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Arkadiy Dubnov
journalist
UZBEKISTAN: WORN-OUT AND SUBTLE STABILITY
A wave of rebellions having spread the North Africa and the Middle East disgraced the professors of a political science and the professionals of the secret service; none of them foresaw the perturbations which, possibly, formed a new picture of the world and not only the Arabic one. It's naturally that a question arises whether a continuation will be and if yes then where will it happen? There were indications for the region of Central Asia and the South Caucasus among the first answers. One names Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are the most exposed from the point of perturbations like those having taking place in "the Arabic street".
The Moslem outskirts of the former soviet empire were mentioned during the Tunisian and Egyptian events. The ruling at best authoritarian but often totalitarian regimes during the decades being characterized with nepotism, corruption, neglect of the human rights, awful poverty and misery, unemployment and the lack of social lifts can be used for Central Asian reality description.
Before the events in Libya one could speak only about likeness of the internal reasons for disturbances in these countries discussing a possibility of the Egyptian-Tunisian scenario repetition in Central Asia and Azerbaijan but now some CIS-countries must take into consideration more serious spectrum of the threats. Owing to the Libyan resolution of Security Council of UNO the frameworks for the foreign interference into the internal affairs of a sovereign state are widened under the pretext of a civil population protection from the armed violence of the authorities. Any inter-ethnic conflict can be such
reason. Besides, interference can be considered as necessary to forestall bloodshed before its beginning.
For example, such situation can happen if there is a threat of event repetition being similar to those in June 2010 in Osh and Jalalabad at the south of Kyrgyzstan. The conflicts between the Kyrgyz and the ethnic Uzbeks when several hundreds of peoples were killed made the leadership of Russia, the neighboring states and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) quickly consider a problem concerning peacemaker sending or some other interference. The more especially as there was such request from the Kyrgyz leadership.
The Osh events began on 10 July 2010 when there was the summit of SOC in the capital of Uzbekistan. After the meeting of the presidents of Kazakhstan, Russia and Uzbekistan, N. Nazarbaev, D. Medvedev and I. Karimov late at night the last called the aroused clashes as "internal affair of Kyrgyzstan". This point of view became determinative in CSTO with respect to the situation.
Uzbekistan's refusal to interfere into Kyrgyzstan's internal affairs can be explained by the intention to avoid a dangerous precedent threatening to Tashkent itself. The riots can also break out in Uzbekistan like those in Andizhan in May 2005. In 2009 the main motive was the intention not to allow developing a legitimate supporting information for intervention when Tashkent blocked a consensus decision adoption allowing using the Collective forces of aggression of CSTO in case of force majeure situations in some country of the organization. Now after a military campaign in Libya approved by UNO the precedent is. Moreover, according to information of the Uzbek sources by the German expert on Central Asia, V. Volkov, Tashkent is ready to defend fellow tribesmen in the neighboring country more resolutely up to bringing in troops in case of the tragic
event repetition in Kyrgyzstan. But it can bring, first of all, to the ruling regime removal there.
It's more difficult to foresee CSTO's response for the situation escalation in the region. Nevertheless, as there are three countries in the zone of the greatest risk which the Fergana valley is divided between -Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan - one can suppose that the position of official Tashkent will determining as before. But it means that interference of the external forces into the internal affairs of that or any country will probably be on two-sided basis without CSTO's mandate. Such scenario as appropriate will allow coming to agreement between the western partners and interested states - the members of CSTO.
It's even more difficult to foresee how a wave of riots organized by the Islamic radicals at the north of Afghanistan at the beginning of April 2011 will tell upon Central Asia. In Mazari-Sharif populated by preferably the Tajik and the Uzbeks the crowd carried massacre in the mission of UNO warmed by a sermon of the local imam. The expert of the Russian center of studies for modern Afghanistan, A. Serenko, considers that a tragedy can be a portent of a new active protest in the Moslem world, "movement of Koran defender" (the reason was Koran's burning in Florida). The Afghan Uzbeks and the Tajik are probably much more religious in comparison with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. But there is no doubt that the Islamic radicalism can find a fertile ground there.
It isn't appropriate to discus the Arabian curve of instability in public Uzbekistan. Now and again one can discover the every evidence in mass media being completely controlled by a government that somewhere in Libya a civil war is going on. The Uzbek press preferred not taking notice of the last events in neighboring Kyrgyzstan.
Only very attentive observer could catch some apprehension in the words of the president of Uzbekistan said on the occasion of
Novruz celebration on 21 March. Islam Karimov appealed the citizens to "preserve order and international and harmony". The Uzbek political scientist, R. Saifullin, doesn't observe reasons for drawing analogies between the events in the Arabian countries and in Central Asia. His conclusions are based on obvious interest of the external forces in the regional destabilization excluding an analysis of the internal factors to erode stability in the countries of the region. The political scientist affirms that USA and EU need Central Asia as a strategic corridor with a two-sided movement - goods transit for the military coalition in Afghanistan and opposite transit of oil and gas in Europe. And the ruling regimes don't oppose to it.
The Russian scientist, A. Arbuzov, is sure that if disorders begin in such republics as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan they "will be suppressed in their first stages very severely and very quickly". Probably, this confidence is based on the riot suppression in Andizhan in May 2005 when almost 200 persons were killed according to official date but in several times more - according to unofficial ones. The Uzbek authorities take already measures to control Internet. In the middle of March the Uzbek agency of communication and informatization asked the operators controlling Internet access to inform a government about mass suspicious mailings and obliged them to switch off Internet-users on the first demand.
As for a protest potential in Uzbekistan one have to make conclusions on the base of studies conducted during several years by the director of central Asian program of the center "Memorial", V. Ponomarev as there is other reliable information being received from this practically closed country. In the last report published in March 2011 one analyzes data about the political persecutions in Uzbekistan in 2009-2010. One notes that a repression a surge of which was at the end of 2008 and exceeded violence scales associated with the events in
Andizhan in 2005 "became a part of everyday life of Uzbekistan involving public at large". According to Ponomarev's data the thousands of people are in the prisons because they studied Islam unofficially or communicated with the friends on religious or political themes. One affirms in the report that under conditions when the terms "religious extremism", "fundamentalism" aren't clearly legally defined there are the ample opportunities for arbitrary court trials with respect to the Moslems. Taking into consideration the regime specificity defined by the character of 73-year old leader, I. Karimov, the situation I hardly to be changed up to the end of his government. One can add a possibility of a palace revolution to the described threats of stability which a protest from below carries out being Islamic by a form and social by a character. Its perspective will be real if intra-elite struggle for a political heritage of I. Karimov being controlled by him up to now draws a response with a high social activity outside of the elites. However, if such metamorphosis happens so quickly like in neighboring Turkmenistan in December 2006 then the external world will have only to take into consideration the new realities.
"Rossiya v global 'noi politike", M., 2011, March-April, p. 128-138.
S. Mitrofanova,
political scientist (the North-Western Academy of the state service) THE ISLAMIC FACTOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC MOVEMENT
In the modern period the international Olympic movement (IOM) faced with the necessity to optimize the efforts in order to neutralize "the Islamic factor" influence on its activity. The Moslem states and
