CC BY
5
whereas at present the "Muslim self-consciousness" of Tatars is becoming more religious.
"Grazhdanskaya, etnicheskaya i regionalnaya identichnost: vchera, segodnya, zavtra," Moscow, 2013, pp. 119-125.
I. Babich,
Senior research associate, Institute of Ethnology & Anthropology RAS "SOFT ISLAMIC REVOLUTION" IN MODERN ADYGEA
On November 24, 2012, a regular congress of Muslims of Adygea and Krasnodar territory took place in Maikop. The previous congress was held on November 12, 2008. The last congress was a very important one for the revival of Islam in Adygea, because it changed the paradigm of religious life in the republic. There were 177 delegates at the congress. The report was made by the mufti of the Spiritual Board of Muslims N. Emizh, who acquainted all those present with the board's activity and financial position. Among other things, he mentioned the fact that many local people in recent years preferred to go to various sects, but not to mosques, and this was why the Spiritual Board adopted the following decision in 2012: if a member of an Adyge family joins a sect, he and members of his family will not be allowed to be buried at the local Muslim cemetery.
The key event at the congress was the election of a new mufti. During the discussion of the subject two groups were formed: one proposed to vote for the present mufti, N. Emizh, the other wanted to elect a younger one. Thus, the boundary was formed between Muslims of the older and the younger generations. Among candidates to the post of mufti were four men: the present mufti N. Emizh, the imam of the
Maikop mosque A. Kardanov, the imam of the cathedral mosque I. Shkhalakhov, and the imam of the mountain village of Mafekhabl H. Muhamad of Kosovo origin.
As a result of the open vote, the post was taken by A. Kardanov. In the view of the author of the article, the election was a "transition stage" of a "soft Islamic revolution" in Adygea. Young Muslims came to leadership in the Muslim umma of Adygea. A more neutral person was elected for the transition period, who became a more formal rather than the real leader. Actually, spiritual power was taken by the new Council of the Spiritual Board, in which there were stronger leaders who became the main actors in the new Islamic reality in the Republic of Adygea after December 2013.
Evidently, at the congress power was changed in the Muslim umma of Adygea by a democratic procedure. Now the Spiritual Board of Muslims will be headed by "young Muslims," as they are now called, who want to introduce their own methods and forms, and view differently the process of Islamic revival in Adygea than it was viewed by N. Emizh, who stood at the head of the board for twelve years
It should be noted that such "struggle for power" within Islamic community and Islamic institutions is characteristic of many republics of the North Caucasus. For example, we witnessed almost similar situation in the past ten to fifteen years in Kabardino-Balkaria, where "young Muslims" were striving for power, although using quite legitimate means of influence on the Muslim community, but suffered defeat, after which they turned to violent methods and were ultimately crushed by the local and federal law-enforcement agencies. A question arises as to why young Muslims suffered defeat in Kabardino-Balkaria, whereas in Adygea there was a "peaceful transfer of power" into their hands. What similarities and differences were there, in these two republics of the North Caucasus?
For all years he was in power as the mufti of Adygea N. Emizh pursued a definite and well-thought-out policy of Islamic revival in the republic. In his work he often turned to scholars who rendered him support. And we always felt his good-natured and honest attitude to Islamic communities. In 2002-2006 we often talked with mufti Nurbi Emizh, discussing the problem of "confrontation" between Muslims of different generations, especially after the well-known events in the city of Nalchik in October 2005, when there were bloody clashes between "young Muslims" and the republican authorities of Kabardino-Balkaria. We talked of a possibility of such turn of events in the Republic of Adygea. Nurbi Emizh was quite sure of himself, his position and the correctness of his course. He maintained that the control network he had set up, his activity, his personal relations with Muslims of different age and social position, in other words, mutual understanding between himself and the republican umma would allow him to keep power in his hands and control the activity of young Muslims.
Young Muslims came to power in the Spiritual Board, and the transfer of power in this case was not as radical as in Kabardino-Balkaria. In our view, it was a natural and legitimate process. N. Emizh was a reasonable and far-sighted person, and he did not resort to a struggle with young Muslims accusing them of radicalism and demanding to fight them with the help of force and administrative resources, as was the case of Kabardino-Balkaria.
A year has passed since the beginning of the work of the new Spiritual Board. The latter is now largely oriented to young people. Lectures, lessons and sermons for them are now more frequent, more of them receive proper theological education, much is being done to develop their religious consciousness and improve everyday behavior.
At the present time there are only five well-educated imams in the Republic of Adygea. The Spiritual Board plans to give special lectures on Islam to district imams; in all, there will be forty-five such imams.
On June 21, 2013, the head of the Republic of Adygheya Aslan Thakushinov met with representatives of the Spiritual Board: mufti Askarbi Kardanov, and imam Sobo Mafekhabl Muhamed Hasani. He discussed with them the questions of rites and rituals and educational problems. By the way, it is planned to open a madrasah in Adygea for training well-educated imams to work in rural districts.
Some theorists and theologians predict the emergence of conflicts between the older and younger generations, that is, between "traditional" and "young" Muslims. But we think that since the latter have received power in our Muslim umma, there will be no need to fight for it. Most probably, there may be a certain tension between the Spiritual Board, on the one hand, and various institutions of state authorities.
The article has been written specially for the Bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World".
I. Dobayev, D. Sc. (Philosophy), A. Ponedelkov, D. Sc. (Political sciences) (Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don), R. Gajibekov, political analyst, Pyatigorsk REASONS FOR AND CONSEQUENCES OF A SPLIT OF THE MUSLIM ELITE IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS
Islam in the Russian Federation is predominantly in its Sunni version of Khanifite trend. Until recently researchers clearly differentiated two areas of widespread Islam in the Russian Federation - the Volga area, the Urals and West Siberia, on the one
