The Ismailaga Community: Shifting Religious Patterns in Contemporary Turkey Текст научной статьи по специальности «Философия, этика, религиоведение»

I.L. Babich. Mezhreligioznyy dialog na sovremennom Severnom Kavkaze: mif ili realnost. [ Interreligious dialogue on the modern North Caucasus: Myth or Reality.] // 1150th anniversary of Russian statehood. Veliky Novgorod, 2012.

The article was submitted by the author for publication in the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World".

Gabriel Piricky, scholar of the Orient THE iSMAILAGA COMMUNITY: SHIFTING RELIGIOUS PATTERNS IN CONTEMPORARY TURKEY

Introduction

The ismailaga branch of the Nak§ibendi Sufi order is considered to be among the most traditional (gelenekgi) and conservative in Turkey, whilst for the secular establishment of the country it represents the incarnation of reactionary religious forces (irtica). Members of the ismailaga community (cemaat), which is led by Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu Hocaefendi, are well-known for their "Islamic" dress code (kilik kiyafet) and their "authentic" beliefs, which are supposed to be in conformity with those of the Prophet Muhammad, and their network of Qur'anic schools; but also for living in ghetto-like conditions in Istanbul's £ar§amba district. Based on fieldwork research and qualitative interviews conducted with several members and observers of the ismailaga community, this study focuses on its activities and explores the environment of this under-researched and relatively new Sufi branch within the context of fast changing conditions. Also, it addresses some aspects of religion - state relations in Turkey within the specific context of the ismailaga community. Not to be forgotten is the fact that certain influential Turkish media groups, especially the Dogan Grubu, have constantly demonized the order, by

fostering various conspiracy theories and attaching derogatory labels. One objective of this contribution is to look at the interaction not only between the community and secularists but also among Islamists themselves. Here, two developments have played a major role: first, the measures taken against the religious cemaats after the so-called virtual military coup in 1997, and second, the expanding space for a more rationalist Islam after the triple victory of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) in general elections since 2002.

Urbanization, migration and societal

transformation through cemaat communities

Before undertaking a deeper analysis of the ismailaga community, some background information is required to clarify what is meant by the term cemaat (Arabic jama 'a), which can be translated as community. For an exploration of the issues we can start with the ideas regarding the rapid urbanization and transformation of Turkey developed by Ali Bula?, the leading Islamist intellectual, sociologist and thinker. Bula? had already engaged more deeply with the effects of modernization on modern cities in his earlier work, Din ve modernizm. Here, he characterizes cities as centers of manipulation where people are controlled and overwhelmed by materialism, with spirituality being highly neglected. In such a situation the only place for powerless human beings to take refuge is their private life1. According to Bula?, the rapid urbanization of Turkey throughout the course of the 20th century brought about the biggest trauma the Turkish society had faced in recent decades. Starting from the 1950s and continuing well into the 1990s, the mass migration from villages to towns had a twofold effect on Turkey: it not only changed the country but also caused a radical

1 Ali Bula?, Din ve modernizm, 193, 217.

transformation; indeed, the appearance of Turkish cities witnessed a dramatic upheaval. As a consequence, the sudden urbanization caused deep transformations in society and politics, with changes that had to be taken into consideration by Islamist circles as well. New identities emerged or re-emerged in urban milieus, which fundamentally affected society as a whole.

As traditional networks of hemgehrilik (co-localism) were unable to face up to this challenge and individuals started to lose their roots and traditions, the task of creating a modern urban identity and solidarity was taken over by the cemaat communities themselves, and they have been able to fulfill both religious and social needs1. To use Agai's words, "the cemaats have arisen in order to fulfill religious and social needs as well as to form their own organizational patterns in accordance with specific contexts," and have created "societal spaces that are free from the hegemonic discourse of the [Turkish] state."2 As an urban phenomenon, cemaats, which have developed through migration, have been successful to such a degree that Bula? is able to speak of the "age of religious communities" (cemaatler donemi). In his words, this represents "the biggest phenomenon of postmodern times." These cemaats not only create social spaces that are free of hegemonic state discourse, but they also fill the moral vacuum (ahlaki bogluk) and bring more selfconfidence in the community's ability to solve various social issues.3 Bula? goes as far as to say that after the 1950s the dynamism behind the Turkish modernization project, initially imposed from above, shifted significantly to become a grassroots movement,

1 The phenomenon is described in Turkish as hemgehrilik or compatriotism and refers to people who are immigrants (in Istanbul, Ankara or elsewhere) from the same village, town, county or region of Turkey. Regrouping migrants from the same geographical space not only strengthens their identity but also creates an informal link involving mutual assistance.

2 Bekim Agai, Zwischen Netzwerk und Diskurs, 51-52.

3 Ali Bula?, "Cemaat ve devlet." Zaman, September 12, 2000.

powered from below (alt ust oldu). Uninterrupted migration from the villages to large cities completely altered the demography of modern Turkey and resulted in the state ceasing to be able to manipulate religion from the centre; Islam as a 'cultural texture' of Turkish society began to take over the lead. Yavuz argues that "Islamic rituals and teachings are reinterpreted under these new urban conditions to provide the cognitive means to understand the social and political world of a new and unsettling urban life."1

Although Bulaij uses the reinterpretation of the city's importance mainly in connection with the global Gulen community, the same is true in respect of other cemaat communities in Turkey as well. No matter how dissimilar their individual organisational patterns are, cemaats have been created in order to satisfy religious and social needs. Far from being archaic structures, these communities have become in many cases the dynamo for social change because "their values and morals also helped the individuals to mitigate the negative effects of capitalist and egoistic society."2 At the same time, cemaats do not function in order to fulfill individual needs, but rather they exist with the aim of enforcing collective principles.3

It is however important to remind ourselves that from the legal point of view no Muslim cemaats have guaranteed legal status or rights in Turkey. In this sense, the term cemaat can only be officially used for non-Muslims, such as Armenians, orthodox Greeks or Jews, all of whom enjoy guaranteed rights both domestically, through Turkish legislation, and internationally via the Lausanne treaty.

1 Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, 83.

2 Michelangelo Guida, «"The New Islamists" Understanding of Democracy in Turkey: The Examples of Ali Bulaf and Hayreddin Karaman,» 354-55.

3 Ali Bulaf, Din-Kent ve Cemaat: Fethullah Gulen Ornegi, 27-33. Unlike cemaat, the term cemiyet signifies for Bulaf an association of individuals with common aims (as in Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, the Committee of Union and Progress).

The ismailaga community: the (ultra)

conservative cemaat in modern Turkey

The ismailaga community (ismailaga Cemaati, also ismail Aga Cemaati or more archaically Cemaat-i ismailaga) is sometimes also called the ^argamba Cemaati, referring to its main and "sacred" location in Istanbul, or the Community of Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu, in reference to their current leader.1 It is one of only five currently existing main cemaat communities of the Turkish Naqshbandiya (Nakgibendilik), the others being the iskenderpa§a community (iskenderpaga Cemaati), the Suleymanci branch, the Erenkoy Cemaati and the Menzil Koy Cemaati. The ismailaga community belongs to the same Sufi tradition as other Nakgibendi branches such as iskenderpaga Cemaati or even the Gulen community, and all of them are networked through loose relationships that serve as the means of cohesion. At the same time, differences do exist among various branches, with some groups being more narrowly traditionalist and closed, while others are more globalized and inclusive. Turkish Islamism is very intimately connected with the Nakgibendi order and practically all successful segments of pro-Islamic politics in Turkey have been influenced by its teachings. A further unique feature that defines Turkish Islamism can be characterized as "the... enduring tradition of Sufism," which is again particularly embraced by the Nakgibendi order and its various branches. Nakgibendilik is even sometimes identified with the so called "Sufi fundamentalism" or as an alternative to both Islamism and modernism.2 Their tasavvuf is based on Hanafi fiqh.

Although nowadays members of the community can be seen in many other neighbourhoods of Istanbul, especially in Sultanbeyli, the

1 Not to be confused with the town of Qar^amba in the Samsun province. The community is sometimes also referred to as the sub-order (of the Nakgibendi order) or dergah.

2 John O. Voll, "Contemporary Sufism and current social theory," 285.

Fatih-£ar§amba district is still regarded as the community's nucleus (gekirdek)1 According to Genel and Karaosmanoglu "£ar§amba resembles any other lower-middle class district of Istanbul, but it is transformed by the dominance of Islamic practices and paraphernalia...[it] is representative of a cultural rupture in Turkey, reflected in the Islamic thought of the 1960s... [although] this way of interpreting and living Islam is bound to change with the growing number of young believers..."2. The strict observance of Muslim practices and rules that are deduced from the Prophet Muhammad's own words and habits (sunnet) is essential for the community.

£ar§amba still resembles an Ottoman mahalle, spreading over several blocks, where a rather small community lives according to strictly conservative and puritan norms, having their own identity and spirit of solidarity, as well as a common religion and culture. In a sense, it is not an exaggeration to say that the cemaat is proud of establishing an "Islamic ghetto" and living in spartan conditions. According to £akir, their neighbourhoods or quarters, which have specific rules and discipline, were set up in a form reminiscent of "Islamic cooperatives."3 In this context, some observers underline the fact that the classical Sufi lodge of recent times now has its best exponents in the ismailaga community, even though there are new departures in various respects. For example, the typical silent Nak^ibendi form of reciting God's name (zikir) nowadays resembles something that is more akin to preaching.

1 More on Qar^amba district in: Dünden Bugüne Istanbul Ansiklopedisi Cilt 2, Istanbul: Kültür Bakanligi ve Tarih Vakfi Yaylnlari, 1994, 472; or Hilmi Köksal Ali^anoglu, Qar^amba - Cibali - 20. Istanbul: Heyamola Yayinlari, 2009. According to the famous Ottoman traveller Evliya Qelebi, the name Qar^amba (Wednesday meaning Wednesday market) refers to the town of Qar^amba on the Black Sea coast. This area saw a re-population after the Ottoman victory in 1453, with settlers coming from the Black Sea region.

2 Sema Genel, and Kerem Karaosmanoglu, "A New Islamic Individualism in Turkey: Headscarved Women in the City," 475.

3 Ru§en Qakrr, Ayet ve slogan, 317.

Among the cemaat members, the most widely read book is probably the Sufi Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi's famous Mektubat (Letters).

Çarçamba is also part of the much broader "sacred area" of Istanbul that is formed by the three neighbouring districts: Fatih, Fener and Balat.x13 This area, crowded with mosques, churches and synagogues resembles, according to some observers, a small-scale Jerusalem (Kudus), with Christians, Jews and Muslims living side by side. Whilst Fener, populated by many Christian communities, was for centuries the seat of Orthodox Christianity (as well as the Orthodox Patriarchate the municipality is home to the Bulgarian church), its patriarchy still holds a special place today, even after the departure of almost all Greeks from the area. Sephardic Jews have been resident in Balat since the 15th century and have been responsible for building the Ahrida Synagogue, the oldest and most beautiful in Istanbul, and the Çavuç baths. However, the demography of the region has changed in favour of Muslims throughout the course of 20th century.

Further areas with significant concentrations of supporters of Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu in Istanbul include the municipalities of Eyup, Kuçukçekmece, Uskudar, Beykoz, Sultanbeyli, and especially Umraniye, a poor district on the Asian shore with a population approaching 700,000. In the provinces they are mainly concentrated in cities such as Trabzon, Tokat, Adapazari and Îzmir. Jean-François Pérouse mentions that the cemaat of Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu connects some of the eastern Black Sea coastal regions, especially around the town of Of, with Istanbul's district of Gaziosmanpaça, by means of the municipality of Fatih.2 Moreover, it is noteworthy, as Meeker has argued, that in "Istanbul the Oflus were able to devise new kinds of

1 Ersin Kalkan and Cansu Çamlibel, "îstanbul'daki kuçuk Kudus: Çarçamba." Hurriyet, February 28, 2010.

2 Jean-François Pérouse, "Aux marges de la métropole stambouliote: le quartiers nord de Gaziosmanpasa, entre Varos et Batikent."

interpersonal associations, some of them mercantile, some of them benevolent, some of them intellectual, some of them religious, and some of them criminal."1

According to Hulur, the ismailaga branch characterises life in big cities as places of freedom and baraka, and contrasts them with small towns and villages that are spiritually dead. In big cities the behaviour of believers is less controlled than in smaller places, where life-styles are more influenced by various pressures from the wider community of Muslims.2

Despite the fact that the ismailaga cemaat is a relatively close-knit community, estimates put their membership at 100,000, a number that includes community supporters with significant influence in society. Claims of 10 million members and supporters seem to be largely exaggerated, a fact that has recently been confirmed by the Consensus Public Opinion Centre. According to the daily Milliyet, which relies on Consensus' polls, out of some 4.5 million people who are at present affiliated with cemaat communities in Turkey, approximately 7.2% are attached to the ismailaga group, that is far lower than the biggest community of Gulen followers (61.8 %).3

The ismailaga community is a cami hareket (mosque movement) and its members call themselves ehli sunnet ve cemaat (people of tradition and the community). This serves to remind us how seriously they take their affiliation with Sunni Islam. When addressing each other, members of the community use expressions such as 'ihvari or 'ihvan karde§imiz' (our ihvan brothers) and speak about 'tarikat karde§ligf (brotherhood or fraternity). On the ismailaga community's

1 Michael Meeker, A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity, 388.

2 Himmet Hulur, "Technology and Naqshbandi Sufism: An Empirical Analysis of Ismail Aga and iskender Pa§a Branches," 330.

3 The ismailaga community also stands behind the Suleymanci and Menzil communities, see Milliyet June 22, 2011.

website one is confronted with the headline "Bizim yolumuz sohbettir. Bir ilim ve kardeglik cemiyeti" (Our path is through conversation. A knowledge and brotherhood society).

This is how Hulur described the community more than ten years ago on a microsociological level: "[The] ismail Aga Dergahi promotes, on the one hand, the view that its disciples should cut off some of their ties with the dominant institutions and seems to advocate an inner spiritualization through taking them into its own web of relations... on the other hand, an ideology of mass mobilization for the aim at mass salvation...isolates the relations of its adherents from the non-believers in order not only to keep them apart from the distortions they would come face to face with, but also to prepare them as the possible agents of a mass salvation."1

Far from being universalist or proselyte, the ismailaga cemaati encourages endogamy and a wide degree of isolation, while keeping an eye on its closed territory. Many of those living in £ar§amba are educationally disadvantaged, members of the proletarian, petit bourgeois or lumpen-proletariat classes, including artisans and traders (esnaf), and only a small number are university graduates. Those of their members who have academic degrees, acquired them mostly in countries such as Egypt or Pakistan. In economic terms, supporters of the ismailaga community fall into lower income categories. The funding of the community is provided through the ismailaga Vakfi (ismailaga Foundation). There are also other associations (vakiflar) that stand alongside the community such as Bilgi ve Hikmet Evi - (Daru'l-hikme) or ilim Aragtirma ve Kultur Dernegi (the Association for Scientific Research and Culture).

1 Himmet Hulur, "Technology and Naqshbandi Sufism: An Empirical Analysis of ismail Aga and Iskender Pa§a Branches," 333-334.

As with the Aczmendi branch of the Nurcu movement, they are recognizable by their social behaviour and dress code, identifying them as a distinctive subculture.1

They made a bold impression whenever they were engaged, often provoking significant turmoil. Besides playing tambourines during regular mosque prayers and shaking their long and braided hair when performing zikir, they achieved wider attention when intending to pray publicly at the Hagia Sophia Museum. Based in the suburban slums (gecekondu), without any historical background, they represent, unlike the ismailaga cemaati, a handful of poor youngsters.

While not refraining from providing political support to Islamic parties, the cemaat members themselves say that the community has no ideological structure (ismailaga cemaatinin ideolojik bir yapisi yoktur) and political motives. In the past, supporting political parties, such as those created by Necmettin Erbakan and the Milli Goru§ movement, or occasionally also the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), seemed to be a sign of pragmatism.

In daily practice, they specialize in Qur'anic study courses for both boys and girls, but at the same time dismiss the approach taken by the educational network around the Gulen movement (the so-called Fethullahci okullar). Although, according to Yuksel, it is erroneous to describe them as true specialists in Arabic syntax (Arab. nahw) and morphology (Arab. sarf), the community does excel at producing books for teaching elements of religion (ilmihal).

Calling themselves the advocates of the "Age of Bliss" (Asr-i Saadet), they attempt to revive the lifestyles and practices of the mythical era of the Prophet Muhammad and the first four so-called righteous caliphs (cca. 622-61). The paradigm of Asr-i saadet is

1 Members of the Aczmendi cemaat led by Muslum Gunduz first became known for wearing black turbans, dark-coloured robes and walking through the cities with sticks in their hands.

reinterpreted time and again in accordance with contemporary needs by various Islamist movements worldwide, but in Turkey it also implicitly incorporates an anti-nationalist stance. The "Age of Bliss" as a political slogan, however, may have different meanings in various situations when interpreted by distinct communities.1

Within the international context, the ismailaga community has strong links with Indian and Pakistani Muslims. In Europe, their presence is linked to local Turkish communities in Germany, Austria and Belgium. More concretely, the United Kingdom Turkish Islamic Association (ingiltere Türk islam Cemiyeti), based at north-east London's Aziziye mosque, is close to the ismailaga cemaati, albeit while officially declaring that it does not have links with any religious group or cemaat. The chairman of its Administrative board (Fahri Hoca) considers himself to be a halife or disciple and representative of Mahmut Hoca.2

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the community sent emissaries to the newly independent Muslim countries in order to establish contact with local Naqshbandis. Bayram Balci examined their activities in Central Asia and the Caucasus while pointing out that until 1997, the year of the post-modern coup in Turkey, the group regularly received students from these regions and trained them in Istanbul.3 It has been particularly successful among Sunni Azeris and Georgia's south-western autonomous republic of Adjaria, inhabited by the so-called "Muslim Georgians." On the other hand, among other countries such as Uzbekistan, they met with the

1 While all pious Muslims believe that Asr-i Saadet was the ideal age in Islamic history, only radical Islamists argue that the Asr-i Saadet society was a classless society

that contemporary Muslims should imitate by distributing their property or spending it

for the sake of Islam.

2 Yakup Qo§tu, "Londrada Türklere Ait Dini Organizasyonlar," 88-89.

3 Bayram Balci, "Between Islam and Secularism: Religious Policies of Turkey in the Turkish Republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus," 115-16.

deep mistrust of the local authorities. In addition, the ismailaga community organizes campaigns to promote the Palestinian cause by helping Palestinian Muslims and harshly condemning Israel. The community considers the activities of the Zionist Jews as being deeply rooted in the communist way of thinking.

From Ebuishak ismail Efendi

to Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu

The community owes its name to the ismailaga Mosque that was built in 1723, and to its founder, Ebuishak ismail Efendi, who came to Istanbul from Mecca. When building the mosque, he was inspired by the sacred Meccan Qacba and the mosque has exactly the same dimensions. The current leader of the cemaat, Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu, is one of the few living prominent sheikhs in Turkey, and is sometimes said to be the doyen of all Turkey's Muslim cemaats. He was born in 1931 in Of, near Trabzon, and is a student of Nak^ibendi Sheikh Ahiskali Ali Haydar Efendi (?-1960). Ali Haydar Efendi lived during both the Ottoman and Republican eras so that the community is sometimes referred to under his name as the Ali Haydar Efendi Grubu (Group of Ali Haydar Efendi).1 Ali Haydar Efendi was jailed for six months for organizing protests against the western way of dressing in 1926. Overall, so it is said, his personality may be characterized by reference to the Qur'anic phrase "commanding the right and forbidding the wrong", in Turkish "emr-i bi 'l-maruf ve nehy-i ani 'l-munkar" (iyiligi emredip kotulukten alikoyma), which is a principle that even today is highly valued by the cemaat.

After Ali Haydar's death in 1960 the role of sheikh was taken on by Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu (Mahmut Efendi), who had previously

1 More on Ali Haydar Efendi in Sadik Albayrak, §eriat yolunda yuruyenler ve surunenler, 154-58.

served in the Gumu§haneli mosque, which was led by the charismatic Sheikh Mehmed Zahid Kotku. After Kotku's death, Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu began to act more independently. This change was triggered principally by the different opinions that developed between him and Professor Kotku's successor, Mahmud Esad Co^an.1 He separated from the iskenderpaga community in 1972 and gradually established a new branch of the Naqshbandiya order, the ismailaga community. Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu started his activities in ismailaga Camii in 1954 so that his full title reads as Efendi (ismailaga) camii gerif imam-hatibi. Mahmut Efendi, who is also referred to as Efendi Hazretleri (His Excellency the Master), is the thirty-sixth sheikh in the Nak§ibendi silsila. The title Efendi Hazretleri is usually accompanied by the saying Kuddise Sirruhu (Holy be his soul).

Generally, Mahmut Hoca prefers verbal teaching and personal contact, and this is also why he has not engaged in writing books for a long time, He considers writing to be against the sharica (geriat). Nevertheless, in Sufi literature, those charismatic leaders who possess both religious and mystical knowledge, as well as knowledge of worldly sciences, are called zu'l-cenaheyn or "double-winged." The elders of the Khalidi branch of Nak§ibendis, starting with Khalid al-Baghdadi (1779-1827), are basically all zu'l-cenaheyn. The educational and literary activities of Mahmut Hocaefendi have to be considered from this viewpoint as well. Unlike the iskenderpaga community, which emphasizes education on the basis of hadith and sunna, Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu remains closer to Sufism based on fiqh, firmly

1 The well-known Iskenderpaga Naqshbandi branch's success story is closely related to its famous and charismatic leader, Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku (1897-1980), who maintained a substantial influence over religious, political and social life in Turkey even after his death. Under Kotku's successor Esat Co§an (1938-2001), the group has been transformed into the network of economic, educational, religious and media enterprises and endowments that has enormously influenced the political life.

anchored in the Hanafi legal school.1 He is inspired by the works of Abu Hanifa and his successors, while being suspicious of any novelties. Inside the community, the close relationship between murids and the mur§it is of great importance, and Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu is respected to the point that his speeches are usually not subjected to criticism or deconstructing.

Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu's still unfinished Qur'anic commentary, Ruhu'l- Furkan, is an example of the type of judgmental commentary (ahkam tefsiri) that first explains the meanings of individual words in the Qur'anic verses, only than placing their meanings (mealler) into context, and concluding with a commentary. Once finished, his tefsir, which also criticizes the interreligious dialogue, should print. Another of his books is regarded as an important work, Risale-i Kudsiyye §erh ve Tercumesi, being a two volume poetic work on the founder of ismet Efendi Tekkesi (The dervish lodge of ismet Efendi), called Mustafa ismet Efendi.

Another highly appreciated activity of Mahmut Hocaefendi is connected with the sohbets, which took place after Sunday morning prayers in the Sultan Selim mosque. Although the conversations took place in the early hours of Sunday morning, people attended in huge numbers so that the event had a special place on the religious map of the community. After 1995, Hocaefendi's conversations were published under the title Sohbetler. They appear in four volumes, based on the notes taken by students during his morning sessions.2 According to Silverstein, who has studied the Gumu§hanevi branch of the Nak§ibendi order, the devotional practice of sohbet is not so much a 'mystical experience' or 'intimate union with God,' as much as being an exposition on ethics, the focus on the need to discipline the base self

1 Ru§en Qakir, Ayet ve slogan, 65.

2 Sohbet or "conversation in companionship" is for them more important than rabita, the link between the shaykh and his disciple.

(nefs)1 With Efendi Hazretleri's deteriorating health conditions morning sohbets finally came to a close in 1998, when Mahmut Hoca also left the post of imamlik at the ismailaga camii.

Ahmet Mahmut Unlu (born 1935), familiarly known as Cuppeli Ahmet or "Ahmet in the garment," is a possible successor to the congregation leader Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu; he is also a controversial preacher (vaiz). He is well-known for his sohbets on the internet and CDs. His popularity continues to remain high so that whenever he comes, for example, to preach at the Sultanbeyli's Ulu Mosque, people attend in huge numbers.2 His name used to be mentioned in connection with an unlicensed kulliye (medrese and other buildings around the mosque) in the £avu§ba§i district of Istanbul. For engaging in these activities Cuppeli Ahmet spent almost three years in prison.

Although preaching modesty and frugality, numerous people have indicated that there is a huge gap between Cubbeli Ahmet's words and his deeds. The Turkish tabloid media usually follow the eyecatching stories surrounding Cubbeli Ahmet with great interest, some of them publishing articles and photographs that recount his trips and holidays abroad, others questioning his sincerity through reference to his luxurious residence in Istanbul. Despite advising members of the cemaat to stay away from beaches, Cubbeli Ahmet goes swimming and jet skiing wearing only shorts and accompanied by bikini-clad women. The attention of the public has been caught by Cubbeli Ahmet's holiday photographs. Although previously condemning the practice of bathing on beaches, he and his wife have failed to comply with this prohibition. Moreover, his wives often dress in designer labels with expensive accessories. One can only speculate as to whether or not it is due the

1 Brian Silverstein, "Sufism and modernity in Turkey: from the authenticity of experience to the practice of discipline," 42-44.

2 Cihan Z. Tugal, "The Appeal of Islamic Politics: Ritual and Dialogue in a Poor District of Turkey," 260.

impact of other cemaats, such as the Gulen movement, that the group members who previously avoided traveling abroad are now taking part in visits to foreign countries.

In the forefront of community preachers we also find the following personalities: Hizir Ali Muratoglu (imam of the £ukurbostan mosque), Bayram Hoca who was referred to as a "walking library" (ayakli kutuphane) because of his high level of knowledge, Ahmet Vanlioglu, Abdullah Vanlioglu, ilyas Vanlioglu, Cemal Terzi, Adil Gokburun and Abdullah Ustaosmanoglu. They are well-known for taking a firm stand against the West and for being inspired by the work and life of the Egyptian Islamist theorist Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) who, however, in sharp contrast to them, dismissed Islamic mysticism (tasavvuf).

Among Turkish intellectuals who have had a great impact on members of the ismailaga community we should also mention Necip Fazil Kisakurek (1904-83), an exceptionally influential political activist, novelist, poet and philosopher, who formulated the ideas of an Islamist-nationalist movement in Turkey. Kisakurek's strongly anti-communist and anti-Western ideology sought to synthesize Turkish nationalism with the Ottoman heritage and Islam, while at the same time emphasizing the need for a new morally strong ruling elite that would be deeply embedded in conservative Muslim values.1

Two symbolic buildings: the "Qacba-Mosque"

and the ismailaga Qur'anic school

The ismailaga mosque still remains the most important place of worship for the community. It was constructed by the fifty-sixth Ottoman §eyhulislam, and former kadi of Mecca, Ebuishak ismail Efendi (1645-1725) in 1723. Situated in Ceveciba§i mahallesi, the

1 Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, 137-39.

mosque is built of brick and its height, length and width are identical to the measurements of the Meccan Qa'ba. The walls of the Qa'ba all have different dimensions (11.68 m; 12.04 m; 10.18 m; 9.90 m), and the same is true of the mosque. The central dome of the cami was built during the age of tulips (lale devri) in the baroque style. Seriously damaged by an earthquake in 1894, the ismailaga mosque with its minaret was only reconstructed in 1952. The mosque is managed by the ismailaga ilim ve Hizmet Vakfi. Next to the mosque is a small burial place with four tombs of geyhulislams. One notable feature is that the muezzin based at the mosque reads the ezan without a microphone. In addition, the house of Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu is separated from the mosque only by the ismailaga Qkmazi (a blind alley), but there is an overpass so that the ailing Hocaefendi does not need to cross the street when going to the mosque.

The commitment to ensuring the survival of religious education stands high among the priorities of the ismailaga community, which manages the largest Qur'anic school (Kuran kursu) in Turkey. It is said that its building is among the biggest in the greater Middle East region.1 The huge building near the ismailaga mosque is situated only a few hundred meters from the equally grandiose Greek Orthodox school, which was built in the 19th century.2 The Turkish Sociologist Mufit Yuksel, who often provides a television commentary on events concerning the ismailaga community, interprets the territorial proximity of both buildings as a struggle for visual and factual dominance over the Fatih and Fener districts, indeed over the whole metropolitan city of Istanbul. He also suggests that by allowing the construction of this

1 Thierry Zarcone, La Turquie moderne et l'islam, 226.

2 The Greek school known as Megali tou Genous Scholi (Great School of the Nation), responsible to the Orthodox Patriarchate, has an immense importance to all Greeks in Turkey and beyond. It was originally established in 1454. Today's building dates from 1882.

Qur'anic school without the permission of the authorities, the Turkish state indirectly created a counterweight to the historically strong presence of Orthodox Christians in the area. Symbolically, this response to the historically significant Byzantine and Greek identity of the area has encouraged the Muslim-Turkish side to increase its efforts at demonstrating who is currently the real master in Istanbul.1 Although nowadays only a small number of non-Muslims live in the neighbourhood, the Muslim majority clearly strives to use history in order to

The site of the ismailaga Qur'anic study centre building (ismailaga Camii Kuran Kursu) - about 2,800 square meters - was bought at the beginning of 1980s, after the closure of the Arda cinema (Arda Sinemasi) which stood on the land. The building is situated on the highest of seven of Istanbul's hills and it has space for a maximum of 850 students.2 Although the official decision issued in 1996 required the destruction of the eight storey edifice, which had been built without permission, in practice, the building has remained untouched.

Although religion may only be taught in government-approved schools in Turkey, unsanctioned religious education (e.g. kagak Kuran kurslari) is widespread in the country and, in fact, infringements of the law are rarely prosecuted. The ismailaga community members have been regularly criticised for sending their children to 'madrasa-like' schools at the age of four, in sharp contrast with the country's secular laws that allow teaching religion to children only after the age of twelve. Operating clandestine Qur'anic courses without the consent of

1 Ru§en Qakir, "ismailaga cemaati ve Fener Patrikhanesi." Zaman, September 13, 2006; and Ru§en Qakir, "Aczimendilik gecekonduydu, ismail Aga ise gokdelen." Zaman, September 15, 2006. legitimize its dominance over the area. The multi-ethnicity and multi-religiosity of the area often remain forgotten, as if Erbakan's catchphrase "Istanbul - the Islamic city" represents the only true reflection of the city to its population.

2 See «"Dokunulamayan" Kuran Kursu binasi.» Hurriyet, September 7, 2006.

the highest state governmental body, the Presidency for Religious Affairs (Diyanet), was seen as unacceptable by the authorities. Among the list of measures taken after February 28, 1997, the socalled "virtual" coup d'état, was the demand to curtail all kinds of financial resources from non-governmental religious communities and brotherhoods. Consequently, in the following years, the possibilities of delivering unsanctioned religious education were significantly restricted.1 The closing down of Kur 'an courses combined with other restrictions on Islamic activities represented a major blow for the ismailaga community, seriously limiting their influence among believers.

In response to the ultimatum of the military authorities, several branches of the Turkish Nakgibendi order, which had previously often competed with each other, began to seek rapprochement. Later, allegedly, sheikhs from the three major branches of Naqshbandiya order, Esad Coçan for the iskenderpaça community, Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu and Sami Efendi, the leader of the Erenkoy community, decided to give their support to the Islamist Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) with Recai Kutan as its chairman.2 The ismailaga Cemaati is to a large extent a closed organization, in which instruction is intensive and requires full commitment to the life in the community. Members perceive the external world in principle as the abode of evil, and community members are called on to convince the outside world that change is possible only if people join the cemaat. On the one hand, therefore, the brotherhood calls its adherents to break numerous ties with the outside world and national institutions. On the other hand,

1 Directive 3 of the National Security Council decision no. 406 issued on February 28, 1997 ordered: An eight-year uninterrupted education system must be implemented across the country and necessary administrative and legal adjustments should be made so that the Qur'anic courses, which children with basic education may attend with parental consent, operate only under the responsibility and control of the Ministry of National Education.

2 Thierry Zarcone, La Turquie moderne et l'islam, 243.

some members of the branch desire to save the whole of mankind and thus produce their own ideology of mass mobilization.1 Indeed, followers are required to live in isolation from unbelievers and all the evil world in order to become, in the long run, the vanguard of mass salvation for the whole of mankind. Interpersonal relationships, television broadcasting, the economic system, the educational system, and urban life are defined by the community in principle as a network of evil that is in need of the cleansing breath of Islam, in the form of the Qur'an and the sunna.2

While the influential community of iskenderpa§a has gradually opened up towards the external world and its members have voluntarily entered into modern educational, economic and media institutions, members of the ismailaga Cemaati, by contrast, has retired into their own shell. Personal contacts between members of the iskenderpa§a group and various supporters of the iskenderpa§a community are common even today and sometimes the difference between the two disappears as a result of an "open door" approach. In sharp contrast, belonging to the ismailaga affiliation is interpreted much more rigidly and requires "more intimate" links that demand the separation of members from the wider range of people who are interested in learning more about them.3 Weismann, for example, mentions that in contrast with the iskenderpa§a community, in the ismailaga mosque he was required to convert to Islam before he could be given an interview with one of the leading community figures.4

Himmet Hülür, "Technology and Naqshbandi Sufism: An Empirical Analysis of Ismail Aga and Iskender Pa§a Branches," 333.

2 Ibid., 306.

3 Ibid., 308.

4 Itzchak Weismann, The Naqshbandiyya, 155.

Emphasis on morality and "true Islamicity"

In order to fill the moral vacuum (ahlaki bogluk) within the urban setting, the ismailaga community's strategies focus on practices and principles that are usually identified with the most conservative segments of Turkish society, people who are struggling hard to cope with both the material and emotional impact of mass migration.1 A total focus on "true Islamicity" and appearance is probably the main factor that differentiates them from other Turkish cemaats. The attitude of the ismailaga cemaati in relation to television broadcasts has aroused widescale interest in recent decades. Disputes over the "Islamicity" of watching television are nothing new in the Muslim world. In 2004, for example, Dar al-ulum in Deoband, the largest Islamic seminary in India, issued a fatwa that prohibited watching television on the grounds that broadcasts include immoral programs.2 Dar al-ulum also stressed that it is improper to use television for Islamic missionary purposes.3

Although television in itself is considered useful by the ismailaga community, given the content of broadcasts, it is held as being mostly harmful to humans. Most community members believe that an intelligent person's spiritual life should not be flooded by the content of television programs. Television affects family life and harmony, as well as conversation between close relatives; it flirts with human desires and basic instincts, such as the sexual drive, instead of focusing on people's attention towards the Creator and Islamic values. Television broadcasting may be useful only if fully supervised and managed by Muslims, thereby preventing its negative effects. In this way alone is it possible to prevent the spread and glorification of godlessness, immoral behaviour or excessive sexual desire. After seeing something haram or

1 See also Ali Bulaf, Din-Kent ve Cemaat, 66-73.

2 Yoginder Sikand, "Deoband's War on Television: Fury over a Fatwa," 48-49.

3 Ibid.

doing something wrong, members of the community usually repent by listening to sohbets. But, the watching of television is also considered to be harmful for a different reason: advertising campaigns broadcast on screens incessantly motivate people to go shopping and what is more, to purchase things they do not need.

The regulations of Mahmut Efendi in this respect, however, demonstrate significant inconsistencies, as indicated by the internal instructions banning the watching of television broadcasts. Many community members used to watch television from time to time, arguing that in the past the sheikh himself had allowed people from his immediate surroundings to do so. Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu justified his decision by arguing that people who surround him were providing him with information about domestic and world events, especially on developments in the Islamic world, information that he used for the benefit of the whole community. Nevertheless, in reality, even the ismailaga community must gradually come to terms with some aspects of modern life and moderate their self-imposed "sanctions." Tugal summarizes that "as the practice of the main body has failed to live up to its own ideology, ideology itself has started to change, which has caused cracks in the community."1

In contrast, radio broadcasting is seen by the community as more acceptable, although community members believe that a female voice over the ether is contrary to Islamic values. Even more useful are personal computers that enable people to watch permissible CDs or particular programs. Followers and supporters of Cubbeli Ahmet, for example, are currently using print and the web to disseminate their views. The internet is seen mostly as more acceptable because it can

1 Cihan Z. Tugal, "The Appeal of Islamic Politics: Ritual and Dialogue in a Poor District of Turkey," 262.

operate without presenting pictures of human beings.1 Moreover, it can also be used as a tool for propaganda purposes. In 2010 the ismailaga community, for example, used its website to provide computer games simulating revenge attacks linked to the deadly Israeli attack on the humanitarian aid naval convoy heading for the Gaza Strip. Generally speaking, disagreements in the way the media are used by the community have led to some friction and it is especially the younger generation that is more likely to make compromises even in cases where they are not in accordance with the official ideology of the community.2 The emphasis of the cemaat on morality and Islamicity is even more evident in the area of education. The ismailagacilar stress that schooling and science in the Turkish educational system are characterized by being strictly separated from faith. Therefore, according to the prevailing view inside the community, the younger generation should not be sent to these institutions. Moreover, they argue that the education system is at all levels aimed at combating Islam and secularizing society.

That is why children should study the Qur'an, the Arabic language and the eternal truth contained in the works of prominent mystics in separate schools which avoid presenting negative views of Islam. Memorizing the Qur'an (hafizlik) is one of the primary duties that pupils are obliged to follow. The emphasis on teaching Arabic and Arabic writing does not correspond with the aspirations of the country's lay circles, which in the early days of the Republican era pushed for a ban on the use of the Arabic script. The alphabet revolution in Turkey in 1929 led to a break with the former Turkish-Muslim heritage and

1 More information on the cemaat webpages: http://www.ismailaga.info; http://www.ismailagacami.com and http://www.ismailagacemaati.com; see also http://www.beyan.com.tr; http://www.arifandergisi.com; http://www.furkandergisi. com; and http://www.dayanismavakfi.org

2 Cihan Z. Tugal, "The Appeal of Islamic Politics: Ritual and Dialogue in a Poor District of Turkey," 262.

50

studying the Arabic language is now, after hafizlik, the most important objective of the ismailaga community in relation to the younger generation. One of my informants has told me that he attended the ismailaga Qur'anic course since the age of twelve. In spite of not being among the in-group of the ismailaga members, he had studied hafizlik for two years and then Qur'anic sciences for another five years. Although he had not studied at secondary school, he had passed all his examinations and been accepted at university. In general, he underlined, the fact is that former students of the ismailaga Qur'anic course had a better level of knowledge and gained higher grades than those who graduated from regular secondary schools.

Not only does the community condemn the co-education of boys and girls, but it does not allow teachers to be of a different sex to their students. This is an additional reason for refusing to send their children to higher education institutions. The community sees the solution of this situation in the reopening of Muslim madrasas that could also end the "imitation of the West." Boys and girls are educated separately within the community in a spirit of strict rules. Christopher Houston recalls the late 1980s when girls who attended the Qur'anic courses in Uskudar's suburb of Selamsiz received detailed instructions on how to behave in everyday life. They were instructed to put a pinch of salt on their tongue before eating as the Prophet Muhammad had reportedly done, and, in addition, they were given instructions on cutting their nails by starting first with the middle finger, and provided with directions on how to dress or cut their hair.1 Similarly, strict rules were provided concerning how to eat: girls were not allowed to use forks or slice bread, and it was permitted only to break bread with both hands. During menstruation underpants and bras were prohibited because, as the argument ran, they were largely made by male hands. The girls

1 Christopher Houston, Islam, Kurds and the Turkish Nation State, 54.

were also told which prayers should be recited upon entering and leaving the toilet or in which direction to bow when using it.1

Traditional clothing habits

of the community

The special significance of the dress code in Turkey dates back to the Ottoman period, although the Republican era establishment followed an even more consistent policy in this regard. Republican intellectuals, similarly to the Ottoman ones, stressed the importance of focusing on aspects of everyday life as a means of creating a modern Turkish human being. The new republic emphasised the importance, among other things, of the external image and appearance of citizens, which should conform to Western standards.2 For example, as expressed by Atatürk in his Nutuk (Long Speech), "the fez had to be removed. Because the fez was sitting on our heads as a sign of ignorance, bigotry and hatred in the face of civilization and progress." Approached from this angle, garments used by the Ismailaga community represent a clear negation of these efforts. What is more, the dress code of their members is considered as a challenge to Turkish modernization and Westernization.

Members of the Ismailaga community are well-known for their strict 'Islamic' dress code (kilik kiyafet) in its authentic interpretation which is supposed to be in conformity with that of the Prophet Muhammad. In general, the laik sensitivity of secular people in Turkey is more widespread when seeing somebody from the Ismailaga cemaati on the streets or when learning that their prayer halls are apparently closed outside of prayer times for persons who are not associated with the cemaat. Whereas on the street it is impossible to recognize who is from the Gülen or Menzil community and who is not, with the Ismailaga group things are different. Bearded men wearing baggy

1 Ibid.

2 See e.g. Sefil Deren, "Kültürel Batilila^ma," 384.

trousers (galvar) and women in dresses with veils (gargaf) that only leave the eyes exposed to the outside world are clearly distinguishable from the other people. More specifically, they do not generally wear ready-made clothes. Tailors in £ar§amba provide members of the community with their outfits, sewn according to the "rules" practised at the time of the Prophet. The situation is somewhat reminiscent of the Haredi Jewish neighbourhood, Mea shearim, in Jerusalem, where life is regulated by the strict adherence to Jewish law. The visual differences that both Turks and foreigners encounter when visiting £ar§amba may also be accompanied by an awareness of the use of idioms and vocabulary that are rare elsewhere, such as when men on the streets greet each other with "es selamu aleykum" or when one is addressed with the words "bereket olsun" while paying for a cup of coffee.

The portrayal of the ismailaga Cemaati as deeply backward looking and Islamist is often accompanied by photographs of their attire. Moreover, in Turkey the ismailaga dress code is often taken as the litmus test of the basic difference between fundamentalists and secularists. The portrayal by Turkish journalists and paparazzi is sometimes done in such a dishonourable way that Dumanli is certainly right in stating:

"This is my suggestion for the photographers who tend to use their cameras as if they were bazookas: If you have the guts, go to the centre of New York and try to harass people as much as would normally do in Turkey. You may go to, for example, Brooklyn. You will see that all shops, markets and streets are organized according to the basic Jewish tradition. You will find a city which is far more pious than the streets where the ismailaga community lives and which you tried to present as an 'autonomous zone. ' If you have the heart, go and attempt to cover the stories, as you do in Turkey, of the people who wear the Jewish skullcap or a fedora walking with the Torah in their hands,

accompanied by headscarved wives and children with kippah. No, you cannot do it, because you do not have the right to do so."1

The fact that community members dress differently and grow beards, however, does not mean that the clocks stopped in £ar§amba at the time of the Ottomans (fargamba 'da saatler Osmanli 'da durmug), as a popular saying goes. Of course, they still dwell in kiyafet, especially while praying in their turbans made of long and white muslin. But unlike in the past when men wore thin-soled light rubber shoes (cizlavet) produced by the Cizlavet factory that was closed down in the 1990s, nowadays cizlavet are seen only on older men. The galvar is disappearing in favour of a twelve-fold, and also a six-fold pontul with a special pocket for a mobile phone. Furthermore, men's clothing increasingly includes a specially designed vest shirt (yelek gomlek). Men cover their head while praying with a beyaz sarik (white turban) instead of a takke (close fitting hats).

As soon as men began changing their appearance, women also began to dress differently. Before they had dressed in the same way, whatever the season, but currently the latest fashion trend has taken the place of unfashionable dresses. The qargaf that used to be black, now appears in dark blue, brown or cream. Even under their black garments women have started to wear make-up. Non-alcohol based helal perfume made of rose water or the so called "hajj oil" (haciyagi) can now be bought, although young women prefer Armani or Lacoste brands.

Occasionally, recommendations from Mahmut Efendi regarding dress code rules become the subject of disputes within the community. He preaches in his sermons that religion requires that the supporters of cemaat should wear long robes (cuppe), a turban and close fitting hats (takke). His opponents argue, however, that this argument is based on an unreliable hadith, and that at the time of the Prophet Muhammad all

1 Ekrem Dumanli, "What rights do you have." Today's Zaman, May 8, 2008.

men without exception in Arabia wore such garments which means that the robe or turban had no religious significance at all.1

Although the concept of bid'at (Arab. bid'a) or corrupt innovation is central to the thinking of the branch, in their everyday life change is no longer taboo. Some time ago, when a bank was opened just opposite of the ismailaga mosque, it had to be closed down because local people arranged their financial transactions differently. However, nowadays times have changed and many members of the community possess bank cards. Interestingly, although smoking is also considered bid'at, some of them do in fact smoke.

Inventing the enemy: media coverage of the ismailaga community

The history of modern Turkey is full of accusations of fanaticism, treachery, reactionary and anti-state activities vis-à-vis the Nakçibendi brotherhood and its various branches. Among these, the ismailaga community is visually exposed and thus constitutes a notoriously easy target. The often extreme representation of the ismailaga community in the media can be characterised by the claim that the community has turned into a state (devlet olmu§ bir cemaatten bahsediliyor).

Some powerful Turkish media groups, such as Dogan Grubu, the owner of Hurriyet, Radikal, Posta and until 2011 also of Milliyet and Vatan dailies, have in recent decades constantly demonized the community and fabricated various conspiracy theories and unflattering labels, such as irtica. In trying to prove that the community poses a threat to the Turkish state and has a secret agenda, they have not refrained from mocking and constantly defaming the cemaat. The

1 Cihan Z. Tugal, "The Appeal of Islamic Politics: Ritual and Dialogue in a Poor District of Turkey," 263.

portrayal of the ismailaga community as deeply backward looking and Islamist became a particular problem following the funeral service in January 2004 for Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu's daughter in the Fatih Mosque, which was attended by cemaat members in "typical" attire. Various people referred to its members as antimodernists, a folk group, and radical associates of Iranian fundamentalists. The ismailaga group was even accused of failing to pay taxes.1 However, when we study the cemaat in detail, it soon becomes clear that it is very much afraid of any activity that might weaken the state because of the anarchy that could follow.2 Contrary to what is often circulated in the Turkish press, members of the community pray for the preservation and protection of the state and the Turkish army. Indeed, they take the following slogans seriously: "Vatanimizi, milletimizi ve devletimizi koru;" "Devlete ve millete zeval verme;" "kutsal vazifesi - askerlik yapmak" (Protect our fatherland, nation and state; Do not harm the state and the nation; To do military service is a sacred duty). Equally less well known is the fact that printed materials with links to the community condemn what is sometimes referred to as "Islamic terrorism." According to them, the term "does not exist, because there are only terrorists who misuse the word Islam."3

Most of the negative articles amount to nothing more than simplistic and sensational stories pretending to be scholarly or historically grounded. For example, the ismailaga Cemaati has been compared to the Kadizadeliler, the religious movement that gained control over the Ottoman government in the early 17th century.4 This

1 Dogan Sarsar, "Cemaat konu^uyor." Radikal, September 13, 2006.

2 Ru§en Qakrr, "Ismail Aga cinayeti provokasyon olabilir ama tutmasi imkansiz." Vatan, September 4, 2006.

3 "islami terör yok, islam'in güzel ismini kullanarak terör yapanlar var." Beyan 59 (Jan 2004), 26-27.

4 Murat Bardakfi, "Gefmi^in iktidar cemaati olan Kadizadeliler'in yerini §imdi ismailaga Cemaati aldi." Hürriyet, June 10, 2006.

group of radical and intolerant ulemas, who were named after their leader and famous alim, Kadizade Mehmet Efendi (1582-1635), gained influence within the sultan's palace and started to implement strict rules in relation to what they saw as the true meaning of Islam. Their golden age came with Sultan Murat IV (1623-40) who issued a ferman prohibiting smoking tobacco and drinking coffee, and his brother Ibrahim Deli ("Mad", 1640-48). Kadizadeliler ideologically recognized only the authority of the Qur'an and the prophetic traditions, at the same time denouncing all kinds of innovation (bid'at). Soon, they controlled most religious foundations in Istanbul and enforced public morality and shari'a law. As they declared that the sufis were the worst heretics, and ensured that the tekkeswere closed and the dervishes imprisoned, it is hard to understand in what ways the ismailaga community could be accused of resembling them. Unlike the ismailaga cemaat, the Kadizadelis encouraged political instability and public disorder to the point that they "challenged the ulema hierarchy by attempting to perform the hierarchy's job."1

The ismailaga Cemaati have on several occasions made headlines in the Turkish press, for example, when Ali Hasan Unal, the mufti of Uskudar, who had criticized the community, was assassinated in 1982. Mahmut Hoca, together with several Naqshbandi sheikhs, was accused of being behind Unal's murder, but was later acquitted. The mufti's assassination was said to have been ordered in the ismailaga mosque, after a secret meeting that declared a fatwa sentencing him to death. In support of this argument, Unal was said to have demanded that students on the Qur'anic study courses should be dressed in European clothes.

In another media-driven case, Ali Hizir Muratoglu, Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu's brother-in-law (damad) and imam of the £ukurbostan

1 Madeline C. Zilfi, The Politics of Piety, 170.

mosque in the Fatih district, was shot by a gunman in the ismailaga mosque in 1998. His murderer has never been caught. Imam Bayram Ali Ozturk, a prominent retired figure of the ismailaga brotherhood, was killed in 2006 during morning prayers at the mosque and the killer was lynched soon after by worshippers. No action in terms of a legal case was taken against those who lynched the killer and the authorities made no arrests. The fact that both imams were murdered in public when they could have been simply killed without witnesses while walking on the street, shows that the acts were intended to be public executions among the community's own believers. Subsequently, speculation was rife in the press that the aim of the second killing (cinayet) was to push the group out of the £ar§amba district and cause disunity or a split among members of the community.

According to certain reports, as a result of this, further activities of the ismailaga community were exposed and these included accusations that the group practised underground shari'a trials presided over by kadis} On the other hand, as Mufit Yuksel mentions, both Islamic and Kemalist circles were unhappy about his view that the community represents the balancing force to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate.

Recently, the community was mentioned in an indictment relating to the Ergenekon affair, a criminal organization attempting to overthrow the government. The existence of Ergenekon, a behind-the-scenes network including members of the armed forces who attempted to use ultranationalist ideology in order to incite chaos, has long been suspected. But the current investigation started in 2007, when a house in Istanbul's Umraniye district that was being used as an arms depot

1 See "Secular Turks Criticize the U.S. Ambassador for Dismissing Warnings Against Rising Islamism in Turkey," (note 12), Special Dispatch No. 1345 , MEMRI November 3, 2006. (available on http://www.memn.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1931. htm)

was discovered by the police. As became clear in 2009, the ismailaga probe that started in 2007 failed to find any evidence to prove that the community was working as an armed organization prepared to use violence. After two years of monitoring the phone calls and correspondence of several ismailaga officials, the investigation of Erzincan Chief Prosecutor ilhan Cihaner announced that his office had found no evidence of violence or a threat by the community during the course of the investigation.1 However, the intercepted conversations of politicians and businessmen close to the AKP government uncovered demands in favour of the ismailaga community in relation to granting tenders and employment to members of the cemaat. Cihaner was later imprisoned, as he allegedly had links with the Ergenekon group.

In the meantime, rumors circulated that the Ergenekon trial had caused serious differences within the ismailaga community. An emotionally charged atmosphere developed after Cubbeli Ahmet Hoca put up five Ataturk posters in the premises of the Kasr-i Arifan journal that has been under his influence since its appearance in 2007.2 Moreover, it was this wing of the ismailaga community that published supportive articles in relation to Kemal Ataturk and the War of Liberation 1919-23 (Kurtulug Savagi). These steps have been criticised by another wing of the ismailaga group around the Furkan journal, which has been published by Saadettin Ustaosmanoglu, the nephew of Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu since 1995. Among the adherents of Saadettin Ustaosmanoglu's group is Salih Mirzabeyoglu, the leader of the Great Eastern Islamic Raider's Front (iBDA-C, islami Buyuk Dogu Akincilar Cephesi). According to Shmuelevitz and Bennett "the iBDA-C, often referred to as a Sufi political movement (tasavvufi siyasi hareket), became close to ismailaga and adopted their Furkan magazine as its

1 Today's Zaman, January 5, 2010.

2 Kasr-i Arifan is the name of the village close to Bukhara where Shah Naqshband was born.

own."1 In fact, even if there is a certain degree of familiarity and cooperation between the iBDA-C and ismailaga cemaati, the organic link does not exist (organik baglantisi yok).

After the arrest of Furkan's editor-in-chief in 1998 in connection with the relationship with iBDA-C, and following his prison sentence and release in 2005, the journal continued to be published as Yeni Furkan (New Furkan). Furthermore, whereas the Furkan journal praised the Ergenekon operation, the Baran journal, that is also close to Cubbeli Ahmet, criticised it as a campaign managed jointly by the US and Israel. Not surprisingly, the Furkancis also oppose Cubbeli's 'music policy,' especially the live programs broadcast by Lalegul FM, the radio station that has been established by Ahmet Hoca in recent years. This radio station mostly plays ilahis, which are entirely vocal hymns recited during worship. But the most important cause of rivalry is, almost certainly, the fight over the future leadership of the ismailaga cemaati, which is on the agenda because of Mahmut Efendi's old age and poor health.

The ismailaga Cemaati has also earned occasional harsh criticism from the state Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet i§leri Ba§kanligi). Its former chairman, Ali Bardakoglu, and various inspectors of the Diyanet have pointed out that Muslims who are not members of the community are discriminated against in the £ar§amba district mosques because they can not be seated. Diyanet officials have claimed that gradually the religious community is being transformed into a community claiming its own mosques, which is unacceptable. Moreover, they have claimed, although the main Qur'anic school functions under the supervision of the state, behind the curtains of

1 Aryeh Shmuelevitz and Mitchell Bennett, "Turkey (Turkiye Cumhuriyeti),"

593. 60

private houses in £ar§amba the unofficial Qur'anic study courses forbidden by the authorities are mushrooming

Winds of change: The transformation

of Turkish Islamism

Throughout this paper I have argued that the simplistic descriptions of the ismailaga cemaati based solely on religious understanding is insufficient and misleading. As shown by Bula?, Turkish migrants have step by step been able to adapt to city life, as well as to cope with both the material and emotional effects of mass migration, through the activation of cemaats. In this respect I also share Bula?'s view that without this type of communalism (cemaatlegme) the situation in Turkey could have been even more complicated. Moreover, "there is today a close alignment of the cemaafs interpretation of Islam with what one could call the contemporary Turkish Sunni orthodoxy, as represented by senior scholars at the official Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs and the semi-official Institute for Islamic Research (ISAM) in Istanbul. It is thus no coincidence that ISAM's recently published two-volume ilmihal ('Muslim catechism') emphasises the important role of tasavvuf in the Islamic tradition, without, however, mentioning the significance or even existence of Sufi cemaats."1 The further enlargement of the religious community in Turkey since the mid-1970s has made the establishment of the ismailaga cemaati much easier. Group solidarity, personal loyalty, comradeship, social class, in-group localism, networking, patron-client relationship or specific identity, have all played an important role within the ismailaga community, but the same is true in connection with other professional, religious, ideological or political groups in Turkey.

1 Heiko Henkel, "One foot rooted in Islam, the other foot circling the world,"

The transformation of Turkish Islamism after the ascent to power in 2002 of the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party has put pressure on other segments of Turkish Islam and they in turn are beginning to shift their understanding of their own identity as well. When researching the ismailaga community, it makes sense to mention in this context that as part of his education, the current prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, attended the imam-hatip school situated close to the ismailaga camii, and visited both the mosque and the nearby Qur'anic course. More importantly though, apart from this personal journey, the cemaat perceives Erdogan as a close "fellow combatant," who has taken the community under his wing.1

On the one hand, the AKP has attempted to introduce Islam-based morality into Turkish politics and this has been welcomed by the cemaats. On the other hand, diminished pressure from the state authorities has allowed them to act more freely. This can be best illustrated by reference to the ismailaga cemaati. It has been my aim to highlight some of these developments in recent ears and show important changes. Whereas in the past the press, television or foreign travel were considered as prohibited innovations by the members of the branch, nowadays they seem to be admissible (caiz), together with presenting themselves on the internet. Furthermore, my personal conversations with supporters of the cemaat have confirmed that in recent years they have also entered the media sector with the aim of promoting their own commercial objectives. This is important because, as stressed by Bula?, no cemaat can function without reference to economic reality and the ability to be financially self-sufficient.2 It is widely accepted, however, that the Islamization of consumption

1 "Erdogan has reportedly been associated with the ismail Aga section of the Nak^ibendi [order]," according to Angel Rabasa and Stephen F. Larrabee. The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey, 14.

2 Ali Bulac, Din-kent ve Cemaat, 18.

patterns, as in the case of the iskenderpa§a community, is not sufficient for members of the ismailaga community.1

Any discussion on the future of the ismailaga community should also be set in a more detailed way against the background of the concept of bid'at or corrupt innovation, which is central to the thinking of the branch. Although the cemaat adheres very much to the principle of the unacceptability of any bid'at, substantial changes have been occurring as the pressure from the secular and military circles diminishes. In general, the adoption of "innovations" is mainly popular with the younger members of the community, who are the most likely to "modernize." But, unlike the iskenderpa§a community, whose disintegration in the past was speeded up by the entrepreneurial activities of so called "green capital" (yegil sermaye), the ismailaga brotherhood, at least so far, has resisted such a fundamental transformation. In addition, the community encounters a more general problem: how to use modern technology without being affected by the associated values.

It remains to be seen how far all these changes will impact on the intellectual world of the community. Here, the underlying hypothesis is that with the transformation of Turkish Islamism as represented by the AKP or the Fethullah Gulen Movement, other segments of the Islamist scene are also being pressurized to react, not least by shifts in their identity. The nature of socio-religious movements in Turkey has changed significantly in the last decade and long established stereotypes are not reflected in reality anymore. The socio-political atmosphere after the ascent to power of the AKP government in 2002 has bolstered the more rationalist Muslim communities that rely on the use of pragmatic and non-confrontational methods on a large scale. This has been to the disadvantage of those cemaats which relay to a

1 E.g. Rusen Cakir, Ayet ve slogan, 317.

larger extent on the charisma engendered by their association with sheikhs, such as Mahmut Hoca. This, together with the closing down of most Qur'anic study courses attributed to the ismailaga cemaati after the 1997 military intervention, has contributed to the falling number of their adherents. Although the ismailaga community is representative of the most traditionalist (gelenekgi), "authentic" and conservative (muhafazakär) communities in Turkey, it is at the same time marginal, elders-dominated and one of the weakest (en zayif olanlardan biri), as best characterized by following its own traditions, and remaining aloof from the power struggle.

Far from being based on simple participation as is the case with the so-called "sociological Muslims," the engagement with faith in the ismailaga community is constant and active. As has been discussed throughout this paper, their attachment to the traditional tarikat relationships, including its powerful religious hierarchy, seem to be stronger than in other Nak^ibendi branches. It is, therefore, not surprising that they are disapproved of and in varying degrees discouraged by the secular nation-state culture that portrays them almost as a pathological deviation within Turkish Islam.

The debate about the nature of the ismailaga cemaati is only slowly unfolding in scholarly literature, but several assumptions have already been made, albeit, except for the work of Ru§en £akir, without any serious research work being undertaken on the community itself. Zarcone, for example, has classified the group as fundamentalist, while Rainer has argued that the cemaat members are radicals.1 For Bulut, their ideas and practices place them among the so-called "reactionary factions" (irticai fraksiyonlar)2 According to Yavuz, it is ruralism and conservativism that sets them apart, together with the Menzil Cemaati

1 Thierry Zarcone, La Turquie moderne et l'islam, 413; and Hermann Rainer, "Die drei Versionen des politischen Islam in der Türkei," 53.

2 Faik Bulut, Ordu ve Din, 438.

of Adiyaman.1 Houston offers an outlook on the ismailaga community, characterizing it as an Islamist caste.2 Yet another scholar, Marc Saurina i Lucini, holds that the community, which can be seen as ultraconservative, anti-systemic and radical, has not contributed to the process of modernization in Turkey.3 Furthermore, Genel and Karaosmanoglu have concluded that the residents of £ar§amba "embody both a confined, and an ahistorical Islamic identity in Turkey."4 According to Pekoz the community, which currently votes in general elections either for the AKP or the Islamist Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi), has always felt close to all the parties of the Turkish right, although it does not wish to participate openly in political activities.5 However, individual members of the brotherhood do have political messages that sometimes appear in print or on the internet. Saadettin Ustaosmanoglu, the editor of Yeni Furkan journal, for example, has said that "Turkey is used by the West, the West isn't sincere." He adds, "since Turkey is a bridge between East and the West, according to the Western mind, Turkey can play an important role to smooth the waters when the time comes for the West to account for its wrongdoings against the East."6

The accusations of plotting against the Turkish secular state on various levels seem to be largely unfounded and misleading. Whereas the Islamist threat in Turkey is a real one, it is certainly not the ismailaga community that is by any means a major player in this. In a

1 Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, 140.

2 Christopher Houston, Islam, Kurds and the Turkish Nation State, 53.

3 Marc Saurina i Lucini, "Los grupos religiosos (cemaat) y el secularismo en la esfera pública en Turquía," 153.

4 Sema Genel and Kerem Karaosmanoglu, "A New Islamic Individualism in Turkey: Headscarved Women in the City," 475.

5 Alex Mustafa Pekoz, Le développement de l'islam politique en Turquie. Les raisons économiques, politiques et sociales, 139.

6 Molly Moore, "Western Businesses Embrace Turkey as E.U.'s Resistance Grows." The Washington Post, December 12, 2006.

quest for real threats that lie outside of this conventional cemaat, one is tempted to conclude that the ismailaga community can only be classified as a pseudo-threat to the secular order. One example of a real threat is Turkish Hezbollah. However, during recent decades, the security forces have closed their eyes to the activities of Turkish Hezbollah, a militant and radical anti-secular organization, because it has been fighting against PKK militants. To some extent, Hezbollah has been accused by its rivals of being too closely connected to the Turkish intelligence services. According to £akir, it is insufficient to portray religion-state society relations in Turkey as a clash between progressive and reactionary forces and it is also not helpful to identify communalism (cemaatlegme) with "the abuse of religion." He also warns that each campaign against "reactionary" religious forces (irtica kampanyasi) ultimately backfired on secularism (laiklik). Therefore, to say that the ismailaga community is either a "symbol of reaction." a "state agent" or "a neighbourhood's fool", does not explain the true face of religion in the country.1

Typologically speaking, the ismailaga community corresponds to what Bula? calls the "limited-field cemaat type" (sinirli alan cemaati) which is characterized by the withdrawal into the self, unpretentiousness, a closed sphere of activity and a "demodernisf' lifestyle.2 In the cosmopolitan environment of Istanbul's metropolitan culture, the ismailaga community provides a platform for a traditional and ultraconservative rural culture. As with other cemaats, it provides support and assistance not only in religious matters, but also in many social areas, such as job searches, education, charity or the search for financial resources. Their religion resembles a sub-culture and community members struggle with the dilemma of how to use modern

1 u§en Qakir, "Aczimendilik gecekonduydu, Ismail Aga ise gokdelen." Zaman, September 15, 2006.

2 Ali Bula?, Din-Kent ve Cemaat, 19-20.

technology while at the same time keeping a distance from the values it conveys. Finally, it is an unpolitical cemaat. According to members of the community, to take an active part in political associations could result in an undesired departure from Sufi disciplines and principles. The big question, of course, is what will happen when the charismatic Mahmut Hoca leaves the scene. The Nak§ibendis of various offshoots, however, have always been able to reinterpret their principles and practices in response to changing circumstances or the preferences of their leaders.

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