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ГУМАНИТАРНЫЕ И ЮРИДИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ
УДК 94(54) «1949»
Л. А. Черешнева
ВИЗИТ ПЕРВОГО ПРЕМЬЕР-МИНИСТРА ИНДИИ ДЖАВАХАРЛАЛА НЕРУ В США В 1949 г.
В статье, написанной на английском языке, основанной на материалах Архива внешней политики РФ, дана характеристика визита первого премьер-министра независимой Индии Джава-харлала Неру в Соединенные Штаты Америки, состоявшегося в 1949 г по официальному приглашению президента США Г Трумэна. Становление внешней политики Индийского Союза, возникшего на политической карте мира в августе 1947 г. в результате передачи власти и раздела Британской Индии на Хиндустан и Пакистан, происходило в условиях начавшейся «холодной войны». Стратегическое значение Индии для США до определенного времени было не более весомым, чем значение Пакистана. Премьер-министр Индии Джавахарлал Неру первым получил приглашение посетить США с официальным визитом. Вопрос о получении американской пшеницы и технической помощи явился одним из основных мотивов поездки Неру в США. Рост коммунистического влияния в Азии и авторитета Советского Союза, образование Китайской Народной Республики также вызывали тревогу в правящих кругах Индии. Компартия Индии при Неру подверглась гонениям. При этом премьер именовал себя со-
циалистом и намеревался бороться с бедностью и социальным неравенством у себя в стране. Определить свое место в новых геополитических реалиях (антикоммунизм или позитивный нейтрализм?), сформулировать политику Индии в отношении СССР, КНР и коммунистического движения вообще - еще один побудительный мотив поездки Неру в США. Визит состоялся в 1949 г, и Неру получил возможность переговоров с политиками, бизнесменами, научной и культурной элитой США. Он в известной мере способствовал индо-американским экономическим связям, но не привел к прорыву в двусторонних отношениях, разочаровав обе стороны: Неру не нашел понимания по важнейшим вопросам, в первую очередь по проблеме Кашмира, и был встревожен вниманием Белого дома к Пакистану. Президент же США Трумэн остался недоволен непреклонной силой индийского политика, отдающего себе отчет в сущности внешнеполитических приоритетов Индии и необходимости защищать ее национальные интересы.
Ключевые слова: Индия, Джавахарлал Неру, США, Г. Трумэн, 1949 г., антикоммунизм, позитивный нейтрализм.
Ь А. Chereshneva
THE VISIT OF THE FIRST PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO THE USA IN 1949
The article contains the characteristics of the official visit of the first Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru to the Unites States of America in 1949. It is written in English.
Key words: India, Jawaharlal Nehru, USA, G. Truman, 1949, anticommunism, positive neutralism.
Indian Union and Pakistan appeared on the political map of the world in 14-15 August 1947 in the result of the partition of British India - the most significant British colony. The transfer of power in India was organized on the basis of compromise of the political forces - a result of the negotiations
between Britain and Indian leading parties: the Indian National Congress (leader - Jawaharlal Nehru), the All India Muslim League (leader - Muhammad Ali Jinnah), and others. Nehru became the first Prime Minister of India, the League's Secretary General Liaquat Ali Khan - that of Pakistan [2].
1 Статья подготовлена при поддержке РГНФ, проект № 16-01-00258
ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ И АРХЕОЛОГИЯ
Jawaharlal Nehru (14 November 1889 - 27 May 1964) was the first Prime Minister of India and a central figure in Indian politics before and after independence. He emerged as the paramount leader of the Indian independence movement under the tutelage of Mahatma Gandhi and ruled India from its establishment as an independent nation in 1947 until his death in 1964. He is considered to be the architect of the modern Indian nation-state: a sovereign, socialist, secular, and democratic republic. He was also known as Pandit Nehru due to his roots with the Kashmiri Pandit community while many Indian children knew him as Chacha Nehru (Hindi, lit., «Uncle Nehru»). The son of Motilal Nehru, a prominent lawyer and nationalist statesman and Swaroop Rani, Nehru was a graduate of Trinity College, Cambridge and the Inner Temple, where he trained to be a barrister. Upon his return to India, he enrolled at the Allahabad High Court, and took an interest in national politics, which eventually replaced his legal practice. A committed nationalist since his teenage years, he became a rising figure in Indian politics during the upheavals of the 1910s. He became the prominent leader of the left-wing factions of the Indian National Congress during the 1920s, and eventually of the entire Congress, with the tacit approval of his mentor, Gandhi. As Congress President in 1929, Nehru called for complete independence from the British Raj and instigated the Congress's decisive shift towards the left [1].
The independence was accompanied with a deterioration of relations between India and Pakistan, primarily due to their territorial claims to each other. Thus, the debate about the principality of Jammu and Kashmir led to the outbreak of the hostilities in October 1947. Nehru was ready to divide Kashmir along the line separating the armies of the dominions after January 1, 1949.
In the context of the beginning of the «Cold War» the Indian subcontinent quickly turned into a collision zone of the strategic interests of the great powers. The United States, as well as the former colonial power, Britain, through their representatives in the Commission on India and Pakistan
set up in the United Nations in January 1947, did not oppose the division of Jammu and Kashmir, but into three parts: to give Pakistan the territories which had been already occupied by Pakistani troops, Jammu was to be given India, and as for the Kashmir valley, which was under control of the Indian army, they even plan to turn it in a separate section and organize a plebiscite there. The idea was that, as a result of the plebiscite, it would have been given to Pakistan. Both of the Dominions resolutely opposed such a decision. The USSR and the Ukrainian SSR abstained from voting on the Kashmir issue at the UN Security Council in 1948. Indo-Pakistani military conflict over Jammu and Kashmir led to a de facto partition of the principality, with the most important military-strategic areas located near the territory of the Soviet Union, were in the sphere of Pakistan' influence and control. The United States got into this principality, using a decisive voice in the relevant UN Commission and sending a group of military observers to that region. British achieved the adherence of Gilgit to Pakistan and was satisfied because it was its main military base in the north of Kashmir; they tried to gain a foothold there. In addition, the success of the national liberation movement in China made the United Kingdom and the United States to counterbalance it and try to form a block of Southeast Asia [3].
By the end of the 1940s the strategic importance of India for the United States was no more significant than the value of Pakistan. However, it was Jawaharlal Nehru, who first received an invitation to visit the United States with an official visit. As for the Kashmir problem, the United States supported the idea of a plebiscite in the principality, and although Nehru on the eve of the trip said he would not give Kashmir in, and rejected the offer of President Truman to mediate on the issue of plebiscite, the latter did not change his mind about the reception of the Indian Prime Minister in his own country.
A trip to the USA was necessary to the Indian government for many internal and external causes. In India, the rapidly growing inflation did not stop from the end of the Second World War. Britain owed a huge amount of money to the Indians, that by June of 1948 amounted to 15 billion 470 million. Rs [4]. London agreed to increase the sum for payment in 1949-1950 and 1950-1951 up to 650 million. Rs. For this «concession» British India, from its side, agreed to reduce its imports from the dollar area on 25 % compared with imports 1948-1949. In that way the UK protected to some extent from its Indian market from the American export [5].
From that time India could increase its imports from the United States or by increasing exports
ГУМАНИТАРНЫЕ И ЮРИДИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ
or by borrowing from the Americans. India needed food and equipment, and the issue of the reception of US wheat and technical assistance through the delivery of goods or by the American loan was one of the main motives for Nehru's trip to the United States.
In addition, the growth of communist influence in Asia and the prestige of the Soviet Union, the victory of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and then the formation of the People's Republic of China caused alarm in the ruling circles of India. The Communist Party of India was persecuted. The Premier called himself a socialist and intended to fight poverty and social inequality at home. To define a place in the new geopolitical realities (anti-communism or positive neutralism?), to formulate India's policy toward the Soviet Union, China and the communist movement in general - another incentive for a trip of Nehru to the United States.
Over the ocean, they were preparing for the arrival of Nehru. Political advertising appreciated him as «a national leader, a figure of international significance» and, furthermore, - «as the most popular man in the world» [6].
In October 1949 the Premier of India paid an official visit to the United States. He spent three weeks in America touring around different cities from the Atlantic coast to the Pacific Ocean. His meetings with President Truman, business and political elite, public figures contributed to Nehru's fuller understanding of Americans and their government. The Truman Administration and the US business also received a comprehensive view of the Indian leader.
Speaking to the US Congress, October 13, 1949, Nehru said: «The US is not an unknown country even to my distant India, and many of us have grown up admiring the ideals and aspirations that had created your great country ... India has achieved its political freedom, and now she must provide economic progress and raise the welfare of the Indians ... To do this, it needs the technical assistance on mutually beneficial terms». In this speech, he touched on the fundamental question, which the US government had asked him: «I am often asked why India is not adjacent to any particular nation or group of nations, and that if we refrain from such actions, it means, we sit on the fence. The answer is: we do not want to lose the benefits that we provide with our current isolation ... To save this isolation is not only our interests but also the interests of peace and freedom around the world» [7]. It was a designation of Nehru's policy of positive neutrality, non-alignment in any military-political blocs, which - in the circumstances of the begining of the confrontation
between the United States and the Soviet Union -appeared to be a bold bid, a claim to India's own role in the system of international relations of the postwar world.
On October 19, speaking to the UN correspondents, Nehru said about the economic purposes of his visit:
1) «India requests the immediate priority to the supply of food, especially wheat.
2) India needs the technical assistance for the implementation of major projects of the country, prepared by the Indian government.
3) India needs investment on terms to be agreed between India and foreign countries» [8].
The White House and political circles in the US found «strange» that Nehru limited their statements only with the themes of the Asian continent and showed no interest in the so called «Soviet aggression and intolerance», which had great significance for Americans. The agency «United Press of America» declared on October 19: «Nehru adheres very unrealistic views on communism in the broadest sense of the word. He informed the US officials that he saw no reason to ensure that the activities of the Indian Communists, whose leaders had imprisoned for their violent acts, must set up him against the Chinese Communist regime. Nehru intended to recognize them as a legitimate government of China... He would've not any objections against the Communists of India, if they ceased their militant activities» [9]. Washington newspaper «Daily News» on October, 17 wrote without any ethic norms: «If India insists to stay away from the «Cold War», then can we at least protect our wear carpets spread out for the reception of such a fair visitor?» [10].
The Indian business and the ruling elite saw the main thing and in the whole were rather objective in Nehru's visit evaluations. Thus, the official «Hindustan Times» on October 21, 1949 wrote that «Nehru, despite everything, had created a favorable for India environment of the US dollars in the United States» [11]. As a proof of these estimates, on the 16 of November, 1949, four US senators, members of the Special Subcommittee on the US Senate Appropriations came to India -Allen Ellender, chairman of the subcommittee, Theodore Green, Homer Ferguson, William Jenner. The nature of the talks with them the Indian government left in a secret. However, the left newspaper «Blitz» informed its readers that the senators involved in the development of parts of the Indo-US Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation [12].
Thus, the visit of Nehru to the United States to a certain extent contributed to the Indo-US econom-
ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ И АРХЕОЛОГИЯ
ic relations, but did not lead to a breakthrough in their bilateral relations. It is no exaggeration to say that the origin of Indo-US relations disappointed both sides: Nehru did not find understanding on key issues, primarily on the issue of Kashmir, and was alarmed with the attention of the White House to Pakistan. Truman while inviting Nehru did not expect to meet with so soft, but unbending force of that great Indian politician, who was aware of the essence of India's foreign policy priorities and the need to protect its national interests.
A few months after that visit, the United States warmly welcomed the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, and obviously found it more amenable for the cooperation in the issue of transformation of the South Asia into the bastion of the struggle against communism of China and the Soviet Union. In the context of the «Cold War» pro-Western policies of Liaquat appeared to be much more preferable for Washington than a positive neutralism of Jawaharlal Nehru.
Sources and Literatture
1. Юрлов Ф. Н. Династия Неру-Ганди: от восхода до заката. Кн. 1. Мотилал и Джавахарлал Неру. М.: ИВ РАН, 2015. 520 с.
2. Черешнева Л. А. Несостоявшийся визит премьер-министра Пакистана Лиаката Али Хана в Советский Союз в 1949 г. // Восток. Афро-азиатские общества: прошлое и настоящее. 2014. №5. С. 55-68.
3. Черешнева Л. А. Радуга над Красным фортом: борьба политических сил колониальной Индии в 1947 г. М.: Восточная литература, 2012. 391 с.
4. Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации. Ф. 090. Оп. 7а. П. 11. Д.4.
5. Blitz. 1949. November, 16.
6. Hindustan Times. 1949. October, 21.
References
1. Yurlov F. N. Dinastiya Neru-Gandi: ot voshoda do zakata. Book 1. Motilal i Jawaharlal Nehru (Dinasty of Nehru-Gandhi: from Sunrise to Sunset). Moscow: OI RAS. 520 р. (In Russian).
2. Chereshneva L. A. Nesostoyavshiisya vizit premier-ministra Pakistana Liakata Ali Hana v SSSR v 1949 godu (The Failed Visit of the Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan to the Soviet Union in 1949) // Orients. Afro-Asian Society: Past and Present. 2014. No. 5. Р. 55-68. (In Russian).
3. Chereshneva L. A. Raduga nad Krasnim fortom: borba politocheskih sil kolonialnoi Indii v 1949 godu (Rainbow over the Red Fort: Struggle of the Political Forces of Colonial India in 1949). Moscow: Vos. lit., 2012. 391 р. (In Russian).
4. Avives of Foreign Policy of Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs. F. 090. Inv. 7a. P. 11. D. 4. (In Russian).
5. Blitz. 1949. November, 16.
6. Hindustan Times. 1949. October, 21.
