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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Alexander DUDNIK
Ph.D. (Hist.), Senior Fellow at the Ukrainian Presidential Fund under the Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine (Kiev, Ukraine).
THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH ISSUE IN UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY (1992-2012)
Part One
The Nagorno-Karabakh Issue in the Policy of Presidents Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1993) and Leonid Kuchma (1993-2004)
Abstract
T
his article attempts to identify the characteristics of Ukrainian policy regarding settlement of the Armenian-Azeri Na-
gorno-Karabakh conflict over the past twenty years. It takes particular note of the positions and approaches formed, as well as
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Ukraine's initiatives and the participation of each of the country's four presidents in this conflict as they took their turns in power: Leonid Kravchuk (1992-1993), Leonid Kuchma (1993-2004), Viktor Yushchenko (20052009), and Viktor Yanukovich (since 2010).
It points to the common and specific features of the policy of all the Ukrainian leaders on this problem and reveals the internal and external factors that have had an influence on the change in Kiev's position on this question and, correspondingly, on
Ukraine's relations, primarily with Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia, in looking for ways to settle it.
It reveals the reasons for Ukraine's interest in resolving the conflict and Kiev's justification of its right to carry out a mediating and peacekeeping mission in it. It focuses particular attention on Ukraine's policy regarding this issue within the framework of international organizations, as well as on Kiev's achievements and blunders in assisting this conflict settlement.
KEYWORDS: The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Black Sea-Caspian Region, Ukrainian mediation, conflict settlement, the Minsk Group (MG), the OSCE, the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (ODED)-GUAM, U.N. Security Council resolutions.
Introduction
Ukraine's vitally important national interests are being realized in complicated internal and external circumstances that are characterized by several challenges and threats. They include the danger of escalation of the so-called frozen or smoldering regional conflicts close to the Ukrainian border, the most challenging of which is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the Central Caucasus. Today, its possible settlement is complicated by the involvement of other states, the shadow business, and even international criminal groups in it.
There are several reasons for Ukraine' s participation in settling the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the main one being the country's national security. Based on this, Kiev is interested in forming an international security system in the Black Sea-Caspian region by collaborating with NATO and the European Union, or within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (ODED)-GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova), and other international organizations. Today's conflicts are transboundary in nature and their negative trends and consequences—growing numbers of migrants, illegal arms trade, international terrorism, and several other crime-related factors—threaten the stability and development of all of the region's states.
However, as of today, such international structures as NATO, the EU, the OSCE, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (CIS) have been unable to elaborate unified approaches and mechanisms for ensuring regional security, particularly by coordinating their activity in a particular region.
None of the guarantees of these organizations, primarily NATO, the CSTO, and the OSCE, apply to the Black Sea-Caspian region as a whole. Attempts to build an "arc of security" by creating ODED-GUAM have not only failed to yield corresponding results, they have stirred up anxiety and resistance in Russia and are even promoting disintegration in the region.
The correlation of forces of the main players in the region—Russia, the U.S., Turkey, the EU, and NATO—is instrumental in determining its state of security. The situation is also aggravated by
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termination of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), as a result of Russia's temporary withdrawal from it in 2007. Without the CFE Treaty, countries participating in conflicts are at liberty to increase their armed potential, even by means of their settlement mediators, for example, Russia. This is making the Black Sea-Caspian region more vulnerable to negative external impacts and threats to internal sociopolitical stability.1
Therefore, if Ukraine pursues a detached or passive policy in the Black Sea-Caspian Region, this may fully deprive it of the opportunity to have any, even a minimum, impact on the situation in it and even become dependent on it.2
Moreover, if the situation in the Black Sea-Caspian Region develops negatively, Ukraine faces the danger of third forces transferring scenarios of these conflicts to its territory, in particular the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea, by making use of its conflict-prone potential.
A recent interview with Andrei Illarionov, a Russian expert and former aide of Vladimir Putin (2000-2005), showed the reality of this threat today for both Ukraine and the entire region. According to him, a few years ago, Vladimir Putin said as though by accident, but in fact deliberately, that the Ukraine does not have a long history of its own statehood and a large part of Ukrainian territory is actually Russian territory that Ukraine has no justified right to. He said something like, "Half of Ukraine is Russia." Illarionov believes that Vladimir Putin recognizes Ukraine's independence in some measure, but that he nevertheless has an inner conviction that at least part of Ukrainian territory should belong to Russia.
Andrei Illarionov emphasized that Vladimir Putin, taking Egor Gaidar's cue, repeated a phrase that reflects the imperialist view of history by some of the Russian elite: "The collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century." Therefore he has a corresponding attitude both toward this event and to those states that have formed in the territory of the former Soviet Union. The ex-aide called this an instinctive, almost unconscious, desire to revive, reconstruct not so much the Soviet Union as the influence of a controlling center (implying the Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation) and make use of this influence to bolster its existence. "After all, as it (the FSB) sees it, the world consists of different blocs—be they manifest or unmanifest. The Soviet Union was a manifest bloc in this case. And if it was impossible to take political revenge, economic steps were taken,"3 stated Andrei Illarionov. The trade war between Russia and Ukraine waged by Moscow in August 2013 confirms these words.
Ukraine is also interested in settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict due to the fact that large Armenian and Azeri diasporas reside in its territory. According to census data, as early as 2001, in Ukraine's total population of more that 48 million, the size of the first amounted to almost 100,000, while the second exceeded 45,000.4
Armenians have been living in Ukraine since the days of Kievan Rus. However, the Karabakh conflict has increased their numbers in the country more than ten-fold over the past twenty years. Today, Ukraine has one of the most powerful Armenian diasporas in the world, which has formed a very influential Union of Armenians of Ukraine (UAU). Although it is becoming integrated into Ukrainian society, the Armenian diaspora still retains its cultural, national, and religious features.
1 See: "The Crimea, Ukraine, Black Sea Region: Security and Development," National Security and Defense, No. 4-5, 2011, available in Ukrainian at [http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/files/category_journal/NSD122_ukr_1.pdf].
2 See: B.O. Parakhonsky, M.M. Gonchar, V.L. Kuznetsov, V.O. Maliarov, O.Ia. Manachinsky, P.O. Moskalets, The Strategic Interests of Ukraine in the Countries of the Black Sea Region and Problems of National Security, Presidential Administration of Ukraine, National Institute of Strategic Research, Foreign Policy Strategy Series, Issue 7, 2007, available in Ukrainian at [http://eu.prostir.ua/library/1545.html].
3 S. Leshchenko, Putin's Ex-Aide Andrei Illarionov: Putin Believes that Part of Ukraine Should Belong to Russia, Ukrainskaia pravda, 10 October, 2013, available in Ukrainian at [http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2013/10/10/6999733/].
4 For more on the size and composition of the Ukrainian population according to the results of the All-Ukrainian Population Census of 2001, see: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, available at: [http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/ general/nationality/].
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Today its representatives belong to Ukraine's highest power structures and join together to comprehensively defend the interests of their people.5
Most of the Azeris currently living in Ukraine arrived as refugees after the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They are mainly engaged in commerce in large cities of Kiev, Donetsk, and the Crimean cities. In recent years, the number of Azeris emigrating to Ukraine has significantly grown. Today they rank second among foreigners officially registered to acquire residence permits or Ukrainian citizenship.6 Like the Armenians, they are not fully integrated and assimilated into Ukrainian society. The Azeris join with representatives of other Turkic peoples of Ukraine, in particular, Crimean Tartars, Gagauz, Turks, and Meskhetian Turks. In 2013, they created their own organization—The Joint Diaspora of Azeris of Ukraine,7 which took part in the founding assembly—the Congress of Turkic Peoples of Ukraine (CTPU). As of today, the Turkic peoples comprise more than one million Ukrainian citizens, while the Turkic factor is considered one of the promising vectors of its foreign policy.8
By creating conditions and guaranteeing political and economic rights for a productive life and development of national minorities and the representatives of other nations, including Azeris and Armenians in its territory, Ukraine is confirming its open-mindedness and interest in settlement of the Karabakh conflict.
The Ukrainian population in Armenia and Azerbaijan is not such an important issue. This particularly applies to Armenia, where, according to the data of the 2001 population census, only 1,633 Ukrainians lived, or 0.05% of the country's more than 3-million-strong population.9 There are many more Ukrainians in Azerbaijan. At the beginning of the 2000s, they amounted to 33,000 people in Azerbaijan's total population of more than 7 million.10 However, their number is constantly decreasing, since many of them emigrate.
Ukraine's economic interests play quite an important role in its desire to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This primarily applies to attempts to diversify deliveries of energy resources. In so doing, Kiev is not only interested in purchasing and transporting Azeri oil and gas, but also Turkmen and Iranian gas, as well as Kazakh oil. Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as of other conflicts in the Caucasus, will only promote this. As early as the beginning of 1992, a trilateral Ukrainian-Azeri-Iranian agreement was signed in Kiev on researching, planning, and building a gas pipeline for transporting Iranian natural gas. An agreement was reached with Iran on building and operating a three-branch gas pipeline for linking Iran with Western Europe.11
Since 2003, the European Union has been actively discussing the possibility of implementing such a project with Iran via Armenia, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine to Europe.12
5 See: "V Ukraine sozdaetsia odna iz naibolee moshchnykh armianskikh diaspor v mire," 25 March, 2013, available at [http://voskanapat.info/?p=1337]; "Soiuz armian Ukrainiy: glavneishie sobytiia diaspory v 2012 godu byli sviazany s religiei," 15 January, 2013, available at: [http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/20122-soyuz-armyan-ukrainy-glavnejshie-sobytiya-diaspory-v-2012-godu-byli-svyazany-s-religiej .html].
6 See: "Rezko uvelichilsia potok zhelaiushchikh osest v Ukraine kavkaztsev i aziatov," 21 October, 2013, available at [http://argumentua.com/novosti/rezko-uvelichilsya-potok-zhelayushchikh-osest-v-ukraine-kavkaztsev-i-aziatov].
7 See: "Obedinennaia Diaspora Azerbaidzhantsev Ukrainy," available at [http://aze.in.ua/uabd/].
8 See: "Tiurksky kongress Ukrainy—obedinenie radi soglasiia," 5 July, 2013, available at [http://aze.in.ua/2013/07/05/ tyirkskij-kongres-ukraini-objedinenie-radi-soglasia/].
9 See: "Naselenie Respubliki Armeniia," available at [http://www.abp.am/armenia/population/peoples/].
10 See: L.D. Chikalenko, "The Caucasian Vector of Ukrainian Policy. The Azerbaijan Republic," in: Ukrainian Foreign Policy, Chapter 5, Kiev, 2006, available in Ukrainian at [http://pidruchniki.ws/15840720/politologiya/zovnishnya_politika_ ukrayini_-_chekalenko_ld].
11 See: Ibidem.
12 See: A. Kovtun, "Why Is Ukraine Still Not Taking Advantage of Alternatives to Russian Gas Deliveries?" Ekonomicheskaia pravda, 24 March, 2008, available in Ukrainian at [http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2008/03/24/ 15945 5/view_print/].
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Proceeding from the above-mentioned factors and in the context of ensuring national security, as well as security and stability in the Black Sea-Caspian Region, Ukraine is focusing its attention on settling conflicts in the territories of the ODED-GUAM member states, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria conflicts. For this reason, government structures, politicians, scientists, experts, and journalists are attentively studying the reasons for and possible ways to resolve these conflicts, as well as ways for Ukraine to participate in the negotiation process, use its armed contingents for peacekeeping purposes, and form an international security system in the Black Sea-Caspian region.
This topic is also made urgent by the fact that Ukraine has declared one of its priorities in chairing the OSCE to be promoting the settlement of regional conflicts in the post-Soviet expanse, particularly Nagorno-Karabakh. In order to understand how realistic this is, this article aims to reveal the characteristics and shed light on the achievements and blunders of Ukraine's policy aimed at resolving this issue in previous years.
Ukraine in Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict during Leonid Kravchuk's Presidency
Ukraine first officially understood the need to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict while it was still a part of the Soviet Union. On 17 May, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic headed by Chairman Leonid Kravchuk adopted a statement on the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In it, the Supreme Soviet, expressing concern about aggravation of the situation and confirming the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic's intention to develop interstate relations on the principles of sovereign equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and refusal to use force, considered in impermissible to use the Soviet Armed Forces in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, or to capture and hold hostages. It proposed looking for a solution to this situation in immediate peace talks, believing that the conflict could and should be resolved only by political non-violent means. Leonid Kravchuk believed that it could not be resolved without a show of good will on the part of the Azerbaijani and Armenian leadership, release of hostages, rendering of medical assistance to the wounded, creating conditions for returning people to their homes (assistance to those whose homes had been destroyed or damaged), as well as objective and sober highlighting of the events by the media. "We believe that the efforts of the two neighboring peoples will return peace to Azerbaijan and Armenia," said the statement of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet.13
On 5 March, 1992, the first president of now independent Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, made a statement on the events involving Nagorno-Karabakh. He focused attention on the fact that the conflict had reached its critical point, which had resulted in degradation of the spiritual and cultural life of the peoples, suffering among the population, violation of human rights, thousands of refugees, the murder of hundreds of innocent people, and destabilization of the situation in the region. On behalf of the Ukrainian people, the president called on the parliament and leadership of Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as everyone able to have an impact on the events in Nagorno-Karabakh, to put an end to the bloodshed and begin a dialog between the sides concerned in order to take specific steps to achieve peaceful settlement of the conflict. In particular, he proposed discussing settlement of the conflict on 20 March, 1992 at a sitting of the heads of the CIS member states in Kiev. Leonid Kravchuk said that in order to restore peace in Nagorno-Karabakh, the hostilities must immediately stop, all sides must
13 See: "Statement of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. on the Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia," Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, No. 26, 25 June, 1991, p. 306.
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guarantee a cease-fire, all armed formations, including the CIS armed forces, must be withdrawn from the region, and democratic institutions of legal power must be created to ensure a return to normal life. He also supported the recommendations of the Committee of Senior Officials of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) for settling the conflict. Leonid Kravchuk believed that the membership of Azerbaijan and Armenia in the U.N. and CSCE would give them the opportunity to make full use of the mechanisms of these international forums.14
A week later, on 13 March, 1992, the Ukrainian representative office in the U.N. handed the U.N. Secretary General a brief statement from the President of Ukraine about the events involving Nagorno-Karabakh. It said that the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh had reached a critical point, as a result of which the population was suffering and there was the danger of destabilization of the situation throughout the region. Ukraine declared its support of peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict with the help of the CSCE and based on the recommendations of its supreme body, the Council of Senior Officials, and also called for withdrawal of all the armed formations from the region, including the armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Escalation of the hostilities was confirmed by Azerbaijan on 9 May, when it announced that Armenian troops had seized and destroyed the town of Shusha in Karabakh.15
So in 1992, Ukraine, as an independent state, first showed its interest in resolving the Karabakh conflict at the international level and was regarded by the participants in the conflict as one of the mediators in its settlement.
Kiev's active stance in this issue, along with several other states, promoted examination of the Karabakh question by the U.N. Security Council and its adoption of four corresponding resolutions (822, 853, 874, and 884) between 30 April and 12 November, 1993. In them, the Security Council demanded immediate cessation of all hostilities, unconditional release of the occupied territories or withdrawal of all occupying forces, restoration of the economic, transport, and energy links in the region (853), and removal of all obstacles to communications and transportation (874). Moreover, in its resolutions, the U.N. Security Council expressed grave concern at the displacement of large numbers of civilians in Azerbaijan and the serious humanitarian emergency. In the context of the latter, Kiev actively supported the establishment of a temporary U.N. branch and a representative body of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees in Azerbaijan, which opened in the summer of 1993.
In 1992-1993, Ukraine was also actively in favor of coordinating the efforts of the CSCE and U.N. aimed at resolving regional conflicts, including in Nagorno-Karabakh. As a result, it was one of the 35 U.N. member states that adopted a corresponding draft of the resolution on 23 October, 1992 at the 47th session of the General Assembly (GA), which was later approved in 1993 at the 48th session of the U.N. GA.16
On 30 October, 1993, Head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Anatoli Zlenko expounded on Ukraine's approach to ethnic conflict settlement, including in Nagorno-Karabakh, during the general discussion at the 48th session of the U.N. GA. First, the Ukrainian minister welcomed joint efforts by the U.N. and CSCE to search for ways to put an end to the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia. This suited Kiev, which refused to recognize the peacekeeping efforts under the auspices of the CIS, meaning Russia.17 Second, Anatoli Zlenko stated that the interests of all the states of these regions, as well as of the ethnic communities, should be taken into account when settling all
14 See: "Statement by the President of Ukraine on the Events Involving Nagorno-Karabakh of 6 March, 1992," in: Ukraine on the International Arena. Collection of Documents and Papers of 1991-1995, in two volumes, Comp. by V.V. Budiakov, ed. by G.Y. Udovenko, Vol. 2, Iurinkom Inter, Kiev, 1998, pp. 300-301 (in Ukrainian).
15 See: Yearbook. United Nations, Vol. 46, 1992, pp. 388-399.
16 See: "Draft of the Resolution on "Coordination of the Efforts of the United Nations and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe," in: Ukraine on the International Arena. Collection of Documents and Papers of1991-1995, Vol. 1, pp. 597-598.
17 Ukraine refused to recognize the CIS as an entity of international relations and regarded it as a negotiation mechanism for establishing new ties and relations among the post-Soviet states.
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the conflicts in the post-Soviet expanse and in former Yugoslavia, referring to corresponding decisions of the U.N. GA and the principles of international law.18
On 9 November, 1993, Ukraine was one of the 11 states that presented a draft of the resolution on "Emergency International Assistance to Refugees and Displaced Persons in Azerbaijan" at the 48th session of the U.N. GA. The document insistently pointed to the need to continue further international efforts by the U.N. Secretary General, member states, programs, and organizations with the aim of not only attracting the attention of the international community to the urgent problems of Azeri refugees and migrants, but also of mobilizing their efforts for rendering assistance to these people.19 Since it gained its independence, Ukraine has taken a clear and unequivocal stance regarding settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It proceeded from the need for rigorous adherence to the first principle of the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE—"the right of each state to preserve territorial integrity," as well as the principles of the U.N. Charter—All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use offorce against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.
So Ukraine was in favor of preserving the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by peaceful means with the mediating role of the U.N. and the CSCE, and observing the rights of ethnic minorities in its territory, particularly Armenians, within the boundaries of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic, the status of which should be determined by consent of the conflicting sides. It focused particular attention on the return of refugees.
This stance by Kiev in this issue, as well as the military-technical cooperation with Baku, had a negative effect on the development of Ukrainian-Armenian relations.20
This also aggravated Ukraine's relations not only with Armenia, but also with the Russian Federation (RF). As we know, the RF unofficially supports its strategic ally—Armenia—in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by supplying this country with arms totaling more than one billion dollars,21 thus violating all the corresponding international contracts, principles, and resolutions, but guaranteeing its security. Without Moscow's support, Erevan would be unable to continue occupying Azeri territory. Russian scientists also openly admit this in their research.22 In 2006, a Great Encyclopedia in 63 volumes was published in Russia, in which Nagorno-Karabakh is presented as an independent formation that "historically belongs to the Armenians."23 And many Russian politicians, such as Konstantin Zatulin and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, are demanding recognition of the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, in the same way as Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.24
However, in the early and mid-1990s, Kiev's support of Baku in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which was not coordinated with Moscow, also directly threatened its national and, in particular, territorial security. After declaring the post-Soviet expanse a zone of its national interests, and officially not recognizing the interstate borders in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Moscow threatened the new states that did not agree with this approach with support of separatism in their
18 See: "Speech by head of the Ukrainian delegation, Ukraine Foreign Minister Anatoli Zlenko at a general discussion during the 48th session of the U.N. General Assembly on 30 October, 1993," in: Ukraine on the International Arena. Collection of Documents and Papers of1991-1995, Vol. 1, pp. 436-437.
19 See: "Draft of the Resolution 'Emergency International Assistance to Refugees and Displaced Persons in Azerbaijan' at the 48th session of the U.N. GA," in: Ukraine on the International Arena. Collection of Documents and Papers of1991-1995, Vol. 2, pp. 42-44.
20 See: L.D. Chikalenko, op. cit., Chapter 5.
21 See: A. Iunusov, Azerbaidzhan v nachaleXXI veka: konflikty i potentsialnye ugrozy, Adilogly, Baku, 2007, p. 44.
22 See: O. Kuznetsov, "Evolution of Russia's Geopolitical Interests and Priorities in Transcaucasia," The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 2012, p. 154.
23 Ia. Iakis, "The Impact of the Energy Industry and Frozen Conflicts on Cooperation in the Black Sea Region," in: Black Sea Synergy. Papers from the International Odessa-Istanbul Conference of 21-23 October, 2007, available at [http://www.kas. de/wf/doc/kas_13443-1522-13-30.pdf?080411074040] (in Ukrainian).
24 See: "Zhirinovsky: 'Nagorny Karabakh prinadlezhit armianam,'" Rosbalt, 16 September, 2009, available at [http:// www.rosbalt.ru/main/2009/09/16/672487.html].
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territories (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova), or openly stated its territorial claims to them. In Ukraine, this applied not only to the Crimea and the Odessa Region, but also to the Donbas District.25 The striving of first president Leonid Kravchuk to pursue a state policy independent of Moscow and oriented toward the West26 was one of the reasons for his early departure from his supreme state post.
The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in Ukrainian Foreign Policy during the Presidency of Leonid Kuchma
In the summer of 1993, as a result of an early presidential election, Moscow-oriented Leonid Kuchma was elected as the new head of the Ukrainian state. This was when Ukraine first declared its willingness to participate actively in the negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, supporting, as before, preservation of the territorial integrity and political-economic independence of the Azerbaijan Republic. Leonid Kuchma and heads of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Anatoli Zlenko, Gennadi Udovenko, and Boris Tarasiuk talked about this repeatedly both in Baku and in Erevan. The Ukrainian president proceeded from the fact that Ukraine was a non-bloc state, that is, was not a member of and did not strive to participate in any military-political or defense organizations or agreements, such as NATO and the Tashkent Pact (1992) in the CIS. In addition, Leonid Kuchma believed that, although it was not a full-fledged participant in the CIS, Ukraine should still have an active impact on policy within the Commonwealth. "If we do not participate in establishing the 'rules of the game,' these rules will be established without us and to our detriment," he said.27
When establishing all-round Ukrainian-Armenian relations, Leonid Kuchma constantly referred to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in particular to Kiev's mediating role in it. In May 1996, during his official visit to the Republic of Armenia, an Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between Ukraine and Armenia was signed. Leonid Kuchma discussed the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and in other hotspots of the Commonwealth with Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian. The heads of state came to an agreement on the need for their settlement exclusively by political means.28
At the beginning of July 1997, when Ukrainian Foreign Minister Gennadi Udovenko paid an official visit to Armenia, the sides discussed, among other issues of interstate cooperation, looking for ways to promote political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.29 This resulted in Levon Ter-Petrosian paying two official visits to Ukraine at the end of July and in September of the same year. He expressed his confidence that Ukraine could participate in resolving the complicated Nagorno-Karabakh issue.30
However, the events that unfolded in the Black Sea-Caspian Region at the end of 1997-begin-ning of 1998 changed the situation. First, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova united in an interstate structure called GUAM in order to uphold their interests in the post-Soviet expanse and resolve the problems jointly. In contrast to the CIS, this union did not envisage the creation of supra-
25 See: A. Zlenko, Diplomatiia i politika. Ukraina v protsesse dinamicheskikh geopoliticheskikh peremen, Folio, Kharkov, 2004, pp. 385-387.
26 During Leonid Kravchuk's presidency, Ukraine did not sign the CIS Statute or the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in the CIS—Tashkent Pact of 1992.
27 N.P. Baranovskaia, V.F. Verstiuk, S.V. Vidniansky, Ukraine: The Formation of an Independent State (1991-2001), Alternativy Publishing House, Kiev, 2001, p. 657 (in Ukrainian).
28 See: Ukraine on the International Arena. Collection of Documents and Papers of1996-2000, in two volumes, Comp. by V.V. Budiakov, ed. by G.Y. Udovenko,Vol. 1, Iurinkom Inter, Kiev, 2003, pp. 123-124, 254.
29 See: Ibid., p. 360.
30 See: Ibid., pp. 362-363, 377.
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national centralized structures, established relations among its participants on an equal basis, and orientated itself toward developing political and economic cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and the U.S. The establishment of GUAM meant a complete transfer of the participating states to a multivectoral foreign policy.
One of the main reasons for forming GUAM was Moscow's lack of any real desire to promote settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistrian, Abkhazian, and South Ossetian conflicts, as well as the constant political and economic pressure on these states. This particularly applied to pressure on Ukraine in nuclear disarmament issues, the Crimea, division of the Black Sea fleet, and signing the Treaty on Friendship and Good-Neighborly Relations.31
After GUAM was formed, Ukraine came forward with a new initiative at the beginning of 1998 to create a GUAM joint peacekeeping battalion under the auspices of the OSCE for meeting the needs of the Caucasian region. Although nothing was said about its possible peacekeeping mission directly in the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement, this is precisely how it was implied. As early as the 1994 Budapest CSCE/OSCE Summit, a document was adopted that envisaged possible deployment of the OSCE multinational peacekeeping forces for settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the condition that the sides enter a peace agreement. The OSCE Planning Committee drew up the plan for this operation. But the precise designation and nature of the OSCE's involvement in the conflict settlement process depended on the actual needs of the sides concerned.32
The Ukrainian initiative was positively perceived by President Heydar Aliev, who noted repeatedly the significant role of Ukraine and President Leonid Kuchma personally in stabilizing the situation in the Caucasus. He also talked about this during the visit of a Ukrainian delegation led by Prime Minister Valery Pustovoitenko to Azerbaijan in May 1998.33
However, on 3 February, 1998, Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian handed in his resignation as president of the country, which the parliament accepted. The reason for this resignation was the split in Armenia's ruling elite caused by Levon Ter-Petrosian's consent to the plan for stage-by-stage settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict proposed by the OSCE Minsk Group. His opponents in the "party in power"—Prime Minister Robert Kocharian, Defense Minister Vazgen Sarkisian, and Minister of Internal Affairs and National Security Serge Sarkisian—did not support this plan,34 proposing instead a so-called package deal that directly tied the status of Nagorno-Karabakh to the withdrawal of troops from the security zone.35
So the change in Armenian leadership essentially thwarted the OSCE Minsk Group's conflict settlement plan, as well as Kiev's possible mediation mission in the Nagorno-Karabakh question. Moscow's position also promoted this, which did not want to allow OSCE or U.N. peacekeepers into the conflict zone, let alone Kiev, since it did not recognize the peacekeeping efforts under the auspices of the CIS and had begun openly orienting itself toward the West. The Kremlin continued regarding independent Ukraine as a temporary phenomenon.
31 See: Anatoli Zlenko, op. cit., pp. 379-464.
32 See: F. Shiller, "Potential of the Ukrainian Peacekeeping Policy in the CIS Region," in: Ukraine's Peacekeeping Activity: Cooperation with NATO and Other European Security Structures, National Institute of Strategic Research under the Ukrainian Presidential Administration, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Section No. 3, Kiev, 2001, available at [http:// old.niss.gov.ua/book/Perepel/008.htm] (in Ukrainian).
33 See: Ukraine on the International Arena. Collection of Documents and Papers of1996-2000, Vol. 1, p. 444.
34 The gist of the plan was to return five or six districts in the security area to Azerbaijan (apart from Shusha, Khankendi, and the Lachin District), to deploy the peacekeeping forces along the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh, raise the blockade on communications, and hold talks on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, which would be determined by means of a referendum, which Levon Ter-Petrosian had no intention of allowing representatives of the Azeri community to participate in. In exchange, Armenia could acquire full access to all transit energy projects Azerbaijan was involved in.
35 See: "Former Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian might head an Orange Revolution in Armenia," HayBlog— Armenia, 13 August, 2007, available in Russian at [http://hayblog.ru/2007/08/13/byivshiy-prezident-armenii-levon-ter-petrosyan-mozhet-vozglavit-oranzhevuyu-revolyutsiyu-v-armenii/].
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Conservation of the conflict settlement met the interests of Moscow and the Karabakh clan, the representative of which, Robert Kocharian, became the new Armenian president in March 1998. This again confirmed the fact that from the very beginning, Erevan had been taking direct and immediate part in the conflict.
At the same time, rejection of the stage-by-stage Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement plan proposed by the OSCE Minsk Group was in a certain sense acceptable to the Azeri side too since the plan did not envisage return of other occupied territory or enforcement of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan.36
However, the Ukrainian leadership continued the policy it had begun. In particular, in September 1998, President Leonid Kuchma said in his statement at an international conference on "The New Possibilities of the Historical Silk Road" in Baku that Ukraine was supporting the efforts of the sides to settle regional conflicts and confirmed its willingness to be a mediator in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.37
In June 1999, new head of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Boris Tarasiuk visited Georgia and Azerbaijan, where he emphasized that Ukraine had always expressed the willingness to promote conflict settlement, but from the very beginning did not agree to participate in forming a peacekeeping contingent under the auspices of the CIS which, in his words, "is not peacekeeping in essence."38
Nor did the beginning of the second Chechen war promote the creation of a GUAM peacekeeping battalion, since there were worries that this subdivision might be drawn into actual hostilities. The uncertainty about the negative influence of Ukraine's activity in this region on the development of relations with Moscow also slowed down its establishment.
As a result, in September 1999, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Alexander Kuzmuk said that Ukraine was ready to participate in political consultations, create a Trans-Caucasian transport corridor, restore the Silk Road, and significantly raise the level of economic cooperation with the countries of the region in order to ensure stability in the Caucasian region, for which it did not have to send a peacekeeping contingent to the Caucasus.
However, the Ukrainian leadership did not reject its mediating peacekeeping mission in settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In particular, this question was discussed with the New Armenian leadership in December 1999 during Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian's official visit to
Kiev.39
In the spring of 2000, after the second Chechen war officially ended, Kiev again brought up the question of its military presence in the Caucasus. There were several reasons for this: first, the OSCE Istanbul summit in 1999, which made amendments to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) on the initiative of the GUUAM states, obligating Moscow to limit its military presence in the region40; second, Ukraine's temporary membership in the U.N. Security Council; and third, the March (2000) visit of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma to Tbilisi and Baku. Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan came to an agreement that personnel for the joint subdivision would be trained at the Odessa Military Institute of Ground Forces. Each of the sides was to independently finance the activity of its part of the battalion, which was no larger than one squadron with the corresponding hardware. According to the decision of the three participant states, the battalion was to act within the framework of the U.N. and OSCE mandates.41 This proved rather difficult to achieve primarily due to Russia's
36 See: O. Sabykhzade: "Conservation of Conflict Settlement Meets the Interests of Moscow and the Karabakh Clan, the Representative of Which is the New Armenian President," 12 February, 2008, available in Russian at [http://news.day.az/ armenia/107710.html].
37 See: Ukraine on the International Arena. Collection of Documents and Papers of1996-2000, Vol. 1, p. 798.
38 See: Ibid., pp. 567-568.
39 See: Ukraine on the International Arena. Collection of Documents and Papers of1996-2000, Vol. 1, p. 591.
40 In 1999, Uzbekistan joined GUAM and the Association was called GUUAM.
41 See: V. Krivokhizha, "Problems of Contemporary Peacekeeping," in: Ukraine's Peacekeeping Activity: Cooperation with NA TO and Other European Security Structures.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
position, which was in no rush to execute the key decision of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul summit and withdraw its troops from Georgia and Moldova. It saw this as a threat to its military presence in the Central Caucasus and Transnistria. As a result, the OSCE considered it inexpedient to bring the GUUAM subdivision into the region, which might only aggravate the situation there.
During President Leonid Kuchma's visit to Baku (March 2000), a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership was signed between Ukraine and Azerbaijan, which was ratified by the parliaments of both states. The document envisaged the development of bilateral relations on the basis of strategic partnership. According to the Treaty, Ukraine and Azerbaijan were to exert efforts to strengthen international peace and stability, placing special emphasis on regional security. The treaty also noted the need for close cooperation within the framework of international, regional, and subregional organizations and structures, in particular further development and strengthening of partnership relations in GUUAM.42
During his visit to Azerbaijan, President Leonid Kuchma visited the refugee tent camps, where children were born, sick and old people died, and weddings were held. The Ukrainian President gave the refugees one hundred shipping containers, which became their homes. The same year, Azerbaijan offered Ukraine preferential terms for 500,000 tons of diesel fuel needed for the sowing season.
In 2002, the women of Ukraine who participated in the Women's GUUAM Forum43 in Baku decided to render all the help they could and promote a rapid end to the conflict.44
In May 2000, during the Kiev meeting of foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Ukraine, Vilayat Guliev and Boris Tarasiuk, the Ukrainian minister emphasized that Ukraine's position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remained unchanged and fully corresponded to the decisions of the U.N. Security Council and OSCE.45
In August 2000, during an unofficial meeting of the leaders of the CIS member states in Yalta, talks were held between Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and Azeri President Heydar Aliev and Armenian President Robert Kocharian, during which, along with other problems, the question of settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was raised. The Ukrainian leadership paid particular attention to this question and tried to accelerate finding a solution that would be acceptable to all sides.46 Ukraine wanted to be the venue for the talks on this problem. Therefore, in Yalta, the presidents of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia held a separate meeting at which they discussed the situation in the Caucasus.47 At the beginning of September 2000, at the U.N. Security Council summit, Leonid Kuchma said that postponing a final decision on the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet expanse could lead to irreparable consequences. In November of the same year, Anatoli Zlenko, speaking at the 8th sitting of the OSCE Council of Ministers, called for stepping up the Organization's activity in resolving regional conflicts, including in Nagorno-Karabakh. The head of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry proposed convening an assembly of experts of the sides concerned under the aegis of the OSCE in order to determine the main mutually acceptable parameters of conflict settlement. In his opinion, the first step in this direction should be unconditional and mandatory implementation of the Istanbul agreements.48 However, all of these proposals directly contradicted Moscow's interests.
42 See: "Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Azerbaijan Republic," Bulletin of the Ukraine Supreme Council, No. 30, 1993, p. 327 (in Ukrainian).
43 Women's Forum of the GUUAM Member States (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) is a nongovernmental, public association. The main goals and tasks of the Forum are to establish close cooperation between women parliamentarians, state and public figures, and women's public organizations of the Association's five countries.
44 See: V. Zamiatin, "Interview, Taliat Aliev: Ukraine Needs to Work in Azerbaijan in the Future," Den, 18 October, 2001, available in Ukrainian at[http://www.day.kiev.ua/66191/].
45 See: Ukraine on the International Arena. Collection of Documents and Papers of1996-2000, Vol. 1, pp. 632-633.
46 See: B.O. Parakhonsky, M.M. Gonchar, V.L. Kuznetsov, V.O. Maliarov, O.Ia. Manachinsky, P.O. Moskalets, op. cit.
47 See: Ukraine on the International Arena. Collection of Documents and Papers of1996-2000, Vol. 1, p. 667.
48 See: A. Zlenko, "Ukraine's Foreign Policy: From Romanticism to Pragmatism (Speeches, Statements, Interviews, and Articles of the Ukrainian Foreign Minister A.M. Zlenko)," Ukraine Press, Kiev, 2001, pp. 25-26 (in Ukrainian).
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
In 2000-2001, Ukraine actively assisted the Azerbaijan Republic's accession to the Council of Europe, thanks to which the Azeri side was able to provide the European community with documentary proof that the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh occupied by Armenia is an uncontrolled zone and one of the main transit routes of drugs, and has also become a place for burying nuclear wastes. Moreover, all of Azerbaijan's cultural monuments and values, as well as schools and mosques have been destroyed there.49
In turn, in 2001, when the question of termination of the powers of the Ukrainian delegation in the European Council was discussed, Azerbaijan spoke against adopting this resolution.
In October 2002, during Leonid Kuchma's official visit to Armenia, he confirmed that Ukraine's position in the Nagorno-Karabakh question remained unchanged. He believed that the only solution to the current situation was for the sides to agree between themselves. Ukraine, in turn, was ready to support any peaceful resolution of this problem. Leonid Kuchma approved the development of the negotiation process between Erevan and Baku, which, in his words, was occurring as "an open and honest dialog." He also noted that world experience of settling such conflicts as the Nagorno-Karabakh showed that such settlement could not occur without damage to the sides. Ukraine stated its willingness to assist both countries in every way possible in resolving this problem, but in so doing did not intend to play the role of main mediator-negotiator, since the OSCE Minsk Group was already performing that function, the co-chairs of which are the U.S., Russia, and France.50
At the end of 2003, at a meeting of the Council of Heads of Foreign Ministries of the OSCE countries, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Konstantin Grishchenko called on the members of the Organization to take more active part in resolving conflicts in the post-Soviet expanse as a priority vector in OSCE operations, which are based on observing the fundamental principles of international relations: respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of the borders of the member states. He also noted that all the GUUAM countries comprehensively upheld this approach, while the OSCE did not have the necessary resolve and dynamism to settle conflicts in the territory of the former Soviet Union.51
Moreover, Ukraine constantly insisted on holding special extended sittings of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly dedicated to discussing conflict settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, and Georgia. Kiev tried to get itself nominated for work in the OSCE's field divisions. So as of 2001, Ukraine was represented in the group of assistants to the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chair-person-in-Office in Nagorno-Karabakh.52
(To be concluded)
49 See: V. Zamiatin, op. cit.
50 See: "The Nagorno-Karabakh Problem Should Be Resolved Exclusively by Peaceful Means, the Ukrainian President Emphasized in Erevan," in: Countries of the World. Azerbaijan, Ukrinform, available in Ukrainian at [http://svit.ukrinform. ua/Azerb/azerb.php?menu=ukrinform].
51 See: "K. Grishchenko Calls on the OSCE to be More Active," Den, No. 218, 2 December, 2003 (in Ukrainian).
52 See: "Ukraine: 10 Years of Independence," Brama, 2001, available in Ukrainian at [http://www.brama.com/ua-consulate / Independence10.html].
