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Mustafa AYDIN
Professor of International Relations at the TOBB-Economy and Technology University; as well as at the Turkish National Security Academy. He was UNESCO Fellow at the Richardson Institute for Peace Studies, UK (1999); Fulbright Scholar at the JFK School of Government, Harvard University (2002); Alexander S. Onassis Fellow at the University of Athens (2003); and Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris (2003). His most recent works include Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present, and Future (ed. by C. Erhan, 2004); Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis (in English and Greek, 2004); and Central Asia in Global Politics (ed. in Turkish, 2004).
TURKEY AND THE CAUCASUS
Abstract
The emergence of newly independent Turkey, while enlarging its role. The col-
states in the Caucasus at the end of lapse of the Soviet Union removed the cen-
the Cold War presented challenges to tury-old Soviet/Russian threat, while at the
same time created a power vacuum on Turkey’s borders. In this environment, Turkey became an important actor in the region as a result of its strong historical connections. While Turkey had traditionally avoided involvement in regional politics, it has since been drawn into the volatile new politics of the region. After fifteen years, despite setbacks, Turkey has become one
of the important players in a region where it previously had only a marginal influence and no active involvement. Although economic and political conditions in the region are unlikely to stabilize for some years, it is without doubt that Turkey will continue to create new networks of interdependency between Ankara and the regional capitals.
I n t r o d u c t i o n: Early Expectations
The worldwide transformation since the late 1980s has positioned Turkey at the epicenter of the rapidly changing Eurasian geopolitics. While the emergence of eight independent states to Turkey’s northeast at the end of the Cold War has presented it opportunities to utilize, the changes also highlighted potential risks. Citing its strong historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic bonds with the newly independent states of Eurasia, the role Turkey might play in the region has been extensively discussed, not only within Turkey but also in the West, whose fear that radical Islam might fill the power vacuum that occurred in the region with the demise of the Soviet Union, led to encouragement to the newly independent states to adopt a “Turkish model” of secular democracy, combined with a liberal economy.
Turkey, however, having based its post-war foreign and security policies on the strategic importance it played for the West, due to its location vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, hardly welcomed the end of the Cold War. As the function and relevance of NATO in the post-Cold War world order was opened up to discussion, Turkey suddenly found itself in a “security limbo” and realized that the end of the “threat discourse” was fundamentally damaging to its Western security connection, and to the military and the economic benefits derived from it. While the emergence of liberal democracies in Eastern Europe created a buffer zone between Western Europe and Russia, Turkey still felt threatened by the uncertainties in its immediate neighborhood.
While it was observed that the bipolar system had been radically altered, it became clear that Turkey could no longer sustain parameters of its traditional foreign policy of non-involvement in regional problems, based on the predictability of the Cold War politics. As Turkey was getting increasingly uneasy about its post-Cold War posture, the emergence of newly independent states beyond its Caucasian border was both a challenge and a thrill. Nevertheless, Turkey’s response to the Soviet collapse during the late 1980s was somewhat cautious, especially at the outset when the status of the new republics was far from clear. Thus, when confronted with the opportunity to establish relations with the individual Soviet republics after Gorbachov’s glasnost and perestroika policies began to open the closed Soviet system, Turkey’s main policy was designed to avoid any perception of seeking to undermine the existing U.S.S.R.1
Since then, however, Turkish policy toward the region has changed dramatically, and after the U.S.S.R. formally broke up in December 1991, the implementation of a new policy orientation soon followed. As a result, Turkey became the first country to recognize the independence of the new republics; Azerbaijan on 9 December, and the rest on 16 December. After the recogni-
1 See: B. Simsir, “Turkey’s Relations with Central Asian Turkic Republics,” Turkish Review Quarterly Digest, Vol. 6, No. 28, Summer 1992, pp. 14-15.
tion, Turkey also signed protocols with each of them, except Armenia, initiating diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level.2 Thus, by the end of 1991, Turkey had completely abandoned its Moscow-centered policy, and embarked on a program of active relations with the Soviet successor states.
Although initially cultural, linguistic, and/or religious affinities were stimulating factors for forging closer ties, Ankara’s new attitude toward the region was based more on pragmatic economic and foreign policy considerations than on simple rhetoric or sentimental concerns. First of all, the changed international environment clearly forced Turkey toward a regional role. Turkey suddenly found itself located at the center of a new political and economic conglomerate, i.e. Eurasia.3 It was clear that Turkey could play a dynamic role in connecting the newly independent Central Asian and Caucasian states to the rest of the world.4 This role also included efforts toward regional cooperation through such organizations as BSECO, which, if worked on the basis of cooperation and mutual benefit, could help to stabilize the region and provide an institutional link for these states through which they could connect to the rest of the world.
At another level, Turkey expected to gain major economic benefits from the development of closer ties with the newly independent states. The potential for economic cooperation was quite substantial in the region, and the Turkish private sector, with heavy backing from the government, had moved extensively to exploit the region’s economic potential.5 At the same time, there was also the expectation that Turkey would become politically more important in regional and global politics because of its linkages with the region. This view was also based on the belief that Turkey’s secular and emerging democratic credentials would enhance its importance as a model for future development in the former Soviet republics.6
At the same time, while Turkey was aiming to achieve a greater role in the region, the fear that the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union could lead to Islamic fundamentalism among the Muslims of Eurasia led to the West’s promotion of Turkey as a model.7 Hence, as a result of growing self-confidence about its potential and political support in the West, Turkey felt ready to take advantage of the economic and political opportunities offered by the newly independent states of Eurasia. Thus, following visits of regional leaders to Ankara, the Turkish Premier toured the area in April 1992 and offered $1.1 billion in import credits and loans.8 Cultural and economic cooperation protocols were exchanged, and in an unprecedented way, Russian interests in the region were challenged. Turkey also discussed the possibility of providing military training to the regional countries, and actively advocated building gas and oil pipelines through Turkey to market the Caspian energy resources. Thus, by mid-1992 Turkey had made a bold bid for influence in the region in the political, financial, cultural, military, and economic areas.
2 See: Turkey Confidential, December 1991, pp. 11-12; Newspot, 14 November, 1991, pp. 2-3.
3 Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel’s speech at Johns Hopkins University, Bologna, Italy, 14 May, 1992, Turkish Review Quarterly Digest, Vol. 6, No. 28, Summer 1992, p. 89.
4 In the spring of 1992 Demirel was quick, after the declaration of independence by the Central Asian and Caucasian states, to offer Turkey’s services to the West in the form of a comprehensive proposal submitted to President Bush of the U.S. as a conduit for channeling funds and ideas to the new republics (see: “Ankara’dan Yardim Hamlesi,” Milliyet, 24 March, 1992).
5 According to the then Turkish premier Tansu Qiller, by 1995, Turkey’s private and public investment in Central Asia, approximated $4 billion (see the text of her speech at the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C., 19 April, 1995).
6 See: S. Sayari, “Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 46 (1), Winter 1992, p. 15; P.B. Henze, Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 1992, p. 9.
7 See: The Times, 17 February, 1992, observed that the “fear of fundamentalism spreading in Central Asia has in turn prompted Washington to encourage Turkey in its approaches towards the region.” The Daily Telegraph of 22 February, 1993 quoted the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker as urging Turkmenistan “to follow Turkey, rather than Iran.”
8 See: Newspot, 21 May, 1992, p. 2.
Regional Rivalries and Facing Reality, 1993-1995
Despite all the earlier promising signs, it quickly became clear that Turkey was not alone in its bid to fill the power vacuum. On the contrary, the competition between the rival countries seeking influence in the rapidly changing Eurasia became a 21st century replica of the “Great Game,” with the Russian Federation, Turkey, Iran, the U.S. among others envisioning becoming key players. Each of the countries seeking influence in the region had their specific objectives, and the competition among them included economic, political, ideological and religious dimensions, thus various possibilities for widespread conflict.9
From the Turkish perspective, the possibility of a military confrontation with either Iran or Russia provided ample concern. Turkey was concerned that Iran would attempt to have an impact on identification of Muslim people throughout the Caucasus (and Central Asia), an apprehension shared at the time by the Russian Federation and the West generally. Iran, on the other hand, worried that Turkey’s active role in Azerbaijan and Turkic republics of Central Asia might create pan-Turkic hegemony on its northern borders. Thus, a competition ensued briefly between the two opposing models of political development for the Turco-Muslim peoples of Eurasia; the secular model of Turkey with its political pluralism and the Islamist model supported by Iran. However, despite their initial enthusiasm in approaching these republics, it soon became clear that neither country had enough political cloth and economic power to back up its ambitions. Moreover, since late 1992 Moscow, which had no coherent policy earlier on following the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., began to exhibit a keen interest in the region, redefining it as the “Near Abroad” so that by 1994, the power vacuum created by the collapse of the U.S.S.R. had proven to be a temporary phenomenon.10
In the meantime, while Turkey became the first country to extend recognition to Azerbaijan, Iran did not conceal its concern over the Turkish action, accusing Turkey of pan-Turkism, and the West of instigating such sentiments. Fears were expressed that the Turkish recognition would encourage an independent Azerbaijan to lay claim to a “greater Azerbaijan.” Existence of about 20 million Azeris, out of roughly 60-million population, made Iran edgy and afraid that Iranian Azerbaijan might get restless after the independence of the Soviet Azerbaijan. The concern was exacerbated earlier by the nationalist rhetoric of the President Elchibey in Azerbaijan. Though Turkey never played to such sentiments and Azerbaijan after Heydar Aliev’s rise to power has stayed clear of the issue, Iran still dreads the possibility that another nationalist leadership might come to power in Azerbaijan. In such a case, Iran will inevitably see Turkey as the beneficiary in the evolving relationships that directly affect Iran’s territorial integrity, and might put itself on a high-stakes conflict path with Turkey.
These factors also complicated the Karabakh conflict. Although both Turkey and Iran shared similar concerns about the continuation of the Karabakh conflict, there were differences between them about how to solve the problem. While Turkey attempted to have the conflict dealt with within the OSCE context, Iran, which also has a large Armenian minority, took a more direct approach by negotiating with and attempting to meditate between the two Caucasian republics. While Iran’s bilateral attempts to solve the problem created concerns in Turkey about a possible increase in Iranian influence in the region, Iran, in turn, was concerned about Turkey’s cooperation with the U.S. to solve the problem, which was seen as paving the way for “growing American influence in the region.”11
While Turkey was locked in an influence competition with Iran, it, at the same time, did not wish to alarm Moscow by exerting too much influence in the region. Although Russia initially wel-
9 For description of the new “Great Game” and the policies and aims of its players, see: M.E. Ahrari, “The Dynamics of the New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1994, pp. 525-39.
10 See: N. Diuk, A. Karatnycky, New Nations Rising: The Fall of the Soviets and the Challenge of Independence, John Wiley, New York, 1993, p. 132.
11 K. Haktanir, “Developments in Central Asia and Turkish-Iranian Relations,” Middle East Business and Banking, June 1992, p. 11.
comed Turkish influence in the region as a counterweight against Iran, those views modified rather quickly and Russia became more aggressive in its assertion of its own rights in its “Near Abroad.” Hence, after a brief self-isolation, Russia moved to re-establish its place in the region as a dominant actor. In this move, political, economic and military pressures have been used extensively. This put Russia and Turkey briefly on the opposite sides in the Caucasus.
Turkey, however, realizing the Russian sensitivities regarding ethnic strife in the Caucasus, has repeatedly reassured Moscow of its opposition to any further fragmentation of Russia, and of its support for the CIS’s stability and integrity.12 As a result, while Turkey, soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union appeared to be gradually shifting its priorities away from Russia in its focus on the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union, since 1995 it has adopted a policy stressing that the benefits of cooperation with Russia are still greater than those of the rest of the former Soviet republics.
Although the Turkey has chosen to avoid involvement in any way to the conflicts within the Russian territory, the quest of the Chechens for independence, and Turkey’s interest in it, had earlier became a sore point in Turkish-Russian relations. The crisis was especially critical for Turkey, not only because Turkish public opinion showed great sympathy for the Chechen cause, but also because the crisis displayed similarities to Turkey’s Kurdish problem. Thus, while criticizing Russia for its excessive use of force in Chechnya, Turkey has been quite careful to state that the matter is an internal affair of the Russian Federation.13 In any case, Turkey avoided direct involvement in the issue especially after the second round of fighting started in October 1999.
Nevertheless, Turkey’s moves in the region to forge closer relations prompted its rivals to question whether Turkey was aiming for regional hegemony and/or a revival of the historical pan-Ottom-anist and pan-Turkist unions. Although Turkish leaders have repeatedly expressed that fears of a revival of pan-Turkism as an extension of Turkey’s efforts in the region are unfounded, the suspicions of its neighbors have continued.
Concentration on the Caucasus, 1995 onwards
Perhaps resulting from disappointments faced in Central Asia in creating a credible zone of influence, and also arising from inability to utilize its perceived strengths, Turkey has subsequently moved its attention to the Caucasus, a region that has proved more promising for partnership than has Central Asia. In addition to geographic proximity, the lures of the Caspian energy reserves and the need to transfer these resources to Western markets provided added incentive for closer involvement. Finally, the Caucasus presented Turkey with a particular challenge with regard to ethnic conflicts, as it became clear that Turkey’s standing in the region would be determined by its responses to the ethnic and nationalist conflicts in the region.
Relations with Armenia
Turkey’s relations with Armenia have been an especially delicate issue because of the legacy of distrust between the two nations and the historical baggage that they brought into the relations. Although Turkey recognized Armenian independence on 16 December, 1991, without any preconditions, the border between the two countries immediately became a source of controversy as the latter
12 See, for example: “Turkish PM Demirel Visits Moscow: Useful, Constructive Talks Expected,” FBIS-SOV, 27 May, 1992, pp. 15-16.
13 See: Briefing, No. 1023, 9 January, 1995, pp. 7-8; No. 1024, 16 January, 1995, p. 10.
has consistently refused to recognize the border between the countries, originally drawn by a peace treaty signed between Turkey and the short-lived independent Armenian Republic in 1921. The Rus-sian-Turkish treaty of 1921 also confirmed all the borders between the R.S.F.S.R. and Turkey [the R.S.F.S.R. remained an independent Socialist state until 1923, when it became a nation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, as Turkey no longer shared a border with Russia, some Armenian parliaments announced that they did not recognize those borders established by Moscow.14 As a result, in the spring of 1992, Turkey stipulated that it would not proceed to formalize diplomatic relations with Armenia until it provided formal written recognition of existing borders. As of now, it has not done so.
Apart from the border issue, references in the Armenian Independence Declaration to “killings of Armenians by the Ottoman Turkey in 1915,” and Armenian efforts to obtain international recognition for it created tension between the two countries. Although former Armenian President Ter-Petrossian, recognizing the need to enhance his countries relations with Turkey on a realistic basis, refrained bringing the issue into the agenda and thus offered an opening, developments in the Caucasus, i.e. the Kara-bakh problem, prevented further rapprochement between the two countries. From Turkey’s point of view, the conflict has presented unacceptable options with dangerous ramifications. Turkish public opinion has strongly encouraged the Turkish government to side with Azerbaijan, even supporting military intervention.15 The government however has refrained from acting on these pressures and chosen to mobilize international response to Armenian attacks in Karabakh. It has also displayed awareness toward the importance of the “Russian factor” to solve the conflict by seeking Russian cooperation especially in the OSCE. However, when the matter of peacekeeping was discussed following the ceasefire between the warring parties on 12 May, 1994, Turkey advocated for the deployment of a multinational force under the OSCE supervision, and against Russian peacekeepers as suggested by Moscow. Turkey saw in this another attempt by Russia to exclude the rest of the world from the Caucasus.16
Although Turkey was able to remain clear of military involvement in the conflict, Karabakh issue firmly underscored the dilemmas that faced Turkey in its efforts to maintain neutral regarding ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet republics. Turkish policy during the conflict was aimed mainly at ensuring with political measures that this regional conflict does not escalate to a level that seriously threatens Turkish security, and thus compels it to intervene militarily. However, the conflict has brought an end to tentative moves from both sides of the Turkish-Armenian border to put an end to historic animosities. Although early in the independence process both sides seemed to agree on the need to overcome psychological barriers between the two peoples, moves by the Armenians over Karabakh caused Turkish public opinion to press Ankara to speak out firmly against Armenian actions, thus halting the process of reconciliation. With the advent of nationalist Kocharian into power in Armenia in March 1997, the possibility of rapprochement between the two countries shelved for the time being.
In the meantime, Armenian signature of a friendship and cooperation agreement with Russia in 1997, and allowing Russian forces to be stationed in the country, has put Armenia and Turkey on the opposite sides of the emerging loosely defined political alliances in the Caucasus: the Russian Federation, Armenia and Iran on the one side; the U.S., Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey on the other.
Relations with Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan was among the top of the list that every expert on the Caucasus predicted Turkey to make most progress in its post-Cold War relations. The expectation proved correct and Turkish-Azeri relations started-off with a leap forward based on cultural, linguistic, and historic bondages as well as
14 See: Briefing, 19 March, 1991, p. 3; C. Kirca, “The Only Hope for Armenia,” Turkish Daily News, 12 February, 1991.
15 See: Financial Times Report on Turkey, 7 May, 1993, p. 5.
16 See: Milliyet, 25 February, 1995, p. 17; 8 May, 1995, p. 13.
shared economic, political and strategic interests. In time Turkey has become the only country that consistently supported Azerbaijan in its struggle over Karabakh, risking its relations with Armenia and Russia along the way.
Although the harmonious relationship between the two countries established during the reign of president Elchibey was somewhat cooled down with the advent of Heydar Aliev in Azerbaijan, the cooperation continued and even expanded into various domains. Apart from strategic cooperation against Russian attempts to re-establish its hegemony over the Caucasus, the two countries have been cooperating on Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) project, possibility of transferring Azeri natural gas to Turkey, various cultural programs and thriving trade, as well as establishing and training national army of Azerbaijan. Moreover, Aliev’s policy of avoiding alienation of Russia and Iran in the region while firmly cooperating with the West has helped Turkey move away from its earlier confrontational line with Russia, Iran and Armenia. This pattern of relationship continued after the transformation of power in Azerbaijan from Heydar to Ilham Aliev, whose rise to power was welcomed by Turkey, alongside the U.S., for continued stability in the country.
Relations with Georgia
After the collapse of the U.S.S.R., Georgia has rapidly become Turkey’s one of the more important foreign policy openings in the post-Cold War era. The relations have thrived on the Georgian opposition to Russian dominance in the Caucasus, its support for the realization of the BTC project, and its willingness to cooperate with Turkey on wide variety of issues, from tourism to security. Turkey, in return, has been more than willing to extend its friendship, economic, political and military support to Georgia, which offered to Turkey a foothold in the Caucasus and a gateway to Central Asia.
In contrast to Russian meddling with ethnic issues in Georgia, Turkey’s bipartisan approach to Abkhazian and Ossetian problems and continuing reaffirmation of Georgian territorial integrity helped to enhance the relationship. So much so that Turkey became the biggest trade partner of Georgia shortly after its independence and, in the words of former Georgian President Shevardnadze, a strategic partner in the long run. In addition, starting with cooperation in military education, Turkey, under NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, offered its advice and help in establishing Georgian national army. Then the two countries moved on to cooperate in the restoration of Marneuli airfield and Vaziani military base after the withdrawal of the Russian forces.
Recently, when Georgia was again put under pressure by Russia in the aftermath of 11 September events, with accusations that it was harboring Chechen gunmen, Turkey, with the American backing, was again forthcoming in its support. Finally the arrival of American military advisors to Georgia in the wake of 11 September attacks, sealed Georgia’s western orientation. This, together with Turk-ish-Georgian-Azerbaijani trilateral security cooperation, is poised to bring new dimensions to both bilateral relations and in a wider scale to Caucasian geopolitics. Although Turkey was caught unprepared for the developments leading to the Rose Revolution, the relationship between the two countries continued to be friendly, based on sound understanding of security situation in the Caucasus and mutually shared interests.
Caspian Energy Resources and the Struggle for Pipelines
One of the peculiar features of the Caspian is that the regional countries most interested in the early exploration and transportation of oil and natural gas are landlocked and have to rely on the goodwill of their neighbors to be able to export their petroleum. Under geopolitical calculations,
Russia has been trying to retain its political influence in the Caspian Basin. Thus, it had insisted that the northern pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan, to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiisk should be the main transit route for oil from the Caspian region. If successful, this would have of course ensured Moscow’s exclusive and strategic control over the region’s resources.
However, opposing Russian insistence on the northern route, the U.S. and Turkey as well as Georgia and Azerbaijan preferred a western route through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Although there have been various projects developed to move Caspian energy resources to market, the main competition has been between these two routes. What was at stake was not only oil and gas transit revenues that both countries can extract from pipelines passing through their respective territories, but more importantly, the pipeline network is one of the key factors in securing and maintaining influence throughout the Eurasia.17
As the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is being put into operation in these days, its main effect would be to weaken Caspian states’ economic and transportation dependence on Russia. They will appear as new competitors to Russia in the export of oil and gas, and, together with Georgia, would use the money thus obtained to enhance their political independence from Russia. The role of the Western states, whose oil and gas companies provide the necessary investment, would increase, as would the role of Turkey.
C o n c l u s i o n s
The collapse of the U.S.S.R. has been a mixed blessing for Turkey. While the century-old Soviet/Russian threat to Turkey’s security has disappeared, the vacuum created by this departure in the Eurasia has become the breeding ground on Turkey’s borders for potential risks and threats for regional security, because of the deep tensions between mixed national groups, contested borders, economic difficulties, and competition of outsiders for influence.
Yet, Turkey is cited as an important stabilizing actor in the emerging new order because of its strong historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic bonds with the newly independent states. Thus, the role Turkey may play in this region has been extensively discussed not only within Turkey but also in the West. While Turkey has traditionally avoided involvement in regional politics, it has been unavoidably drawn into the volatile new politics of the Caucasus, where Armenia and Azerbaijan are locked in a potentially expandable conflict, where Georgian politics is highly unstable, and where Chechens fight to break away from the Russian Federation. For its part, Turkey, mindful of the disruptive impacts of sub-nationalism and ultra-nationalism, has been eager to promote the positive aspects of national formation in the region, making clear that transitional concepts based on Islam or pan-Turkism are not part of its policy vis-a-vis the states in the region.
In the meantime, a new rivalry with Iran and the Russian Federation over influence in the new states of the Caucasus presented new risks and difficult policy choices. Yet, Turkey has attempted to play down the importance of these potentially threatening tendencies, instead emphasizing its moderate character, which helped lead the newly independent states in a moderate and secular direction, thereby also seeking closer relations with both Russia and Iran. It should not be forgotten that Turkish-Russian mutual interest in maintaining peace in the Caucasus and in regional cooperation in the Black Sea is considerable, and the importance of these states to each other proved to be greater than initially expected.
It is clear that Turkey has undergone a dramatic shift away from its traditional policy of isolationism, and that Turkish foreign policy is increasingly focusing on the Caucasus, alongside the Balkans, the Middle East and the Central Asia. It is clear that the tensions between the Soviet successor states in the region will be contributing factors for Turkish security planning in the early part of
17 On this subject, see: M. Aydin, New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus; Causes of Instability and Predicament, Center for Strategic Research, Ankara, 2000, pp. 56-71.
the 2000s. Although Turkey has disavowed any intention of intervening militarily in inter-republican clashes in former Soviet territory, it is still conceivable that Turkish forces might be invited by these states to play the role of peacekeepers between or within them. In this context the Armenian-Azerbai-jani conflict has already presented Turkey with a sense of the difficulties that it might encounter in the near future if it chooses to engage in ethnic and nationalist conflicts in the region.
Even if Turkey’s initial vision toward Eurasia proved somewhat unrealistic, the effects it generated did set the tone for Turkish policy for the rest of the 1990s and early 2000s. While Turkey has not necessarily become the model to which the new states of Eurasia aspire, its thriving private sector, its secular approach toward religion and its functioning democracy continue to have their appeal in the region. Meanwhile Turkey had learned two important lessons vis-a-vis its relationship with Russia: It is an important economic partner for Turkey, and that an overly aggressive foreign policy in Eurasia is not advisable, given the risk of escalation into a direct confrontation.
Finally, the emergence of independent republics in the Caucasus represented a turning point in Turkey’s regional role and policies. Turkey has become one of the important players in a region where it previously had only a marginal influence and no active involvement. Although economic and political conditions in the region are unlikely to stabilize for some years, it is without doubt that Turkish policymakers will continue with their efforts to create new networks of interdependency between Ankara and the regional capitals. Also, it is without doubt that other regional players, especially Russia and Iran, will continue to view these policies with suspicion and challenge them.
