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At the end is worth noting that the success of large-scale reforms in all spheres of public life largely depends on the level of legal awareness and legal culture of the population, especially women. Socio-political activity of personality, level of legal culture, true citizenship is essential factors to achieve its goals. The issues related to the phased implementation of the
rights and responsibilities of citizens in civil society organizations and by this — increase political culture and social activity of people, especially women. The assigned us the task of creating a strong state and society should be reflected in such processes, which play an important role effective interaction of state bodies and civil society institutions.
References:
1. Узбекистан Республикасининг Конституцияси. - Т.: Узбекистан, 2010.
2. Инсон хукукдари буйича халкаро шартномалар. Туплам. - Т.: Адолат, 2004. - Б. 38.
3. Хотин-к,излар хукукдари камситилишининг барча шаклларига бархам бериш тутрисидаги Конвенция. - Т.: БМТнинг Узбекистондаги ваколатхонаси, 1998. - Б. 1-3.
4. Инагамова М. М. Халк,аро ва миллий к,онунчиликда аёллар хукукдари. - Т.: Академия, 2010. - Б. 37-38.
5. Хусейнова А. А. Фукаролик жамияти ва аёллар. - Бухоро, 2009. - Б. 52.
6. Женщина в меняющемся мире. - М., 1992.
7. Женщины мира: тенденции и статистика. - Нью-Йорк: ООН, 1995.
8. Жуков В. И. Реформы в России в 1985-1995 годы. - М., 1997.
9. Клименкова Т. А. Женщина как феномен культуры. Взгляд из России. - М., 1996.
10. Краснов Б. И. Уровневая ориентация и парадигмы социальной политики.//В кн.: Социальная политика: парадигмы и приоритеты. Монография. Под общей ред. В. И. Жукова. - М., 2000.
Krushynska Oleksandra Vadymivna, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv graduate student, Institute of International Relations E-mail: alekskru94@gmail.com
The attitude of Germany and Great Britain towards the Ukraine’s accession to the European Union
Abstract: The article deals with the comparison of German and British approaches to the prospect of Ukraine’s EU membership. The attitude of both states towards the idea of further EU enlargement is analyzed.
Keywords: Germany, Great Britain, Ukraine, European Union, enlargement, Russia.
Introduction
Back in 1998, President Leonid Kuchma was the first to express Ukraine’s intentions of becoming a full member of the European Union. Since then, every Ukrainian government has stated its support for Ukraine’s European choice. Even under the regime of former President Yanukovych, that was the most pro-Russian in the whole history of independent Ukraine, the government did not immediately abandon the way towards European Union, despite considerable pressure from Russia. The population of Ukraine mostly supported the idea of European future for their country, as for many of them EU was a symbol of prosperity, democracy and civil society. Refusal of Yanukovych to sign an European Union Association Agreement at the summit in Vilnius in November 2013 became a catalyst of social discontent, which led to mass protests against corrupt and undemocratic regime and, eventually, to Yanukovych’s escape abroad.
The new Ukrainian government announced, that “there is no alternative for the European choice for Ukraine”. A European Union Association Agreement was signed in two stages — on 21 March 2014 the political provisions, and
on 27 June of the same year — the economic part. While presenting his “Strategy of reforms 2020”, the newly elected President Poroshenko said, that the ultimate goal of reforms is to achieve a level of the state development, that will let Ukraine apply for EU membership in 2020.
However, even if reforms in Ukraine are implemented fast enough to meet EU requirements, the final decision will still depend on the point of view of the EU member states, which is today far from unanimous. Some countries (especially Poland and the Baltic states) support the aspirations of Ukraine, because they believe that the European Union should more actively resist Russian imperial ambitions, others (like Greece or Spain), think that Ukraine’s accession will destroy the whole system of economic relations within the Union and lead to a reallocation of budget payments not in their favor. Yet, in this situation the decision of the “leading” member states will be the determinative one. The main aim of this work is to study the position of Great Britain and Germany on the matter. The views of these states are not always the same both on the issue of EU enlargement on the whole and of Ukraine’s accession, in particular,
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The attitude of Germany and Great Britain towards the Ukraine’s accession to the European Union
and that will determine, whether or not they will support Ukraine on its way.
The attitudes of Germany and the UK towards the EU enlargement process are often dominated by fundamental contradictions. The reason is that both countries perceive European integration differently and see opposite tasks for themselves in the process. Germany has always stood for the expansion of the political component of integration and strengthening of supranational institutions — for it is through them it can spread out its influence on other EU countries. Britain, that joined the European Communities later and therefore could not take a leadership position on the continent, believes that the main purpose of integration is the removal of any barriers to economic cooperation between the Member States and, ultimately, the creation of the Common Market [5]. As for the political integration, United Kingdom considers it to be the method of transforming the EU countries into Franco-German vassals.
Both countries supported the EU eastern enlargement in 2004, although they had different reasons for that. Germany expected to receive a lot of dividends from new members. The majority of them either had a direct border with Germany, or were separated from it by just one country, and the access to new tremendous markets would bring her the main advantages within the Union. In addition, after the expansion the eastern border of Germany would no more be the eastern border of the European Union. Stable and more or less homogeneous environment certainly met the interests of German security [9]. Finally, the enlargement would have the positive effect on the political role of Germany in the EU. The majority of candidates belonged to the so-called “Mitteleuropa" — the territory, that Germany considered to be its sphere of influence for centuries and that actually disappeared after the World War II and the creation of “Eastern Europe” out of the Soviet camp states. After the “return of newly-made democracies to Europe”, as the project was pompously presented, Germany could finally have back its status of a leading European country. At last there was an opportunity to restore balance in the Franco-German tandem — for decades Germany had to accept the role of the EU treasurer, while France took over the functions of a political leader. None of «Mitteleuropa» states had such close ties to France as to Germany, and the latter could count on their support in making decisions.
Britain had no such close relations with new member states, but was also interested in EU enlargement. First of all, the accession of 10 new countries would increase movement of goods, capital, services and labor within the union, and that would contribute to the development of the Common Market [5]. Secondly, enlargement met British vision of the regional security. From the UK point of view, the more countries are united by ideas of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights, the lower is the risk of occurrence of various cross-border threats on their territory, including extremist and terrorist groups. Due to the integration processes armed conflicts within the EU are almost unthinkable. Finally, every
increasing of the number of member states would reduce the impact of the “Brussels bureaucracy” (and the union of France and Germany) and extend the possibility of individual members to defend their interests.
“Great EU enlargement” went off quite successfully and benefited both for Germany and the UK. However, its consequences were different for the two countries, especially for the further formation of their foreign policy priorities. Even before the actual accession of Bulgaria and Romania German politicians stressed the necessity of the “pause” in the process of enlargement many times, although at that time at least another three countries had a candidate status, and even more stated their intention to apply. It turned out that enlargement poses a threat to the German vision of the Union, as the accession of new members changed the architecture of the Union dramatically. The alliance of 6 countries could become a highly integrated quasi-state, but it proved to be much more difficult with 28 members, that are actually not united neither by territorial proximity, nor by level of economic development, foreign policy priorities, language or culture. One has only to recall the “letter of eight”, that split Europe into opponents and supporters of the US Iraq invasion in 2003, to understand, that the new union is too fragmented to have a single political line and one leader [4]. If the enlargement process continues, there is a risk of complete disintegration of the EU due to the unwillingness of some members to agree on the general decisions, no matter how balanced they may seem.
In contrast, similar developments correspond to the British interests. Since UK is unable to become a leader of the European Union, it became the biggest enemy of the entire idea of sole leadership within the EU and the strengthening of supranational institutions. One should not forget, that the United Kingdom insisted on the inclusion of the subsidiarity principle into the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, giving local authorities the right to appeal to supranational institutions only when they could not do without that. Increasing the number of members, as noted above, will contribute to strengthening of individual states, not the European Commission or the European Parliament. Britain would even pay for the future expansions less than Germany, because its contribution to the EU budget is incommensurate. Therefore it is not surprising, that members of the British government have repeatedly stated, that their country “remains an active supporter of Turkish membership” and that “the UK’s position is clear — «No» for planned pause after Croatia” [3]. At the same time, Britain continues to insist on the necessity of adherence of all the candidates to the Copenhagen criteria, that are the primary terms of accession to the EU.
It should be noted, that these differences in the standpoints of the two states are mainly related to political elites, while the majority of population both of UK and Germany have the same point of view, as they do not support the idea of further enlargement. Germans and Britons fear, that migrants from the new member states will take their jobs, and that they will have to pay out of their pockets for the unbalanced
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economic policies of individual member states. However, while the German government mainly tries to correspond to the will of their citizens on the matter, the British policymakers sometimes frankly ignore public opinion, as it happened in 2004, when Britain along with Ireland and Sweden were the only EU states, that did not restrict access of labor from the new member states to their markets. After a storm of critics Tony Blair’s government had to make some last-minute changes to the immigration policy, but all of the requirements of the people were still not satisfied [1, 78-80].
It is obvious that the attitude of Germany and the United Kingdom to the prospects of Ukraine’s accession to the European Union will be primarily determined by its success on the path of reforms. But there is another factor, that can affect the position of both countries. That is Russian policy in the region, and the will (or the lack of one) of key EU players to take into account its interests while building relations with Ukraine.
After the fall of the Soviet Union Germany became probably the biggest Russian partner in Europe. According to Germany, it was impossible to create an effective system of European security without Russia, that’s why it was essential to help it to provide democratic reforms and to facilitate the creation of competitive Russian economy [8]. Over the past twenty years strong ties emerged between the two states in all possible spheres — from political cooperation to international educational exchange programs. Economical and energy cooperation play a significant role as well — today Russia provides more than a third of Germany’s needs in energy resources, and Germany is Russia’s third largest trade partner in the world [10]. Even when it became clear, that democratic reforms in Russia reached a deadlock, Germany did not slow down relationship with the country.
On the other hand, Britain does not depend on oil and gas fields in Siberia, and the share of both countries in each other’s trade structure has never been more than 3-4 percent. Even the financial ties between the two countries are not as close as it may seem — Russian investment to Britain makes up about 0.5 % of total investments to the country from Europe, while the rate of British investment to Russia is less than one percent [12; 13]. Also, there are no traditions of friendly political relations — for centuries Russian-British relations have been strained at best, and hostile at worst, and the only thing that could unite their efforts was the presence of a common enemy, as it happened during the both world wars. This means that Britain, unlike Germany, is not inclined to consider the views of Russia in its foreign policy.
The involvement of Ukraine into the European integration structures contradicts the national interests of Russia, that tries to bring together as many post-Soviet countries under its control as possible. In order to keep Ukraine in its political orbit, Russia has deployed all possible methods, up to the direct military invasion. At the same time Russia does not stop putting pressure upon Western states to make them believe, that Ukraine is the state with fascist parties in power, where civil rights and freedoms are neglected. Yet the effect is
quite the opposite — even an ally like Germany does not take the idea of historical justification of Putin’s behavior seriously. The annexation of Crimea was certainly the turning point, as it was a gross violation of the rules, that European states have been creating together since the end of World War II, and that were fixed in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. Since then, no state has allowed itself to capture and attach the territory of another state to their own. By taking Crimea Russia turned into a threat to peace and stability in Europe — and Germany had to react to that, in particular, consistently maintaining pressure sanctions on Russia.
However, that does not mean that Russian-German relations are undermined completely. For Germany, Russia is still not only a trading partner, but also a key player in the region, too important to ignore while shaping European policy. That is why German authorities have stressed many times, that they are ready for the dialogue with the Kremlin on the issue of conflict resolution in the Donbas. If Germany is able to make Russia to return to the certain status quo, that existed at the beginning of last year, it is possible that they will be allies once again.
Therefore the German support for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union seems to be very unlikely. This symbolic step would bring major changes to the existing regional system of international relations. The possible Russian reaction is unknown, but it can seriously affect Russian-German relations, and certainly not for the better. Of course, the situation can change, especially if Russia’s foreign policy becomes more and more unpredictable, Russia loses status of a partner in the eyes of Germany, and Ukraine, on the contrary, gains it through successful reforms [11; 59]. However, it is hardly possible in the short term, and it is not surprising, that in an interview to Spiegel Online on November 23, 2014 German Foreign Minister FrankWalter Steinmeier said, that Ukraine’s accession to the EU is unlikely to take place even in the long run. According to minister, “the improvement of the economic and political situation in the country is the project of the next few generations” [6].
The London reaction to the Moscow actions was much more tough. During the Ukrainian crisis the British government was the only one among governments of leading European states, which has repeatedly stated that Russia is a threat to European security [7; 28]. Right after the annexation ofthe Crimea foreign secretary William Hague claimed that “this situation is the biggest crisis of the 21st century” and called on NATO allies to firmly demonstrate their willingness to fight back. Since then UK has been a consistent advocate of the introduction and expansion of sanctions against Russia, both personal and against entire sectors of its economy. It was as well a British idea to disconnect Russia from the SWIFT international banking system, which may completely crash the already weakened Russian economy. Moreover, Britain does not limit itself to economic pressures only — on the 24 February, David Cameron announced British infantry training mission to Ukraine, within which British troops will train soldiers fighting Russian separatists, and stressed, that “the Russian
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The attitude of Germany and Great Britain towards the Ukraine’s accession to the European Union
president could turn against the Baltic states or Moldova if he is not reined in now’ ' [2].
Great Britain considers promoting the development of security and democracy within the European Union to be one of the important aspects of the organization. Russian foreign policy is a threat to Union, therefore it is necessary to take all necessary measures to strengthen the EU. United Kingdom is not afraid of Russia’s reaction to changes in the regional geopolitical situation and of the deterioration of bilateral relations, and is not as sensitive to its energy and economic dimension, as the majority of countries of continental Europe. That is why Britain is more likely to support further EU enlargement caused by accession of countries, that Russia regards as direct sphere of influence, including Ukraine, than Germany.
Conclusion
Today Germany and Great Britain are the key players in the European Union, they are the states, that have an influence on the future of the Union and all aspects of its existence. The Ukrainian crisis has become a challenge for the Union, and none of the members can now distance itself from the situation, since one way or another, its development will affect the future of the continent.
Of course, while there is a war in the Donbas region, the European future of Ukraine can not be discussed. However, if Ukraine’s territorial integrity is soon restored, and the state does not only overcome the negative consequences of the war, but also achieves significant growth in economic performance and social standards, the question of its accession to the EU may be on agenda in a few years.
Taking into account the present state of affairs, one can conclude that the UK is more likely to support Ukraine on its path, than Germany. First of all, the UK is a greater supporter of the idea of consistent European Union enlargement, than Germany. Germany has always advocated political integration of the EU member states and strengthening of supranational institutions (in that it would certainly play a leading role). It will be extremely difficult to achieve the goal, if the number of members of the EU keeps increasing. At the same time, for Britain the ultimate goal of Europe’s consolidation is the development
of economic integration and the creation of the Common Market, and the new members would be beneficial for that purpose (of course, if they meet predetermined criteria).
Secondly, although both countries have to take into account the Russian factor in their policy towards Ukraine, it plays a different role for each of them. Germany has stable relationship with Russia, especially in trade and energy sector. Despite the fact that the German-Russian relations deteriorated sharply after the annexation of the Crimea and the war in Donbas, Germany does not want to burn the bridges completely, hoping to return Russian foreign policy on a predictable path through sanctions. If Germany supports Ukraine on its way to the EU, it risks to ruin relations with Russia, and Ukraine will give it no alternative (at least, for the next few years). Britain risks much less, because it has no close economic ties with Russia, having mutual historical hostility instead. United Kingdom regards European Union as another chance to unite the efforts of member states against Russian aggression, and considers it necessary to enhance Union’s attention to the “frontier states”. However, this does not mean special favor to Ukraine — that applies as well to Moldova and Georgia, countries that have announced their orientation towards democratic reforms and are under the greatest threat of Russian invasion.
So, what should be the behavior of Ukraine in this situation? Studies show that the support both of the EU elites and the population for any country’s accession depends on how high its level of economic development and social wellbeing is, how successfully they meet EU democratic standards and on the intensity of their relationship with current members (greatest support, about 80 %, is traditionally shown towards accession of Norway, Switzerland and Iceland, although they do not express such intentions) [13; 14]. That is why Ukraine should now actively carry out internal reforms, deepen relations with individual European countries and build a reputation of a reliable and predictable partner. If it succeeds, no one will have to convince the leading EU about the need for Ukraine’s accession to the EU, as they will be interested in the process themselves and approve it, despite the opposition of foreign players, primarily Russia.
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