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A. Serapina,
publicist
THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON POLITICAL PROCESSES IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
The history of corruption is the most unpleasant and scandalous page in political history of any state. Its flourishing demonstrates the decay of the state governance system and the moral degradation of the people, who, on the contrary, are called upon to show smart appearance of this state. But history gives evidence that society did not always perceived corruption only in the negative way. The origin of corruption was marked in the X century, when as imitation of Byzantine the "feeding" institution was created: the head of the state (duke) sent his representatives (voevodas, governors) to the provinces without payment. It was supposed that the population would "feed" its governor. The latter possessed great powers, and, evidently, the population did not stint its gifts. The "feed" received by these governors was divided between them and the state after their return to the capital. The mutual responsibility of provincial and central grafters originated in this way.
In middle-aged Russia "feeding" of voevodas and taking bribes for settling conflicts was considered as usual income of the people, servants of the duke, who also provided them with payment and land. The rise of the state's central power resulted in limitation of citizens independence, provoking high and local officials to violate secretly the law in the interests of the people, wishing to get rid of the rigid control.
"Feeding" was officially abandoned in 1556, but the tradition to live and to get wealthier at the expense of citizens actually remained for a long time, probably up to the present time. The moral and official censure of bribe-taking was quite often pronounced: by metropolitan Kirill in the XIII century, later by Ivan IV Terrible, when the first execution for bribe-taking took place. The statute-book of Ivan Terrible officially proclaimed the struggle against bribe-taking. In time of Boris Godunov the officials, accused of bribe-taking, were publicly whipped and carried in town with the evidence of the bribe. But even these cruel punishments were unable to eradicate the criminal habits of officials. Corruption in Moscovia was accompanied not only by plundering of state treasure but also by accusation of other bribe-takers by other similar criminals in order to cover their own deeds. Corruption intensified the moral degradation of the state power and the flow of lies among competing elites and separate persons. "The criminal thoughts" were subject to proceedings, and officials had to apply falsifications to prove their "truth" and "honest name". It should be said that since that time psychology of this sort of people was not changed a lot.
The irregular behavior of the officials will hardly promote consolidation and flourishing of the political might and authority of the state. Corruption and political corruption in particular is simultaneously the cause and the consequence of the weakness of the state as the bearer of the state power and the guarantee of social well-being of society. It is common knowledge that corruption in the state structures hinders not only successful development of state governance but also results in vast additional expenses of business and the population, which is an obstacle in the way of economic development of the country as a whole. The measures directed to the struggle against corruption are of high priority for Russia at the present stage. The level of corruption in Russia is highly inadmissible, according to the international ratings.
The national studies note the sustainable reproduction of corruption in Russian official structures (both in czarist and Soviet times) for the whole period of its history. This peculiarity of corruption was marked already in the beginning of the XX century by representatives of national sociological research of official structures. Having studied such form of corruption as bribe-taking, national researchers made the following conclusions concerning the type of this phenomenon in Russia: 1) the subornation of officials is a long-term tradition of the Russian state functioning; 2) the forms of bribery changed but its essence as a form of the abuse of power, as an official crime were kept intact; 3) the reproduction of this phenomenon was reflected in language (colloquial and literal), since there appeared its direct names and numerous aphorisms, like "to render homage to", "treat with respect", "recompense", "feed" etc.
Researchers note that by the 1970s the Soviet nomenclature up to the leaders of the state and the Communist Party was totally corrupted. It is sufficient to recall "cotton", "fruit", "fish", i.e. "Uzbek", "Moldavian", "Moscow" and other cases and investigations, which reflected only the visible, superficial part of this phenomenon.
The analysis of the obtained data, possessed by social sciences, reveals a kind of "plot", which exists in the official hierarchy. The essence of this conspiracy is as follows: the officials know, who takes bribes and how much, but they keep silence, showing their corporate solidarity. They know as well that corruption is a bad phenomenon from the moral point of view, but know also that it is profitable to attain personal and more often egoistic aims. E.M. Primakov, former prime-minister of Russia (1998) admitted many years afterwards: " As a prime-minister I asked all ministers, connected with currency and trade, to give me the written information about loss of money due to gaps in law. I was amazed not only of the amount of the loss but also of the fact
that everybody knows it. The dilemma was raised: if I make it public, I would have to use repression. It was impossible to do it, particularly with due account of the urgent task to stabilize the situation, aggravated by default. Then I decided to make a public threatening declaration to corrupted officials (which did not frighten them at all)". It means that the representatives of the high echelons of power kept the situation under control and even more actually created it, having directly participated in it. They are engaged not only in the governing of state affairs but also in corruption processes. Evidently, the second part of their activities is not public but is in the shadow of their official practice.
Corruption is one of the most significant and almost the central component of the phenomenon called shadow politics and shadow economy. Since economy and politics always exchange their resources, the reciprocal relations may have a great impact both on political and economic spheres of their activities. The shadow economy is perceived as certain "complex of ideological, technological and instrumental devices and actions oriented to formation of parallel (projected according to the fixed tasks) or alternative (opposition-revolutionary) institutional relations. The mere fact of being in "shadow" foresees various corruptive actions (bribes, "payments", monopolization, jobs for relatives etc.).
The shadow policy represents a coalition of various non-formal organizations for use of state resources. The fact of existence of such "zone" radically accelerates the process of loss by state institutions of legal and moral limitations. As a result, the official world of political and economic relations coexists with not less equally legal parallel "informal world" (marked by the qualities, such as self-organization, development of more complex public-political forms within the limits of given time). The unofficial sphere of national economy in Russia
plays a special role; the shadow economy, the business activities are executed outside state control and are not reflected in the official statistical data. Experts distinguish three segments in this field: white, grey and black. There are different direct and indirect methods of appraisal of the shadow economy's size. As a whole, in the world within the framework of this sector the annual added value accounts for the sum of not less than $ 8 trillion, which is not fixed in the official data. According to the existing data, in Russia the shadow economy achieves 40% of the GNP. About $ 37 billion are spent in Russia to pay bribes.
Professor A. A. Vartumyan comes to the conclusion that any augmentation of incomes in the shadow economy results in rise of the money's amount spent for paying bribes, which leads to further extension of the corruption scales. The greatest number of actions within the framework of shadow economy is executed primarily in the system of relations "state-business", i.e. "politics-economy". The objective contradictions between state structures and business are as follows: the interest of the state structures consists in enlargement of financial resources at the expense of tax payers, while the vector of business' interest is directed to the opposite side. Society suffers the main damage from illegal actions. Thus, the shadow relations between the state and business are directed directly against society.
The researchers note that the cause of Russian corruption's vitality consists in the scales of shadow economy, in excessive officials' abilities to give permissions, actually in total impunity. In Europe the fear to lose a great pension and the rigid system of declaration of incomes and property of officials and their family members becomes an obstacle to corruption. In Russia the sums of unofficial payments and bribes are so big that the fear to lose pension dissolves in temptation to get good existence for himself and for
children at the expense of two-three corruption deals. Nobody asks in Russia in what way officials and militiamen or judges have obtained and possess villas, which cost millions. Taking responsible decisions, the power elite sometimes is directed not by the state but by selfish ends.
At the present stage corruption in Russia has obtained a vast scale. However, it would be incorrect to consider the existing situation as an exceptional phenomenon. On the one side, at the initial stage of professional bureaucracy's formation corruption was a typical institution of Russian society. On the other side, the index of corruption's perception in contemporary Russia against the background of other countries of the world, including former Soviet republics, is rather small. The rise of corruption and its transformation into a social phenomenon of Russian politics is mostly destructive, since it is able to liquidate many positive achievements of the previous period of social-economic development of the country. In 2005 the market of Russian business corruption surpassed three times the income of the federal budget. The average size of the bribe, paid by businessmen to officials made $130 thousand, while in 2001 it accounted only for $10 thousand (the data does not takes into account corruption in highest echelons of power). In sum, the cost of goods and services in Russia due to corruption became 50% higher than abroad. Business pays corruption money as follows: to local authorities - 75%, to regional authorities 20%, to the federal power 5%.
The corruption consists in the following forms: bribery - 65%, relation connections - 52%, graft of state officials - 35%, machinations with state property - 33%, extortion on the part of officials - 30%, providing services with use of official post - 28%, illegal actions, taken in selfish interests - 14%, providing unlawful privileges 10% etc. According to the data, calculated in 2005, Russian officials received
only in the form of bribes $ 33.5 billion. Officials get 10% of the sum of contract. The following spheres are characterized by corruption most of all: control, tax authorities, customs and license officials. Those, who decided to enter state service to become rich, try to occupy any post just in these state structures.
Concern is being raised not so much by the high level of corruption as by the trend to its growth. Particularly dangerous is the fact that corruption has penetrated, as many experts and ordinary citizens think, the law enforcement bodies, summoned to struggle against corruption. For the last time, the well known corruption scandals have a peculiar feature: the persons, charged with protection of legality, are mixed in it. The high level of corruption in this structure is a big obstacle to intensification of anti-corruption struggle. At the same time, it is stressed that not only "evil intent" of officials-politicians (corrupted people) but also failures of the legislative system itself promote corruption. Laws are 'written" not with consideration of objective conditions but for specific "projects" of individual politicians or business groups, which creates conditions for corruption on the part of given persons.
The rise of corruption leads to economic inefficiency and unjustified expenses, while the profits, received by means of corruption, are used in the consumption sector. The unjust distribution of goods raises the prices for goods and services, resulting in their lower quality and reducing the competition capability and efficiency of economy in Russia.
The political corruption has a special impact on behavior of people at the elections. The review of corruption, made by V.L. Rimsky, in the course of elections reduces it to client trend in electors' behavior. Although the notion of "corrupted electoral behavior" in political science is rarely used, there exists the well known
notion "electoral corruption", while its substance becomes wider than the former notion. For instance, legal science determines the following forms of electoral corruption: 1) illegal financing of election campaigns; 2) use of "administrative resource"; 3) subornation (venality) of election commissions' members with the right of casting vote; 4) illegal organization of information on elections, of referendums by mass media for vested interests; 5) subornation (venality) of the persons summoned to ensure openness and free speech of the election process; 6) subornation (venality) of the persons called upon to represent the interests of the candidates, election associations (the persons empowered to act for the candidates, the empowered representatives for financial matters); 7) subornation (venality) of the candidates, not connected with financing of the election campaign; 8) subornation (venality) of electors.
The main forms and technique of subornation of electors were tested in Russia already for the 1990s and were successfully used in the beginning of the 2010s. The evolution of the election system in Russia on the eve of the XXI century represents the passage from the group (elite) to the undivided authority (principal VIP) principle. For the 1990s, the elites themselves decided who should be elected to a given legislative body, while in the 2005 this right was taken away from them, and the President of the RF remained the only principal elector. However, some political observers regard this fact as a display of Russian democratic system: for the first time former shadow procedures of the Kremlin received the official status.
The corruption of the state apparatus in many societies is caused by motives of most private businessmen to violate law, while nobody intends to inform the authorities about it. All motives, characteristic for the private sector, are in favor of those, who violate rules and prescriptions. When the number of such decisions and limitations
becomes excessive, sooner or later the private sector (since all or almost all its representatives have motives to violate anti-market rules or to bribe officials) makes the government to be corrupted and inefficient. The peculiarity of contemporary corruption is its extension in consecutive order by including in the zone of its influence the spheres, formerly protected from corruption, particularly in law enforcement bodies and in higher echelons of power, which makes it especially dangerous. At present, there is no state organ, which does not provide corrupted services for business. The executive power actually alone distributes Russian markets of corrupted services. Its share accounts for 98.97% of the whole amount of corrupted services (to compare with the judicial power - 0.86% and the legislative power -0.17%). The biggest corruption income is provided by the power function of the executive authorities, particularly by financial control and monitoring - 34.6%, licenses - 34.2%, tax collection and control-22.0%.
Lobbying, particularly its illegal practices, makes a certain input in corruption's development. Legal lobbying provides a wide specter of services from expertise and promotion of drafts to maintenance of informal connections with officials and influence via mass media. Exactly on the basis of this practice the so-called "iron triangles" are being shaped - the sustainable connections among deputies, officials of branch ministers and corporations.
Many political observers note that the irresponsible and immoral power is always highly corrupted. One may make the conclusion that the level of corruption depends directly (proportionally) on its immorality. The higher is the level of immorality of the power, if not the law enforcement bodies, historians will discover embezzlement in its practice.
The privatization for the beginning of the 1990s may be qualified as corruption, since it created the social construction, the two poles in society: the poor majority ("new social low strata") and the super-rich minority (oligarchs). The middle class as the basis of civil society does not exist in this format and under such conditions. The power itself (due to its inexperience or by hidden malicious intent!?) created favorable political-legal conditions for the unjust privatization. Exactly injustice is the indication, which determines the level of the power's corruption. At the same time, the political and social injustice has economic roots.
K. Kabanov, the head of the National Anti-corruption Committee mentions that the system of corrupted payments makes 40-60% in the structure of corruption. Corruption takes place also in the system of state purchases, determination of quotas, for instance, in the sphere of natural resources usage and in other spheres. Under conditions of economic crisis, the corruption will grow, since the size of budgetary means, allocated for anti-crisis programs, was raised, while the control over their spending has not been shaped. The system of providing exclusive rights (benefits, including export and import, taxes, licenses etc.) creates advantageous situation for corruption. In the course of preparation of the concept of administrative reform various ministers and executive organs were asked what powers they lacked. In most answers the demand of licensing was mentioned.
The cheap labor force (mainly illegal), engaged in construction of elite buildings, is a profitable business for construction companies and banks, which are in charge of mortgage. In Russia the prices for apartments are excessively high, while services of migrant workers are very low. As a result, a small group of particularly enterprising people gets super-profits. And just they will do anything to keep this situation intact. Otherwise, they will have to raise the wages and to create human conditions of living for these workers, i.e. to raise expenses. But most
migrant workers have only one advantage - their readiness to live anywhere. Therefore it is more profitable to hire migrants than the local residents, who claim for normal working conditions. The existence of cheap labor force, used by the state, precludes in principle emergence of civil society in the country. At present, there exists the covered exploitation of work performed by the people, deprived of economic and political self-dependence. In 2004 all economists at the top of one voice spoke about this lack of balance. The rise of prices, according to doctor of economic sciences E.Panina, is the result of conspiracy of monopolists, who rigidly watched emergence in the financial market of new financial means (particularly cash compensation of benefits) to use them successfully. Monopolists raise prices to depreciate completely all compensations. The state wastes all these financial means, since the citizens do not succeed to use them in good time. Therefore the power of monopolists should be reduced. When prices are kept under control of the state, it is necessary to increase the incomes of the whole population. "The social standard of living" exists all over the world. It is a shame that Russia is the only country, where the minimal size of payment for work is considered as the standard of well-being.
Corruption, arranged by officials, delivers colossal damage to national interests and national security of Russia. It is actually "the fifth column", the internal enemy, which penetrated the power structures. Corruption is a threat to development of state governance. Corruption inflicts a blow to national security of the country. In 2006, deputy general prosecutor of the RF A. Buksman compared the amount of corruption market with income of the federal budget and estimated it for more than $ 240 billion. According to INDEM foundation, the size of annual corruption was raised from $ 33 billion in 2001 to $ 316 billion in 2005. According to some experts, from 30% to 50% of the organized criminal society's incomes are used for bribery of officials
and for putting its representatives in official executives and legislative organs. The criminal elements, having penetrated in power structures, create advantageous situation for corruption. The researchers note that the authorities imitate some features of criminal culture, while criminal elements absorb separate elements of political culture. As a result, it may be difficult to distinguish "a thief in law" from a politician.
Russian mass media already in the beginning of the 2000s marked that "thieves in law" penetrated higher echelons of power. These facts may at least create a shock:
in the State Duma there are three (!) "thieves in law" and seven "thieves in authority" (i.e. those, who may be crowned in the nearest future). Certainly, they may be "the formers", i.e. the former criminals, who abandoned criminal activities, but the fact remains: three "thieves in law" in the State Duma is too much;
in March 2001 there were 18 "thieves in law", who occupied high posts in some ministries;
two criminal authorities with tattoos of "thieves in law" occupied posts in the presidential administration;
four well-known "thieves in law" planned to participate in elections to the Moscow State Duma on 16 December 2001, and they possessed the needed financial means to become Moscow deputies.
Judging by the financial means spent by the officials on themselves and their political projects, there is no financial crisis in Russia. All their failures the authorities try to cover by public declarations about the successes achieved by these authorities. The situation resembles the actions, taken by city authorities to the benefit of higher officials: the places with unpleasant waste plots of land, rubbish heaps and the old unfinished construction sites, started to cover them with gigantic fences with green bushes and windows.
The appeals for spearing the budgetary means proclaimed from high rostrums were not heard at lower stages of power. The mass media actually every day inform about expenses of the authorities at various levels to buy expensive goods. The authorities always find the needed means for summits and jubilees and say that they are not the end in itself and that significance is as follows: afterwards there will remain houses, bridges, roads and other items of infrastructure. But actually it happens not always so. The authorities are sometimes incapable to fulfill the programs of social support to the population but at the same time find the means to buy expensive goods. In this connection, mass media mention that even in time of crisis the population has to save on items of first needs, while the officials make declarations about inconceivable incomes... And it is worth recalling advice of D. Mendeleev to employees to be modest. But at present the officials accustomed to cover-up and to impunity understand even the hints, dropped by the Kremlin, of only being imprisoned. The anti-corruption grafts turn out to be empty words, since for some secret reason the provisions on confiscation of criminally earned property disappear in the final version of legislative drafts. Corrupted officials are not frightened at all by such legal proposals without provision on confiscation. One should not be surprised that despite "the relentless struggle" against corruption, the level of corruption, according to general prosecutor Yu. Chaika, rises annually by 5%.
At present, the authorities admit that Russia needs a real exit out of corruption crisis and not the politicized hysteria. For the sake of struggle against corruption the experts propose to minimize contacts of officials with businessmen asking for state services, to create and to use widely the so-called "electronic government". Up to the present time, Russia is behind significantly the western analogues, and, if
modernization proclaimed by the president does not succeed, corruption will suffocate not only democracy but also developing civil society.
"The Caspian region: politics, economy, culture", Astrakhan, 2009, N 4, p. 103-110.
N. Ivanov,
political scientist N. Kiryushina, political scientist A. Rudakov, political scientist S.Ustinkin, political scientist
THE ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF RUSSIA OF FOREIGN NON-GOVERNMENTAL RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
At present, a number of non-governmental religious-political organizations (NRPO) pursuing various aims and tasks carry out their activities on the territory of the Russian Federation. This specter of NRPO varies from the so-called "wahhaby" jamaats to religious-political parties like"Hizb ut Tahrir al-Islami" and extremist sects like "Nurdjular" and "Sulemandji"
The Turkish religious-political sect "Nurdjular" intensified its activities. Its activities are oriented to the literary creative works of Turkish author Badiuzzaman Saida Nursi (1876-1960) for the time of reforms of Kemal-pasha Atatyurk. This period was characterized by the defeat of Turkey, ally of Germany, during the First World War resulting in the uncontrolled disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Under these conditions Atatyurk proclaimed the course for modernization of Turkey, and de-islamization of traditional Turkish
