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H. BREZINSKI
УДК 339.98 Х. БЖЕЗИНСКИ
Университет экономики г. Познань, г. Позрань, Польша
ВЛИЯНИЕ КРИЗИСА НА УКРАИНЕ НА НЕМЕЦКО-РОССИЙСКИЕ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ
Аннотация. Современная геополитическая обстановка в мире определяется отношением правительств стран к вооруженным конфликтам. Последний из конфликтов — на Украине — фактически противопоставил интересы России и стран Организации Североатлантического договора (НАТО). Руководствуясь демократическими принципами, члены НАТО и Европейского союза (ЕС) пытаются воздействовать на Россию посредством экономических санкций. Однако вопрос эффективности санкционной политики против России остается открытым. В этой связи представляется актуальным исследование влияния украинского кризиса на немецко-российские отношения, в первую очередь на их экономическую составляющую. В статье обобщен исторический опыт введения экономических санкций против отдельных государств, дана оценка текущих взаимоотношений между Россией, Украиной, Германией и другими странами ЕС. В работе также представлены результаты анализа влияния санкций не только на российскую экономику, но и на экономику Германии; приведено соотношение потерь. Несмотря на экономические последствия санкций для всех участников конфликта, автор признает самым негативным последствием — потерю взаимного доверия между Россией и Германией.
Ключевые слова. Международные отношения; мировая экономика; немецко-российские отношения; геополитика; экономические санкции.
Информация о статье. Дата поступления 12 сентября 2014 г.; дата принятия к печати 29 сентября 2014 г.; дата онлайн-размещения 31 октября 2014 г.
H. BREZINSKI
Poznan University of Economics, Poznan, Poland
THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE ON GERMAN-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Abstract. The modern geopolitical situation in the world can be defined by the governments' attitude to armed conflicts. One of the last conflicts — the conflict in Ukraine — in fact opposed the interests of Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Guided by democratic principles, the members of NATO and the European Union (EU) are trying to influence Russia through economic sanctions. However, the question of efficiency of this sanctions policy remains controversial. In this regard, the study of the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on German-Russian relations and mainly on their economic components becomes extremely urgent. The article summarizes the historical experience of imposing economic sanctions against individual countries. The current relations between Russia, Ukraine, Germany and other EU countries are evaluated. The paper also presents the results of the analysis of sanctions impact not only on the Russian economy, but also on the German economy; the ratio of losses is provided. Despite the existence of economic consequences of sanctions for all parties of the conflict, the author admits that the most negative consequence is a loss of trust between Russia and Germany.
Keywords. International relations; world economy; German-Russian relations; geopolitics; economic sanctions.
Article info. Received September 12, 2014; accepted September 29, 2014; available online October 31, 2014.
Introduction. The armed conflict in Ukraine between the Ukrainian government and the pro-Russian separatist has led to an international conflict in which the NATO partners and Russia are involved because both of them are backing either the Ukrainian government or the pro-Russian separatists. The Ukrainian government wants to be at least associated with the European Union (EU) and with the
NATO, which is a threat to the Russian geopolitical and security interests and symbolizes an exit from the integration activities of the former Soviet Union members. Russia sees its vested interests in danger as well as the interests of the Russian ethnicity in Ukraine. The past policy and transition process in Ukraine has not convinced the Russian ethnicity that they are living there without discrimination and may
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benefit from a better economic and social welfare than in Russia1.
In order to solve the conflict in a peaceful and democratic way and according to the rules of the international society respecting human rights the NATO partners as well as the EU are trying via economic sanctions to enforce upon the supporting partner of the pro-Russian separatists Russia to change their foreign policy. Thus, Russia and the pro-Russian separatists should be willing to respect the rules of international law and stick to them and solve the conflict in a peaceful manner.
Looking at the current situation, we have to ask whether economic sanctions are an efficient tool to force states to change the behavior and adopt the proposed style of settling conflicts. Thus, we will have first a look at the efficiency of economic sanctions in the past, then we will look at the current process of announcing and implementing economic sanctions in the present conflict. We will analyze the impacts on the Russian and the German economy and come up with conclusions of our analysis.
On the experience with economic sanctions. Sanctions constitute a part of international diplomacy. They are regarded as a tool for coercing target governments into specific alleys of response [8]. By increasing the political, social and economic costs the country imposing sanctions wants to change the policy of the target country or send out a message of deterrence. However there are limitations on the use of sanctions. There are several reasons for such a failure:
1. The imposed sanctions are inadequate for the intended task. This may due because of lacking cooperation from other countries, or because the goals are to elusive or the means are to weak.
2. The sanctions may create support for the government of the target country by the population or the political opposition. They may be even call for «black knights» of the target country.
3. They may create repercussions. Thus, sanctions are answered by sanctions of the target country.
4. Sanctions may hit other countries which in turn do not want to cooperate.
In general, sanctions are nevertheless regarded as an instrument you use instead of starting a military conflict.
1 If you look at the transition indicators of the EBRD you discover that Ukraine as well as Russia are lacking behind the Baltic States and Poland e.g., especially in the field corporate governance and enterprise restructuring and competition policy (EBRD: Transition Report 2013). Moreover, countries such as Poland had caught up with pre-transition level already in 1996, Estonia in 2001, Russia in 2007, whereas Ukraine lagged behind in 2012 with only 60 % of the pre-transition level (EBRD, Transition Report 2012).
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History provides us with numerous examples of sanctions [I bid.]. In the recent past the U.S. government started a grain embargo and a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics in order to stop the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Another example is provided by the the CoCom controls in the period of cold war which aimed at forbidding exports of weapons and goods of dual use to the Soviet Union and its allies. The results were not encouraging. The same applies to the sanctions executed against Cuba or North Korea.
More than 67 cases of sanctions are reported after 1990 which imposed costs of 27 - to 30 billion US$ annually [I bid.]. This is just less than 0,5 % of total world exports.
In general, there are three major types economic sanctions:
- limiting or banning exports;
- limiting or stopping imports;
- impeding the flow of finance. This relates to commercial finance, credits handed out by the World Bank or the IMF or bilateral credits. Moreover, it can implicate the freezing and seizing of financial assets of countries or individuals [3].
In the past a combination of trade and financial instruments was used, because it turned out to be the most efficient. Since general economic sanctions are not only hitting the political leadership but also the population, who might than back the political leadership there is a tendency to ban the mobility of individuals involved in the leadership and also to harm them by freezing or confiscating their financial assets.
While there was a strong belief in the past that economic sanctions are inefficient, this opinion has been revised when looking at the empirical evidence from more than 200 case studies. It turned out that in 34 % of the cases intended to change the policy goal were successful, but in the case of disrupting military adventures only 21 % were solved in the intended way [8].
There are several reasons why sanctions may fail:
1. The executing countries have crosscutting interests and conflicting goals in their overall relations with the target country.
2. In the executing country there may be hurt economic interests of special groups, such as entrepreneurs and workers, who lose from a disruption in trade, finance and investment.
3. The target country may be large enough to circumvent the effects of sanctions or even reply with own sanctions.
4. The political leadership of the target country does not stick to democratic rules and thus will not be confronted with the danger of being not reelected.
5. The actions taken are just creating a national consensus in the target country.
In the light of these few remarks on the experience with economic sanctions we may understand on the one hand politicians and governments being in favor of the use of economic sanctions, because there might be some success, when you pay attention to the specific case and analyze all repercussions and impacts of the activities implemented. Game theory has provided us with some insights which in the normal case lead to a prisoner's dilemma, which results then only in an inferior result. However, a solution for a prisoner's dilemma cannot always be found via the emergence and setting up of appropriate institutions which have the power to implement the best solution for all involved parties in a conflict.
Having these general remarks in mind about our current issue, this may help us to understand in a better way the past and present policy activities.
The current sanction activities between Russia, Ukraine and European Union/Germany. The sanction activities started in early March when first the U.S. government announced that they would freeze talks on cooperation and three days later on march 6 the EU announced that the talks about economic alleviations between the EU and Russia would be stopped for the present moment. On March 17 the U.S. government imposed travel bans against economically and politically powerful persons in the environment of president Putin and froze their bank accounts in American banks. The credit card enterprises Visa and Mastercard stopped their services for clients of the Rossija bank and its subsidiaries for a short period causing uncertainty, anxiousness among Russian clients who could not use this card at home and abroad in shops or hotels. This demonstrated the vulnerability of a monetary based economy. On march 20 the EU-Russia summit was cancelled and in April Russia was excluded from the G8 summit. By the end of March these sanctions of stopping mobility and freezing accounts were enlarged to more persons [13; 15].
All these activities were announcements which had an impact on the behavior of investors in Russia as well as in Europe and the U.S.A. the German industry was already very concerned.
On August 1, the second round of sanctions were imposed and already a third round of likely economic sanctions was announced by the German chancellor Angela Merkel [6]. These sanctions consisted of an embargo of weapons of the EU, Russian state banks had a more difficult access to the EU capital market, being allowed to invest only in bonds with a duration up to 90 days. The same ap-
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H. BREZINSKI
plied to Western banks concerning their investment in Russia. High-tech goods for the extraction of oil are no longer allowed to be exported to Russia. Dual-use products cannot any longer exported to military clients in Russian. The firing and crash of the airplane MH17 and the handling of the crash contributed to this escalation. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD as well as the European Investment Bank blocked the financing of new investment projects Both banks had lent in
2013 3,74 billion US$ to Russia. The EBRD invested annually in the past about 2 billion € in Russia [4]. Also the EU funding of cooperation programs which foresaw an amount of 609 million US $ for the period
2014 to 2020 was blocked [5]. This was regarded as a message to the Russian government.
Russia reacted by banning the imports of a number of agricultural products from the EU and its members such as pork, beef, vegetables, fruits and dairy products.
The seemingly apparent evidence of Russian support for the pro-Russian separatists and the urgent wish to bring the conflicting parties together to negotiate about the future gave rise to start the third level of economic sanctions in early September. The EU plans to take sanctions against the Russian oil enterprises Rossneft and Gazprom Neft and wants to impede the access to the European capital market for Russian banks as well as for the weapon industry. The export of dual-use goods will be further restricted and the number of persons getting no visa for the EU will be enlarged by another 20. The sanctions against the oil industry refer only to state-owned enterprises.
Russia is working on retaliation measures. The worst case would be the stop of oil and gas exports. This is a scenario which never came true ven during the time when an embargo on pipeline tubes was imposed in 1980. The Soviet Union at that time always honored signed contracts.
Given this escalation of sanctions what is the impact on Russia and on Germany.
The impact on the Russian Economy. The recent and now intended sanctions imposed on the Russian economy have relatively severe effects, because the Russian economy is already in a period of stagflation. The announcements of the sanctions against influential business people and investors have led in the first quarter of this year capital outflows of 48,8 billion € and have risen by another 25-30 billion E in the second quarter. By the end of the year the capital outflow might rise to 100 billion € in total [2]. The Russian Central Bank has in order to stop the capital flight increased the interest rate from 5,5 % in
February to more than 8 % in August [7]. Enterprise credits handed out by some banks have increased to 25 to 28 %. Medium-sized enterprises pay already interest rates of 15 %. This constitutes a problem for financing long-term investment. The banks in turn face problems in refinancing their credits. The foreign indebtedness of the Russian banks corresponds to 214 billion US$. 107 billion US$ have to be pai back during the next year. The indebtedness of Russian enterprises amounts to 432 billion US$. 128 billion US$ are due during the next year. EU banks would suffer from a default tremendously. German banks might lose more than 17 billion €. The Russian ruble was devaluated by 20 % from the beginning of this year towards the US$. The Russian ruble may fluctuate in a band between seven to nine ruble. Based on a currency basket which consist of 55 % US$ and 45 % € the band would range between 35,40 RUB and 44,40 RUB. The current rate is 41,50 RUB. This in turn has negative impacts on profits and revenues of state-owned enterprises as well as on those of the private corporations. The inflation rate will increase from 5 % to 6,5 % due to the intended sanctions, thus having a negative impact on private consumers. The sales go down. Employment will not improve an the growth which was already declining will lead to a stagnation of the Russian economy. Especially the technology access restrictions have serious impacts on the weapon industry as well as on the oil industry according to vice prime minister Dmitrij Rogozin. The retaliation measures of the Russian government to ban imports of agricultural products will hit the Russian population because a complete substitution by Belorussian products is not possible. Consequently the standard of living will decrease. Moreover, given the tasks of the government to support the system relevant banks, to invest in measures to improve the business climate, such as the premium to buy new Russian cars, to keep the high level of arms expenditure on a high level or even increase it between 2015 and 2017, to pursue a policy of import substitution due to the bottlenecks in the arms industry, the space and aircraft industry, in shipbuilding industry and special vehicle production, the government has to spend more money than planned. In addition, the fulfillment of the promises for social welfare for the inhabitants of the Crimean peninsula has required additional money which can generated by savings and reimports of capital, additional taxes, such as a newly designed value-added tax. This puts pressure on the government budget. Joint venture will be damaged. The project of producing liquefied gas (LNG) will be hampered. As it seems the demand for oil is no longer increasing which has led to a fall in the oil
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price. The long-term prospects for becoming again a leading super power also in economic terms may not come true. Russian was once hailed as one of the BRICS. The capitalization of the Russian stock traded companies amounts at the moment to 735 Billion US$. When Russian shares were priced like in other BRICS countries then the capitalization would amount to 1,77 billion US$. According to the British Economist, one could label Russia a DOG, i. e. «Discount for Obnoxious Government» [11]. Thus, the loss for the Russian economy will not amount to 100 billion, as it is estimated by some analysts, but at more than 1000 billion US$. The actions to avoid the dependency on Western nations and look for a realignment with China in the energy and raw material sector or in the credit card system and the construction of an own SWIFT system will take several years before these activities yield results.
Still we have to put the question are the sanction activities fully implemented or do we find serious opposition decreasing the effects of the economic sanctions? Therefore we will look at the impact on the German economy and society which constitutes the third largest trade partner of Russia [12; 14].
The impact on the German economy. German industry was especially worried when the first announcements about the so-called partisan1 measures were announced. But this has increased the concerns, when the third level of sanctions will start. German - Russian trade which has already declined in 2013. Exports went down by 5,2 % (36,1 billion €) and imports went down by 5,5 % during that period amounting to a level of 40,4 billon €. During the first month of 2014 from January toned of June the exports declined by another 15,5 % (15,3 billion €) whereas imports increased by 2,1 % (20,2 billion €). These data do not reflect the real impact of the sanctions and the retaliation activities of the Russian government. Furthermore these are macroeconomic data. They do not reflect the activities in certain sectors and especially for some large enterprises. More than 6200 companies are having economic relations with Russia. 330 000 jobs are secured by exports to Russia. The machine-building industry faces a decline of the Russian exports of 18,7 % during the first six months (-3,4 billion €). The ban on Rosneft affects more than a dozen firms such as Bilfinger, doing facility services and Siemens which received a 90 million contract to supply turbines and generators [9].
1 This expression refers to a categorization done by Askari et. al., meaning that you are hitting via third parties your target,
i. e. via the impact on the influential oligarchs you try to put pressure on Putin to revise his plans [1].
The car industry suffered from a decline 3,1 billion € (-24,4 %) and exports of agricultural products went down by 31,9 % (420 million €) [10]. About 30 000 jobs might be endangered. The largest German players in German-Russian economic relations are EON, which has invested since 2007 more than 6 billion € in the Russian electricity market. Eon employs in Russia 5 000 persons who contributed 7 % to the operative profit of EON in 2013. They are dependent with 30-40 % on Russian gas deliveries. BASF has invested in several gas joint ventures via its subsidiaries. Deutsche Bahn has a turnover with Russia of 250 million €. It is active in the field of logistics via at least four totally owned subsidiaries. Daimler as well as Volkswagen have largely invested in two joint ventures in the field of trucks and Volkswagen in Kaluga. Metro has a sales turnover of 4,3 billion € and employs more than 22 000 persons in Russia. Henkel has a turnover of 1 billion € and Adidas looks at Russia at one of its most important growth markets, doing more than 1 billion € sales in Russia. Given the size of the German economy and its various branches the impacts are rather tiny, whereas in Russia the impact is considerable. Prices for vegetables and meat have increased since the beginning of the year, e.g. in the St. Petersburg area by more than 20 %. The supply has decreased in Russia. In the long-run however, this could impact on energy deliveries to Germany. Russia contributes 21,5 % to the total energy demand of Germany. This could have an impact on the price development. All in all the current impact on Germany is rather small. In the long run Russia will change its trading partners. In the field of agriculture Latin American countries may benefit, in the field of machine-building, energy investment goods and space and aircraft industry Chinese enterprises may benefit. The most important thing, however, is the loss of trust among the business partners, an important part of intangible capital.
The German government is aware of this impact. Therefore, the German activities towards economic sanctions on Russia remain reluctant and always offering a chance for turning down the threatened actions.
Conclusions. Via economic sanctions you may label as punishment and partisan activities according to
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H. BREZINSKI
the wording of Askari the West hopes to change the strategic behavior of president Putin. The escalation of sanctions might lead to welfare losses for Russia by 100 billion € in the next two years, but also for the West by 90 billion €. The loss in assets may be for the Russian side ten times higher in the long run due to the losses of the value of assets. All these data are of course simple calculations. The damage to the various countries is different. In the case of Germany this does not constitute a vital threat for the economy. Thus, you find the willingness to announce sanctions in a palliative way, i. e. it is regarded as a threat. The sanctions seem to hit the parties in an uneven way. The a larger part of the burden is on Russia and its population. There is still one big misunderstanding on the side of the Western partners. They think that Russia behaves according to the rules of the New Political Economy, i.e. you assume an ideal democratic society in which voters go for the politicians who increase their welfare and politicians try to maximize votes in order to receive 50% plus one vote. In this model lobbies and intermediaries of information play a great role in advising politicians to adopt to the will of the majority of voters. This model is not valid for Russia. There may be some discussions between president Putin and the consulting oligarchs. However, their loss will not tremendously change the strategy of president Putin. He is of course interested in the acclamation of the population. At present according to various polls between 70 and 80 % of the Russian population seem to approve Putin's strategy. In the longer run, however, he is faced with hard budget constraints which will have a negative impact on the welfare of the Russian population. Thus, there may be a compromise for the solution of conflicts in Ukraine leading not only to armistice and a guarantee for Russia to have free access to the Crimean peninsula on the land way and not by huge bridge or tunnel saving a lot of costs. Sanctions may turn out in this way as a beneficial way for all the parties involved and also for those neighboring Russia. However, prudent diplomacy could have evaded the situation up to now in which many soldiers as well as civilian persons were killed and deprived of their home and economic basis.
Список использованной литературы
1. Askari H. G. Economic Sanctions: Explaining their Philosophy and Efficacy / H. G. Askari, J. Forrer, H. Teegen, J. Yang. — Westport & London : Praeger, 2003.
2. Bilder B. Wirkungen der Russland Sanktionwen: Vergiftetes Geschaftsklima in Moskau / B. Bilder // Spiegel online. — 2014. — July 22.
3. Cortright D. Economic Sanctions: Panacea Or Peacebuilding In A Post-cold War World? / D. Cortright. — Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995.
4. D'Amora D. As Crisis Deepens, EBRD Freezes New Investment in Russia / D. D'Amora // Moscow Times. — 2014. — July 23.
Izvestiya of Irkutsk State Economics Academy, 2014, no. 5 (97), pp. 121-126. ISSN 1993-3541
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5. Draft EU Plan Seeks to Block Loans to Russia Through EBRD and EIB // Reuters. — 2014. — July 16.
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1. Askari H. G., Forrer J., Teegen H., Yang J. Economic Sanctions: Explaining their Philosophy and Efficacy. Westport & London: Praeger, 2003.
2. Bilder B. Wirkungen der Russland Sanktionwen: Vergiftetes Geschaftsklima in Moskau. Spiegel online, 2014, July 22.
3. Cortright D. Economic Sanctions: Panacea Or Peacebuilding In A Post-cold War World? Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995.
4. D'Amora D. As Crisis Deepens, EBRD Freezes New Investment in Russia. Moscow Times, 2014, July 23.
5. Draft EU Plan Seeks to Block Loans to Russia Through EBRD and EIB. Reuters, 2014, July 16.
6. EU-Sanktionen gegen Russland: Kein Selbstzweck sondern unvermeidbar. — Bundesregierung Deutschland, 2014. Available at: http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2014/07/2014-07-29-eu-sanktionen.html.
7. Guriev S. Sanktionen gegen Russland sind ein voller Erfolg. Die Welt, 2013, June 17.
8. Hufbauer G. C., Schott J. J., Elliott K. A., Oegg B. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Washington, DC: Peter G. Peterson Institute or International Economics, 2007.
9. Kennedy D. M. Deterrence and Crime Prevention: Reconsidering the Prospect of Sanction. Milton Park: Routledge,
10. Politisch motivierte Handelsbeschrankungen. Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 2014, August 7.
11. Rickens C. Berechnung des «Economist»: Putins Politik kostet Investoren eine Billion Dollar. Spiegel Online, 2014, July 27.
12. Wipperfuhrt C. EU gegen Russland: scharfe Sanktionen, 2014. Available at: http://www.cwipperfuehrt. de/2014/07/eu-gegen-russland-scharfe-sanktionen/.
13. Wipperfuhrt C. Russland und die Sanktionen. Teil 1, 2014. Available at: http://www.cwipperfuehrt.de/2014/06/ russland-und-die-sanktionen-teil-1/.
14. Wipperfuhrt C. Russland und die Sanktionen. Teil 2, 2014. Available at: http://www.cwipperfuehrt.de/2014/06/ russland-und-die-sanktionen-teil-2/.
15. Wipperfuhrt C. Sanktionen gegen Russland sind eine Sackgasse, 2014. Available at: http://www.cwipperfuehrt. de/2014/03/sanktionen-gegen-russland-sind-eine-sackgasse/.
References
2003.
Информация об авторе Хорст Бжезински — профессор экономики, Университет экономики г. Познань, 61875, Польша, г. Познань, ул. Неподлеглости, 10, e-mail: horst@brezinski.de.
Author
Horst Brezinski — Professor of Economics, Poznan University of Economics, 10 Niepodleglosci St., 61875, Poznan, Poland, e-mail: horst@brezinski.de.
Библиографическое описание статьи
Reference to article
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Brezinski H. The impact of the crisis in Ukraine on Ger-man-Russian economic relations. Izvestiya Irkutskoy go-sudarstvennoy ekonomicheskoy akademii = Izvestiya of Irkutsk State Economics Academy, 2014, no. 5 (97), pp. 121-126. (In English).
