Sources of variations of governance systems in central Eastern Europe Текст научной статьи по специальности «Политологические науки»

Международные политические процессы

удк 32

G. Sootla, P. Suve

SOURCES OF VARIATIONS OF GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE1

Соотла г., Суве П. Источники вариативности систем управления в центральной и Восточной Европе

Цель статьи — анализ причин различных путей развития после краха коммунистических режимов в странах Центральной и Восточной Европы. Анализ проводится в рамках социологического и исторического институционализма. Показывается, с одной стороны, что различные пути развития стран объясняются в большой мере различиями в базовых ценностных установках их народов. Главные различия в институциональных структурах правления в Европе, а также в посткоммунистических странах прослеживаются по-прежнему более-менее очевидно по конфессиональным линиям (протестантские, римско-католические и православные страны). Они выражаются в том, в какой мере среди населения преобладают установки на индивидуализм (или коллективизм), ориентация на достижения и конкуренцию (маскулинность) или на консенсус (феминность); в какой степени акцептируют или избегают небольших (или больших) дистанций власти и состояний неопределенности. Вместе с тем вариации путей строительства институтов вызваны различным опытом государственности и спецификой национальных коммунистических режимов в этих странах. В статье эти различия анализируются на уровне структуры правительства (кабинета), государственной службы и структур местного самоуправления. Демонстрируется, что широко распространенные линейно-эволюционные и телеологические интерпретации посткоммунистической трансформации применительно к государствам — новым членам ЕС стали очевидно неадекватными.

Ключевые слова: институциональная теория, ценности, национальные коммунистические режимы, правительства, гражданская служба, местное самоуправление.

1. introduction: why politico-administrative systems are different

New choices and perspectives have opened before nations of Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of Soviet Union and in countries in its spheres of influence. In the end of 1980s the "end of the history" thesis become fashionable (Fukuyama, 1992), which forecasted that all the world is moving towards the universal and the only rational pattern of politico-administrative systems. The process of transformation was called as transition from communism (post-communist transition) which implicitly presumed that this transition can only be towards liberal democracy. Hence, the transition would not offer anything new and any choice but is a process towards the known route. This normative picture started to concretize after first crisis and failure in post Soviet space in Belorus, Georgia, Moldova and Russia and bloody war in Balkans.

The author of the "end of the history thesis", F. Fukuyama published already in 1995 in Journal of democracy the article "The Primacy of Culture" (Fukuyama, 1995). In this article he implicitly questioned the well known theory of democratic consoli-

1 This research was supported by a Marie Curie International Research Staff Exchange Scheme Fellowship within the 7th European Community Framework Programme (grant no: PIRSES-GA-2011-295232).

© G. Sootla, P. Suve, 2014

dation (Linz, Stepan, 1996, 2001) and comes to conclusion that the construction of formal politico-administrative institutions — like successive partisan elections — is not enough to build up the stable politico-administrative institutions in long term perspective. Integrated civil society and strong value consensus are basis for sustainable institutions in all societies. Besides, he discussed with Lee Kwan Yew whether the atomized liberal democracies are capable to build up effective structures and values of collective behaviour that are basis for stable institutions (Fukyama, 1995, p. 12). Culture matters in developing sustainable institutions2. The question is: how it matters?

This conclusion was a bit trivial for European reader in politics and government, which is based less on behavioural-positivist methodology — as US research on government — but more on the theory of new institutionalism (overview see: Hall, Taylor, 1996; Keman, 1997; Lowdens, 1996; Pierson, 2000). This theory asserts that people are not doing majority of their choices on the basis of rational calculations as utilitarian and public choice perspective presumes. Rational actor is rather a theoretical abstraction that is relevant in case of certain actors (bank dealers, politicians, chessplayers) and situations (simple situations, like buying potatoes at the market). Even individual at elections is not choosing the best candidate which can promote his/her interests but frequently he/she is voting for the most attractive or trusted by others candidate. In Central and Eastern Europe the famous artists, sportsmen, media-figures are frequently elected.

New institutionalist theory (Marsh, Olsen, 1989; Scott, 1995) asserts that sustainable and beneficial decisions and activities are possible for majority of people only because of institutions. Institutions are not understood here as peak organisations of government that have legal authority to issue laws and other norms and to apply sanctions in case of disobedience. Institutions are vehicles that make possible coordinated collective action (Bogason, 2000). Institutions on the one hand are restraining, i. e. coordinating, making more similar individuals choices by offering normatively preferred patterns of behaviour and choices not exclusively in the form of legal norms, but though theories in use or forming practical consciousness (North, 2004). On the other hand, institutions are providing assistance in making correct choices because institutions are simplifying and providing positive incentives — by generalized carriers of information like values, meanings, routines, fashion — choices and ways of behaviour that are equally beneficial for all and for individual.

Traditional understanding of institutions and norms presume that these norms are compelling individuals to do in some way and if not the sanctions will follow. This understanding is paralleled by Weberian concept of distributive power as the process of imposition of will to others (Weber, 1978). Weber himself supplemented this view with the concept of legitimate authority, which works in situation when majority of citizens accept voluntarily the domination of somebody or something. The most sophisticated and effective reason of voluntary compliance was — according to Weber — belief in the rationality codified in laws. But this value preference (rationality) is still backed by authority and sanctions of the state agencies. As we evidence later this is a specific German understanding of the role of laws: people in Anglo-American and in Orthodox world perceive the role of laws differently.

2 This profound shift in understanding institutional susuainability did not prevent largely unsuc-cesful attempts to impose the institutions of liberal democracy in Iraq.

The traditional Weberian understanding — or of to be precise, traditional interpretation of Weberian understanding — of power and institutions was quite adequate in XIX century, when majority of citizens were the passive and poorly educated mass of people, who ought to obey either in traditional corporatist communities or to work and receive necessary resources for subsistence in industrial areas, on the one hand. On the other hand, the role of the state were mainly the enforcement of compulsory duties: taxes, ensuring public order and justice, in preparing for defence of country (conscription), which presume the strong formal-legal institutions. In the end XXI century these roles become more and more secondary as compared with new roles of the state: the elaboration and implementation of complex policies in environment protection, in education and health etc. which cannot be implemented by mere compulsion, following formal rules but which presume more or less conscious acceptance of policies: voluntary re-design of old behaviour patterns of individuals or/and learning qualitatively new ways of conduct. As example, most of us must make in some points a very complex choice of future profession and must learn all the life to be competitive in labour market as compared with compulsory elementary education for all. A relatively large proportion cannot still follow the requirement of compulsory education in Europe: ca. 15 % of them have not finished compulsory basic school (8...9 years), which indicates the need in traditional mechanisms of compulsion. But more than half of people are studying at Universities, frequently choosing speciality one or more time to survive in modern labour market. And there the new institutional mechanisms can ensure that. Or, most of us must develop healthy way of living to be capable of learning and working up to old age. But very many of us are smoking and overuse alcohol and fats. Or, we have to follow the ways of conduct that does not harm our environment: to sort the garbage, to save the energy etc.

These and many other new ways of conduct can be developed (by the government policy) not because strict compulsion but thanks to capacity of institutions to assist us in learning those patterns and in developing new habits. Moreover, also in situation where formerly the compulsion and formal rules were effective (taxation, criminal prevention, drug avoidance) the policy is shifting the focus from compulsion to prevention, which is more effective and chapter. Modern policy prefer to develop ways of conduct that anticipate and prevent the old diseases like poverty, deviant behaviour, unhealthy ways of living etc.

How it becomes possible that signals from institutions on the one hand, and the will and interests of individuals (which itself are so different) can coincide and support each other? Why in certain countries citizens are voluntarily paying taxes to the government (Sweden) and in another countries, like recent example of Greece, they are not willing to pay, and as a result, they are facing serious economic problems? Why tax policy is on one case working and in other case is not working? Or, to put the question differently: can we borrow from some ideal practices of government from abroad? Can we establish liberal market economy in society where corporatist clan relations are prevailing, or to develop deep hierarchical bureaucracy in society where individualism and egalitarian values prevail?

Hence, the new institutionalism is providing new understanding of mechanisms of politics (interests) and policy, their effectiveness. This understanding enable us also to explain huge differences of ways how effective institutions may and have been built up in different countries, regions.

Briefly, government institutions and policy can be effective — in sense of providing certain patterns of preferred behaviour — in case these institutions/structures and their signals are coinciding with general expectations and — what is nowadays very important — because they are understandable for the majority of individuals. Moreover, if the rational choice perspective presumes that individual interests are stable and given the new institutionalism see a very important enlightening or educating role of institutions. It presumes that institutions play a very important role in the formation and change of individual interests.

M. Foucault gives a rather extreme example of institutional impacts, when he analysed the repressive phenomena — the discipline in army, school etc. (Hindess, 1996). Discipline may force individual to do something that initially is against his/her will, and individual may be severely punished when he/she is not following standard patterns of required behaviour. But, — surprise, surprise — after the first bloody battle our solider revealed that the following of certain routines increases the probability of survival considerably (which is a very interest of solider) and after the first exams our pupil reveals, that his/her knowledge increased because of study discipline much faster, which makes possible to make a good career as compared with classmates who enjoyed life during required working hours.

In similar vein institutions are restraining and assisting individual in recognizing its actual interests and in choosing the most effective ways of behaviour in all other spheres.

This logic is determining also the mechanisms of effective institution building. Institutions must reflect basic, general beliefs of median citizen about preferred behaviour. But, institutions are not following blindly practical consciousness. These beliefs are deriving from the past history and are reflected only not in the mind of people but are supported by obvious successes and failures (much often with tragedies) which makes them legitimate and preferred. This is called the logic appropriatedness which make institutions legitimate; institutions are taken for granted because majority of us understand it's meaning. I. e. these preferences are tested in million times and we all understand them similarly; this is the main argument for their acceptability. From these basic premises or values are developed the more concrete solutions and in this the institutions (and elites) play much active role; the can even to manipulate with individuals to get acceptance (like in advertising).

The other source of institutional stability (i. e. stability of basic values) and changes is the history, and historical institutionalism explains how historical circumstances make new institutional patterns possible, but at the same time there is also the restraining mechanism that is called "path dependency": once certain choice has been made, the variety of future choices are reducing (Thelen, 1999).

2. CULTURAL SOURCES OF DIFFERENCES OF POLITICO-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS

What are those basic values or premises that are shaping not only our behaviour but also must be basis for institution building? I can give here only a very brief overview and refer you to sources where this issue is analysed in depth (Raadschelders, 2003; Loughlin, Peters, 1997; Castles, 1998; Hofstede index, http://geert-hofstede.

com). I will comment some important details and expect that majority of those values or choice alternatives are commonly known. Besides, these basic dimensions are not in order of importance and their role varies in different cultures.

The first issue is about how much centralized state is acceptable and how much autonomy must be given to communities to manage themselves. That are state centred cultures (Continental Europe, Orthodox region) and society centred cultures (Anglo American, Nordic) where people prefer as less as possible central state. In English the "the state" means the territory or sub-regions (United states) and governing machine that in Continental Europe is "the state" is called "The Government". This is not, however, the dimension which is defining how many public vs. private sector would be reasonable. Nordic people, who do not expect much state prefer extensive public sector at local and regional level.

In Orthodox culture the strong centralised state and its leadership is more valued that in all others. In this culture the state is legitimized more by personalities and routine bureaucracy is considered often even with hostility. If Southern Continental have problems with responsiveness and honesty of bureaucrats (Chandler, 2000), then in Orthodox region the low level of responsiveness and honesty is the grand issue of public administration. Because the family and primary community is preferred over the state as collective entity.

Index of perceived corruption is rather indicative here (CPI index 2009, www.trans-parency.org) The least corrupted authorities in Europe are Sweden and Denmark (the 2 and 3 rank). The low score have also countries of Rhineland-German states (ranking from 5...18) and Anglo-American states (UK is 17th and USA was 19th. The most corrupted among developed European nations are Greece (71) and Italy (63). In Central-Eastern Europe the least corrupted are Slovenia and Estonia (27th ranking), whereas countries of Orthodox background Bulgaria and Romania occupy both 71st rank. The Belarus ranking is 139 and Russians ranking is 146 that obviously reflects also negative attitudes towards bureaucracy.

The next important dimension is egalitarianism contra hierarchy, which is identifying also power distance (Hofstede, 2001). Some nations accept equality between people (Americans, Nordic nations) and they are considering each other in familiar manner (which reflects mall power distance). In other cultures vice versa, the hierarchy is accepted as normal and preferred type of relations (Continental Europe). In the latter cultures the people turn to each other in plural form emphasizing in such a way respect to elder or superior whereas informer countries this could be interpreted as a sign of disrespect. Ortodox world is controversial. The radical equality, similarity of people is accepted at popular level but power distance is very high between superiors and subordinates and power relations are presonificised. Highest leaders are frequently sacralised.

The next dimension is individualism contra collectivism. In individualistic cultures it is expected that individual must be not only free to promote its own ends but also (that is frequently forgotten) is completely responsible for its own fate. Collectivist culture is frequently interpreted with liberal bias. Hofstede defines collectivist cultures as one's "in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, often extended families), which continue protecting them in exchange for

unquestioning loyalty" (Hofstede index, http://geert-hofstede.com). I would prefer more flexible and positive definition of collectivism via solidarity, which Raadschelders 2003 called Biblical individualism. Individualist cultures are valuing winners with presumption that losses in competition can motivate weaker to put more efforts to become more competitive. In collectivist cultures it is expected that in collective the coordinated behaviour and mutual support could create the synergy, i. e. added value which do not emerge when everybody is acting separately. Besides, modern collectives can provide possibilities of self-realisation (and satisfaction) for weak and disabled persons who can contribute to the society according to their capacity. I. e. the support is not simply the charity but rational re-distribution of resources to achieve maximum synergy.

The most individualist cultures are of course Anglo American ones. Collectivist cultures in sense of loyalty and de-individualisation are Southern European and especially Ortodox cultures, whereas in the latter the competition between individuals is absolutely not tolerated. (This has been also one of the cause of failure of market reforms in majority of former Soviet republics.) In Nordic culture we observe the support to modern collectivism (Biblical individualism) because solidarity and here the redistribution are used to the increase of individual and collective capacity. For this reason in Nordic area is accepted very extensive public sector at the level of self government.

In the next dimension people prefer certain way or mechanism of decision-making, which are the consensus versus majoritarian cultures. In the latter cultures the legitimate decision is the majority decision that is made correctly according to formal rules. Majoritarian cultures may emerge because of high individualism (Anglo-American), but also because deep division of society into two parts (Central-Southern Europe). In consensus cultures the participants intend to find a solution that satisfies as much as possible participants of decision-making process and society. Here the voting is exceptional and decision is made after there is no stakeholder which veto the process. For this reason the decision-making process is long, but if decisions are made they are usually legitimate for a long time, like in Nordic countries. The Orthodox culture is locating in between of these traditions. In these cultures the correct decision is the decision of superior normative authority, but, like in consensual cultures, the decision must be contextual, justified by following some rationale or principle of the situation.

The last dimension is the meaning of legal norms. In some cultures the law is considered as primarily technical rational rule that might be established by people who have an expertise (like bureaucracy). This is appropriate first of all for Germanic culture. In Anglo-American culture the law is primarily a convention between counterparts which may take into account the context and also presume active participation in lawmaking. Hence the case law system emerges. Nordic countries are something in between these understandings. They are in the framework of Germanic culture, but permit interpretation of laws and at the same time presume adoption of laws with high level of participation of constituents3. The Orthodox world (and to some extend

3 For instance in Finnish Constitution (up to 2000 when the new one was adopted) there was a long time the provision that enables to adopt laws that did not fit with existing constitution with the 5/6 majority of votes. Around 1900 laws were adopted in this way.

Southern European cultures) is also in-between but in the other sense. There are huge amount of contradictory norms issued by different institutions in these countries and it is assumed that these norms must be followed strictly. (Russian president Putin is speaking about "dictatotship of laws). But as they are actually contradictory and power relations in hierarchy is presonificized, there is a need for their interpretation (defining which of norm is correct or not correct) by higher authorities. For this reason officials acquire huge powers in actual definition of norms. This makes norms illegitimate in the eyes of populace and the practice of "telephone rule" very popular.

Hence, there are three generally recognized families of politico-administrative cultures, but I would add one more to them that has clear Byzantium-Orthodox background, which is forming a huge territory, including countries of Southern Europe (Greece, Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, Balkan countries), Caucasus countries (Georgia and Armenia) and Eastern Slavonic countries (Belorus, Russia and Ukraine). The impact of those differences in values on the politico-administrative institutions are summarized in Table 1 .

Table 1. Dominant values and expectation about institutions in Europe

Value continuum/ region Northern Europe Central-Southern Europe Anglo American countries Byzantine/Orthodox culture

Strong/centralized state vs minimal/ decentralized state Decentralized but medium state; large public sector at local level Centralized extensive state, large public sector at central level Minimal state, small public sector at all levels Strong centralized state, high legitimacy of central and low legitimacy of lower authorities

Individualism vs collectivism Egalitarian community as partner to the state Hierarchical (clan) community, defending community from central intervention Individualism, instrumental communities for achieving individual benefits Profound collectivism, counter-individualism

Egalitarian vs hierarchical Egalitarian, low power distance Hierarchical, large power distance UK — hierarchical, UK colonies — egalitarian Symbiosis of egali-tarianism at grass-root level (small power distance) and hierarchical at higher levels (extremely large power distance)

Majoritarian/ competitive vs consensual decisions/politics Highly consensual, emphasis on best solution, highly deliberative (moderately competitive) Majoritarian, but not competitive, emphasis on normative prevalence and procedures Majoritarian and also competitive, emphasize on procedures Very specific mix: consensus that is based on authoritative (normative) legitimation; unless consensus achieved extremely majoritarian

Role of the law: technical rule or deal Rule that might be interpreted on the basis of consensus, high role of participation on rule setting Technical rule as the universal way of conduct, no participation needed Deal, agreement, but formal/competitive interpretation Weak commitment to formal dimension of rules (personification) and ad hoc interpretation dependent on context (telephone rule)

Source : composed by Georg Sootla (2011, p. 372).

3. sources of differences in cee countries: specific routes of transition

Traditional democratic consolidation theory (Linz, Stepan, 2001) considers the transition from Soviet type society as return of CEE countries (and other non-democratic regimes) to democratic politico-administrative system from the system that could be called as totally administered society. This vision of transition is based on rational actor perspective, which considers institutions narrowly as established by actors rational rules of game. The only variable that could create the variations of these rules is pattern of political actors that decides those rules at some point of development (at the formation of Constitution) (North, 2004). The second, this behavioural-positivist theory considers the transition as a teleological process of movement to final rational way of organizing of society and its power relations. I. e. this theory underestimates the deep impact of history on future solutions (so called path dependency (Thelen, 1999; Hall, Taylor, 1996)) and established patterns of understandings or practical consciousness (Power, 2009) in developing new institutional patterns.

It was expected that decisive break with the past regime — with its ideas, practices and people — is simple because it was imposed regime. Thus nations can build up the new system from zero basis, without any restraints and according to preferred best practices from the Western developed nations. The only task was not to allow people who supported the regime to influence the transition process. This stance was very similar with understanding of social development by founders of Soviet regime.

Actually, some of former republics of Soviet Union and countries of Warsaw bloc perceived this transition primarily as the return to the Europe and its current ideals and practices. Because Soviet regime conquered those countries and transition was considered primarily as national liberation. This dimension, mixed with normative ideals and patterns of liberal democracy makes the transition in political sense a rather controversial process. The most important fact was that overwhelming majority of CEE countries did not returned or restored democratic politico-administrative system, because before the second world war only Czechoslovakia was a democratic regime and in other countries the liberal-democratic politico-administrative regime was abolished already in 1920-s (in Estonia in 1934) after military coup earlier. I. e. almost all CEE countries were more or less anti-democratic authoritarian regimes. So, these countries have rather few to inherit for the past from the perspective of building up western democracy. Nevertheless, countries which are developing in Northern and Central-Continental cultural space were able in 1990-s rather easily to develop liberal-democratic regimes. Although at the end of 2000-s it is clear that the functioning of politico-administrative patterns is still far from being enough stable and finalized. The other part of European post-communist countries either had a very difficult route from this totally administered system and/or were able to overcome chaos and violence thanks to strong Western assistance and direct influence. In classical orthodox world neither the liberal democratic institutions nor the free market economy did not survived (Russia, Balorus, Moldova, Armenia) or are at the very beginning of transition (Ukraine, Georgia) which could easily reversed. One of reasons is that the party political and free market competition grow into adversarial process that confirmed overall perception of competition as a negative value in this region.

Countries based on Islam culture have developed pronounced autocracies and some of them are approaching to sultanic regimes. These trends can be hardly explained by the impact of Soviet traditions or Soviet elites, i. e. by the communist legacy as up to now is being explained .

Actually a rather profound historical and cultural variables determined the routes of transition and specific patterns of politico-administrative institutions that emerged. Those were primarily the statehood traditions and the evolution of communist elites (Sootla, 1991; Offe, 1996; Sootla et. al., 2006).

One of them — different religious basis of nation — is self evident. Sourthern-Orthodox countries in Balkans and in Soviet Union have serious problems in stabilizing post-communist regimes. But also protestant countries (areas) and catholic countries have also rather different routes and background. Usually Baltic states have treated as the coherent region. But the Catholic Lithuania has rather different history as compared with Estonia and Latvia and their traditions are much similar to Poland or Slovakia.

The other important variable was the specific and strength of statehood, especially the nation state traditions. Majority of CEE countries did not have at all or not enough long nation-state tradition. In Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia these traditions and, what is especially important, the legitimate national elites command state authority very briefly or did not have it at all. For instance, in Estonia emerging after 1918 national elites were partly suppressed politically after 1934 coup, repressed or emigrated after the Soviet occupation in 1940. Also national communist elites were repressed in 1950-s and 1970-s. Hungary and Czech nations were dependent parts of Habsburg monarchy having some kind of autonomy and national self-government from the mid 16th century. Poland and Lithuania — a largest European (joint) state in 16th century — lost its independence in the end of 18th century (at the stage of formation of nation state) and temporarily get it back between wars. Polish national elites were crudely repressed in the II world war or let in emigration. Romania, Bulgaria and countries of former Yugoslavia had the similar fate (strong kingdoms in medieval past) and were dependent regions during the formation in Europe the nation states. But they got independence not from Habsburgs Empire that modernized society from 18th century onwards, but from Ottoman empire. So, majority of nations had impressive statehood tradition in far past and experience of limited government and administration at the stage of formation of nation states. So, statehood traditions were to large extent the myths of past glorious statehood. This also determined a specific impact of statehood tradition on transition.

Visegrad countries, like Poland, Hungary and also Lithuania, borrowed much from German-Austrian government system in building up their politico-administrative system, with its strong bureaucracy and strong executive leadership. Whereas Romania, Bulgaria and to some extent Slovakia tried to get legitimacy from the past history and largely resided on historical myth in legitimizing their statehood. The strength of that myth legitimized backward looking approaches among them ideas of the restoration of monarchy. This caused rather controversial aims in building new politico-administrative patterns and, because of specific impact of communist time, rather extensive period of instability, that (except in Slovakia) is lasting up to present days.

Estonia, Latvia did not have any profound legitimate past benchmarks. As a result they were able to borrow very extensively from different western countries. Such experimentation makes, however, their political-administrative system and society more controversial because of presence of structures and practices from different cultures in Estonia, from US (economics), Germany (Public central administration), Nordic countries (local government). The controversy is even more profound. Historical traditions of government formed in these small countries under the German traditions, which , by the way, played important role also in building up the Soviet administrative system. But culturally Estonians are much close to Nordic nations.

As a result Estonia and Latvia established the least state centred, liberal-major-itarian and decentralised system of governance, and thus followed the similar path with Czech Republic that would rely most of all on liberal-democratic traditions. In last years, partly because EU impacts, the centralizing trend in the development of public administration, — i. e. the increase of dominant role of civil service and corporatist groups — prevails in Estonia and Latvia.

The third specific variable was the legacy of communist elites which determined the impact of those elites on the future of governance. In Romania and Serbia (Yugoslavia) the national communist regimes were established, who openly — especially in Yugolsavia — opposed to the Soviet regime. In this they referred to the national identity and traditions. In these countries, probably also because of profound impact of leadership cult of orthodox cultures, communist elites acquired relatively strong legitimacy. (For this reason also Bulgaria — which was satellite of Soviet Union and even applied to be Soviet Republic — belongs into this group.) This does not excluded that some of their leaders, who indicated signs of dictatorship did not survived during transition. Romania and Serbia were most consistent in trying to find the third nationally specific road based on this legitimacy and nationalism. In this dimension Russia and other orthodox post-Soviet countries were similar: the primary aim of post-communist transition for elites in these countries was the socialism, — a rational-technocratic society, — but without the communist party and party politics at all. This conception was developed by J. Andropov in 1980-s and in classical form introduced by Putin in Russia and Lukashenko in Belorus.

In countries which did not established exactly authoritarian style of government — Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia — this plan of following the third way — did not succeeded. Without clear concentration of powers and with the party or group politics without explicit rules and balances the chaos and unpredictability emerged in politics as well in administration. In specific cultural context the huge corruption emerged and organized crime started to influence the government process. So, these countries (like also Russia in 1990-s) passed long period of political instability that restrained the reorganisation of the system of government and public administration. In former Yugoslavia this resulted even in civil war.

In Hungary, Poland, Lithuania and Slovenia the communist elites were recruited largely from nationals. Hungary and Poland passed deep crisis of communist regime and were headed by Moscow's trustees. Nevertheless, communist elites in those countries command some extent of legitimacy and pictured themselves and soft-liners in implementation of Moscows (Belgrad) stagnant policy in the country. In Slovenia local elites were able even radically increase its legitimacy after the victorious war

with Belgrad in 1991. Obviously the belief in the legitimacy of superiors in hierarchy characteristic to catholic cultures played also certain role in this. In those countries we observe the balanced transition, where new and old soft-line communist successor elites developed policy options through long and heavy debates. The reform-communist parties were in 1990-s even more organized, experienced and commanded support of bureaucracy. They won elections and promoted reforms. The most stable was the majority in Slovenia (successor of young communists league in Slovenia, who chaired the coalition up to 2002 and in Hungary, who left the government office in 2010.

For this reason government and especially public administration reforms were rather moderate. Many policy choices and profound changes were made in late 1990s and even in early 2000-s when the country was already at the stage of relatively stable development (Majchearkiewicz, 2008; Krasovec, 2008) and prepared for the EU membership. So, institutions that emerged were enough consensual and stable and bear the stamp of needs and requirements of EU.

In Estonia, Lithuania and Czech Republic the communist leadership was for different reasons formed — after the purges of national communist elites — by proxies of Moscow or/and Russians. In Estonia and Latvia the language of those elites was Russian and young nationals were easily absorbed into this ethos and culture (like at Baltic German rule). So, there did not exist any meaningful link between elites and people. The extreme split between public and private discourse developed even among communist elites. After the collapse of Soviet dominance the national communist parties broke down and national communist elites take in charge in business and privatisation. In Latvia the Russian part of communist party survived, likewise the Communist party of Bohemia and Moravia, which was the regional party branches in Czech Republic. In these countries new elites did not met in the course of reforms neither considerable benchmarks of past national statehood (and relied mainly on survived myth) nor balancing restraints of reform-communist elites. Hence, reform decisions were fast, radical and mostly borrowed from foreign experience. Czech Republic but especially small Estonia acquired the image of radical reform countries.

Institutional choices were made very early and during the profound crisis. These were, firstly, de facto temporary solutions in providing administrative support to radical political reforms. The second, these policy choices were made without essential political debates over principal core choices but with fierce debates over secondary issues. This was not only because of absence of reform-communist parties in country. In Estonia and Latvia the strategic consensus was based largely on the fear that the Russian state can intervene to back Russians locating in the independent country (who counts 35 in Estonia and near 60 % in Latvia) on the one hand, and on the extensive support and examples of western countries, especially in reforming economy. For instance, Estonia was the most successful in privatisation, because it takes shape from German Treuhand privatisation company and was advised by the western experts. The third, policy of Estonia and Latvia was essentially subordinated to two goals — EU and NATO membership — with insignificant opposition to these goals. All decisions were to certain extend determined by those uncontested goals. Paradoxically, but the absence of debates over strategic goals was paralleled by extremely majoritarian even adversarial policy style in both countries.

4. reforms of politico-administrative patterns in central-eastern

european countries

In this section I can very briefly analyse reforms of politic-administrative systems in CEE countries. Firstly I will analyse mainstream reforms of core executive and secondly reforms and issues of civil service and local governance.

4.1. The cabinet setting and prime minister

The most important the reform of politico-administrative system was the redesign of core executive — The Government Cabinet or Council of Ministers. This reform mirrored the specific of party spectrum on the one hand and shifts in politico-administrative relations between politicians and bureaucrats, on the other hand.

The central task was to ensure shift in CEE countries from dual hierarchy — where policymaking powers and policy implementation powers were concentrated into the hands on parallel hierarchies (the party bureaucracy made policy and administrative bureaucracy was responsible for its implementation) — to the pattern where political and administrative authority is concentrated in the hands of government which must integrate and balance those two central roles. I. e. the government must become skilful policymaker and at the same time it (and its ministers) must be skilful top administrators. Probably the most difficult task was the achievement of responsiveness and accountability of civil service to government. Actually these tasks were much complicated in all CEE countries than it seems at the first sight.

The first, in the Soviet system the party bureaucracy dominated over the administrative bureaucracy. The administrative bureaucracy itself was not hierarchical but splintered by vertical subordination to party bureaucracy. Each tier of administrative bureaucracy receives policy input and was controlled by party bureaucracy at corresponding level. The politico-administrative top was organized in similar way. Thus, the government and bureaucracy were very fragile, splintered in horizontal as well as vertical and sectoral dimensions. In this system the middle level manager may have more authority and discretion than top level vice minister. Thus the administrative leadership and state service in general had few habits of true bureaucracy, few policymaking capacities and few capacity to manage outcomes, which were capacities of party bureacuracy.

The second, even in major developed democracies — especially in Continental European countries — the government is not able to play necessary political and administrative role because major policy-making tool — the expertise and implementation organisation — is in hands of bureaucracy. In Nordic area the policy progress is achieved by developing policy ownership among bureaucracy though consensual decision-making, whereas in United Kingdom the government largely bypass the bureaucracy and rely on party bureaucracy and selected policy communities. There have been three scenarios of the reform of the core executive in CE countries.

4.1.1. Scenario 1: Administration without politics. In those countries (Southern Europe, Orthodox world) elites saw their task simply in replacing former communist elites and in concentrating the executive authority into the hands of professionals and avoiding senseless political competition. Most explicitly this has been realized in

Russia by Putin. The development of new capacity and roles of the core executive was not taken as the crucial task for a long time, in Russia, Ukraine and also in Bulgaria, Romania. This creates a very deep vacuum in the system. For that reason they were not able to initiate the integrated policymaking and institutional reforms. Actually the old system of administrative decision-making remained intact and poorly linked and influenced by political system. The Council of Ministries was composed by very autonomous ministers, who have missed not only political control but also political input to policymaking. Individual ministers do not bear any political responsibility before the cabinet and PM, who can only fire them which make their office also very unstable.

Hence, the prime minister and the Cabinet as collegial body had few opportunities to launch a coherent policy and to ensure its implementation. As parties were fragile and possibility to change party affiliation or to become valued expert-minister (politically neutral) was extensive, the party-politics did not have important role in ensuring policy input and accountability to the government.

The fragile top executive draw on rather balkanized support structures. There were minor reorganisations of central administration: the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. It remained organized as bureaucracy over the bureaucracy. Its task was to oversee routine implementation of bureaucracy without having actual tools for that. It was not capable to develop the skills of policy expertise and policy coordination and assistance of Cabinet in policymaking. Besides, this Secretariat has numerous independent non-ministerial agencies. For instance in the end of 1990-s about 100 of different agencies were subordinated to the Secretariat in Bulgaria (Bulgaria, www. sigmaweb.org) that actually means that they were even more uncontrollable and without policy input than ministries. The Council of Ministers has numerous members, and a lot of decision-making and coordination was delegated to cabinet committees. In this situation of weak political integrity and control committees even deepened the fragility of the Council of Ministers.

Hence, the Council of Minister was not the policymaking centre but the arena for accounts from ministries that was the only regular feedback from bureaucratic machine. The organisation of core executive machine was not able for a long time to transform policy inputs into effective outputs even if there would be some source of regular and balanced the policy input.

The integrated policy input can emerge from politically balanced and stable Cabinet, where ministers are backed by expertise from party and party support. In this dimensions all CEE countries faced with tremendous difficulties, but these trends were more pronounced in countries with Orthodox background. At first stages of transition in many countries the non-political ministers were preferred, hence the member of government has weak responsibility to the Cabinet which must work as collective decision-making body. There were rather few minimal winning coalitions in CEE countries in 1990 which are most regular configuration in the multiparty systems. More frequently a specific coalitions emerged like single party cabinet, surplus cabinet, caretaker cabinets that are usually not so frequent for multiparty systems. Finally, the party spectrum itself was rather unstable, where new parties emerged and old parties declined and/or merged to survive before the next elections. The average Cabinet was in office in CEE one and half years. (Müller-Rommel et. al., 2004). This

also makes a strong policy input rather problematic and explains the delay of reforms (Verheijen, Keraudern, 1997).

I mentioned earlier about vacuum of policymaking capacity. These managers of government agencies and ministries who command extensive autonomy and have few responsibility to the quasi-political cabinet, were rather weak by themselves, because they depend, first of all, on competing factions of bureaucracy over the influence to the leader and on organized external constituencies, with illegal background among them. The practice of frequent nomination and firing from above make them even more dependent on those external forces in making policy in certain area. This makes effective policy implementation and achievement of expected outputs rather problematic.

So, countries which did not reform its core executive and especially its support structures , had even after 15 years of transition, fragile executive and huge but inefficient support structures and were not able to develop mechanisms of meaningful policy input and output. Two routes in solving this dead-end was used. Belorus and Russia establishes a very strong presidential bureaucracy and even more diminished the role of ministers, i. e. that actually re-establishes dual hierarchy. This improved the management over the bureaucracy but not the policymaking capacity4. There are rather minor changes of organisation of core executive in Romania and Bulgaria first of all thanks to pressures to ensure the better coordination of implementation of EU policies.

4.1.2. Scenario 2: strong prime minister and prime minister's office. The

other scenario we observed in Poland, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia, which tried to develop the policymaking capacity of core executive through the creation of strong Prime Minister and its office, which has strong capacity of policy advice and coordination (Goetz, Wolmann, 2001). This pattern was openly borrowed from Germany to concentrate the elaboration of policy strategies of the Cabinet into Prime Ministers Office and to develop effective structures of policy and administrative coordination over the bureaucracy. Major policymaking capacity in areas — especially public administration reform capacity — that involves difficult coordination over various ministries and stakeholders were concentrated in this office. The pattern presumes Cabinets with strong majority party and powerful Prime Minister, and in all of these countries this precondition was persistent in 1990s, first of all because strong reform-communist parties. It was critical how to combine strategic support to the Cabinet policy making and implementation, that is usually in hands of career officials, with political part of PMO which must ensure political coordination of decisions to have smooth and stable policymaking between coalition partners. Skilful combination of those roles enables also for weaker parties to establish via strong PMO its dominance and policymaking capacity. Especially edifying were PMO reforms in Poland in 1997-1998 (Zubek, 2001; Majchearkiewicz, 2008).

The advantage of this pattern of core executive was the more consistent policy, although many reforms were reversed also in these countries. At the same time, as

4 The Office of the Prfesident in Russia are located in former buildings of Communist Party of Soivet Union.

noted earlier, the making of major policy decisions was restrained by the very clear split between old (leftist) and new (right wing) elites and presumed long debates. The reforms were promoted but much slower than for instance in Baltic states.

This pattern started to erode its strength in 2000s. On the one hand, after the failure or weakening of strong majority-party coalitions from the left in Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia, and emergence of populist parties in the former two countries, the fragile and controversial coalitions were not able to use coordination capacity of those support structures. In Slovenia the coordinating roles started to be delegated to branch ministries (Krasovec, 2008). On the other hand, in Hungary the trend towards the presidentalization of Prime Minister become especially pronounced in the second half of 2000-s when the PMO and PM tried to monopolize the policymaking roles and to reduce the role of ministers and ministries to pure implementation process (Vass, 2006).

4.1.3. Scenario 3: strong collegial political cabinet. This pattern of core executive emerged in two protestant Baltic states (and to some extend in Czech Republic). In these countries the intention was to diminish the role of PM in the policymaking to mere chairman of the Cabinet meetings, to concentrate all political decisions to the cabinet and to ensure collegiality of politically strong Cabinet. The other specific was the diminishing the the role of civil service in policymaking to minimum and to develop clear political and administrative split between political cabinet and neutral civil service. For this reason in Estonia and Latvia not only all independent agencies but also coordinating administrative roles and structures were transferred and divided between branch ministries. For instance, for civil service reform four ministers and Cabinet secretariat were responsible in Estonia. Regional policy is in responsibility of five ministries. I. e. ministers and ministries become rather independent in policy elaboration and implementation, but all decisions were in responsibility of the Cabinet. Even bureau of European Integration was not coordinating but advisory unity at the Cabinet Secretariat in Estonia. In mid-2000-s the Strategy Bureaus were established in both countries but also without meaningful policymaking and administrative coordination roles.

What is especially interesting there is no permanent Cabinet committees at Estonian Cabinet to avoid the hierarchical cabinet and to increase its collegiality.

This pattern of core executive is a very transitory. It enables a very fast promotion of reforms and very weak role of bureaucracy. The argument was that bureaucracy focuses on technical details and risks that sufficiently can make reform and policy initiatives slower. In both states the focus is on the distributive and regulative policy (Lowi, 1972; Rothstein, 1996) — that is specific to right-libertarian parties — which presumes that policy will be implemented better and cheaper via spontaneous adaptation of target groups and with minimal interference of bureaucracy. This enables to avoid difficulties and high costs implementation problems that are characteristic to interventionist and institutional policies, which focus on case by case renewal and on the organisation of different issues.

This is because Estonia becomes as a country with outstanding reform capacity. This is also a cause of its main problems at current stage of development when the transformation to regular and stable patterns is needed.

4.2. Evolution of civil service

There were two central issues in the civil service reforms in CEE countries. The first and foremost important issue was the scope of reorganisation in terms of creating and staffing new organisations. Mayor part of countries have not been sovereign states, but part of Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The republics in Yugoslavia had more autonomy and more roles of the state were delegated into their responsibility than in the Soviet Union. The problem of Baltic states was even more delicate. Estonia and Latvia (and most of the world) did not recognized themselves as the part of Soviet Union but as occupied territories and considered independence in 1991 as the restoration of statehood. In other Soviet Republic state services (army for instance) were divided between Russia and new C. I. S. states, which (especially army and secret services) become also as a kind of chain that binds those former republics to Russia.

Baltic States did not accept this and must thus build all core state roles from the zero: beginning from army, secret, custom, frontier guards and foreign service to — like in Estonia — the police, tax, immigration services etc. This issue was directly linked with the other issue that has been frequently neglected: to what extent the new regime might rely on old bureaucracy and to what extent the bureaucracy might have control over and influence of policymaking and reforms. Or whether the old civil service is transferring also old values into new organisations? In debating this I do not dispose detailed empirical data from CEE countries, but would like to develop some hypotheses for further discussion based on experience of Estonia, where the both issues were solved in most radical form.

The countries that did not have needs in creation of new services have possibility to rely on the old bureaucracy, but as we see it should be considerably reformed to develop effective core executive. In those countries where the reform-communist parties/elites survived they defended the stability of bureaucracy based on arguments of professionalism and extensive experience. There were a very widespread belief among new elites that this is not feasible because Soviet bureaucrats bear also values and habits of former regime. Actually the Soviet administrative system was huge and inefficient, but people working in administration and state organisations in Baltic states were rather professional and accountable to citizens. The problems of old bureaucracy were linked with outdated facilities and new skills — especially because of a need to introduce e-equipment — and also with habit to think independently.

But the problem was much profound. In organisation theory (Heffron, 1989) it has been demonstrated that organisations are more than expected influenced by their initial (at a time of formation) organisational identities, habits and technologies. The older the organisation is becoming (passing several stages) the more rigid, inefficient and isolated from environment it becomes. Estonian experience demonstrated rather well that public organisations that were created from the zero basis (and frequently with assistance of Western neighbours) become soon, after extreme difficulties at first stages, more advanced and dynamic organisations, with modern work environment and newest equipment as compared with reorganized Soviet organisations and ministries. True, in some areas the conservative stance could be even preferential but as

a rule the old identities and memories become to restrain innovations and personnel development.

For this reason in Estonia also the redesign of the other part of bureaucracy was easier. By 1997 almost 90 % of public servants in central ministries and agencies were employed who have entered into the service after the 1985 when Soviet perestroika was launched (State Chancellery, 1997).

The next conceptual problem becomes soon a very practical: whether CEE countries must return back to classical bureaucracy or these countries can develop — at least in certain fields — more advanced forms of public service, like new public management (Coombes, Verheijen, 1997). The main argument of those who stood for the first solution (restoration of Weberian classical bureaucracy) referred to the extreme politicisation of public service. Those who stood for the second solution referred to the need to develop more managers-like officials who can ensure efficiency and result oriented government.

Actually this was a very profound opposition that has not yet reached even satisfactory conceptual solution. Firstly, the debate was about the adoption of either closed career system of civil service which was developed in Continental Europe; or of the adoption of open position system which was preferred by Nordic countries and in US (Auer et. al., 1996). Secondly, this was the debate about the support to the Continental state centred model of government system that was — after its low reform capacity become obvious — called neo-weberian (Pollitt, Bouckaert, 2004); or affiliation to the hollow (coordinative) state model that in eariler version was promoted by M. Tatcher as the minimal state and new public management ideology. The Tatcherian reforms were successful in Anglo-American world but had controversial or insufficient results in Europe, especially in Central Eastern Europe, because were conducive to corruption. Later the concept of governance become widely supported in Northern Europe and in Anglo American world (Pierre, Peters, 2005). The continental central eastern countries tried to return to classical patterns in civil service and in building up government administration, whereas Estonia was the most exemplar follower the ideology of new public management. But both strategies did not succeeded — institutional context and institutional preferences were so specific that solutions must be rather individual and implemented gradually.

The most important restraint in developing stable patterns of administration was the politicisation of civil service which both approaches to civil service and public administration reform did not avoid. The politicisation argument was serious that we evidenced already in the analysis of core executive. This was not politicisation in conventional sense as (in for instance Germany, Sweden) party political affiliation of civil servants and support to some kind of policy choices or involvement into the policymaking process. We can-not explain the politicisation also exclusively by extreme fragmentation of unreformed core executive and by capture of civil service by external groups in some countries. The problem was much profound and, unfortunately not yet completely understood and analysed. I would explain this general trend in reformed CEE countries using the Estonian example.

In 1992 when the first government of independent Estonia come to office, it promised to "purge the place" i. e. to fire as much as possible of officials that were

hired during the Soviet time. Actually this was caused not by some ideological reasons. New political elites are convinced that are faced with strong experienced bureaucracy, which may contest their ideas and start to work against reforms. It was not only fear to involve them to the policymaking, it was also the belief that they may start to sabotage their implementation. I think the main reason for that specific perception was the profound Soviet time technocratic illusion about mechanisms of reforms: that correct ideas must be realized in the life almost automatically, and of course political elites have major right to express these ideas. It was almost complete misunderstanding of the role of political-administrative balances, of discourse and policy ownership as major tools of reforms. The world of new political elites reproduced the old Soviet archetype, that always there are those who are right and those who are wrong; instead of having understanding that there are several equally correct ideas and solutions which must be negotiated to be implemented sustainably.

Simultaneously with the lack of policymaking skills the political elites — both the new and old — did not command skills of balancing civil servants in the policymaking process, because the mechanisms of management of civil service actions (accountability) was qualitatively different as compared with previous regime. At the same time new political elites felt — at least at initial stages — very strong support and mandate for the changes. The major tool of ensuring the civil service loyalty or at least accountability to new political elites was seen in the establishing personal and later direct partisan loyalties of officials to politicians. Political elites in CEE started intensively to replace top officials or to compel the rest of them to be loyal to concrete political superior. The political superiors see the personal loyalty and devotion as the only tool of smooth policy implementation. This triggered the high volatility of civil servants in central ministries and agencies. In US where the new president can replace several thousands of top officials only at the federal level he can draw on their political loyalty at least four, more frequently eight years. The cabinets in CEE are lasting short, as demonstrated earlier 1,5 years in average. After the new cabinet is coming to office and face the party-political appointees of former coalition a new wave of appointments is starting anew.

At first stages the political appointments concerned higher echelons then gradually this principle spread to lower level appointments in government agencies but also in public organisation. The open system of civil service may be per se more conducive to politicisation than Weberian career system, but this was not confirmed by studies in CEE. Several countries like Hungary, Poland and also Estonia tried to solve this problem by creating the stable Senior Civil service, which is stable, integrated and has high prestige. But those attempts were not yet successful. (Meyer-Sahling, 2001). The main reason was the simplistic and very outdated perception of the policy process by political elites.

4.3. The development of local governance

Local government reforms were in CEE countries in beginning of 1990-s in the political focus. These were one of the first institutional reforms at all, which started in some countries even before full replacement of Soviet-type regimes. The real opposition to the regime and basis for new elites comes from local level. Besides,

during the deep social, economic and political crisis in Soviet Union, resources of centralized system become to accumulate at local (county) level.

The first issue was the extent of continuity with previous regime. The Soviet type power vertical was complete administrative hierarchy, where elected councils had a symbolic role in decision-making. The local capacity was concentrated at county (district, province) level, whereas municipalities provided only minor administrative services. (Larger states, like Poland, Russia, Ukraine etc. had also regional authorities, but let them here aside.) Besides, many of welfare services were provided in Soviet Union by collective farms or state enterprises. After the local government reform become into policy agenda, the main issue was to what tier of government to delegate main competences and resources. The main local government capacity and free resources were at the second — county — level where strong local elites formed in the situation of crisis. i. e. after weakening of centralized control. The municipal level should be almost completely created anew because there were few people and resources (only in cities). The location of core level becomes an issue of political competition. In countries where local government reforms were leaded by reform-communists and politically neutral local elites, the large local government units were created that are de facto provincial/county units, whereas the community based municipalities remained weak and subordinated to the core level (Lithuania, Slovenia, Bulgaria) or the latter were reorganized much later as in Poland. In countries where new elites dominated the reform focussed on the re-creation of community based municipalities where new elites intend to found also the political power basis. In Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia the one tier self-government system was created. In Latvia where the community based municipality was also a key level, the existence of second tier was permanently under the political pressure. Once more, as in case of core executive the solution were not the balance of technical capacity and political self-governance, but one of alternatives was chosen. In countries with large municipal units (see table 2) the issue of steering and control (and corruption) become acute, whereas in countries which put emphasize on democracy and self governance of small communities soon faced tremendous capacity problems. In the beginning of 2000-s because of active regional policy of EU the self-governing regions were established in Czech Republic, Slovakia and Latvia (in 2009).

Table 2. Size of local government units in selected new EU member states

Country Number of municipalities Mean number of inhabitants Municipalities below 1000 inhabitants (%) Mean density of inhabitants in km2 Mean area of municipality (km2)

Estonia 227 4117 15,4 20,7 199

Czech Republic 6230 1482 79,8 116,7 12,7

Hungary 3127 2657 54,8 89,2 29,8

Slovakia 2875 1722 68,4 100,7 17,1

Latvia 118 12 869 0 23,5 547,4

Source: calculated by government websites of respective countries. The population of the capital city is excluded.

The second, CEE countries developed their local authorities exactly according the traditions of families of politico-administrative cultures. Continental countries established patterns of central-local relations as well as council-executive similar to Continental area. Local authorities may have extensive autonomy (thanks to strong bottom-up initiatives at the moment of their creation), but the main welfare services are provided by the provincial state government or by the central government field services. Local authorities are as a rule small because based on settlement communities and there is large number of them. Local councils do not have considerable legislative powers and are more as supervising structure over the strong and directly elected executive (Sootla, Grau, 2004) Local authorities are in different ways, for instance via general civil service system, subordinated to the administrative power vertical of the state.

In Estonia and especially in Latvia the municipalities were shaped according to Nordic experience. They are territory based municipalities, there are fewer of them (especially in Latvia after 2009 amalgamations). In these countries local authorities are forming autonomous sphere of public authority in relations to state public authority and the latter can not intervene into their affairs otherwise that via court and in cases when local authorities violate state laws. All powers reside in councils and councils have large discretion in making local laws. In Estonia the strong council is paralleled by strong executive (mayor), whereas in Latvia strategic executive roles are concentrated in council's commissions (Sootla, Kungas, 2007). The former solution makes council's decision-making more strategic, but the latter makes councillors closer to citizens.

The traditional local government system in Europe in general has faced serious structural crisis. Firstly, the fiscal stress does not enable to central government grant enough resources to local government. Secondly, with the extension welfare services and with the increasing technical complexity of traditional communal services the role of local government in the public sector ought to increase. But especially in Continental Europe the settlement based communities are too small and do not have capacity to provide those services. When in Nordic and Low countries and in Northern Germany and Austria the capacity issue is solved by amalgamations of small communities, in other part of Continental Europe communities are resisting to amalgamations. So, in majority of CEE countries the huge number of small municipalities is a central bottleneck that do not have yet solution, whereas in Latvia the amalgamation reform was in 2009 and in Estonia the voluntary individual mergers are carried out. It is expected that CEE countries will face very soon serious reforms at the local level.

5. IN CoNCLuSIoN: RECoNSIDERING TRANSITIoN

This article was a brief overview to explain background of government reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. The differences of reform process and institutional patterns that have been established are very different (Temmes et. al., 2004). But this difference may be explained based on institutional theory that takes into account the considerable impact of cultural as well as historical circumstances in developing new government structures. This article was aimed also to demonstrate that there is no

single best solution even in countries that are based on Christian values and culture. Successful reforms and patterns of institutions can be studied but never copied.

Many CEE countries are members of EU and some of them are still aspiring to membership. It is expected that majority of the first wave new member states have already finished the transition. There have also coined a term — post-transition. It is assumed that former Soviet republics are at the start to transition. I would contest both these views (Sootla, 2009). On the one hand, former Soviet Republics have rather different historical and cultural background and their progress in transition cannot be evaluated by benchmarks that we assessed transition in advance central European countries like Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland. Especially specific could be a way of Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan and Azerbaidjan, where modernizing trends, availability of oil and the presence of Russians are combined with traditional Islamic culture and with a very strong traditional community, which is difficult to fit with free market and liberal individualism.

On the other hand, new member states of Central Europe and Baltic states, have erected all formal structures of western liberal democracy and only some of them have obvious difficulties in managing them. But, firstly, these institutions were established to ensure the transformation, especially in radical reform states. Thus these countries are facing in foreseen future with the need to make new choices to establish institutions for the management of regular and stable processes. The second, the period when EU audience admired how those countries succeed in becoming capable of EU membership is over. Now in the sphere of government the EU is requiring to follow rules and will apply sanctions if this is not happening. (Estonia has got already one fine.) In economic sphere those countries are now competitors and are considered frequently as a market space, as less advanced economies that may play the role of sub-contractors or areas with less productive labour and lower level of salaries. The third, to come back to Fukuyama, institutions must be grounded in culture, not in rhetoric but in everyday habits, attitudes, patterns of behaviour. At least on the level of political elites we can often meet habits and patterns of behaviour are far from being liberal and democratic. What we can expect from ordinary people? I. e. new member states are facing a period that must develop much effective institutions of government and market economy to jump off from transition train, the revolutionary logic of institutions. This might be much difficult and unpredictable than crumbling the old and outdated Soviet type system.

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