CC BY
31
Maxim KIRCHANOV
D.Sc. (Hist.), Associate Professor at the Chair of Regional Studies and the Economy of Foreign Countries of the International Relations Department,
Voronezh State University (Voronezh, Russia).
THE CHURCH IN GEORGIA'S POLITICAL LIFE: PROBLEMS, CONTRADICTIONS, AND PROSPECTS
Abstract
T
his article, which is a logical continuation of the present author's earlier publications,1 concentrates on the de-
1 See: M. Kirchanov, "The Media about Georgian Nationalism: Between the Political Nation and Traditionalism,"
Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2013.
gree to which the Georgian Apostolic Auto-cephalous Orthodox Church is involved in the country's political life and its related identity established within the traditional system of coordinates still important in the Georgian state and society.
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KEYWORDS: Georgia, Orthodoxy, the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church, nationalism, identity.
Introduction
The disintegration of the Soviet Union, which allowed Georgia to restore its independence, echoed in the country's religious life. The Church consolidated its authority and became more actively involved in social, cultural, and political transformations. In fact, it regained its medieval role of an important political and economic actor that spread far and wide beyond the limits of religious functions. Amid the 1990s-2000s political turmoil, the Church consolidated its position by consistently defending the idea of Georgia's territorial integrity and supporting the European choice of the ruling political elites.
The Church and Politics: Georgian Specifics
The Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church and its related identity (as part of the traditional system of coordinates) has played and is still playing an important role in the contemporary Georgian state and society.
Formally, Georgia is a secular state, however Art 9 of the Constitution of Georgia says: "The state shall declare complete freedom of belief and religion, as well as recognize the special role of the Apostle Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia in the history of Georgia and its independence from the state."2 The role the Church played and is playing in Georgia is too great and too obvious to cause any doubts: in the Middle Ages, Modern, and Recent History, it was one of the social forces that preserved the Georgian identity, the Georgian nation, and the Georgian language and promoted their development. It preserved at least part of its former consequence in Soviet times and, despite the officially proclaimed atheism, it, along with the academic institutes of the humanities, remained one of the most active and influential actors in helping the Georgians to preserve their identity and their language.
President Saakashvili and other top officials have opted for the European Union as the main and universal political, economic, and cultural beacon. On the other hand, the ideas of secularization and the secular state figure prominently in many of the EU members (with the exception of several Catholic countries, recent EU members). This brings Georgia with its European ambitions and desire to preserve or even develop traditional values closer to Poland and Croatia.
Few state and political (formally secular) events in Georgia do not involve the Church hierarchs and Orthodox clergy. The Church is very straightforward when it comes to political issues and subjects carrying a lot of political weight: it condemns homosexuality and actively promotes traditional values. The hierarchs are very outspoken when it comes to international developments, Georgia's foreign policy, and its bilateral relations.
In these conditions, the Georgian Church and all other religious organizations supplemented their religious and moral missions with a political role. The Georgian political elites (very much like
2 The Constitutional Agreement between State of Georgia and the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia, 14 October, 2002, the Svetitskhoveli Cathedral, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/_en/?action=eklesia-saxelmcifo], 21 March, 2014.
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their medieval predecessors) acquired not only an important strategic ally, but also a consistent critic, the opinions of which are heard in all social strata and the importance of which is comparable today with that of political parties and analytical structures and will be even greater tomorrow.
The Church and the State: Legal Foundations of Interaction
The Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church has an important role to play in the political and intellectual life of the Georgian nation. Its ideologists are involved in formulating the basic concepts of Georgian nationalism; the Church supports the Georgian identity and Georgian language; its hierarchs are developing a narrative about Georgia's territorial integrity; the Church supports the European and Euro-Atlantic choice of the Georgian political elites.
The Constitutional Agreement between the State of Georgia and the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia signed in 2002 laid the legal foundation for the Church's further functioning. The Preamble says, in part: "As an independent and democratic state, Georgia has re-established its historic place in the civilized world" with the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia as its inalienable part. The document outlined the spheres in which the Church and the state could cooperate; it also declared the Church "a juridical person of common law," while the state guaranteed security of the Catholicos-Patriarch. The sate recognized the rights of the Church in primary, secondary, and higher education and said that "the state, in compliance with the Church, shall adopt additional rules on conservation of cultural and historic values according to acting law."3 The Church signed a Memorandum on Mutual Understanding with the Ministry of Education,4 which laid the foundation for the Church's involvement in education.
Ideology of the Georgian Orthodox Church: The Religious and the National
Unlike many other churches, the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in particular, the Georgian Orthodox Church is very consistent in its interpretation of the Soviet period in Georgia's history. While the hierarchs and theologians of Moscow Orthodoxy try to exonerate the Soviet period in tune with the current political sentiments, the Georgian Church sides with the Georgian political elites, which prefer to stress the narrative about the "Soviet totalitarian regime"5 and its negative role in the history of Georgia. Georgian Orthodoxy treats the Soviet period as a national tragedy and a time of "persecution, destruction of churches, and murders."6
3 Ibidem.
4 See: Memorandum on Mutual Understanding and Joint Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science and the Orthodox Church, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=text/samartali09], 21 March, 2014 (here and elsewhere all quotes are in Georgian unless otherwise stated).
5 From a Statement by the Georgian Patriarch, 27 January, 2014, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=news_ show&mode=news&id=789], 21 March, 2014.
6 Sunday Sermon of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II, Sioni Cathedral, 24 December, 2004, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=qadageba_show&id=132], 21 March, 2014
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The Church figures actively involved in political life are not only concerned about national interests, but also about Christian and Orthodox values and never fail to point out that the Russian, Ukrainian, Constantinople, East Syrian, Greek and Georgian churches belong to a single Orthodox community.7 This is closely connected with the efforts of the Georgian Church to inform the Georgians and the world about its position on the 2013-2014 events in Ukraine. On 22 January, 2014, the Patriarch deemed it necessary to point out in his statement that Ukraine "was living through hard times and that tension might reach a critical point."8 On 19 February, 2014, the Patriarch of the Georgian Church clarified the official position of the Georgian Church by pointing out that "peace in the world lost its former stability" and that "due to very special relations between Georgia and Ukraine the Church is especially concerned about what is going on there."9
Nationalist narratives figure prominently in the Church's political picture; in fact, despite its religious status, the Church is developing a secular version of nationalism by expounding narratives relating to Georgia's ancient and glorious history, the need for the country's political and civil consolidation, which will restore Georgia's "greatness of the times of David the Builder,"10 as well as its understanding of the external threats: "God gave us a beautiful land, but our enemies are numerous."11 Church theologians do not deny that they have political ambitions and point out that "proceeding from its historic tradition, the Orthodox Church of Georgia became one of the main pillars and driving forces for the construction of the new Georgian state. This has been revealed not only in the religious and ecclesiastical activities, but in all spheres of social, political and cultural life of the country as well."12
This sheds light not only on the Church's intellectual impact on social life, but also on the objective contradiction between the secular modernist pro-Western and the traditionalist trends in Georgian nationalism. These statements reveal the latent ambitions of the Church hierarchs to claim the honor of preserving identity and building the state. This is especially important against the background of the secular elites' moral responsibility for the loss of Georgian territories and the fact that they are more compromised than the Church, which sticks to its traditional role of peacekeeper and intermediary.
Narratives relating to the idea of Georgia's unity occupy a special place in the political ideas of Georgian Orthodoxy. The Georgian hierarchs say from time to time that "some people say we have lost Abkhazia. No one should repeat this under any circumstances. Abkhazia was, is, and will remain part of Georgia ... we have temporarily lost control of these lands. By Divine Grace the day of reunification will come ... the same applies to Tskhinvali ... we were present there and will remain there."13 In this respect, the Church sides with the secular political elites, which refuse to recognize separation of the Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia from Georgia and treat their regimes, which depend on Russia, as illegitimate. By developing these narratives, the Church is contributing to the concept of Georgia as a political fatherland and a distinctive political community that has temporarily lost some of its territory.
7 From a Statement by the Georgian Patriarch, 24 February, 2014, available at [http://www.patriarchate. ge/?action=news_ show&mode=news&id=793], 21 March, 2014.
8 From a Statement by the Catholicos-Patriarch, 22 January, 2014, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=news_ show&mode=news&id=790], 21 March, 2014
9 From a Statement by the Georgian Patriarch, 19 February, 2014, available at [[http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=news_ show&mode=news&id=792], 21 March, 2014.
10 Sunday Sermon of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II on the Holy Virgin Feast. Cathedral of Gori, 21 September, 2004, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=qadageba_show&id=122], 21 March, 2014.
11 Sunday Sermon of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II on the Holy Virgin Feast, 24 July 2004, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=qadageba_show&id=119], 21 March, 2014.
12 "About Us," available at [http://patriarch.eng/about-us/], 21 March, 2014 (in English).
13 Sunday Sermon of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II, 16 July, 2004, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=qadageba_show&id=118], 21 March 2014.
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The Church and Traditionalism
The Church is not afraid of talking about the problems that interfere with its mission. In particular, the International Charitable Foundation of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II stated, in particular: "In the 21st century, Georgia moved to a qualitatively new stage of its development. Owing to numerous objective, as well as subjective reasons, many obstacles emerged on its way to building an independent state. These found their reflection both in the domestic, as well as foreign life of the country." The Church, therefore, is working hard to preserve the Georgian identity and deems it necessary to stress that "at a time of universal globalization, political and economic boundaries of countries lose their former significance and the difficult process of assimilation of various nations and cultures is ongoing. Under the circumstances, the cultural domain remains a chief factor to define the national identity. This is especially so for a small country like Georgia."14 This brings the Church ideology closer to ethnic nationalism, that is, the striving to unite the country not into an abstract community of citizens who share democratic values, but to relate it to more archaic values of a common language, origins, and ethnic solidarity in the face of external threats and challenges.
Despite their very critical attitude toward the contemporary world and globalization trends, the Church hierarchs, who consistently protect traditional values (the Church resolutely condemns abortions15), admit that the Church is living "in the far from simple conditions of integration and globalization"16 and support the country's European and, wider, Atlantic choice. In April 2004, the Georgian patriarchs thanked the United States which "helped Georgia at the most critical period of its history."17 The hierarchs have become convinced that "today, when integration and globalization have become irreversible, the Church should shoulder much more responsibility than before;" this means that relations with European partners, among them Poland as a "country of ancient culture" comparable to that of Georgia, have acquired special importance.18
Conclusion
The above suggests that the current political significance of the Orthodox Church in Georgia is not a temporary or chance phenomenon. Its political authority is rooted in the country's early history, which means that its present role in social life can be described as a religious renaissance and a revival of the high status it enjoyed throughout the history of independent Georgia, from adoption of Christianity to the loss of independence.
What makes the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church an active and influential actor of the country's social and political life? The answer to this question should be sought in the ups and downs of Georgia's recent social and political history. Political, social, and economic modernization in Georgia began later than elsewhere in Europe and has been unfolding at a much slower pace. This means that the contemporary Georgian nation was invented and institutionalized by Georgian intellectuals much later than in the other European nations because of much slower modernization and the ongoing existence of an incomplete social structure and archaic institutions.
14 "About Us."
15 See: "On Criminalization of Abortions," Blagodat, February-March 2004, available at [http://www.patriarchate. ge/?action=text/samartali 14], 21 March 2014.
16 Sunday Sermon of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II, Sioni Cathedral, 2 August, 2004, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=qadageba_show&id=121], 21 March, 2014.
17 Sunday Sermon of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II, 18 April, 2004 [http:// www.patriarchate.ge/?action=qadageba_show&id=104], 21 March, 2014.
18 Sunday Sermon of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II, 2 May, 2004, the Sve-titskhoveli Cathedral, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=qadageba_show&id=105], 21 March, 2014.
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In other words, in the West, traditional agrarian and urban communities were transformed into political civil nations through secularization, capitalist development, and mounting secular political ideologies born by the European Enlightenment and bourgeois revolutions. In Georgia, on the other hand, similar processes unfolded while the Church increased its political involvement. It did not protect the traditional and archaic institutions (as happened in the West), but led the anti-imperialist political struggle designed to restore its status in the Russian Empire and later to protect religion as an axiological system and the very roots of the Georgian nation as the cornerstone of the Georgian S.S.R.
This explains the Georgian Church's political impact, which is comparable to that of several other countries (Poland, Croatia, and Lithuania) where the Church played one of the main roles in the national movements. This makes the Georgian Orthodox Church not merely a religious organization, but one of the key political institutions of contemporary Georgia. An analysis of the Church's role and activity in the context of all sorts of institutional theories looks promising; indeed, as a political institution the Church demonstrates new dimensions and new features.
They look alien in the contemporary world, but they were prominent and absolutely natural in medieval Europe: the Church not only prays for salvation, but actively contributes to the country's state and political construction.
The current political and social dynamics in Georgia suggest the following: the Church will retain its authority and consequence in the foreseeable future; it will remain a social integrator and stabilizer, the political component of which will be further developed.
In this context, its role and status share many common features with the role and status of political parties. This analogy is based, among other things, on the fact that there are several Christian nationalist parties in Georgia. Their ideologies and activities, as well as intellectual preferences of the Georgian Church as a whole, are worth making them a subject of more detailed interdisciplinary study.
