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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Guram SVANIDZE
Ph.D. (Philos.), coworker at the Human Rights and Civil Integration Committee, Parliament of Georgia
(Tbilisi, Georgia).
SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE GEORGIAN CRISIS
Abstract
This article looks at the particular traits of the emergence and development of independent Georgia and studies the special features of the crisis in Georgian so-
ciety. It focuses on the viewpoint that radical public conscience and stubborn political leaders are the insurmountable barriers interfering with Georgia’s peaceful development.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Georgia’s most recent history has been developing dramatically. On the one hand, it is characterized by extremely mobile internal processes and society’s openness to innovation and reconstruction, while, on the other, it has repeatedly found itself on the brink of arduous tests.
With a rich history of survival and having lived through powerful empires, the Georgian people should have developed skills that ensure a stable and safe existence inside the country. But their ancestors’ maneuverability in foreign policy could not always be applied to domestic affairs.
Eighteen years ago, Georgia experienced the most extreme crisis phenomenon—anomie. At that time, axiological and moral precepts stopped working, and sociality as such was degraded. Society plunged into chaos. The absence of legitimacy turned it into an aggregate of both accidental and unstable social ties.1 It took colossal efforts to put the country on the path of stable development.
Today, we are seeing the manifestation of other crises in society—instability, radicalism, and irreconcilability. The capital is awash with spontaneous meetings. This is why it sometimes seems that radical public conscience and stubborn political leaders are the insurmountable barriers interfering with Georgia’s peaceful development.
General Sociological View
It stands to reason that radicalism presupposes instability. The more radicalism, the less likelihood of consensus in society and, consequently, the less stability in it.
On the whole, internal instability and insecurity are normal and healthy phenomena for any society. Particularly if it is transforming and being built on democratic principles. But the more viable the system, the more opportunity it has to keep the processes within a standard framework. Going beyond the framework leads to a dead end.
1 See: G. Svanidze, “Ispivshie vod okeana,” Druzhba narodov, No. 9, 2008.
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As sociologists have noted, systems established by revolutionary radical methods use up many more resources and time on developing a stable and legitimate government. For example, in those countries where monarchies were overturned as the result of revolutions, the republican regimes that came to power proved incapable of acquiring legitimacy in the eyes of all the important strata of the population right up to the fifth post-revolutionary generation.2
Sociologist Seymour Lipset illustrates these provisions with the following observation—there are monarchies in most of the extremely stable democratic states of the West. At that time (the second half of the 1960s, only the U.S. and Switzerland, as purely republican countries, met the criteria of stability in the democratic rules of the game.3
What do we have in the case of Georgia’s most recent history? In this sense, the period of Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s rule is interesting. It represented the transition stage from the communist past to the independent existence of the Georgian state.
If we follow the scenario presented above, it can be presumed that it was then that the foundations were laid for periodically recurring crises. Admittedly, there are some specifics. In Georgia, essentially complete self-removal of the “old type of law” has occurred, the bastion of which was the party-management core. The new regime acquired power easily, without visible resistance from the communists. Without encumbering themselves with emotional heart-wringing, the party bonzes rejected their past. One of the reasons for this development of events was the profound power crisis after the drama of 9 April, 1989. At that time, suppression of a peaceful meeting led to human losses. It would seem that conditions had developed for building a new society from scratch.
But the inexperienced politician took an erroneous path. He tried to legitimize a system based on ethnonational principles. They proved insufficient for forming a stable society, since they did not satisfy enough of the population.
This choice can be explained by the fact that only the nationalists put up any real resistance to the communist establishment in the country. Their efforts were directed against the policy of proletarian internationalism. In this they saw signs of communist cosmopolitism and the danger of Russification. Examples of civil courage and disobedience to Soviet power can be found precisely in this sphere.
The negative attitude toward the policy of proletarian internationalism was so strong that, when they came to power, the Georgian nationalists ignored the need to form a civil society and develop general democratic principles. Nationalism grew into ethnonationalism. It placed the emphasis on building an ethnic state.
It is important to note the nuance that the government proved incompetent due to its inability to consolidate society around the principles of ethnonationalism, and not because of the failures in economic policy. A severe economic crisis did not inflict the country and become urgent until later, after the rule of Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
The factor of social structure is interesting.4 It nurtures the potential of causing a split in society. Often class, professional, religious, ethnic, and religious differences give rise to political differences. Sociologists have noted that class contradictions are also inherent in economically developed states. While axiological conflicts are more characteristic of developing countries. In the second case, contradictions are usually seen between the values of the modernization era and traditional values.
The situation in Georgia has developed a little differently in this respect. Vocabulary relating to the class struggle was entirely excluded from Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s political discourse. The fight for social justice did not have any class feature. As for the axiological conflict, the special trait of the Georgian example is that here the consequences of modernization according to the socialist manner had to be eliminated. Westernization at that time was a certain mythologeme that was regarded as an absolute
2 See: S. Lipset, “Politicheskaia sotsiologiia,” in: Amerikanskaia sotsiologiia: Perspektivy. Problemy. Metody, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 207.
3 See: Ibidem.
4 See: Ibid., p. 214.
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boon. But there was no fight, and the values of the past disappeared peaceably into oblivion. The modernist, pro-Western discourse with its accent on the values of a civil society was long used by the authorities, but it remained declarative. Ethnonational rhetoric and its corresponding practice prevailed.
The ethnic component of social culture became a factor of the split in society. The consequences proved grievous. In the autonomous formations and in several areas where minorities compactly live separatist movements emerged or became revived that led to bloody clashes. At that time, the way was paved for territorial disintegration of the state.
The danger arose of collapse of the titular nation itself. The line of the split ran between Tbilisi, a cosmopolitan metropolis, and the ethnonationalistically oriented Mingrelian region, only because Zviad Gamsakhurdia was thought to be of Mingrelian origin. After the first president laid down his powers, a civilian resistance became aggravated in the country.
Based on the example of Gamsakhurdia’s regime, the action of the so-called “inflated expectations” effect can be seen.5 Usually such trends are associated with those movements and social groups that had to seize state power by force, thus heralding in the hope that a “golden era” would begin. The ease with which the new regime acquired power in Georgia reinforced the inflated expectations even more, radicalized them.
The charismatic leadership was a risk to the young state’s stability. It constituted a more direct road to “legitimations of domination.”6 The time and resources necessary for achieving other types of law and legitimacy (traditional, rational-legal) were saved on building the leader’s personality cult. The figure of Zviad Gamsakhurdia embodied the struggle for nationalist ideals and was identified with the system he created. Meanwhile, it is difficult to maintain a personality cult in conditions of an open society, in conditions of democracy. Some thought that the expectations formed during the Soviet era were not allowed to come to fruition, while others saw that they were obviously utopian. The insurmountable polarization generated disintegration of the social organism.
The Historical Dimension
During Soviet times, after Khrushchev’s Thaw, the alienation between society and the government gradually became aggravated in the empire. One of its most dangerous manifestations was legitimization of the illegitimate things that went on by default in society, unification of common interests with the private interests feeding on it. Consent to this kind of order was akin to a deal, corruption turned into a systemic quality. The contradiction inherent in this alienation was not conducive to development, only to stagnation.
It can be hypothetically presumed that during the stagnation period in the former Soviet Union, a so-called revolution of increased expectations, an increase in consumerism, occurred. Since this phenomenon has not been sufficiently studied, it can only be surmised that it took place during Brezhnev’s stagnation era. At that time, the Western society of universal prosperity looked much more attractive to Soviet people than the gloomy monotony of Soviet power. Consumer standards grew and the population became less enticed by the promises of a radiant future.
A new dimension of social structure appeared—the access of large and small groups of people to shadow sources of income and services.
The double moral standards did not bypass Georgia. It was in this country that this duality became most fully developed, which was notorious in the Soviet Union. Corruption was characteristic not only of the ruling elite, but also became entrenched in everyday life. This corruption became so
! Ibid., p. 208. Fro
1946, p. 78.
5 ]
6 From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. by H.H. Gerth, C.W. Mills, Oxford University Press, New York,
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ingrained in public conscience that not only were fraudulent gains not deplored, they were esteemed as a sign of the ability to live the good life.
The industrial mafia groups, those controlling the citrus, tea, tobacco, wine, and fruit sectors of the economy, were the largest shadow formations in Georgia. The sectoral principle of their appearance was supplemented by regional and subethnic factors, and so on. It should be noted that there were no clan structures in the country, there was no merging between structures formed on blood relations and the power and economic institutions.
The country put up a fight against shadow groups in all their guises. In the 1940s, cleansing was carried out according to the regional principle (“the Mingrelian case”). During the time of Eduard Shevardnadze, a communist, personnel policy was strictly adhered to (the well-known resolution of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee on the fight against nepotism, and so on). Prevention measures in this area were enforced in principles of forming the ranks of a party-management core. But the double moral standard was ever present.
Zviad Gamsakhurdia led his own fight against the mafia’s stranglehold. This was one of the most popular slogans of the independence movement. But without a strong administrative apparatus, the first president suffered defeat in this struggle. At the same time, the virus of the double moral standard had penetrated Gamsakhurdia’s comrades-in-arms. Mingrelian particularism came into its own rights.
Incidentally, the double moral standard is not something unequivocally destructive. Georgian history shows that it can be functional and be a strategy of survival for the people. Due to the constant threat of aggression and genocide, in conditions of extremely infringed or essentially non-existent sovereignty, the central government became a target of deals with the empires. State institutions had a purely pragmatic adaptive function. Constant breakdowns in dynastical inheritance undermined the legitimacy of supreme power.
The community remained the last bastion for preserving the Georgian nation. The country was a conglomerate of communities with a single ethnic identity, which is reflected in the ethnonational concept “nation” (eri). Nationalism (erovneba) in Georgia unusually implies the ethnic origin of an individual.
In the context of the nation’s survival, the double moral standard may still be tolerated. But there can be no doubt that it is not conducive to the building of state institutions. The intrigues of the appanage princes undermined the foundations of central power.
The fact that Georgia has never known an absolute monarchy also takes its toll. After all, it was the monarchy that became the foundation of the state structures of contemporary Europe and created the traditions of statehood. Not to mention the sacralization of state institutions, which can be seen in the Far Eastern cultures (Confucianism and others). Georgian Orthodoxy was long the religion of a nation that was trying to survive physically and spiritually, the custodian of its cultural heritage and historical memory. The church was the bearer of the nation’s spiritual unity in its ethnic understanding. At that time, it could not participate in nation-building, due to the fact that it was constantly discontinued.
The low level of legitimacy of state power made society unable to organize and govern itself. This shortcoming can be compensated for if there is either some external power or a “boss”—a strong charismatic leader. They act as the guarantors of lawfulness and stability.
It is typical that the Georgian public conscience retains the memory of czar-unifiers and czar-builders (David the Builder, Queen Tamara), the rule of whom was perceived as a golden era in the country’s history.
Nostalgia for a legitimate central government, for a strong leader, was supplemented by mythol-ogemes about powerful single-faith nations that should free the country from the yoke of the infidels and at the same time help to unite it. At first this was Russia. And now the new target of expectation is NATO.
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Culturological Dimension
It is customary to believe that one of the reasons for the permanent instability in Georgia is that individualism is strongly developed in the country. Georgia supposedly has more ambitious individuals than it can handle, each of whom is striving to become president. Admittedly, such statements are not underpinned by analysis. They are perceived as one of the national mythologemes.
A Georgian historian said on TV that Georgians are not Englishmen. Englishmen are able to obey a specific captain on the ship, while we are so proud and stubborn that it is difficult for us to obey anyone.
Another illustration showing homegrown individualism is the way football is understood in Georgia. Although it has a traditionally large number of individually strong players, it cannot form a more or less decent team. A compensatory reaction to the systematic failures of Georgian football has been developed in the public conscience—they say that individualism interferes. Whereby people lose sight of the fact that full-fledged individualism presupposes the individual’s participation in complicated types of coordinated interaction, to which Georgian football players are not inclined. After all, a football team is a kind of model of self-organization, the embodiment of the ability to follow general rules for the sake of achieving a common goal. And we are not saying that there were no big shots among English sailors, but they understood the need to obey the captain, who by definition was the most qualified person on the ship.
Incidentally, one perspicacious viewer reacted to the historian’s tirade. In a telephone call to the TV channel, he asked whether this was not why it sometimes seems that Georgia is not destined to have a disciplined army. Whether the apology for this type of individualism was not conceptual nonacceptance of discipline.
According to the mentioned mythologeme, individualism is regarded as an argument in favor of the Georgian culture belonging to the European. Admittedly, the aforesaid presumes that specifications are made. And there are so many of them that the arguments are leading to opposite conclu-sions—Georgians belong to the Asian cultures.
The reason is that the traditional way of life is still strong in Georgia. We are dealing not with the individual as a person, but with the representative of a group, the bearer of a social role. During a discussion at a parliament sitting of a draft law on lustration, the thought was expressed that it would only be of detriment, would drive a wedge among families. The reason—we are all relatives in Georgia. There will always be relatives among those who became victims of terror and those who carried it out. The authority of the community might be placed higher than individual freedom. Whereas a civil society can provisionally be called the unification of individuals as people, ethnonationalism presumes an aggregate of individuals—the representatives of ethnic groups.7
Participation in the group is pertinent and self-sufficient. Even belonging to ad hoc collectives (friends-comrades living on the same street, partners in card games) can guarantee access to the good life with as much success as an individual’s personal achievements and abilities.8 The super value of participation entails the super value of representation, which can go as far as “tribal self-boasting” and directly relates to personal ambition and creates the illusion of developed individualism.
In conditions of the double moral standard, the traditions and customs of the community compete with the law. The law is observed, but not esteemed. Rituals look more understandable than paper pre-
7 See: G. Svanidze, Gosudarstvennaia politika v oblasti zashchity prav i grazhdanskoi integratsii lits, pri-nadlezhashchikh k natsionalnym menshinstvam, June 2006, 77 pages, available at [http://www.ecmigeorgia.org/rus/ publications.html].
8 A typical situation—after learning the name and noticing the speech peculiarities of a new acquaintance, a Georgian clarifies what region the new acquaintance is from, what district, city, village. And wants to know if he is a relative of so-and-so, and so on. If it turns out that the new acquaintance is from Tbilisi, he, not waiting for additional questions, says that his relatives are from such and such a region, and so on. Finding at least one common acquaintance is considered something valuable.
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scriptions. It is the same with the form of governance. The bureaucracy is omnipotent, but does not enjoy prestige. In this sense, it does not have the charisma enjoyed by the elders of the community.9
In the communist period, as a result of migration of the rural population to the city, particularly to Tbilisi, the importance of unofficial ties began to decline. But at that time migration to large cities went smoothly, keeping pace with the development of industry in them. The city was able to assimilate the migrants and orient them toward more universal values of city life. At that time, it was considered inappropriate not to try and fit in, so as not to acquire the reputation of a yokel. In the 1990s, this balance was destroyed. Hundreds of thousands of refugees, migrants, and displaced persons began pouring into the metropolis from the impoverished districts and conflict regions. Tbilisi was unable to oppose the spontaneity of the local psychology. At that time, there was also talk about a crisis of urban culture and about the city turning into a big village.
We cannot ignore the hedonistic precepts of the traditional culture. Some philosophers took them as a healthy, eudemonic, and Apollonic sides in Georgian culture. Whether there is a direct link or not between hedonism and the increase in consumerism in the country must still be studied and proven. Although it is clear from history that asceticism, and not hedonism, stands in opposition to the consumer environment. The slogan “Paradise forthwith!” nevertheless comes from hedonism, and not asceticism.
Extremization of public conscience could lead to the population not being ready for the number and radical nature of the reforms, or for the rate of their implementation. Being more used to the leisurely life of a traditional society, public conscience will run to extremes, fall victim to political manipulations and tend toward chaos. The effect of the double moral standard will not pass unnoticed. Society and the individual are experiencing its exhausting so-called cross pressure. Whereas in conditions of stagnation, this provides room for maneuver, in an unstable stress situation the need arises for simplified solutions to problems that provokes radical actions.
An element of Georgia’s political culture, such as meetings, has acquired particular importance. There is some truth to the statements that such acts are the achievement of the young Georgian democracy. The country’s citizens usually exercise their right to express their demands and right to freedom of association and gathering by observing formalities, without acts of vandalism, and in an organized way.
A meeting is the development of elements of a national assembly, an attribute of traditional life. It often easily turns into a national assembly, some ethnic mass act reminiscent of a theatrical performance. Incidentally, it has been observed that actors from Tbilisi theaters and bohemians are often very prominently present at meetings.
During the time of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, representatives of traditional ethnic genres, “wailers,” “voodoo specialists,” and so on, spoke during campaigns. It is worth noting that social demands are rarely put forward at demonstrations. Most frequently a Tbilisi meeting gathers in the context of a general crisis. The syncretical internally non-differentiated system spontaneously opposes the rejected system with its legislative, judicial, and executive branches, and law-enforcement bodies.
At the same time, holding meetings has its price. It is believed that the more people a meeting gathers, the fairer it is. This also gives more reason to appeal to the meeting as to the nation, address it as a source and holder of power.
Exploitation of the concept of “nation” does not help to raise the political culture of the masses, does not promote the democratic process, which presumes an independent choice made by the individual beyond the bounds of the group. A meeting in itself is totalitarian to the extent it opposes the
9 An example of the collision described can be the case of Sandro Girgvliani, which caused a furor. It was a case of equally everyday and large-scale dimensions. At that time, the hooliganistic behavior of a tipsy citizen with respect to high-ranking state security officials and their public humiliation ended up tragically for him. The incident registered a problem—the need for turning to the police was not even discussed. In the end, it was the low-ranking officials who organized the murder of Girgviliani who were sentenced and not the people who ordered it, which aroused indignation among the people. And again, few public representatives thought that administrative sanctions should have been brought against the disturber of the peace.
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right of the individual to vote at free elections by secret ballot. But this does not mean that man’s rights should not be respected, which he realizes in community with other people.
The development of this tradition actually goes against the practice of holding elections, regarding the fairness of which serious differences always arise.
Events take an undesirable turn when a meeting begins to be regarded as a form of the nation’s direct participation in governing the state, as some power structure. This trend reached its fullest development in November 2003, during the Rose Revolution. And it has not lost its pertinence today. The radicals reproach the opposition leaders for not knowing how to curb the events and allow people to go home after gathering “a whole stadium of protesters” (26 May, 2009). Supposedly the people were not pleased that they had been bothered for nothing.
This kind of twist does not correspond to the demands of democracy and the law. This trend was laid after the tragic events of 9 April, 1989. As already noted, the authorities’ barbarous reprisal against defenseless people led to the government completely losing its authority among the population, on the one hand, and made it impossible to give a critical assessment of the action of the demonstrators, on the other. As a result, confidence in the effectiveness of radical mass action and the immunity of the meeting as a “people’s brainchild” became more reinforced in political usage in Georgia.
This experience was not studied or taken into account afterwards. For example, demonstration of the administrative resource on 7 November, 2007, when a meeting was scattered, had the opposite effect. The state, which had already earned the definition of “a police state,” become “even more police” after the November events. The assessment was that supposedly Mikhail Saakashvili’s goons had dealt with the people in the same way as happened on 9 April, 1989. The tough measures used to scatter the meeting were perceived as even more brutal because they came from the Georgian police. And this was despite the complete incompatibility between the number and nature of the victims when scattering the two demonstrations.
Eduard Shevardnadze made his contribution to establishing the tradition of meetings when “on the demand of the masses” he appeared before them. Since then the demand that the president come out and face the people has become imperative. Mikhail Saakashvili’s refusal to come out to the “masses” was evaluated as disrespect and a manifestation of cowardice.
The significance and popularity of meetings in Georgia is also explained by another circumstance. Being close in spirit and purpose to some genres of traditional culture, it borrows, to a certain extent, some elements of feasting. As we know, in micro groups it is one of the mechanisms used for regulating and reproducing their internal solidarity. Basic values are given voice through the strict sequence of toasting rituals, whereby the participants in the feasting state their loyalty. In a quickly changing and unpredictable situation, the need to perform such rituals grows. So the meeting becomes a way of collective adaptation to the quickly changing conditions. The content and stylistics of any speeches are reminiscent of toasts that are not at all related to the specific reason for the demonstration.
It is no accident that at one point during the act of protest in front of the president’s residence, a table more than 100 meters in length was set up for dining. The speeches continued and were reminiscent of toasts that top off wine-drinking.
Return of Eduard Shevardnadze
Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s regime served as a catalyst for bringing communist rule to an end in Georgia, but proved ineffective when it came to laying the foundations of an independent country.
Eduard Shevardnadze’s return to Georgia from Moscow in March 1992 marked a new stage in the development of statehood. His international prestige was high enough to make maximum use of the external factors. The West, particularly the U.S., exerted great efforts to save, establish, and develop Georgian statehood.
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Mutual mistrust between society and the state for some time neutralized Eduard Shevardnadze’s authority. The elections at that time were not authentic and were falsified in favor of the returned leader. But everyone ignored this. Ethnic conflicts in the autonomous regions were frozen, but not settled. Eduard Shevardnadze was forced to get along with the leader of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria Aslan Abashidze, who made a show of ignoring the central authorities. The assassination attempt on Eduard Shevardnadze in February 1998 was confirmation of the fact that Gamsakhurdia’s cronies had been hatching plans to retaliate and return to power the legally elected Supreme Soviet that was overturned as a result of the Tbilisi war of December 1990-January 1991. Although some of the moderately or conformist-minded Zviadists decided to cooperate with Eduard Shevardnadze.
The ethnonational discourse ultimately replaced the democratic one.
Eduard Shevardnadze’s return did not mean the return of the old party nomenklatura. Georgia had its own “response”, which was supposed to curb a revolution (according to Pitirim Sorokin). In the East European and Baltic countries, this took the form of the return of the communists as a political force, admittedly, in a different Europeanized image, which only added to the legitimacy and stability of the systems created there. In Georgia, on the other hand, it was limited to giving jobs to the old bureaucracy. The former party elite was represented in the form of a new bourgeois class.
This breakdown in forces did not save the country from phenomena that continued by momentum from the Soviet past. Again features of the double moral standard arose. A new “party-manage-ment core” appeared—the Union of Citizens. Instead of spreading democracy, expanding its social base, and forming a civil society, the new government privatized all the undertakings. It appropriated all the benefits that came from abroad to build democracy and declared itself the main agent of its ideas and their practical embodiment.
A similar situation developed in the nongovernmental sector. Here its monopolists appeared. As in the economic sphere, oligarchization trends began here, blending of the state structures with nongovernmental organizations. All of this intentionally or unintentionally was furthered by the grant policy of international funds working not to spread the idea of democracy in the country, but to create “democratic castes.”
This is when the foundations of private property were laid, although the accumulated capital was not impeccable in the legal and moral respects. Instead of a free market, society acquired a system for laundering dirty money, that is, crony capitalism.
Political processes were sluggish. Eduard Shevardnadze tried to find a balance, limiting himself to half-measures. Radicalism at that time did not bring dividends in politics. It is interesting that during the eleven years of Eduard Shevardnadze’s rule the people languished under the burden of an energy crisis that was initiated by the mafia groups who made an enormous amount of money on it. But the people kept quiet. They were either content with the routine stability of the regime, or could not imagine that such cynicism and impudence were possible.
The stability of Eduard Shevardnadze’s institutional system was maintained not thanks to general democratic consent, but on a deal that smacked of the double standard between the government and society living according to its own interests. The government’s minimum material resources could not maintain this deal for long. Nevertheless, during his rule, Eduard Shevardnadze withdrew the country from its state of chaos and created the foundations of statehood. He was also the initiator of the geostrategic breakthrough. Georgia became an “interesting” region for the West.
Roses with Thorns
The Rose Revolution was meant to enliven the social processes and give them a boost. The first task of the new authorities was to build on the “achievements” of Westernization in the country. It could have been presumed that the West’s widespread assistance did not exclude its direct participa-
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tion in internal Georgian affairs. It is a well-known fact that the Soros Foundation sponsored the revolutionary campaigns of 2003.
Mikhail Saakashvili inherited an amorphous state apparatus, but quite a developed civil society with an extensive NGO system and free press. There was a personnel shakeup: the elite part of the nongovernmental sector formed according to Western standards wandered over into the power structures. The ruling party, Union of Citizens, was transformed into the National Movement. In this way, there was an attempt to form a system, the guarantor of legitimacy and stability of which was to be “those who had drained the cup of the West.” This was what personnel who had received their education in the West was called.
The authorities understood the meaning of the slogan about retaining national values. They made a point of tying it to demands to build a civil society. In this respect, contacts were established with the Zviadists. The president obtained dividends. Upon its arrival in Tbilisi, the caravan of buses (mainly from Mingrelia) that stretched several kilometers brought Mikhail Saakashvili victory in the Rose Revolution in November 2003. It ensured the loyalty of the region’s electorate. The president’s wife sang songs in Minrelian in Zugdidi that charmed the local voters. Personnel from this region occupy leading positions in the security and defense ministries and not only there. Zviad Gamsakhur-dia’s reinterment was a significant phenomenon.
Return of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria to Georgia’s institutional system was also a great achievement. This happened after Moscow’s puppet, Aslan Abashidze, was driven out of Batumi.
There were many changes in the country. Whereas during the time of Zviad Gamsakhurdia the country was on the brink of collapse, during Eduard Shevardnadze’s rule it was threatened with a relapse of Brezhnev’s stagnation. When Mikhail Saakashvili came to power in the country, the least he did was put an end to the energy crisis that had been the bane of the country’s existence for years and the most was that the country acquired a function in the geostrategic breakdown.
For the first time in many centuries, a strong state apparatus formed in Georgia. The army and the internal affairs bodies were rather quickly restructured. The country’s fiscal services operated more efficiently, and privatization was carried out, thanks to which the state budget increased five-fold.
The new authorities created a legislation that placed Georgia among the first twenty countries in the world with the most favorable conditions for developing market relations and encouraging an inflow of investments. Their assets included fighting such a heretofore tenacious phenomenon as corruption. According to the report of the World Bank published in July 2006, in 2002-2005, the level of corruption has perceptibly decreased in Georgia, compared to other countries with a transit economy.
A “zero tolerance toward the criminal” campaign unfolded in the country that dealt a severe blow to the criminal world.
By Means of Exclusion
Four years had not passed since the revolution before the country was again shaken by opposition meetings. The radicalism, inability of the sides to listen to each other, denial of consensus, and so on customary of Georgian political life made themselves known again.
What was the reason for the new outbreak of instability?
As already mentioned, the authorities make skillful use of the ethnonational factor. The “historical insult” of the Zviadists has been removed, and the self-isolation of the Ajarian Autonomous Republic has also been overcome. Admittedly, this trend failed to spread to the rebellious ethnic autonomies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The thesis about the generation gap in the country and the contradictions between the traditional culture and modernist trends associated with it can be considered exaggerated. However, a certain conflict potential does exist. For example, there was talk about “age discrimination.” This was caused
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by the fact that rejuvenation of personnel in Georgia was carried out hastily and in an accelerated way. The phenomenon that has been given the melodious-sounding name of “juvenation” proved extremely repressive and peremptory. It was crowned by the president’s remark to a certain part of the intelligentsia that he referred to as “refuse.”
Whether or not the particularities of the age of the new state officials had an effect, at first the government not so much lost contact with the people, it stood opposed to them, entirely forgoing its own image. The superciliousness the “famous youth” from the president’s team permitted themselves with respect to the people flowed smoothly over into the fear of them.
The people’s discontent was not long in coming. After the events of 7 November, measures were urgently undertaken. Many of the odious members of the president’s team stopped appearing on the TV screens and were later replaced. The party list of the pro-presidential national movement at the parliamentary elections was renewed by 75%. The age of its participants was much more diverse this time.
But the values of Westernization that “those who had drained the cup of the West” were supposed to have inculcated were not severely rejected. Admittedly, “those who had drained the cup of the West” were accused of disdaining the national culture and their cultivation of religious tolerance was interpreted as a threat to the position of the Georgian Orthodox church. Statements were heard that went directly against the Western “teachers,” against the interference of “masons.” Supposedly, under the pretext of building liberal democracy homosexualism was being inculcated in Georgia and Jehovah’s Witnesses were freely roaming the country. Such accusations do not sound so imperative today, since as religiosity in the country increases, the position of Orthodoxy has become significantly reinforced. The “harassment” of the Jehovah’s Witnesses no longer annoys the population as much, and the tolerance of Georgian culture has not yet gone as far as sexual minorities.
It is significant that the achievements of Westernization have not yet becoming deeply rooted in society. The degree of assimilation of these values by the current generation of “those who have drained the cup of the West” has aroused mistrust. Jokes have been circulating in society about the poor academic performance of some of the current leaders who were educated in the West, and about the status of the graduation certificates they received there.
Most of the oppositionists do not question the pro-Western course. The age component of the social structure was not a factor of antagonistic opposition between the older and younger generations. It is limited to grousing about the large number of social climbers in the government who have bad manners.
To a great extent, it is the lack of demand for knowledge and experience, as well as unemployment, and not the age of those who are governing in this country that arouses protest among the population.
According to the Laws of Escalation
As already noted, a bloodless revolution does not guarantee stability of the new government if the latter does not correctly set its priorities. This is what happened with Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who became a victim of ethnonationalism and lasted for one year.
The example of Mikhail Saakashvili shows what revolution is fraught with if there was no need for one. Radicalism, or “revolutionariness,” both in words and in deeds, clearly showed in his actions. While he did not provide anything that was a direct alternative to Eduard Shevardnadze’s regime.
In the heat of the revolutionary statements, the essentially liberal and aging politician was called a tyrant, although no one had any clear recollection of a single cruel measure undertaken by his government.
As we know, “overthrow of the tyrant” was preceded by meetings at which ministers, the parliament speaker, and a large number of deputies ruled the roost, while the minister of state security and
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his Western colleagues were doing their thing behind the scenes. This resulted in a whimsical symbiosis of revolution and court coup. As a result, some achievements of the previous regime were shamelessly appropriated, while there was talk only of its sins. Things got ridiculous when the new authorities held celebrations to open large facilities for the second time. The epitome of this attitude toward their inheritance of the past was an incident at one of the large international forums devoted to a major geostrategic project, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, that was historical for Georgia. Mikhail Saakashvili failed to mention the role Eduard Shevardnadze played in laying the foundation for carrying out the project. This took place against the background of the president of Azerbaijan’s gratitude to his predecessor-father who was also a founder of this project and the closest comrade-in-arms of his Georgian colleague.
There is a viewpoint that Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze, who were not as vibrant, but more moderate and calm in their statements, were among the “favorites” of the Western establishment. But during the elections in 2003, these two did not gain the necessary number of votes to overcome the barrier. The people voted with great enthusiasm for more expressive “Mishiko,” who enjoyed the reputation of a corruption-fighter at that time. Mikhail Saakashvili did not make clear claims at being a charismatic leader. But the young president succumbed to temptation and reinforced his presidential power as much as possible, for which amendments were made to the Constitution. As the course of events showed, usurping power puts the stability of a young state at risk, just as does a charismatic type of leadership. A skillful PR man, Mikhail Saakashvili was unable to protect himself from the effect of such a mechanism as the free press and “authoritative opinion” of the man in the street and repeated Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s fate to a certain extent.
Revolutionary vocabulary and concentration of power in the hands of an energetic young leader, as in the case of the first president, generated “inflated expectations” among the population. These “expectations” were proportional to the exacting demands the people made on the effectiveness of Mikhail Saakashvili’s power. Therefore, things that Eduard Shevardnadze was allowed were considered unacceptable in Mikhail Saakashvili’s case, or, people only see the negative and do not notice the positive. For example, while harping on about the rack and ruin of the church, the opposition is keeping quiet about the fact that more than 40 cultic buildings and so on have been restored and built in the country in the past four years. And the ambiguous events of August 2008 and NATO’s decision to halt Georgia’s integration into its ranks were readily assessed as just another failure of the president’s administration, and not as caused by powerful external factors.
Reforms were conducted in the country that could not be popular among the population. So-called structural unemployment increased. Entire branches of production, scientific research institutes, and other institutions were closed down because they were deemed to have no prospects. The world economic crisis also played its part. But the opposition chose to ignore all this. Only the government was to blame for all the mishaps. Of course, there were also definite miscalculations.
It is typical that “those who drained the cup of the West” do not play the last role among the protestors. After integration of the elite part of the nongovernmental sector into the state structures, foreign funds cut their grants to the sector by half, evidently deciding that the democratic personnel nurtured in nongovernmental organizations, when they came to power, would allow these funds to economize on building democracy in Georgia. Some of this contingent were passed over, while others were low on funds after NGO financing was cut back. That is, the tension in the country was largely caused by internal nomenklatura phenomena. Some believe that the “closely packed ranks” of “nationals” became even more closely packed. A so-called democratic caste appeared. In the very beginning, it was replenished by meeting activists, NGO representatives, and people who had gone to school abroad. Over time, its reproduction base increasingly shrank. It is worth noting that a distinction began to be made between those who received an education in English-speaking countries and those who studied in non-English-speaking countries. Those involved in the Rose Revolution but not initiated into Western academic and non-academic programs began gradually being pushed into the background. The fact that after winning the election for head of the football federation (May 2007), its
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chairman Georgi Nemsadze was forced to reject his victory the same day was evaluated as a defeat of this group of “nationals.” According to unofficial information, he yielded to pressure from higher-ranking party departments that followed the lead of the main trainer of the Georgian football team, a German who did not wish to cooperate with the new leader.
The main negative consequence of the domination of the ruling party is the weak and fragmented opposition. It is a well-known fact that it represents an extraordinarily variegated political spectrum, which is evaluated as its weakness. It stands to reason that so many ambitious individuals in one team is fraught with coordination and organization difficulties. Essentially, after managing to get the government to call an early presidential election in January 2008, it was unable to sufficiently pull itself together in order to win the election or, at least, ensure its fairness.
Mikhail Saakashvili is severely criticized for abusing the administrative resource. It is not surprising that Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Vano Merabishvili and Prosecutor General Zurab Adeishvili look to be the most odious of all the government ministers.
But the other side of the administrative fervor in the struggle with corruption was clannishness, a phenomenon that is not customary in Georgian political life, when the representatives of one family occupy the main posts in the defense and security ministries. Such a breakdown suits the government, since it ensures the loyalty of the electorate of one of the regions.
Another consequence of the extremes was the fact that the renewed and rejuvenated judiciary establishment turned into an appendage of the public prosecutor’s office. The court’s decisions were predominantly accusatory.
While carrying out the “zero tolerance” campaign, there were reports every day on TV about how another mafia boss, drug dealer, or corrupted official had been arrested whereby violating presumption of innocence. The number of people held in prison reached a record level (approximately 20,000). Introducing the practice of paying bail had an insignificant effect on the number of people detained, while the government preferred building new penitentiary institutions to improving this practice.
A not entirely juridically correct addition was made to the criminal code. The fact that a person accuses himself of belonging to the criminal world could be grounds for his detention and court prosecution. The legality of the use of arms in some of the most scandalous operations by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which entailed human deaths, aroused a negative response in society.
The fight against corruption is primarily being carried out by means of administrative measures. This circumstance could not help but have an effect on the nature of the double moral standard in the country. Whereas before the population did not regard it as shameful to have fraudulent gains, now it reacts more sensitively to instances of officials making it instantly rich. It should be noted that, at the beginning of the meeting marathon, trust in the leaders fluctuated according to whether the person in question “was close to the feeding trough or did not have anything to do with it.” The list of mistakes goes on...
The population evaluated campaigns against certain property owners, when major buildings were pulled down, as attacks on the sanctity of the institution of private property. Arguments that such campaigns were carried out in the interests of bigger property owners could not be accepted. Protests were aroused by the fact that after the death of billionaire B. Patarkatsishvili, who was opposed to the government, his family was deprived of the right of ownership to the Imedi television channel, which was regarded as a beacon of the free press in Georgia.
Opposition politicians accuse Mikhail Saakashvili of putting strong pressure on big business too. He is known to have carried out several operations at the beginning of his rule aimed at scaring “unconscientious businessmen.” The case of businessman F. Khalvashi became widely known, whose capital supposedly suffered because of his political inclinations.
The authorities’ domestication of the mass media is admonished. When Mikhail Saakashvili himself was in the opposition, many mass media manifested a fighting spirit. With the change in scenery, their fervor has noticeably waned.
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Depth of the Crisis
Mikhail Saakashvili’s regime has possibly earned enough “liabilities” to make it worthy of early retirement. Or, if we follow the speeches of the orators at the meeting, the president’s personality is dangerous for the country, for the world community, and for himself. Whatever the case, the question arises of whether it would not be more sensible to look for reserves in the system itself in order to resolve the conflict by means of institutional measures, instead of allowing radicalism to take the upper hand every time, thus destroying the entire system?
The opposition endlessly assures everyone that it is adhering to the rule of the law. The question of whether it will send the president into retirement, without the corresponding legislative procedures, if he does not wish to resign voluntarily, is answered with the assurance that he will only be forced to resign in a way envisaged by the law and there will be no revolutions.
Probably almost all the members of the opposition are aware of what is happening. Its nucleus consists of former parliamentary speaker and twice acting president, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former defense minister, former branch ministers, and members of parliament. Salome Zurabishvili, a politician who came from France and has a lot of experience in diplomatic work as a high-ranking official in the French Foreign Ministry, figures in the leading roles. Who, if not she, a herald of European values and legal conscience, knows the price of the recommendations by international organizations and the patriarch, as well as many nongovernmental organizations, to sit down at the negotiation table. She does not hide her personal disdain of the president, but this is not enough to stop her from achieving her idee-fixe.
Arguments are presented in favor of this “non-alternative” line of behavior. For example, Eka Beselia, one of the leaders of the opposition, said on the Kavkasia TV channel that as soon as the goal is reached and new elections are scheduled, the opposition itself will announce its self-disbandment, and then ideas and programs will begin competing aimed at bringing the country out of its crisis. Reexamination of the election code, in her opinion, is not sufficient reason to meet with the opposite side. Eka Beselia prefers to hold early elections in keeping with the old legislation that has discredited itself, and only after that set about changing it.
Making amendments to the constitution that will subsequently limit the president’s power does not ignite any confidence in those who want to see Mikhail Saakashvili replaced. They say that he will only reappear in a new guise, in the role of prime minister, say, and again it will be difficult to get rid of him. And this is given as another argument against holding a dialog with the authorities.
The opposition’s television appearances are reminiscent of combat activity reports or gutter press stories by tabloids such as “Tbilisi is ours!” “A group of young activists obstructed the president, who was spending national money to dine out in a restaurant,” “The government is no longer in control of the country, and power has essentially gone to the people.”
When the inviolability of the opposition bloc came under threat, the demonstration organizers said that the government was dealing not with the political opposition, but with the dissatisfied people. And for the umpteenth time in Georgia’s latest history, a meeting became an alternative to the state. Whereas Zviad Gamsakhurdia replaced the state apparatus with counter- meetings, when Eduard Shevardnadze was thrown out, a smaller demonstration supporting the president was scattered by a larger group of people led by Mikhail Saakashvili.
The current president, who himself has become skilled at making speeches at meetings, says he will not help his supporters to organize reciprocal declarations, understanding the level of opposition this could arouse in society. It is difficult to determine how many people the president could gather, how many of them would truly be his supporters, and how many would come “out of necessity.” The radicals who came to the Dinamo Stadium to watch a show of their forces are more predictable in this sense. They honestly admit that they are only just beginning to work in the regions and “go out among
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the people.” It was also revealed that guests from the opposition who showed up in Mingrelia were asked to enter a dialog with the government.
Playing with figures pushes the question of the powers of this or another large group of people into the background. These manipulations should be taken very cautiously, since repeatedly in Octo-ber-November 2007 at Tbilisi demonstrations the radical youth declared the people’s right to forced seizure of power, referring, in so doing, to U.N. documents. Incidentally, after Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s overthrow, the president’s supporters said that it was the people in Tbilisi who had stirred everything up and far from all of them at that. They went against the will of the people, who had almost unanimously elected Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
It cannot be said that the radical opposition has lost the reigns for controlling a demonstration. But the longer it lasts, the less willing its leaders are not to meet its expectations. They are particularly scared about the possibility of being drawn into long talks, which does not meet the spirit and tasks of the campaign. It becomes difficult to determine when speakers are being truly genuine and when they are merely trying to seem loyal.
It is typical that “ordinary Tbilisi lad” Levan Gachechiladze looks more convincing at meetings. He made official use of his bohemian nickname, Grechikha, during the election campaign for president. There was another leader in his shadow, Irakly Alasania, who is considered the most likely candidate for president. As a former diplomat, he, who is more capable in talks and less willing to socialize with the meeting element, has earned himself the reputation of “spineless politician.” As experience shows, the slightest dissonance a particular politician allows to creep into his speech could cost him his political career. Irakly Alasania has already been whistled off stage several times during campaigns.
The meeting gathered many people with their real problems, many representatives of the intelligentsia, and recognized faces known for their virtues and services. In many cases, there was less extremism in their reactions than in the speeches of the speakers. Sometimes shouts were heard calling for the speakers to be more moderate and responsible in their statements, to show more tolerance. But the time comes when people predominate at demonstrations who rouse the leaders to action, manifest intolerance, etc. At times speakers resort to irresponsible statements. The situation is saved by the fact that the meeting is incapable of realizing them. Liberties of that sort are justified by the specifics of the genre.
Sometimes the organizers of a meeting think that their perception of reality is the most adequate only because it is shared by most of the people gathered on the square. Under the spell of the meeting atmosphere, its leaders accuse the president of being inadequate since he refuses to accept the fact that there is an institutional crisis in the country, which they themselves are causing by their inability to hold a dialog.
Narrowed perception is leading to the participants in meetings not wishing to take into account the dangers posed by the presence of Russian occupational troops 35 kilometers from the site of the events, or the damage the world economic crisis is inflicting on the country’s economy.
After visiting the cathedral complex on 2б May, 2009, the meeting leaders tried in every way to modify the message of the Patriarch, who unequivocally called for talks. The same evening the most radical act was carried out—seizure of the railroad.
In contrast to the radical opposition that incautiously rejected the politically profitable slogan about the will to hold a dialog, the authorities constantly talked about their willingness to hold talks. Their greatest concession was to transfer the initiative for holding the celebratory undertakings in honor of the founding of the First Republic (2б May, 1918) to the opposition. The government is showing restraint and not making it difficult for the opposition to put up dozens of fake cages, most of which are empty anyway, to block the central roads. The opposition, in turn, constantly repeats that the talks with the government are considered pointless, since its representatives engage in foul play, while the government says that the opposition members are just unable to coordinate with each other.
The powers that be refuse to succumb to the dictates of the street, while the opposition is calling on them to listen to the “voice of the people” and follow it.
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International organizations are trying to save the situation by regularly holding consultations with the sides. For example, special PACE representative Peter Semneby is trying to till this unyielding soil. Only we should understand that where Peter Semneby’s mission ends the need for Admiral Eduard Baltin appears.
Will Conclusions Be Drawn?
Studying the Georgian example gives political sociologists much specific food for thought. It confirms the thesis that not only those regimes that come to power through revolution are unstable, but also those that make use of revolutionary pathetics at those times when the old regime holds itself aloof and removes all its claims. The “inflated expectations” that arise quickly turn to disappointment. The less the old regime resists and the more radical the rhetoric, the higher the expectations, the sooner the time of disappointment sets in, and the more radical the reaction.
Precisely the same thing applies to the scheme according to which unstable regimes appear where democratic values are declared to be priorities but the authorities’ ambitions are charismatic. For example, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, clearly understanding the damage glorification of his personality was doing to his cause, still did nothing to prevent the building of his own personality cult. Deflation of the president’s charisma also entailed rejection of the entire system, the legality of which he embodied. Polarization of opinions occurred in the country. For some of the population, Zviad Gamsa-khurdia remained an “impeccable” leader who was surrounded by bad advisors and enemies, while for others he was an unqualified president, amateur politician, and hen-pecked husband.
The actions of Mikhail Saakashvili to concentrate power in his hands had similar consequences.
Eduard Shevardnadze’s return occurred in conditions of the government’s weak legitimacy. A civil war was going on in the country. The Zviadists did not recognize the legitimacy of a former communist’s ascent to power. But the policy of trying to find a balance without engaging in broad gestures and the willingness to compromise gradually eased the tension of the main conflict at that time.
Eduard Shevardnadze’s regime, in spite of its high net cost, showed far greater stability and absence of radicalism than the governments of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Mikhail Saakashvili.
Incidentally, some steps have been taken. Zviad Gamsakhurdia was considered either an “angel” or a “monster.” Today no one calls Mikhail Saakashvili an angel. Society is divided according to the principle “we need a dialog!”—“no dialogs, Saakashvili resign!” This shows some progress.
The specifics of the Georgian crisis also consist in the fact that there is no clear struggle between modernist and traditional values. Throughout the whole of Georgia’s latest history, exposure to European values has been considered a priority. In public opinion, there even existed a mythologeme about the European roots of the Georgian culture. During Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s time, this was merely a declared priority. The West did not cooperate with the first president. There was no need to talk about European values infiltrating the country. The residue of the socialist past was replaced by ethnona-tionalism without a struggle. During Eduard Shevardnadze’s rule, Western governmental and nongovernmental funds began actively introducing the achievements of modernization in Georgia. Clashes between the traditional way of life and Western values could not occur because the new trends were only just gaining momentum. At this stage, relations between the two sides were built on the principle of the double moral standard.
It cannot be said that antagonism is seen between them even now or that the double moral standard has been totally neutralized. In the first case, the need for integration into the new way of life, and not passive assimilation, is recognized. There are forces that are in favor of a third way of development based on “the purely national idea.” But their influence is minimal, and it can compete only with the attempts of the pro-Russian Georgian diaspora in Russia to participate in Georgia’s internal affairs. This new player is bent on achieving the country’s political reorientation. As for the double
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moral standard, access to shadow sources of income and services has become the privilege of the ruling elite.
The ongoing Tbilisi meeting, which is a kind of political-culturological institution, has become the reflection of a particular state of society. Non-radical in form, it could be radical in content. But since it is oriented toward direct participation in governing the state, it is also becoming radical in form. The main thing preventing the meeting from going overboard should be an increase in the people’s confidence in the fairness of the elections and affirmation of the individual’s sovereign right to free elections by secret ballot. This should reinforce the conviction among the masses that elections are a more appropriate way to express their will than meetings.
The country is searching for a model of leadership that will be both strong and esteemed in the eyes of society. For some time there was talk about establishing a constitutional monarchy. Measures were even taken to revive a dynasty. But the proposals to implement a project which should turn Georgia into a parliamentary republic are becoming all the more insistent. A universally elected parliament should act as an “esteemed” source, with the president and prime minister as its effective representatives. Such measures will make the social system more mobile and viable. And in this event, should the people become unhappy with the way the country is being run, national demonstrations will become more targeted and cognizant. There will be less likelihood of escalation into radicalism.
This balance will help to remove the double moral standard in society. The instrumental, consumer approach to institutions of statehood will finally be supplemented with an axiological approach. Removal of the collision between society and the state will promote the development of a civil society in the country.
C o n c l u s i o n
Many of the problems noted here require further in-depth research. But the social sciences and political sociology in particular are experiencing hard times in Georgia. We can count on our fingers the number of sociological services in the country. It is no secret that precisely the statistics revealed by polls during election campaigns have provoked abnormal situations in society. There was no trust in the election committee, in the international observers, or in the sociologists themselves. Their calculations have become a target of political manipulations, and each time they placed the country on the brink of chaos. In November 2003, public opinion polls were the reason for the revolution. As a result, sociology has been degraded to a level that is detrimental to its own reputation.
Rating politicians and parties is a popular pursuit at present. This is carried out by mass media which have little interest in the quality of the data they receive and much more interest in the possibility of launching scandalous PR campaigns. Study of superficial problems is not boosting the development of academic science. There are no signs of any branch vector developing in this sphere. Many political scientists have appeared on the scene, but their discourse is limited to leisurely arguments about woes in the political elite. Politics as a sphere of confrontation and coexistence of the interests of large groups of people is being replaced by political maneuvering, a sphere where certain individuals or oligarchic formations struggle to satisfy their ambitions.
Of course, we could say that science is not being developed due to insufficient financing. But this argument is not convincing, whereby no one is showing any signs of wishing to engage in selfcomprehension or exchange opinions. For several years now, there have been no round tables or conferences where ideas can be aired and the possibilities of our mentality correlated with the risks generated by the reforms. It is at times like that that nations normally search for their identity and attempt to establish a connection with the times. But instead of social thought undergoing a revival, it has
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become stupefied. Extensive studies have not been carried out, either before, when the reforms were just starting, or now, when there is no complete certainty whether these reforms will help to build the state or destroy it.
This state of affairs is causing concern, because sociology constitutes the core of democracy, the main axiological landmarks of Georgian society. Sociology helps governments to maintain direct feedback with their citizens. Of course, the viewpoint of a respondent in a sociological poll does not mean that citizen is participating in governing the state, as happens at elections or during referen-dums. But no one doubts the fact that the development of sociology helps to strengthen democratic principles.
