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Literature and Culture: Historic and Contemporary DOI: 10.24411/2470-1262-2018-10013
УДК (UDC) 82-3
Koichi Toyokawa, University Meiji, Tokyo, Japan
For citation: Toyokawa Koichi, (2018).
The Strategy of I.K. Kirilov toward the south-east Russia.
Cross-Cultural Studies: Education and Science.
Vol.3, Issue II, pp. 7-20 (in USA) Manuscript received:05/04/2018 Accepted for publication: 06/13/2018
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СТРАТЕГИЯ И.К. КИРИЛОВА В ЮГО-ВОСТОЧНОЙ РОССИИ THE STRATEGY OF I.K. KIRILOV TOWARD THE SOUTH-EAST RUSSIA
Abstract
During the eighteenth century, the Russians shared in the Enlightenment and worked toward building their own identity. Working along these lines, Russia prepared to build an empire. For this reason, and for Russians to understand the character of the Russian empire, it was necessary for them to organize academic expeditions. Through these undertakings, they formed a "consciousness of territory," and the Russian empire endeavored to discriminate between "European" and "non-European" consciousness.
In 1734, I.K. Kirilov presented his proposal to the Russian government for the exploitation of natural resources and economic development in the south-east of the Russian empire and the construction of a city-fortress along the Or River. Kirilov hoped that through the new city fortress, trade would develop with Kazakh in Central Asia and India. It appears that he aimed to expand the territory and acquire wealth for the Russian empire—as most of the mercantilists in eighteenth-century Russia and Europe were doing. His successors also continued his work, and through this process, some of them came to believe that the native people opposing Russian colonial policy were semi-savage, and tried to exterminate them.
Both the Enlightenment and Russian colonial policy helped to create the Russian identity,
which came to be known not only as "Russian European " but also as a complicated identity of Russian mixed with Asian constituents. In this study, we discuss the role of Russia's academic expeditions, including Kirilov 's Orenburg Expedition, and how Russians began to construct and find their own identity.
Keywords: Russian European Russian Empire Enlightenment V.N. Tatishchev A.P. Vol'nskii, I.K. Kirilov
Introduction
Russians participated in the concert of European affairs starting from the reign of Peter I (the Great,1682-1725) and lasting until that of Catherine II (1762-1796)—a period in which the Enlightenment involved the Russian intelligentsia. If this era is examined in detail, it is possible to see not only the continuity of eighteenth-century Russia with that of the seventeenth century in terms of government and social systems but also the simultaneous rise of Russia and the Great Powers in eighteenth-century Europe. Most historians acknowledge the necessity of studying early modern Russia from the government and social system perspective as well as from the period during the rise of Russia and the Great Powers.1 Toriyama Shigeto, a Japanese historian who introduced the historical research of L. Jay Oliva,2 also specifically pointed this out.3
What kind of age was the Enlightenment in Europe? Peter Gay, who wrote the classical study on this topic, stated that it was a time in which learned Europeans were awakened to a new idea of life. They enjoyed a free and easy feeling of rule over nature and themselves.4 Roy Porter expressed the same point.5 Although we can certainly say that eighteenth-century Europe was a transitional period from "traditional" to "modern," to be sure, it was not a transition that merely involved various significant changes in society and geography from medieval times to modern.
How we can understand eighteenth-century Russia? Many historians argue about matters concerning the Russian state and society in that period for clarifying about Russian's identity. M.J. Okenfuss noted the close relation between Catherine II's policy and her trip around Russia to observe her country under her reign.6 M. Rywkin, who examined the abolition of the state's departments—prikaz Kazanzkogo dvortsa, Sibirskii prikaz, and Malorossiiskii prikaz—which were founded in the sixteenth century, concluded that the primacy of the empire had been superior to that of the Crown after the time of Peter the Great.7 M. Raeff—studying the era of Peter the Great, who aimed to establish a "well-ordered" police state-wrote that the meaning of his General
1 Raeff, M., Understanding Russia. State and Society in the Old Regime, translated by Arthur Goldhammer, Foreword by John Keep (New York: University Press, 1984).
2 Oliva, L. Jay, Russia in the Era of Peter the Great (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1969).
3 Toriaya Shigeto, Rosia Too no Kokka to Shakai (States and Societies in Russia and East Europe) (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1985), chapter. 7.
4 Gay, Peter, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, 2 vols. (New York: Vintage, 1966-69).
5 Porter, Roy, The Enlightenment (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
6 Okenfuss, M. J. "Catherine the Great and Empire," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas (the following: JfGO), Bd. 56, 2008, H. 3, S. 321.
7 Rywkin, M., "Russian Central Colonial Administration: From the prikaz of Kazan to the XIX century, a Survey," ed. M. Rywkin, Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917 (London and New York, 1988), p. 20.
Regulation of February 28, 1720 was that "the new administration was organized on functional rather than geographical lines (as theprikazy and other Muscovite institutions has been)."8
Iurii M. Lotman, a prominent scholar of cultural history in Tartu, wrote that the Europeanization of Russian culture promoted by Peter the Great and his successors created trouble for Russian noblemen. After the death of this Emperor, the common people saw the nobility as living a life of luxury apart from them.9 The estrangement between the nobility and the people continued until the beginning of the twentieth century. A. Kamenskii, a contemporary Russian historian, also investigated the same problem.10
G. Marker, studying the publishing culture in Russia, defined the isolation of the common people.11 Toyokawa Koichi, who researched Russian traditional popular folkways, wrote that eighteenth-century Russia regulated popular manners and customs.12
H.C. D'Encausse wrote about the Russian government, which Peter the Great tried to modernize: the Emperor was the first Russian sovereign to address the public as a partner of the state, and he believed that the individual public good were closely tied together and would both affect the success of his reforms.13 I. de Madariaga has written that it was in this era that the new outline of Russian society was determined, the intelligentsia established, and the general idea of private property and liberalism appeared within the elite's consciousness.14 D. Geyer, a German historian, wrote that it was impossible in Russia to replace a corps of noble landowners with a body of state servants who owed allegiance only to the state (as in Austria or Prussia) because such a body did not exist yet. As a result, Catherine II was forced to weld her administration not to a bureaucracy but to the existing noble "estate" organization.15
The eighteenth-century Russia aimed at forming European-style state institutions and participating in European policymaking. However, Russia's participation in European policymaking remained marginal in Europe.16 Although the Russian common people did not recognize the nobles whom Peter the Great charged with state service as Russians or fellows, this
8 Raeff, M., op. cit., p. 45; see also, Eroshkin, N.P., Istoriia gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdenii dorevoriutsionnoi Rossii (Moscow, 1983) p.73.
9 Lotman, Iu.M., "The Poetics of Everyday Behavior in Russian Eighteenth-Century Culture," in Lotman and Boris A. Uspenskii, The Semiotics of Russian Culture (Ann Arbor, 1984), pp. 231-256.
10 Kamenskii, A., Rossiiskaia imperiia XVIII veke: traditsiia i modernizatsiia (Moscow, 1999), pp. 301-306; also see The Russian Empire in the Eighteenth Century, translated and edited by D. Griffiths (New York and London: M. E. Sharp, 1997), pp. 281-286.
11 Marker, Gary, Publishing, Printing and the Origins of the Intellectual Life in Russia, 1700-1800. (Princeton, 1985).
12 Toyokawa Koichi, "The State, Church and Society around the Popular Folkways in Early Modern Russia: Iarov "The Magician" Incident in Sinbirsuk," Sundai Shigaku (HistoricalReview at Surugadai), 2013, pp. 127-167.
13 D'Encausse H.C., Mikan no Rosia, translated by Taniguti Susumu (Tokyo: Fujiwara-shoten, 2008 (original: La Russe inachevé (Libraire Arthéme Fayrad, 2000)).
14 de Madariaga, I., Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 581-588; idem, "The Russian Nobility in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in H.M. Scott (ed.), The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (London and New York: Longman, 1995), pp. 223273.
15 Geyer, D., "Gesellshaft als Staatlishe Veranstalung," JfGO, Bd. 14, 1966, S. 21ff.
16 Ledonne, J.P. "Russia in the eighteenth century: 1700-1825," in Kouza Sulavu no Sekai, Slavu no Rekisi (Series. Slavic World: History) (Tokyo: Koubunndo, 1995), p. 91.
Emperor considered the public as his own partner. In the era of Catherine II, the educated classes and the intelligentsia at the time recognized the backwardness of the Russian society.
We must pay attention to how contemporaries perceived the period in which they lived, along with examining Russia in terms of the state and society that existed there in the eighteenth century. Bannai Tokuaki, a Japanese scholar of cultural history, defines eighteenth-century in Russia as "the century of the expeditions or journeys." According to him, the Russian people in medieval times moved to take advantage of a religious or a commercial opportunity, like a pilgrimage or trade. Similarly, in the eighteenth century they did so with an aim of sightseeing or obtaining training to acquire skills. This movement through the space of Russian territory meant that they were able to observe different cultures. These efforts did not reflect individual ideas of Peter the Great but the uniqueness of the times or a change in people's curiosity and recognition of the space.17 The change was based on the scientific revolution that took place in the seventeenth century, which in turn influenced the intellectual and social movement known as the Enlightenment.
This study examines the problem of the Russian state institutions and focuses on the Russian public or society. In the eighteenth century, Russians searched for their own identity as the Russian intellectuals were involved in the Enlightenment. They wondered who they were as people. What kind of work they endeavored to accomplish? To answer these questions, we will consider the existing scholarship on colonization and its historical conditions in the South Urals or Bashkiria.
Raeff surveyed eighteenth-century Russian society in his article titled "The Emergence of the Russian European: Russia as a Full Partner of Europe."18 The term "Russian European" was found in the memoir of Sergei Iu. Witte. Count Witte was concerned about the expanding administration and discussed the aims of the Russian empire, especially the problem of the Finns, on the eve of World War I. This former minister of finance wrote, "the mistake of our last policy toward the non-Russian people was due to the fact that we forgot we were not 'Russian,' but 'Russian European.'"19 We presume that Raeff wrote his article with these words in mind.
To create the "Russian European" in the eighteenth century, the country had to acquire a variety of tools to move the process forward. As far as cultural innovation goes, language showed the first effects, and education provided a second tool for Europeanization. Moreover, service in the army and state played a Europeanizing role. These tools and institutions were created by Peter the Great and revised by his successors.
Europeanization spread into Russia's newly conquered territories as well. The Europeanized military assisted in the integration of the new conquests by imposing a uniform pattern of administrative culture, economic development, and promotion of cultural (mostly linguistic)
17 Bannai Tokuaki, "The Birth of Folklore in Russia," Hitotubashi Ronsou (The Hitotubashi Essays), vol. 108, no. 3, 1992, pp. 435-436; see also, idem, The Times of Alexander Radishchev' "The Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow," Hitotubashi-daigaku Kenkyu Nenpou, Jinbukagaku (The Annual Researching Report of Hitotubashi University, Cultural Sciences), vol. 38, 2001.
18 Raeff, M., "The Emergence of the Russian European: Russia as a Full Partner of Europe," in C.H. Whittaker (ed.), Russia Engages the World. 1453-1825 (Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 119-137.
19 The Memoirs of Count Witte, translated and edited by Sidney Horcave (New York, 1990). p. 373. 10
Russification or Russianization. The most prominent of the imperial military and administrative leaders who promoted such policies included Kirilov, Vasilii N. Tatishchev, and I.I. Nepliuev in the south steppes; G.A. Potemkin in the south along the Black Sea; P.A. Rumiantsev in Ukraine; General D.B. Mertvago in the Crimea; and M.M. Speranskii in Siberia.
By the same token, the territorial expansion brought the empire into direct physical contact with states like the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and China, and with non-Western people such as the Kalmyks, Bashkirs, Siberian natives, and Caucasian people and tribes. The enhanced knowledge and integration of Asian civilization into the dynamics of Russia's cultural development were evidenced in literature, music, and scholarship in the first decades of the nineteenth century. P.A. Krotov, the contemporary Russian historian, emphasized that the building of the Russian naval fleet by Peter I made Russia one of the Great Powers of Europe.20 Peter the Great planned to investigate internal Russia and conclude a trade agreement with foreign countries, particularly Central Asian countries such as India, China, Japan, and so on. R. Wortman argued that Russians understood their social imperial character, the existence of Empire, and so on, through academic expedition.21 S. Kozlov vigorously published works on this same theme.22 In 1721, at the celebration of the Treaty of Nistad, which ended the Great Northern War with Sweden, Peter the Great accepted the title of the Imperator or Emperor. Chancellor Gavriil I. Golovkin declared the symbolic meaning of the title in a speech delivered to the Senate. The Imperator, he said that had taken Russia "from the darkness of ignorance into the theater of the World, so to speak, from nothing into being, into [numbering among - T. K.] the political people of the world."23
The Imperator sought to bring Russia into European scientific endeavors. Under the reign of Peter the Great, Vladimir Atrasov—an Iaitsuku Cossack and the discoverer of a Japanese drifted merchant vessel, Denbei—went on an expedition to the Kamchatka with his fellow Cossacks. Besides Atrasov, D. Ia. Antsyferov and I.P. Kozyrevskii traveled to the Kurile Islands.
In G.W. Leibniz's correspondence with Peter the Great, the philosopher wondered whether Asia was joined by land to North America, and the Imperator determined to find the answer. However, it was only after his death that Vitus Bering, a Dane in Russian service, finally discovered the coast of North America on his second expedition (the so-called Great Expedition) that took place from 1733 to 1743. His undertakings involved a sea expedition to the coast of America and a landing, as well as a multifaceted description of Siberia.
In the 1730s, during the reign of Empress Anna Ivanovna (1730-41), the historian and geographer Tatishchev drew a line between Europe and Asia at the Urals, and this division soon gained general acceptance. M. Bassin wrote, "In one stroke Siberia was transformed into an Asiatic
20 Krotov, P.A. Bitva pod Poltavoi. Nachalo Velikoi Rossii (St. Petersburg, 2014).
21 Wortman, R., "Text of Exploration and Russia's European Identity," in C.H. Whittaker (ed.), op. cit., pp. 91-117.
22 Kozlov S.A. Russkii puteshestvennik epochi Prosveshcheniia (St. Petersburg, 2003); Seriia: Russkii puteshestvennnik epokhi Prosveshcheniia. Russkaia provintsiia Pavle Bolotova (St. Petersburg, 2006), and so on.
23 Soloviev, S.M., Istoriia Rossii (Moscow, 1963), vol. 9, p. 321.
realm cleanly set off from a newly identified 'European Russia.'"24
The production of maps was another sign of a European identity. Following the example of Western monarchies, Peter the Great used maps to define his state as a discrete territory, imitating what J. Cracraft has called the "visual conquest of Russia." The Imperator established a cartography department, in which the Russian geographer Kirilov collaborated with the French astronomer Joseph Nicolas de L'Isle. Kirilov's Atlas Vserossiiskoi (1727) and the Academy of Science's Rossiiskii Atlas (1745) represented the first efforts of the state to mark the extent, boundaries, and features of the country.25 Russians were developing what W. Sunderland describes as a "territorial consciousness" that identified "Russia" with the land belonging to the emperor as well as to the Westernized monarchy that created it.26
In addition to assuming the signs of a European identity, Russia also came to reflect the sign of an Asian identity through the results of its scientific expeditions—recorded in the works of G.F. Müller, J.G. Gmelin, S.P. Krasheninnikov, P.S. Pallas, J.G. Georgi, and so on—through which Russians came to an understanding about their own identity.
Data and Methods оr/and Model
Some policies for organizing control of the Bashkirs were undertaken in the first half of the eighteenth century. The most famous policies are found in the "memoranda" of Tatishchev, Iukhnev, A.P. Vol'nskii, Kirilov, Nepliuev, and so on.
Tatishchev, as one of the "baby birds of Peter's nest," was a supporter of and messenger for Peter the Great's policy. The Bashkirs, who insisted on their own rights as part of the terms of their participating in the Muscovite state through their own free will, were of interest to all Russian government officials.
In 1724, Tatishchev wrote "An Opinion about the Reasons for the Bashkirs' Uprisings and Better Means for Improving Control of the Bashkirs."27 In this report, the author, first, characterized Bashkir society generally, and then stated in detail his own opinion concerning measures for stopping Bashkirs uprisings and controlling this region. He saw the reasons for their unruliness and self-will in their own traditional self-government. In everyday life, according to his understanding, the Bashkirs were not under the jurisdiction of Russian officials. Only at the yearly "assembly" held near Ufa did they decide on the issues that were important to them. Tatishchev recognized that the assembly was the principal danger to Russian authority, because the Bashkirs not only "discuss[ed] their own affairs there" but also any of the rich and influential Bashkirs could
24 Bassin, M., "Inventing Siberia: Vision of the Russian East in the Early Nineteenth Century," American Historical Review, 6, no. 3 (June 1991), pp. 767-770.
25 Cracraft, J., The Petrine Revolution in Russian Imaginary (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 272281; Bassin M., "Russia between Europe and Asia," Slavic Review, 50, no. 1 (Spring 1991), pp.7-9.
26 Sunderland, W., "Imperial Space: Territorial Thought and Practice in the Eighteenth Century," Jane Burbunk, Mark von Hagen, and Anatoryi Remnev (eds.), Russia Empire: Steppe People, Power, 1700-1930 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007), pp. 33-66.
27 Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR (Moscow and Leningrad, 1949), vol. 3. No. 545, pp. 481-483. 12
use this assembly to call for the revolt.28
Tatishchev thought that Bashkir society was closed as far as its social consciousness. Nobody could enter their society without their consent. The Bashkirs, who lived near the frontier of Russia, put an affront upon the Russians and the Tartars.29 Tatishchev understood that the Russians were fascinated with the economic autonomy and independence, equal rights, and relative political independence in Bashkir society, and that nobody could compel the Bashkirs to be subordinate to the Russian government by force. This famous historian-administrator recognized that it was very important to teach Bashkir representatives Russian. He understood that none of these people had the ability to read and write Russian; therefore, they could not read the government's decrees and sometimes killed the messengers from the central or local authorities, and these circumstances caused confusion.30
Tatishchev based his opinions on the situations mentioned above. He insisted on dividing the provinces into judicial districts, constructing city fortresses, and teaching the Bashkirs how to read and write Russian language. His views were informed by notions of rationalism that were based on natural law and an awareness of his duty to the state.31 He looked at industrial development from the perspective of exploring the field. According his thinking, the construction of factories in the South Urals was connected with the establishment of cities, main roads, and postal system; the problems of the factory workers; and the problems of schools, fairs, libraries, pharmacies, and so on. Tatishchev considered infrastructure vital to improving people's lives. Many of his proposals were made at the time of the Orenburg Expedition by Kirilov.
In the 1930s, M.K. Liubavskii, a former president of Moscow Imperial University, wrote many articles on Bashkir history in the seventeenth and the eighteenth century and highlighted the importance of Vol'nskii's proposal in his "Memorandum" presented to the Senate in the 1730s at Ufa, where he was exiled.32 Vol'nskii asserted that the government should not adopt a mild policy toward the Bashkirs and believe them. In spite of governmental decrees, they accepted fugitives as before, did not pay taxes, and lived as they liked by own their free will.
When Russia was not engaged in war, it reassured the Russians as they were "rams" (i.e. quiet). If a war broke out, particularly if it was defensive, the Bashkirs, in alliance with the Turks, would not only attack Russian territory but also cause serious destruction. Vol'nskii advised to remember that "they have Muhammadan's law, and according to the law, of course, they must be enemies against Christendom," and "their malice is revealed obviously not only by war but also tyrannical actions toward aged persons and babies."33
The author of the "Memorandum" thought the Bashkirs would be much more dangerous if
28 ibid. p. 481; Istoriia Bashkirskogo naroda. Vol. III (Ufa, 2011), p. 164.
29 Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR, vol. 3, p. 481.
30 ibid.
31 Abe Shigeo, The Study on Tatishchev: The Official and Intelligentsia in the Eighteenth-Century Russia (Tokyo: Tosui Sobo, 1996), p. 233.
32 Nauchnyi issledovatel 'nyi otdel rukopisei Russkoi Gosudarstvennoi biblioteki vMoskve (the following: NIOR RGB), f. 364, kart. 5, ex. khr. 1, l. 119.
33 Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR (Moscow-Leningrad, 1936), vol.1, № 134. p. 302.
their numbers continually increased. The Russian government should eradicate them through any means, he maintained, and should not permit their numbers to expand.34
The Senate did not accept this "Memorandum." The chief flaw of this proj ect was the author's coming out against the inclusion of the Muslim regions in the Russian state.35 Nevertheless, some portions of his proposal were soon realized in the building of the New Trans-Kama River line. Subsequently, throughout the entire eighteenth century, as problems with controlling the Bashkir region recurred, the officials of the Empress Anna were guided by the basic ideas that Tatishchev and Vol'nskii had expressed in their writings.
On May 1, 1734, I.K. Kirilov (1695-1737), who came from a family of clergy and was a geographer and general secretary of the Senate in St. Petersburg, presented his Proekt to the Russian government for the exploitation of natural resources and economic development in the South-East of the Russian empire—Kazakh, Bashkiria, and Karakalpak—and the construction of a gorod-kreposti, or a city fortress, along the Or River. Kirilov hoped that through the new city fortress, trade would flourish with Kazakh in Central Asia and India. We can recognize here that he aimed to expand the country's territory and acquire wealth for the Russian empire—as did most mercantilists in eighteenth-century Russia and Europe.
He went right to the point of the Proekt: "[u]nder a blessed absolute monarchy of Her Majesty, our Empress [Empress Anna Ivanovna], by the mercy and judgment of God, and the fortune of Her Majesty, two great and immortal enterprises are not only glory but also they shall open the door of the expansion of empire and immeasurable wealth. The first task is the expedition to Siberia and Kamchatka. The second, whose door has not yet opened, is a task for Kirgis-Kaisak [Kazakh] and Karakalpak."36
Kirilov believed that Russia would profit from trade with Kazakh and the Central Asian countries because commerce was prospering in these districts. He wrote, "To the capital Bukhara where khans of Bukhara [khanate] live, merchants come from this place and from Persia, India, Armenia, Astrakhan, Barukh, and many other cities, they seek goods and gold of Bukhara, and sheepskins as a chief good from Bukhara are carried from here to Russia. These Uzbeks carry these goods."37 Kirilov paid particular attention to the Badakhshan region in the Pamir, in which "inhabitants have much wealth and trade in above-mentioned precious stones and gold."38 He wrote that the city of Barukh was also prosperous and had become a rich commercial city.39
What is more, Kirilov thought it was important to make an expedition to conquer Central Asia. He explained several times the necessity of acquiring the Khiva khanate and the Bukhara
34 ibid. pp. 302-306.
35 Aznavaev A.B. Integratsiia Bashkirii v administrativnuiu strukturu Rossiiskogo gosudarstva (vtoraiapolovineXVI-pervaia tret'XVIII v.) (Ufa, 2005), pp. 183-186; Istoriia Bashkirskogo naroda. vol. III, p. 173.
36 NIOR RGB. f. 222, kart. XI, l. 141; Dobrosmyslov, A. N. (ed.), Materialypo istoriiRossii. Sbornikukazov i drugikh documentov, kasaiushchikhsia upravlenia I ustroistva Orenburgskogo kraia. 1834 god. Po arkhivnykh documentam trugaiskogo oblastnogo pravltniia (Orenburg, 1900) (the following: Materialy), vol. 1, p. 1.
37 NIOR RGB. f. 222, kart. XI, l. 148ob.-149; Materialy, p. 13.
38 NIOR RGB. f. 222, kart. XI, l. 150; Materialy, p. 15.
39 NIOR RGB. f. 222, kart. XI, l. 150ob.; Materialy, p. 16. 14
khanate.40 However, what in Kazakhstan and Central Asia attracted Kirilov? In general, he was fascinated by the immeasurable wealth in the form of gold and precious stones in these regions, which was well-known since the time of Peter the Great.41
In addition to these reasons, Kirilov focused much attention on the problem of who had control over Bashkiria. The Russian government had been concerned about the seriousness of the Bashkir uprisings and other native peoples' support for them from the seventeenth century to the eighteenth century. In 1662-64, 1681-84, 1704-11, and even after the presentation of Kirolov's Proekt, the Bashkirs revolted against the local authorities due to their colonization policy. This discontent had been increasing, even with the development of mines and the building of iron or copper factories, and, in general, efforts at colonization in Bashkiria. Kirilov said the following about the role of the future city fortress, or Orenburg: "We are able to suppress any plot of the Bashkirs and the Volga Kalmyks against the government and a union of them (for which we have to watch out), not mobilizing a big army and not losing it."42 Moreover, he asserted, "The mouth of the Or River (where the Iaik River flows into it), where the khan [Abul-Khail khan] wishes to build the fortress, is located at the center—between the Bashkirs and the Kirgis-Kaisak orda, or horde—and is the best place for separating the Volga Kalmyks and the Bashkirs."43
Because the Kazakhs sometimes had taken action with the Bashkirs, Kirilov planned not to allow the native people to unite in this region and presented the Proekt to the Russian government to build a foothold or city fortress promoting tsarism, or the tsarist regime.44 He adopted the traditional principle divide et impera (divide and rule).
Further, Kirilov mapped out a plan for enticing upper-class members of the Bashkirs into promoting Russian colonial policy. He tried to reconfirm their rights and privileges as tarkhan, who had an inherited right to own their lands, with an exemption from paying an iasak, or a tax in kind.45
Giving an example of the wealth that lay underground, Kirilov wrote, "In the land that the Bashkirs possess, there is rich copper ore and other ores, and good quality mica. We are able to get and supply them to Russia or Persia."46 He paid attention to salt in the Iletsk district: "The Iletsk salt comes not far from the forthcoming new city [Orenburg]. All Bashkirs are satisfied with the salt in this region. In the future, we need not take it from them, as it is possible for us to take it to Russia to meet the demand."47 The Bashkirs had gathered salt as a form of their livelihood. However, after this Proekt was presented to the government and approved by Empress Anna, the monopoly on salt was introduced with the abolition of iasak (1754), and the Bashkirs raised arms against this Russian policy (1755). Moreover, Kirilov planned to spread farming to that territory
40 NIOR RGB. f. 222, kart. XI, l. 157-157ob.; Materialy, pp. 26-27, 41.
41 NIOR RGB. f. 222, kart. XI, l. 147ob.-148, 148ob.-149, 149ob.-150, 150ob., 167ob., 168; Materialy, p. 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 43, 44.
42 NIOR RGB. f. 222, kart. XI, l. 152-152ob.; Materialy, pp. 18-19.
43 NIOR RGB. f. 222, kart. XI, l. 152ob.; Materialy, p. 19.
44 NIOR RGB. f. 222, kart. XI, l. 170ob.; Materialy, pp. 47-48.
45 NIOR RGB. f. 222, kart. XI, l. 153-153ob.; Materialy, pp. 20-21.
46 NIOR RGB. f. 222, kart. XI, l. 168ob.; Materialy, p. 44.
47 NIOR RGB. f. 222, kart. XI, l. 168ob.; Materialy, p. 44.
and acquire cheap and good quality Bashkir horses.48
Kirilov's proposal, as he said, embodied the ideas and political essence of Peter the Great, which aimed at accessing the wealth and expanding trade with Central Asia.49 Empress Anna gave instructions on May 1, 1734 and approved Kirilov's Proekt.50 He was appointed commander of the Orenburgskaia ekspeditsiia, or Orenburg Expedition, which was organized and comprised 130 bureaucrats and many specialists: geodesists, mining engineers, naval officers for the construction of a future port in the Aral Sea, and so on. The Expedition also included 3,500 soldiers and dragoons.51
The only one of his proposals that was actually accomplished was the construction of a defense line along the northeast border of the "Kirgiz-Kaisak steppe." On June 15, 1734, the Expedition left St. Petersburg and traveled through Moscow and Kazan. On November 10, it arrived at Ufa. In spring 1735, it comprised 16 infantry companies in addition to 1,000 Bashkirs, Mishars, and service Tatars. On August 6, 1735, the Expedition arrived at the mouth of the Or River. On August 15, Kirilov built the wooden fortress, and on August 31, he founded Orenburg (currently known as the city of Orsk) at the border between the Bashkirs and Kazakhstan.52 In 1738, a wooden office of trade was built outside the walls of the city. There merchants from Russia, Kazakh, Khiva, and Tashkent traded constantly.
In 1737, Kirilov died and Tatishcev was appointed commander of the same Expedition. The name of the Expedition was changed to the Commission (Orenburgskaia komissiia, or Orenburg Commission). On August 1738, after his inspection of Orenburg, Tatishchev concluded that it had to be moved to the location of today's Krasnogor' village Saraktasiskii district, because Orenburg was far from any other cities and was flooded by the overflowing of the Or and Iaik Rivers in the spring; moreover, there was no road in good condition or forest nearby. Tatishchev submitted a report to the government, and it was approved.53
The new fortress was built at the point 180 versta (192.6 kilometers) down the Iaik River. In August 1741, this location became the new Orenburg, and the previous Orenburg was changed to Fortress Or.54 The new Orenburg would soon be moved for a second time. On October 15, 1742, Nepliuev—one of the "baby birds of Peter's nest," who held the second rank of a civil servant, Tavel' o rangakh, or Table of Ranks—was appointed the chief of the Commission. On December 28, 1742, he made a report on the construction of a new Orenburg near the Berda Fortress, which was nearer the Iaik and Sakmara Rivers.55 Empress Elizaveta Petrovna approved this report.56 On
48 NIOR RGB. f. 222, kart. XI, l. 155; Materialy, p. 23.
49 NIOR RGB. f. 222, kart. XI, l. 151; Materialy, p. 16.
50 NIOR RGB. f. 222, kart. XI, l. 172.
51 Ocherki istorii XVIII v. (Moscow, 1957), p. 646; See also. Toyokawa Koichi. Orenburg i orenburugskoe kazachestvo vo vremiia vosstaniia Pugacheva 1773-1774 gg. (Moscow, 1996), pp. 50-81; Donnelly, A.S. The Russian Conquest of Bashkiria 1552-1740: A Case Study in Imperialism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 64-81.
52 Russkii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnykh aktov v Moskve (the following: PGADA), f. 248, op. 3, kn. 134, l. 5-6.
53 Polnoe sobranie zakonov-Seriia 1, St. Petersburg, 1834 (the following: PSZ), vol. 11, no. 8630.
54 Rychikov, P.I., Istoriia Orenburgskaia (Orenburg, 1896), pp. 40, 41; PSZ, vol. 10, no. 7876.
55 PGADA, f. 248, op. 3, kn. 136, l. 226-229.
56 PSZ, vol. 11, no. 8630. 16
April 19, 1743, Nepliuev founded a new Orenburg at its present location.57
The inhabitants of the Orenburg region, especially the Bashkirs, were forced to perform hard labor of building the fortress and the Orenburg defense line, and in 1735, they revolted against the activity of the Expedition.58 They were opposed to the construction of the fortress, the harshness of the labor, and the confiscation of their lands by the Expedition. The uprising was severely suppressed.59 The memory of this revolt lives in history. This incident aroused the Bashkirs' feelings of hostility against the Russians.
The uprising continued intermittently over a long period—from 1735 to 1740 (1735-36, 1737-38, and 1739-40). In particular, the cause of this unrest was a census in Bashkiria, which began in January 1739 with the aim of expropriating still more lands and intensifying the taxation in accordance with a decree of February 11, 1736. Soldiers and officers, with Cossacks, were sent to Bashkiria to undertake the census. The Bashkirs understood its aim. On March 1739, they resolved in popular assemblies to refuse the census and use slowdown tactics at the orders of the local authorities, and they banished the examiners.60
The situation became strained. In May 1739, the Russian government received information about riots among the Bashkirs and stopped the census, but this did not placate them. In fact, the local authorities acted against the Bashkirs or the army requisitioned their horses as punishment for participating in the uprising of 1737-38. The Bashkirs burned with anger toward the state army and toward the Bashkirs and Mishars who were "loyal" to Russia and who plundered their villages.
In 1742, Nepliuev was appointed the chief of the Orenburg Commission. After conducting an investigation of the situation in the Orenburg region, he said gloomily, "Here there is no appropriate administration and the inhabitants expressed their disapproval."61 At that time inorodtsy, or non-Russian people (members of a national minority in tsarist Russia), and Russian settlers in this region were plagued with difficulties: many villages were destroyed, fertile lands fell into ruin, the defense system was vulnerable, and there were hardly any forts from the Caspian Sea to Aral Sea. Orenburg had no defense capacity as it was only surrounded by rough constructed defenses in the form of forts, and had a small number of garrisons.62
Reinforcing the weakness in the administration and defense, Orenburg Cossacks were formed and a defense line was constructed to pacify mutinous troops and cut off the solidarity of the native people in Bashkiria. After the formation of Orenburg prefecture, the Bashkirs and the "Kirgiz" [Kazakhs] continued to feud with each other over the construction of the defense line. To avoid
57 Rychikov, P.I. op.cit., p. 57; idem, Topografiia Orenburgskoi gubernii (Orenburg, 1887), pp. 1-5, 242; Vitevskii, V.N. Nepliuev i Orenburgskoi krai vprezhnem ego sostave do 1758 g., 2 vols, (Kazan', 1889-97), vol. 1, pp. 189f.
58 Istoriia Bashkortostana s drevneishikh vremen do 60-kh godovXIX v. (Ufa, 1996), pp. 231-248.
59 Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR (Moscow and Leningrad, 1936), part 1, no. 189, 194; Churoshnikov A.P., Vosstanie 1755 g. v Bashkirii (Moscow, 1940), p. 7; Ocherki istorii SSSR, pp. 646-647; Ocherkipo istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR (Ufa, 1956), vol. 1, part 1, p. 173; Matvievskii P.E., 'Orenburgskii krai v Otechestvennoi voine 1812', Uchenye Zapiski Orenburgskogo Gospedinstituta, vol. 177, 1962, p. 136.
60 Materialy, part 1, p. 374.
61 Vitevskii, V.N., op.cit., p. 180.
62 ibid.
Russian blood being shed, the government instructed the local authorities that they would have the help of other ethnic groups to suppress the native people's uprising. In the 1750s, when Nepliuev was an Orenburg governor, the "Kirgiz" enacted a program against the Bashkirs, from which they could not recover themselves easily.63
Furthermore, the government established instructions and organizations for understanding the situation of ethnic groups in Orenburg. Consequently, in the 1740-70s much valuable information was received not only about the local situation in relation to peace and order but also about the Central Asian regions. By the 1740s, the Tatar-Kalmyk School was founded to train interpreters.64
Peter I. Rychkov (1712-77) and his son, Nikolai P. Rychkov (1746-84) wrote many sorts of treaties on ethnology, folklore, the economy, geography, history, and agricultural administration in this region. P.I. Rychkov, in particular, who was the first associate member of the Academy, had academic exchanges with M.V. Lomonosov (1711-65), Müller (1705-83), and Tatishchev (1685-1750). Rychkov, from a merchant family that fell upon hard times, worked at a state service, applying his knowledge of foreign languages and accounting. In 1734-43, he helped Kirilov as an account for the Orenburg Expedition; in 1744-60, he worked at a prefecture office; in the 1750s-60, he was a governor's aide (tovarishchprigubernatore); and in 1770-71, he was a chief manager of salt in Orenburg. Rychkov, like Kirilov, complained about the trade with Asian countries, including India, from Orenburg.65 He contributed to the age of Enlightenment, as it were.
Results
N.G. Appolova, a Soviet historian, studied the South Urals region, including Bashkiria, in the eighteenth century. "The issue that an absolutist government in eighteenth-century Russia faced was economic development—farming and farming industry in the Central Volga region (especially, Tataria and Chuvashia), and farming and the metallurgy industry in Bashkiria."66 Prior to this the Russian government did not have any clear colonizing policy toward these mixed-ethnic regions.
It was the Stroganovs and Russian Orthodox monasteries that first came to Bashkiria. Then, Russian peasants settled there. According to Iu.M. Tarasov, who wrote a monograph on the colonization in the South Urals, peasants were "first fugitives, namely Russian peasants escaping from the oppression of the serfdom, and staroobriadtsy, or Old Believers, who were chased by the government. Next, came the state peasants. The government distributed the ownerless lands known as the 'dikoe pole (wild field)' or 'steppe frontier region' in Bashkiria."67 Initially, the efforts at colonization in this area were characterized by farming.
In addition to the Russian settlers, Tatars came to Bashkiria from Siberia, and almost at the
63 Bartold, V.V., Istoriia izucheniia Vostoka v Evrope i Rossii. Soch. (Moscow, 1977), vol. IX, p. 407.
64 RGADA, f. 127, op. 1, d. 211, l. 26.
65 OR RNB, f. 595 (Polenovy V.A. and D.V.), ed. khr. no. 103.
66 Appolova, N.G. 'K voprosu o politike absoliutizma v natsionalnykh raionakh Rossii v XVIII v.' in Absoliutizm v Rossii (XVII-XVIII vv.), Sbornik statei (Moscow, 1964), p. 357; See also Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR (Moscow, 1956), vol. IV, part 2, no. 492-494, 497, 498.
67 Tarasov, Iu.M., Russkaia krestianskaia kolonizatsiia iuzhnogo Urala. VtoraiapolovinaXVIII-pervaiapolovinaXIX v. (Moscow, 1984), p. 3.
same time, Don Cossacks settled there and became Iaik Cossacks. In 1591, Iaik Cossacks founded their army corps, and they fought frequently against their neighbors, the Kalmyks and Bashkirs. The Russian government succeeded in making an ally of the Iaik Cossacks and used them for the military colonization on the frontiers. The Iaik Cossacks region, like the Don Cossacks area, became a so-called "asylum" or a safe place for all people dissatisfied with serfdom.68
It took a long time for Russians to colonize the South Urals District because of opposition from the Bashkirs, the Kazakhs, and other native inhabitants. The Russian government had to establish fortresses for protecting Russians against steppe nomads: Ufa (established in 1574), Menzelinsk (1584), Osa (1591), Kungur (1648), Birsk (1663), Troitsk (from the second half of the seventeenth century to the beginning of the eighteenth century), Ekaterinburg (1721), Krasnoufimsk (1736), and so on.69
By introducing the guverniia, or prefecture, and uezd, or county, system, nobles and bureaucrats indicated a tendency to increase their numbers. Serfdom also expanded. In 1767, there were 462 nobles (male) and 21,842 serfs (male) in Orenburg prefecture. By the end of the eighteenth century, the numbers had risen to 766 nobles (male) and 341,413 serfs (male).70
The main point of the decree of February 11, 1736 was to reinforce control over Bashkiria after the suppression of a Bashkir rebellion in 1735. A.F. Chuloshnikov, a Soviet historian who studied the Bashkirs, wrote that Kirilov, who proposed the decree, had a firm faith in the extermination of the Bashkirs as being the best policy in Bashkiria.71 He seems to be a typical Russian "colonialist" in the eighteenth century.
Further, factory owners drew up deeds on lands with terms to their own advantage. When they gained lands from the Bashkirs, they obtained more by violating the contract.72 Russian thinking at the time was the following: "For them [the Russians ], though the Bashkirs were not savage, they were poludikar, or semi-savage, because they sometimes revolted against 'the Russian orthodox authority,' and so it was thought fair compensation for the Russians to cheat and rob the Bashkirs of their lands, albeit in moderation."73
Conclusions or Discussion and Implication
During the eighteenth century, the Russians shared in the Enlightenment and made efforts toward forming their own identity. Working along these lines, Russia prepared to build an "early modern" empire.
For this reason, and also to understand the character of the Russian "early modern" empire, it
68 ibid., p. 38
69 Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, V.P. (ed.), Rossiia. Polnoe Geograficheskoe opisanie nashego otechestva. Ural' i Priural'e, vol. 5 (St. Petersburg, 1914), p. 138.
70 Materialy, vol. IV, p. 390.
71 Chloshnikov, A.F., Vosstanie 1735 g. v Bashkirii (Moscow and Leningrad, 1940),
72 Tashkin, S.F., Inorodtsy Povolzhsko-Priural 'skogo kraiia I Sibir po materialam Ekaterinninskoi Zakonodatel 'noi Komissii, vol. 1 (Orenburg, 1921), pp. 192-193.
73 ibid, p. 192.
was necessary for Russians to organize academic expeditions. Through these undertakings, the "consciousness of territory" was formed and the early modern Russian empire endeavored to discriminate between "European" and "non-European."
Conclusions or Discussion and Implication
Kirilov's Proekt took the course described above. In this draft he declared his aim to expand the country's territory and acquire wealth for the Russian empire—as most mercantilists in eighteenth-century Russia and Europe did. His successors also continued his work. Through the process of these efforts, some of them came to believe that the native people opposing Russian colonial policy were polidikar, or semi-savage, and Russian colonial policy helped create the Russian identity, known not only as "Russian Europe" but also as Russia with a complicated identity mixed with Asian constituents.
Information about the author:
Koichi Toyokawa (Tokyo, Japan), Doctor of Philosophy in the field of History and Area Studies, Professor at Meiji University, Department of History and Geography School of Arts and Letters, 1-1 Kanda-Surugadai, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 101-8301, Japan. E-mail: toyokawa@meiji.ac.jp
