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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Evgenia GABER
Senior Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Mechnikov Odessa National University (Odessa, Ukraine).
TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES
IN THE CAUCASUS: PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION IN CONFLICT SETTLEMENT
Abstract
The author poses herself the task of analyzing the strategic interests of the United States, as a global actor, and Turkey, as the state that claims the rank of a regional player, in the Southern Caucasus.1 She compares their positions on the key is-
1 The editors, in turn, prefer the division of the geopolitical space of the Caucasian Region into three sub-regions suggested by the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus: the Northern Caucasus (the administrative units of the North Caucasian and Southern Federal Districts of the RF); the Central Caucasus (independent states—Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia); and the Southern Caucasus (the northeastern ilis of Turkey and the northwestern ostans of Iran). For more details, see, for example: E. Ismailov, V. Pa-pava, The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical Economy, CA&CC Press AB, Stockholm, 2006; E. Ismailov, V. Papava, Tsentralny Kavkaz: istoria, politika, ekonomika, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 2007.
sues of regional security and assesses the extent to which they can cooperate for the sake of peaceful settlement of regional conflicts.
The author analyzes the regional policies of both actors in the Southern Caucasus and compares their positions on two key points—the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the conflict in South Ossetia. In both cases, different regional and extra-regional forces are involved at different stages of peaceful settlement, which gives us a chance to assess the prospects for the joint efforts of Ankara and Washington in the far from simple geopolitical situation and identify the main obstacles and the main factors of their efficient cooperation.
KEYWORDS: the U.S., Turkey, regional conflicts, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia.
Introduction
For over twenty years now, unsettled regional conflicts have been and remain the main security threat in the Southern Caucasus and beyond it (the Black Sea and Caspian basins and partly the Middle East). Resumed hostilities will echo far and wide both in the South Caucasian republics (Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan) and in the regional heavyweights (Russia, Turkey, and Iran). This will bring
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destabilization dangerously close to the sources and main pipelines used to transport Caspian energy resources and threaten the energy security of most of the European countries and the United States.
There has been no shortage of conflict settlement projects—from multilateral negotiations under the aegis of international structures to private peace initiatives put forward by state leaders.
The United States and Turkey, NATO partners since 1952 and strategic partners since the late 1990s, arrived at a concept document called Shared Vision and Structured Dialog to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership (signed in July 2006 by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister of Turkey Abdullah Gul)2 better described as a cornerstone of partnership of the two states within the regional security system. It described "stability, democracy and prosperity in the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, and Central Asia" as one of the central spheres of shared strategic interests. In fact, the two countries remained riveted on the Middle East and never put forward joint initiatives of conflict settlement in the Southern Caucasus; their ad hoc attempts at concerted efforts were declarative and, therefore, fruitless.
Turkey:
A Regional Actor with Global Ambitions
In the early 2000s, Ankara claimed the role of one of the regional leaders and more active involvement in regional developments. The roots of its external (regional) activities are found in the domestic political changes that made it possible to revise the foreign policy priorities and in the changed regional environment that allowed Turkey to become a "regional actor with global ambitions."3
For many decades, the country perceived its regional context as dangerous; it stirred up fear, suspicion, antagonism, and enmity. Kemal Kiriççi has written in this respect: "The instability and insecurity reigning within Turkey and Turkey's immediate neighborhood culminated in the 'national security-centered' understanding of foreign policy reasserting itself."4 Prof. Mustafa Aydin has also pointed to this "security paradox:" "Although Turkey possesses the second biggest army in NATO, it lives in a perennial 'insecurity complex.' It is a securitized country where 'security,' in its wider definition, reigns supreme in societal and political development, and overrides most other considerations."5 This "perception of being encircled by enemies," or the so-called Sèvres Syndrome,6 was frequently used to justify the far from simple or even strained relations with neighboring states, concentration on domestic affairs, and the passive, mostly reactive, foreign policy.
There is a more or less concerted opinion that around the early 2000s, when the domestic and regional situation had stabilized to a certain extent, the first wave "that prevailed from the end of the Second World War through the end of the Cold War" and pushed the security issues to the fore was replaced by a "second wave," which was much more liberal and geared at cooperation.7 Ian Lesser
2 See: "Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership," July 2006, available at [http://turkey.usembassy.gov/statement_070508.html].
3 A. Davutoglu , StratejikDerinlik: Türkiye 'nin Uluslararasi Konumu (32. baski), Küre Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2009, p. 552.
4 K. Kiriççi, "Turkey's Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times," Chaillot Papers, No. 92, 2006, p. 12.
5 M. Aydin, "Securitization of History and Geography: Understanding of Security in Turkey," Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2003, p. 163.
6 The fear of foreign (mainly Western) aggression and of losing (completely or partially) sovereignty and territorial integrity (named after the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, which destroyed the Ottoman Empire and de facto divided its territory among the U.K., France, Italy, and Greece).
7 See, for example: I. Lesser, "Turkey's Third Wave — and the Coming Quest for Strategic Reassurance," GMF, On Turkey Series, 25 October, 2011; S. Özel, "Waves, Ways and Historical Turns: Turkey's Strategic Quest," GMF, On Turkey Series, 30 January, 2012.
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has the following to say on this score: "But the real shift was from security to commerce and from distant partners to the immediate neighborhood."8
The Justice and Development Party, which came to power in 2002, ended the prolonged social, economic, and political crisis. Foreign policy was completely revised with "zero problems with neighbors" becoming its main priority. Whereas in the past its military might and special attention to security issues made Turkey a source of "hard power" in the region, today the country relies on "soft power" instruments: cultural and religious affinity, a shared past, economic cooperation, etc. At the same time, Turkey no longer associates its national security solely with the military component: it has been extended to the economic, energy, social, and other components. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has pointed to "security for all," "political dialog," "economic interdependence," "cultural harmony" and "mutual respect," and the main elements of the "new foreign policy thinking."9
Having replaced its previous "zero sum game" neighborhood policy with "zero problems," Ankara unburdened itself from the load of past problems in bilateral relations with its neighbors to fortify its regional position and improve its image in the eyes of the world community. More intensive relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan can be described as an outstanding example of mutually advantageous relations no longer limited to multisided military exercises. They went far beyond these limits to "the growth of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project;" the BTC oil pipeline and the gas pipeline going from Baku via Tbilisi to Erzurum; liberalization of or no visa regime for practically all regional states; and the steadily rising level of trade and economic relations, tourism, and business contacts with the Caucasian and Black Sea states, particularly Russia, which improves the general atmosphere in the region.
There were attempts to normalize relations with Armenia, which, together with the Cyprus issue, were, according to Ahmet Davutoglu, two missing vectors of the "zero problem policy toward Turkey's neighbors." In April 2009, the talks mediated by Switzerland between the foreign ministers of Armenia and Turkey produced principles for normalizing their bilateral relations, drafting a Roadmap, and holding somewhat premature talks that the state borders would be opened without preliminary conditions on the eve of 24 April, the day that the Armenians all over the world mark as the Genocide Remembrance Day. The plans failed for objective reasons (the vague status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the inability of Turkish and Armenian society to accept the policy of drawing closer together, etc.). The so-called football diplomacy10 and the Zurich Protocols,11 which, according to the Turkish foreign minister, "are an unprecedented step toward eradicating the legal and mental barriers that have been dividing the two neighboring peoples,"12 as well as a much more active political dialog with Erevan show that the Turkish leaders were determined to resolve the old problems marring their relations with neighbors.
This was but the first step toward the status of a regional leader, an independent and responsible actor on the international scene with a constructive role to play in the region. Having established relations with most of its regional neighbors, Ankara could have not only offered its model of conflict settlement, but also improved its image. Instead of being an "isolated encircled country," it could have
I. Lesser, op. cit.
8
9 R. Erdogan, "Volny sotrudnichestva v Chernom more idut v odnom napravlenii," 2010, available at [http://www.day. kiev.ua/ru/article/den-planety/volny-sotrudnichestva-v-chernom-more].
10 In September 2008, for the first time in many years, President of Turkey Abdulla Gul came to Erevan on an invitation of President of Armenia Serzh Sargsian to watch a football match between the national teams of both countries during the 2010 World Cup.
11 The reference is to two protocols Armenia and Turkey signed on 10 October, 2009 in Zurich which related the problem of whether the events of 1915 had been "genocide of the Armenian people" to a commission of experts and historians expected to study the facts to avoid the problem's excessive politicization.
12 A. Davutoglu, "Fostering a Culture of Harmony," Russia in Global Affairs, No. 1, 2010, available at [http://eng. globalaffairs.ru/number/n_14784].
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become a "platform of peace talks" and practically the only country in the region whose objectivity raised no questions in any of the conflicting sides.
According to Davutoglu, "in terms of its area of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country."13 "It may be defined as a central country with multiple regional identities,"14 which allows Turkey to be an active peacekeeper, intermediary, and facilitator in the Middle Eastern peace process and an intermediary in settling the "frozen conflicts" in the Caucasus. The Turkish foreign minister has pointed to another huge advantage of his country: "Turkey's unique demographic realities also affect its foreign-policy vision. There are more ... Chechens than in Chechnia, more Abkhazians than in the Abkhaz region in Georgia, and a significant number of Azeris and Georgians, in addition to considerable other ethnicities from neighboring regions."15
On the one hand, Turkey is a welcome intermediary in the Southern Caucasus and an influential actor in the vast Black Sea region, where it can not only organize peace talks among the governments, but also start a confidence-building dialog between the conflicting ethnic and religious groups.
On the other hand, in view of the outspoken demands of the ethnic minorities in Turkey, in order to achieve peace in the region and ensure security of the corresponding national groups in the countries of their origin, Ankara cannot afford the luxury of self-isolation or ad hoc politics because, every time, tension in the region echoes inside the country.
By skillfully combining its "soft power" with its considerable military resources, Turkey is trying to build relations with its neighbors at the state level, encourage individual contacts, and maintain social ties with "kindred" societies. This increases its presence in the region and adds to its attraction as an unbiased intermediary in the Southern Caucasus.
Its active regional policy is part of an integrated foreign policy approach formulated by the ruling Justice and Development Party in the early 2000s. On the one hand, Ankara realizes its leadership ambitions and is seeking additional instruments in its dialog with the West by being actively involved in peacekeeping and regional energy and transportation projects. While on the other hand, its close cooperation with European countries and the United States, as well as its NATO membership are factors of its special status and a source of dividends in its relations with the regional states.
The U.S.:
A Global Actor with Regional Interests
Unlike Turkey which is stepping up its active involvement in regional processes, the U.S. has traditionally been keeping a much lower profile than befitted a global power. The expert community and the U.S. leaders were convinced of the region's strategic importance for the United States, yet this did nothing to expand America's presence in this part of the globe beyond the economic presence of American companies and American energy requirements.
Robert Art, a prominent American academic, who has formulated the "selective engagement" concept as the most efficient foreign policy line for the global power, identified the U.S. "vital" national interests ("including preventing great power wars and security competition among Eurasian great powers) and "desirable" national interests ("preserving an open international economic order;
13 A. Davutoglu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007," Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008, p. 79.
14 Ibid., p. 78.
15 A. Davutoglu, "Turkey's Zero Problems Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy, 20 May, 2010, available at [http://www. foreignpolicy. com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy?page=0,2].
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fostering a spread of democracy and respect for human rights as well as preventing mass murder and genocide").16 He seems to be convinced that while the U.S.'s "vital interests" require military force for their protection, its "desirable interests" can be ensured by other means.
This classification suggests that conflict settlement in the Caucasus does not belong to the U.S.'s foreign policy priorities: these interstate and ethnic conflicts do not threaten America's "vital interests" until they develop into full-scale rivalry of the main regional forces.
Despite the traditional rhetoric of consecutive American administrations, which invariably points to "huge strategic importance" of the South Caucasian republics, Washington cannot implement specific projects and increase its presence in the region because of the more than 10,000 km that separate the Southern Caucasus from the U.S.'s East Coast, the relative scarcity of the region's energy resources (Azerbaijan owns 0.5% and 0.7% of the world oil and gas reserves, respectively), and the absence of America's "vital interests" in the region, even though it would like to see the regional conflicts resolved.17
For a long time, as viewed from Washington, the Southern Caucasus did not appear to be critically important for America's national security, however its interest in this part of the world kept America involved. "This interest had three main drivers... sovereignty, energy and security."18
Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia from 1994 to 1996, has pointed out: "In the wake of the Soviet collapse in 1991, the United States developed working guidelines for dealing with the Soviet successor states. These included recognition of the states as independent and viable entities, support for their transition to market economies and democratic societies, facilitation of their integration into international institutions, and encouragement of regional cooperative arrangements."19 The United States' "preoccupation with the four 'nuclear successor states' (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) prevented the Caucasus and Central Asian states from getting much serious attention until 1994." The author added: "The United States lacked a clear understanding of the new ruling parties in each country, for instance, and a number of unpredictable armed conflicts continued to unsettle the region."20 This explains the fairly passive American policies in the Caucasus limited to "merely watching, listening and learning."21
By the mid-1990s, the United States had gradually increased its attention to the Southern Caucasus, mainly due to its rich oil and gas reserves in the Caspian; in 1997, Washington announced, for the first time, that the Black Sea and Caspian basins were a zone of its national interests as a promising source of fuel and a real alternative to the Gulf energy resources. The United States became actively involved in developing new oil and gas transportation routes from the Caspian to Western Europe and in vigorous cooperation with the regional states (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey) within the BTC and BTE projects. The energy component gradually moved to the fore in Washington's regional policies. Thomas Goltz, who spent several years in Azerbaijan in the 1990s, aptly pointed out that the level of America's economic presence in the country exceeded by far the level of its diplomatic presence, while the oil tankers of Amoco, Unocal, Chevron, and other American companies appeared in the Azerbaijani capital much earlier than the American embassy.22
16 R. Art, "The Strategy of Selective Engagement," in: Strategic Transformation and Naval Power in the 21st Century, ed. by P. Boyer, R. Wood, IR, Newport, 2000, p. 171.
17 See: J. Zarifian, "Le Sud Caucase vu de Washington, ou pour quoi et comment un territoire devient 'strategique'," Dynamiques Internationales, No. 6, 2012, pp. 1-2.
18 S. Cornell, "US Engagement in the Caucasus: Changing Gears," Helsinki Monitor, No. 2, 2005, pp. 112, 111.
19 E. Sherwood-Randall, "US Policy and the Caucasus," Contemporary Caucasus Newsletter, Berkley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, No. 5, Spring 1998, p. 3.
20 Ibidem.
21 Ibidem.
22 Quoted from: J. Zarifian, op. cit., p. 4.
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The conventional third stage of America's Caucasian policy can be described as a much greater attention to security and military-technical cooperation with the local states. It began on 9/11 when, according to Richard Giragosian, "the initial attention paid to the energy transportation corridors and transit pipelines was replaced with the need to organize 'air corridors' and to use air space for military purposes"23 in the interests of a global war against terrorism and the U.S.'s later military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. For some time this added vigor to America's cooperation with the local states in the security sphere still limited to joint counterterrorist military exercises (the Train and Equip Program realized in Georgia) and extended financial and technical support to ensure border security and stem illegal trafficking of weapons and people. These efforts remained superficial; they did nothing to remedy the region's "deep-seated" problems and merely concentrated on fighting the new global security threats.
This means that America's regional presence is limited to its economic presence, involvement in the regional energy systems, financial assistance to the newly independent states, cooperation in the anti-terrorist struggle, joint military exercises, and encouragement of the democratic processes. On the one hand, it is enough to contain the Russian and Iranian impact; however, on the other, this allows the U.S. to remain an outsider free from the obligation to promptly respond to all crises in the fairly stormy region and avoid direct involvement in a conflict with the Russian Federation if the situation becomes too hot. America is involved in settling regional conflicts for the sake of its image of superpower; it was never one of the "vital interests" and never one of the foreign policy priorities of any of the American administrations.
The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict as a Threat to U.S. Regional Interests
It was in the wake of 9/11 and the Turkish parliament's refusal in March 2003 to let the U.S. use Turkey's airspace for its Iraqi war, which came as a bolt from the blue, that the U.S. finally developed a much greater interest in the region and increased its military presence there. This is confirmed by two visits Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld paid to the region in 2003 and 2004 (that is, within the space of less than twelve months). In 2003, he and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev discussed the possibility of an American airbase on the Absheron Peninsula; the American visitor spoke of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as "a formidable obstacle"24 on the road to promoting the U.S.'s vital interests in the security sphere.
It should be said that in the absence of a clear and consistent conflict settlement strategy, U.S. involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement looked especially obvious. A "mandate of the co-chairmanship was set out in March 1995" within the Minsk Group. "This now covers the activities of France, Russia, and the United States, which have been the three co-chairs of the Minsk Group since February 1997."
Officially25 this "commits the co-chairs to more activities than they are currently engaged in, mandating them specifically to carry out confidence-building measures, help develop plans for a peacekeeping force and maintain contacts with other international organizations."26 In fact, their time
23 R. Giragosian, "Natsionalnye interesy SShA i strategiia deiatelnosti na Iuzhnom Kavkaze," in: Iuzhny Kavkaz—20 let nezavisimosti, The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2011, p. 273.
24 S. Cornell, op. cit., p. 114.
25 Mandate OSCE DOC 525/95.
26 T. de Waal, "Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process," Survival, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2010, p. 161.
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was mainly devoted to "secret shuttle diplomacy"27 spread, in the case of the United States, beyond Erevan and Baku to Ankara, another regional capital.
In the 1990s, the sore spot of Nagorno-Karabakh largely determined the dynamics of the Turkish-American cooperation in the Black Sea and Caucasian region. More than that, it figured prominently in their bilateral relations outside the region. In most cases, the two countries agreed on methods of conflict settlement (normally limited to cautious appeals to the warring sides to achieve a peaceful settlement and the ever present intention to trim the roles of the regional powers, the RF in particular). In the Armenian-Azeri conflict, Ankara and Washington found themselves on opposite sides.
At that time, Azerbaijan, a strategically important state because of its geographic location and vast natural and human resources, remained on the margins of the U.S.'s foreign policy strategy mainly thanks to active lobbying of the American Armenian diaspora. At the height of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Armenian lobby in Congress28 spared no effort to discontinue economic assistance to Azerbaijan. Under Section 907 Restriction on Assistance to Azerbaijan, "the United States assistance under this or any other Act (other than assistance under title V of this Act) may not be provided to the Government of Azerbaijan until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh."29
Turkey which traditionally followed the "two countries-one nation" formula in its relations with Azerbaijan was openly pro-Azeri on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. This explains why in 1993 the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress invited the Committee on Foreign Affairs to discuss the "Resolution to express dissatisfaction with the Republic of Azerbaijan's failure to work toward a peaceful and fair settlement to the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh by continuing the devastating blockade and economic boycott of the Republics of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh" which recommended to continue the policy of withdrawal of American aid to Azerbaijan which "failed to terminate the blockade and other uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, as set forth in the Freedom Support Act" and to "encourage the Republic of Turkey, which has provided military, economic and diplomatic support for Azerbaijan, to play a neutral role in helping to promote an equitable resolution to this crisis."30
Washington repeatedly voiced its concern about the state of Turkish-Armenian relations and called on Ankara to open its borders with Armenia. In 1996, the Senate committee on foreign affairs drafted a bill under which aid to Turkey (as earlier to Azerbaijan) should have been suspended until the blockade of Armenia had been lifted.31 Its first and second more generalized versions demanded that military and economic aid be discontinued to those countries that interfered with the deliveries of humanitarian aid to other nations (a reference to Turkey and Azerbaijan).32 Under
27 T. de Waal, op. cit., p. 175.
28 The following organizations are the most influential members of the U.S. Armenian diaspora: ANCA (Armenian National Committee of America), AAA (Armenian Assembly of America), and ARAMAC (Armenian-American Action Committee) (see: S. Karagul, "20. Yuzyilda Ermeni Diasporasi ve Faaliyetleri," in: Dunden Bugune Turk-Ermeni ili§kiler, ed. by 1. Bal, M. Qufali, Lalezar Kitabevi, Ankara, 2006. S. 586-587). These interests were lobbied by the AC (Armenian Caucus) group of Republicans and Democrats (see: §. Kantarci, "Turk-Amerikan 1li§kileri ve Ermeni Sorunu," in: Dunden Bugune Turk-Ermeni ili^kileri, S. 598).
29 Freedom Support Act [Final as Passed Both House and Senate] — S. 2532.ENR, 1992/102nd Congress (1991-1992), Library of Congress, available at [http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c102:4:./temp/~c102AF9kj3:e119984].
30 Resolution. To express dissatisfaction with the Republic of Azerbaijan's failure to work toward a peaceful and fair settlement to the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh by continuing the devastating blockade and economic boycott of the Republics of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. — H.RES.86, 1993 / 103rd Congress (1993-1994), Library of Congress, available at [http:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-103hres86ih/pdf/BILLS-103hres86ih.pdf].
31 See: Congress and the Nation, ed. by A. O'Connor, J. Preimesberger, D. Tarr, Vol. IX, 1993-1996 (Clinton; 103rd-104th Cong.), CQ Press, Washington, 1998, p. 230.
32 See: Ibid., p. 233.
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the pressure of the Armenian diaspora and because of the mounting public discontent with Ankara's Kurdish and Cyprus policies, the Senate agreed on an amendment which, in 1997, cut America's financial assistance from $46 to $21 million.33 In 1999, America discontinued its military aid to Turkey.
The resultant displeasure in Ankara never developed into a serious crisis in the countries' bilateral relations. In fact, America's fairly benevolent treatment of Baku released Ankara from the trap of having to choose between the two partners. Even though Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act limited some types of direct aid (military aid in particular) from the U.S. government to Azerbaijan, the law said nothing about humanitarian aid or grants for the development of democratic institutions and the struggle against crime and WMD proliferation. According to the information supplied by the Armenian National Committee of America for 10 years (1992-2002) "while restricting certain types of direct government-to-government aid, including military aid, this law has not prevented over $200 million in humanitarian, democracy-building, anti-crime, and anti-proliferation aid to Azerbaijan."34 The figures look a bit inflated; what is important in this context is the fact that despite Armenian lobbying, Washington and Baku did not sever their relations; discoveries of rich offshore power resources gave them a fresh impetus. At all times, the United States remained concerned about its energy security and never stopped diversifying the sources of energy resources and their transportation routes. This made Azerbaijan an even more desirable regional partner.
In the 1990s, attempts were made to speed up Nagorno-Karabakh settlement by drawing Armenia into a regional pipeline project. Following an idea of the U.S. National Security Council, Unocal pledged in early 1995 to build a "peace pipeline" that would cross Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia into Turkey. The project was also supported by the Foreign Ministry of Turkey as, according to many experts, this "would contribute to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, without contradicting Turkey's traditional policy of guarding the regional balances."35 The leaders of both countries, however, were opposed to the idea of mixing oil business with politics. The leading international oil companies (Amoco and BP), likewise, did not like the idea of moving oil and gas across this highly volatile region; they would rather look at the north (Russia) or the west (Georgia).36
Seeking the image of a reliable Western partner and the region's "energy hub," Turkey worked hard not to be excluded, because of its unstable neighbors, from the planned transportation routes between the Black and Caspian seas and Europe. This makes the BTC oil pipeline commissioned in 2006 and the BTE gas pipeline commissioned in 2007 (in which Azerbaijan and Turkey were involved with considerable American support) one of the biggest achievements of the Turkish-American relations in the Caucasus of the last few years.
The coordinated activities of the trans-Atlantic partners in the region were the exception rather than the rule. Turkey's special relations with Azerbaijan and its irreconcilable Armenian policy made "Turkey once again the hostage of Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus and prevents it from being the independent regional player that it would like to be."37 This made decision-making and coordination with Washington much harder.
The Armenian factor regularly re-surfaced as an irritant in Turkish-American relations because of the Armenian lobby's consistent attempts to push a resolution through Congress that would recog-
33 See: Ibid., p. 232.
34 Position of the Armenian National Committee of America on Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, Winter/Spring 2006, available at [http://www.anca.org/hill_staff/position_papers.php?ppid=6].
35 E. Er§en, "The Impact of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline on Turkey-U.S. Relations," Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies, Annual 3, 2003, p. 88.
36 S. Lussac, "Will Gas Help Resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict?" Central Asia-Caucasus Institute's Analyst, 17 September, 2010, available at [http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node%2F5406].
37 A. Iskandaryan, "Armenian-Turkish Rapprochement: Timing Matters," Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2009, p. 39.
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nize the huge number of Armenian lives lost in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 as "genocide of the Armenian people." The resolution failed; in addition, the top figures in Washington kept on saying that severed diplomatic relations or military cooperation with Turkey would make the price to be paid for the Armenian issue prohibitive.38 Turkish historian Ilhan Üzgel has written that the far from simple Armenian-Turkish relations, the Armenian-Azeri contradictions, and the still painful Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remained a "source of hushed-up confrontation"39 between Ankara and Washington and made it practically impossible to arrive at a concerted position in the peaceful settlement process.
Cooperation between the two countries in the Minsk Group (Turkey had been involved since 1992, while the U.S. was one of the three co-chairs) turned out to be a failure. In its present status, Ankara was unable to come up with efficient solutions, while the initiative of Baku to make Turkey the fourth co-chair caused resolute opposition from Erevan and failed to stir up enthusiasm among the other members. In fact, because of Turkey's "unconditional support of Azerbaijan and the lack of diplomatic ties between Turkey and Armenia" Turkey was involved in this conflict "as a party rather than a mediator." This limited Turkey's participation in the peacekeeping process and "jeopardized its efforts to become a regional leader."40
Ankara hoped that the "zero problems with neighbors" policy would change the situation for the better. In 2008-2009, Turkey made several attempts to improve its relations with Armenia; the United States actively supported the budding "rapprochement"; in 2009 Washington was the driving force behind the drafting and signing of the Zurich Protocols. It was expected that they would open the state border and restore diplomatic and economic relations, irrespective of the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement, and that Ankara would be more actively involved in the peacekeeping process. On the whole, it was hoped that these developments would defuse the "Armenian genocide" issue.41
Both parliaments refused to ratify the protocols despite Washington's repeated appeals to both countries. Armenia proved unable to drop its demand of recognition of the "genocide of Armenians," while Turkey could not sacrifice its relations with Azerbaijan (left outside the Protocols) for the sake of closer relations with Armenia. Since 1993, when the Turkish-Armenian border was closed, Baku and Ankara have remained convinced that the two issues are interconnected and should be addressed as such. Restored diplomatic contacts between Ankara and Erevan outside Turkish-Azeri understanding would mean a crisis between Ankara and Baku.42 The December 2011 visit of U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden to Ankara produced no results. The two sides failed to come to an agreement on unconditional opening of the borders. The expert community started saying that the U.S. preferred to maintain the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh: the Zurich Protocols effectively deprived the mediator of "economic instruments" to be used to change Erevan's position; very much to Washington's advantage, they removed the conflict between Ankara and Erevan and pushed the talks on Nagorno-Karabakh into a dead-end. Turkey as a potential mediator tried to pursue active, dynamic, and multisided diplomacy as befits a regional leader and repeatedly reproached the United States for inertia and lack of viable initiatives.43
38 See, for example: Bill Clinton's speech in the House of Representatives in October 2000 (see: Armenia Resolution, Congress and the Nation, ed. by Ann O'Connor... Vol. X. 1997-2001. A Review of Government and Politics (Clinton; 105th-106th Cong.), CQ Press, Washington, 2002- (1206 p.), p. 231.
39 1. Üzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla ili^kiler," in: Türk Di§ Politikasi. Kurtuluy Sava^mdan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, ed. by B. Oran, Cilt II. 6, Baski, 1leti§im, 1st., 2002, p. 283.
40 A. Görgülü, "Towards a Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement?" Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2009, p. 24.
41 V. Socor, "Zurich Protocols: No Substitute for American Strategy in South Caucasus," Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 228, 2011, available at [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38786].
42 See: F. Ismailzade, "Azerbaijan-Turkey Energy Cooperation," GMF Analysis, On Turkey Series, 16 November, 2011,
p. 1.
43 For example, in February 2010 Prime Minister Erdogan pointed out: "If Russia, the U.S. and France had worked hard within the past 20 years, none of these problems would have emerged ... or would remain" (see: [http://www.todayszaman. com/tz-web/news-200260-100-erdogan-vows-to-abolish-emasya-protocol-revise-security-priorities.html]).
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This means that cooperation between Turkey and the United States over Nagorno-Karabakh settlement is complicated by many factors, the central of them being the absence of a clear and consistent Caucasian strategy on the part of the United States, the lack of its desire to promptly settle the frozen conflicts, the continued misunderstandings between Turkey and its neighbors, the special relations of both capitals with regional countries (Washington-Erevan; Ankara-Erevan, and Ankara-Baku), and the negative impact of the Armenian issue on American-Turkish relations as a whole.
Much depends on the political will of Ankara and Washington, on the general atmosphere of the relations between the two countries, and on their desire to jointly realize their national interests in the region, in the energy sphere among other things.
The 2008 South Ossetia Conflict: New Opportunities and Trials for Turkey
The Russian-Georgian war of 2008 over the events in South Ossetia is another example of failed cooperation between Turkey and America. Turkey's refusal to allow American warships carrying humanitarian aid for Georgia to pass through the Straits caused a diplomatic scandal between Ankara and Washington. Officially, the former referred to the 1936 Convention of Montreux, which limited the tonnage of warships of the non-Black Sea states passing through the Straits into the Black Sea (the tonnage of the American warships by far exceeded the maximum permitted limits). There is a more or less widely accepted opinion among the experts that Ankara merely did not want to see foreign naval forces in the Black Sea. The problem was settled several days later, however it became clear that Turkey regarded the Black Sea as an exclusive zone of Turkish-Russian influence.
On the whole, the 2008 August crisis demonstrated that the potential scope of Turkey's regional policy was fairly limited; it became clear that despite Ankara's consistent efforts to stick to a good neighborhood policy within the region and put relations with the global actors on a mutually complementary rather than mutually exclusive platform, objective factors make it very hard to elaborate and pursue a logical and consistent foreign policy course.
At the regional level, Turkey had to choose between Georgia, a strategically important partner, and Russia, an economically advantageous and politically influential partner. Georgia's territorial integrity fit perfectly into Turkey's national interests and its image of a conscientious observer of international laws and a fair arbiter in regional contentions. On the other hand, the worsened relations with Russia would have cut down trade turnover and the flow of Russian tourists. At the global level, choosing between Tbilisi and Moscow would have meant making a choice between the United States, a military-political ally of long standing, and the Russian Federation, an economic and energy partner.
On the one hand, Turkey and Russia agree on many regional policy issues: they both try to keep the U.S. away from regional developments; they do not want the Black Sea to become a potential foothold for military operations against Iraq or Iran. Turkey's NATO membership does not prevent it from agreeing with Moscow that the Montreux Convention and the regime of the Straits should be consistently observed; neither country wants the Black Sea to become NATO's "playground."44 Turkey and Russia achieved a consensus on the struggle against Chechen and Kurdish terrorists and
See: O. Ta^pinar, F. Hill, "Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?" Survival, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2006, pp. 86-87.
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opposition to the separatist sentiments of those who planned to set up an independent Ichkeria and Kurdistan.
On the other hand, while prepared to seek peace and stability in the Black Sea and the Caucasus together, individually each of them is striving for regional hegemony. Turkey's inadequate material resources and political weight make America's support indispensable. This is equally important in dealing with the South Caucasian and Central Asian republics, as well as in realizing new energy projects in the region.
This explains why at the first stage of the conflict Ankara looked undecided. Unwilling to complicate its relations with any of its partners—Georgia and the United States, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other—Turkey decided to keep away from both. Here is what Director and Senior Associate of the CSIS Turkey Project Bulent Aliriza had to say on this score: "One of the sides is our closest ally, the United States. The other side is Russia, with which we have an important trade volume. We would act in line with what Turkey's national interests require."45
This gave Ankara a chance to demonstrate its new foreign policy course: efficient, rhythmic, and multisided diplomacy of active involvement of all sides within the initiatives under Turkey's chairmanship. In this way, Ankara addressed several strategically important problems: first, there was no need to make a hard and basically losing geopolitical choice between different partners. Second, Turkey demonstrated that it was ready to become a responsible regional leader which, armed with its "soft power" and "good neighborhood policy," could change the dynamics of regional processes. Third, the image of peacekeeper and its sincere desire to bring the Caucasian countries together in one organization should have improved Turkey's relations with Armenia and raise its status for the European Union.
On the fourth day of the South Ossetia conflict (11 August, 2008), Prime Minister Erdogan declared that the region needed a Caucasian Alliance to maintain regional stability. On 13 August, on a visit to Moscow, Erdogan invited Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to set up the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) of three Caucasian states (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) and Turkey and Russia. Despite the serious contradictions between Russia and Georgia, Turkey and Armenia and Armenia and Azerbaijan, all potential members, accepted the idea of a multisided regional organization.
The CSCP was expected to develop a "regional but comprehensive approach" to find a peaceful solution to all the regional conflicts and build more confidence between the warring nations. According to the then Foreign Minister of Turkey Ali Babacan, "the Caucasus countries need to develop a functional method of finding solutions to their problems from within," that is, without outside interference.46 His Russian colleague Sergey Lavrov was of the same opinion: it is "a mechanism for limiting the conflict potential of the region and increasing stability"; he added that "its chief value rests on common sense, because it assumes that the countries of the region should solve their own problems."47 Turkish expert Dr. Mitat Qelikpala pointed out that in the wake of August 2008 Turkey was guided by the "regional solution for regional issues" concept.48
There was nothing new in the regional stability pact idea: President of Turkey Demirel put it on the table late in 1999; it remained on paper despite Ankara's frantic efforts and Washington's consid-
45 B. Aliriza, "Turkey and the Crisis in the Caucasus," CSIS Commentary, September 2008, available at [http://csis.org/ publication/turkey-and-crisis-caucasus]
46 See: A. Babacan, "Calming the Caucasus," New York Times, 23 September, 2008, available at [http://www.nytimes. com/2008/09/23/opinion/23iht-edbabacan.1.16407371.html].
47 B. Punsmann, "The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform: An Attempt to Foster Regional Accountability," ICBSS Policy Brief, No. 13, 2009, p. 6.
48 See: M. Qelikpala, "The Application of Turkey's 'Zero-Problems-with-Neighbours-Policy' in the Black-Sea Region and its Surrounding Area," available at [http://www.suedosteuropa-gesellschafft.com/framescontent/projekte/2010/conference_ berlin_turkey/celikpala_beitrag.pdf].
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erable support. The 2008 CSCP looked much more promising at first, but the optimism of the Turkish experts ignited by the first rounds of the talks was later quenched. Turkey improved its image in the Caucasus and reminded the other regional forces that it is an indispensable force behind the peace and integration initiatives. What happened later demonstrated that Turkey, which wanted a higher international status and, therefore, sought wider political influence in the region, was left alone with its project. No other country was prepared to work hard to realize the Turkish design of a new security system in the Caucasus.
Russia, which found the September 2008 reality much more acceptable than the prewar situation, preferred the post-war regional context. This explains why its leaders and the state TV channels played down Prime Minister Erdogan's calls to set up a comprehensive stability pact designed to achieve a fair solution of the Russian-Georgian conflict. "Perhaps for this reason the Russian press chose to give short shrift to Erdogan's call for a stability pact, and instead interpreted his visit as signifying support for Russia in South Ossetia. It was not the finest moment in Turkish diplomacy."49
Indeed, when the project depends on "geographical base," Russia will be part of it for sure, which means a tight corner for Tbilisi. "Turkey's moderate policy is fair. Not provoking Russia and protecting our national interests by not staying against Russia for American's adventures is reasonable. But we don't have to forget that Turkey, by itself, does not have the power to stop Russia."50 This means that Ankara has to maintain its relations with Washington at a certain level that is critically important for the country's security; it will, therefore, never go lower.
At the same time, official visits of top U.S. officials to the region in the wake of the 2008 events (President Obama visited Moscow, while Vice President Biden went to Georgia in July 2009, and Secretary of State Clinton visited the three South Caucasian republics as part of her East European tour in July 2010, later in May 2012 she came to the region once more) showed that the U.S. would like to remain in control. In Washington, however, there was "an undercurrent of alarm that the example of what effectively became a Russian occupation of strategic areas of Georgia, if not repudiated in the strongest of terms and reversed, might become a precedent and encourage more uninvited Russian military perambulations around post-Soviet states. It could even prefigure the kind of brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy on the borders of new NATO states that would risk triggering a much wider confrontation."51
Speaking in U.S. Congress on 18 June, 2009, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs Philipp Gordon pointed out that the Southern Caucasus should follow the European path and that the United States was resolved to move the frontiers of liberty to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia by helping them settle their regional conflicts and build democratic institutions.52
According to Matthew Bryza, the then deputy assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia, Washington looked at Turkey as "a strategic link between North and South, lying at the center of an extended Black Sea region that connects the European Union, Russia, and Ukraine with the Middle East" and was of "crucial importance" for America's regional plans.53 Earlier, in June 2005, the then Turkish Deputy Chief of Staff General Ba§bug pointed out that from the military point of view long-
49 M. Reynolds, "Turkey's Troubles in the Caucasus," Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2008, p. 18.
50 S. Laciner, "Is Turkey Getting Away from the US in Caucasus?" 1 September, 2008, available at [http://www. turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=2973].
51 R. Allison, "Russia Resurgent? Moscow's Campaign to 'Coerce Georgia to Peace'", International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6, 2008, p. 1145.
52 See: N. Gegelashvili, "Osobennosti politiki SShA na Yuzhnom Kavkaze v kontekste novoy paradigmy rossiysko-amerikanskikh otnosheniy," in: Chenomorye-Kaspiy:poisknovykh formatov bezopasnosty i sotrudnichestva, ed. by A.A. Yazkova, Institute of Europe, RAS, Moscow, 2011, p. 18.
53 M. Bryza, "Invigorating the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership, Ninth Turgut Ozal Memorial Lecture," 24 June, 2008, available at [http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=406].
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term security and stability in the Black Sea-Caucasian region hinged, to a great extent, on the level of Turkish-American relations.54
Regional rivalry and uncoordinated moves by the United States and Turkey at the height of regional conflicts complicate decision-making, however the sides are aware of the vital importance of their partnership. While deepening its economic ties with Russia and entering into ad hoc coalitions with it, Turkey still relies on its long-term strategic relations with the United States even if its regional initiatives have become much more frequent.
This means that Turkey is insisting on diversification of partners in the military and energy security spheres as the main principle of its regional policies. By offering the Black Sea and Caucasian states regional projects, as well as its mediation in regional conflicts, Ankara is pursuing several aims: regional security, as well as a chance to confirm its regional leadership and acquire more instruments when dealing with the West. On the one hand, Ankara is preserving the status quo to keep American and NATO troops away from the region. On the other hand, however, this greatly limits the scope of its fruitful cooperation with the United States which, at times, stops being a strategic partner and becomes a strategic rival.
Conclusion
The two regional conflicts described above have revealed several objective factors that affect Turkish-American cooperation in Caucasian peacekeeping:
(1) the national interests of the U.S. and Turkey in regional conflicts and the degree of their importance—in the absence of vital interests, the mediators in a conflict will probably be more inclined to be neutral, fair, and objective; this means that they will arrive at a common position based on international law; if any of them wants to achieve specific results or wants to side with one of the conflicting sides, Ankara and Washington will find it hard to arrive at a concerted position; if their national interests clash, no agreement and no harmonized position is possible;
(2) the relations between the United States and Turkey with the conflicting states—close partnership relations with the opposite sides (Nagorno-Karabakh) make it much harder to work together in peacekeeping initiatives. Their positions in regional conflicts not only affect settlement and their relations with the regional states, they also leave their imprint on Turkish-American partnership as a whole, which might stir up disagreements and short crises between them;
(3) the fairly large national diasporas in both countries (Armenian in the United States and Abkhazian, Circassian, Ossetian, and Georgian in Turkey); they have great sway over public opinion and decision-making related to the countries of origin and figure prominently in elections;
(4) the changes in foreign policy (including regional) strategies: the multilateral diplomacy of President Obama's Democratic Administration is much better suited to a dialog with all sides in the conflict and, most importantly, with Turkey than the one-sided diplomacy of the previous Republican Administration of George W. Bush, which repeatedly caused displeasure in Ankara. On the other hand, Turkey's "new regional activism" causes much more
54 See: 1. Ba§bug, "Luncheon Remarks," June 2005, available at [http://www.genelkurmay.org/eng/konusma/ gnkurIIncibsk_atckonusmasiogleyemegi_eng_06062006.htm].
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disagreement with the United States on regional issues than in the 1990s, the period of the country's relative passivity;
(5) energy security—in the last few years, the United States and Turkey have been guided by energy security and economic advantages when identifying their regional priorities; on the one hand, they would like to eliminate regional instability, which threatens the smooth functioning of the pipelines; while on the other, they will become more closely involved with the energy-rich and transit-promising countries;
(6) the general background of Turkish-American relations—the serious crisis in their bilateral relations (in 2003, for example) negatively affected the level of regional cooperation; a much better atmosphere, on the other hand, leads to better coordinated cooperation;
(7) external factors—the regional actors (Russia and Iran), as well as the West and international organizations, are contributing to regional development;
(8) the international situation—important shifts in the international system, as well as the relations among its key actors, largely affect the shifts in Ankara's and Washington's foreign policy priorities and the place of the South Caucasian regional conflicts among them.
The above suggests that in the near future the two countries will not step up their peacekeeping efforts in the Southern Caucasus.
Washington, with no clear and consistent regional strategy at the best of times, will probably concentrate on its domestic problems and the hot spots in the Middle East (the region of America's traditional interests), which have pushed the Caucasus' frozen conflicts from the White House's immediate agenda.
Ankara will probably remain true to the central principle of its regional policy—multisided diplomacy and its status of a regional leader: this will spark off clashes of interests and short-term crises between Turkey and the United States.
The still pending problems and the behind-the-scene promises in Turkish-U.S. relations with regional countries will slow down the talks; in the absence of diplomatic relations between Ankara and Erevan, Turkey will lose part of its potential as an efficient moderator.
At the same time, a correct cooperation format with Turkey and America acting together could have produced good results: Turkey could have tapped its advantages as an influential regional actor (detailed knowledge of all the regional specifics and historical ties with the main ethnic groups); the United States could have relied on its diplomatic and political consequence, without which Turkey's peace initiatives might remain mere 3declarations.
In the present far from simple regional and international situation, joint projects designed to revive a public dialog and multisided efforts to restore confidence among the conflicting sides stand a much better chance of being implemented. At the same time, narrow agreements that exclude the regional interests and principled positions of any of the concerned sides are better avoided. They will do nothing to resolve the regional conflicts and might even trigger another crisis in the bilateral relations of the trans-Atlantic partners.
