak V. Zahranicni politika NSR a jeji misto v evropske bezpecnosti a spolupraci. Mezinarodni vztahy, 1971, vol. 6, no. 4, p. 7.
3. Vrabel F. From Henry Kissinger’s undisclosed files. Historicka revue, 2002, no. 4(13), pp. 24, 25.
(Articles from Proceedings and Collections of Research Papers)
4. Gottfried N. Ostpolitik: Phases, Short-Term Objectives, and Grand Design. American Detente and German Politik, 1969 - 1972. Washington DC, 2004, pp. 124-126.
(Monographs)
5. Bavendam D. Bonn unter Brandt: Machtwechsel oder Zeitenwende. Wien; Munchen, 1971, p. 145.
143
6. Bender P. Die Ostpolitik W. Brandts oder die Kunst des Selbstverstandli-chen. Hamburg, 1972, 139 p.
7. Cech E. Nemecka spolkova republika a jej zahranicna politika v rokoch prvej a druhej vlady “malej koahcie”. Bratislava, 2014, pp. 11-18.
8. Cech E. Nemecka spolkova republika a jej zahranicna politika v rokoch prvej a druhej vlady “malej koaHcie”. Bratislava, 2014, pp. 66, 67.
9. Grosser A. Deutschlandbilanz: Geschichte Deutschlands seit 1945. Mun-chen, 1970, p. 458.
10. Grewe W.G. Spiel der Krafte in der Weltpolitik: Theorie und Praxis der internationalen Beziehungen. Dusseldorf; Wien, 1970, p. 614.
11. Narochnitskaya N.A. SShA i “novaya vostochnaya politika” FRG [The USA and the “New Eastern Policy” of Germany]. Moscow, 1977, p. 138.
12. Sibilev N.G. Sotsialisticheskiy internatsional [The Socialist International]. Moscow, 1980, pp. 189, 190.
13. Siegler H. Europaische politische Einigung II: 1968 - 1973. Bonn; Wien; Zurich, 1973, p. 214.
Автор, аннотация, ключевые слова
Чех Любомир - докт. ист. наук, профессор Братиславского университета экономики (Словакия)
lubomir.cech@euba.sk
В 1969 г., впервые в послевоенной истории разделенной Германии, власть перешла в руки политической силы, отличной от ХДС/ХСС. Коалиция социал-демократов и либеральных демократов, возглавляемая канцлером Вилли Брандтом, взяла на себя управление страной в тот период, когда внешняя политика Западной Германии теряла свою способность решать новые проблемы, возникающие в связи с развитием ситуации в Европе и во всем мире. Коалиция запустила сложный процесс изменений во внешней политике, что привело к более реалистичному подходу - к новой «восточной политике», то есть внешней политике по отношению к СССР и странам Варшавского договора. В результате Западная Германия приобрела более глобальное влияние, что дало правящей коалиции больше пространства для политического маневрирования и усилило ее позиции внутри блока держав Запада.
Международные отношения, внешняя политика, Федеративная Республика Германия (Западная Германия), Германская Демократическая Республика (Восточная Германия), Чехословакия, СССР, Организация Североатлантического договора (НАТО), Организация Варшавского договора, «новая восточная политика», разрядка международной напряженности, В. Брандт, Г. Шмидт
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