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1ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ
Шарова В.Л.
Кандидат политических наук, научный сотрудник Института философии РАН, сектор философии
российской истории
ПРАВЫЙ ПОВОРОТ В ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЙ ПОЛИТИКЕ: СЛУЧАЙНОСТЬ ИЛИ
ЗАКОНОМЕРНОСТЬ?
RIGHT TURN IN THE EUROPEAN POLITICS: ACCIDENT OR REGULARITY?
Sharova V., PhD in Political Science, Research Assistant, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences. Department of the Philosophy of Russian History
АННОТАЦИЯ
На выборах в Европе всё чаще побеждают партии, которые принято называть "ультраконсервативными". "националистическими", "ультраправыми" и т.д. В статье сделана попытка проанализировать: в чем заключаются общие и частные особенности этих организаций, и связана ли данная тенденция с конкретными проблемами Евросоюза, такими, как кризисные явления в экономики или изменение потоков миграции, или же это новый устойчивый тренд в партийно-политической жизни Европы.
ABSTRACT
Political parties, which are considered to be "ultra-conservative", "nationalist", "far-right" etc., win elections in Europe more and more often. In this article an attempt is made to analyze, what are the general and particular features of these organizations, and whether this trend is related to some specific problems of the EU, such as the crisis in the economy or the current changes in migration flows, or is it a new stable direction of the politics of European parties.
Ключевые слова: Европа, Евросоюз, политические партии, правые партии, национализм, мульти-культурализм, популизм
Keywords: Europe, European Union, political parties, right-winged parties, nationalism, multiculturalism, populism
The European political life in summer of the year 2016 was marked by at least two events, which can be considered to be significant markers of a new trend in the political process. The results of the presidential elections in Austria and the "Brexit" referendum in the UK, formally, are the phenomena of different levels, but if and when we are seeking the roots of them, we can find quite similar layers of the "soil" - the social, political and cultural circumstances, under which the usual landscape of the EU parties (left-liberal and moderate conservative par excellence) lost its familiar shape.
49.7%. This figure can, without too much exaggeration, be called one of the major recent sensations of the European politics. This was the score of the candidate of the nationalist Austrian Freedom party Norbert Hofer in the second round of presidential elections in Austria. Thus, Hofer improved his result in the first round by as much as 14% and finally lost only 0.3% to his rival, the representative of the Austrian Green party, Alexander Van der Bellen. Not too convincing victory of the moderate candidate over the eurosceptical supporter of tough anti-immigration measures left the question open: who will take the place in the Hofburg (residence of the President in Vienna)? At July the 1st the Austrian Constitutional Court canceled results of elections: voting will be carried out again, and many experts are inclined to comment the probable results not in favor of the Green party. In general, as the journalist of the French "Slate" Daniel Vernet once noted, the presidential elections in Austria caused the interest that can be compared with the case of the election of the
former UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, who, as it later became known, concealed such meaningful detail of his biography as a service in the Wehr-macht...[10]
The given situation became another occasion for political scientists to discuss the "right turn" in European politics - if it is still appropriate to talk about some common trends and processes in the European states, that are formally united, but, in fact, test these relationships for strength more often than ever. Such events as the long-awaited Brexit, the results of which were quite shocking for a number of the European (and not them only), triggered new discussions about the possible future of Europe unified economically, politically and ideologically.
The rapidly changing geopolitical situation in the beginning of the XXI century has made a number of countries and peoples to face the question of self-identity - the national identity, precisely speaking. The collapse of the so-called "bi-polar" world and the following growth of large-scale integration projects, primarily the European one; globalization of the economics and culture - this is the background of the debate. What does it mean today to be a nation-state? Is there any sense in distinguishing between "bad" and "good" nationalism? Are empires possible today in any form? In this concern, the processes taking place in the European Union, including those that are unfolding literally before our eyes, give strong causes for a thought.
The "right-wing populist" trend in the European election process (it seems to be quite stable by the time) stimulates a debate about the value basis, which once
allowed the European Coal and Steel Community to give rise to the political supranational organization which at various times was called a confederation; a new type of federal state [3] or even a variant of a new empire - such point of view, in particular, once expressed Jan Zielonka, an Oxford researcher of Polish origin. [12]
At first sight, right-wing parties are seeking to take place in the legal, "respectable" area of European policy with unprecedented energy, moving from the street to parliaments. According to the survey published by the influential German magazine "Der Spiegel", the scope of the right-wing European parties is really impressive: in the north, the south, in the east and in the center the right parties take new positions. Perhaps, only Spain with its socialists and Portugal with the center-right coalition of the Social Democratic party and People's Party of Portugal held in the usual positions. But the National Front party in France, the Italian North League, drifting from nationalism to the right-wing extremism, a relatively new Five Star movement, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) of Nigel Farage, which gained popularity thanks to the Brexit case - these parties can be called the "new right", and they get the voters, who eagerly support "traditional values".
The Central and the Eastern Europe are not far from these processes: there are the Polish national conservative party "Law and justice" and, of course, "Job-bik» (Jobbik Magyarorszagert Mozgalom, "For a Better Hungary"), which has already become a talk of the town. Though the "official" Hungarian party "Fidesz" leading by Viktor Orban does not avoid the right populist rhetoric as well. There's no influential right-wing parties in the Czech Republic (anyway, they could not overcome the electoral threshold until now), but it's quite indicative that even the head of state, Milos Zeman, does not hesitate to play on the field of the right-wing populism from time to time. Anyhow, his statements about the migration crisis in Europe are quite demonstrative (we mean those which dealt with the "the organized invasion" of "barbarians", guided by their ideas of right and morality, who can not be integrated into the Czech society and will "chop off the hands of thieves" and "beat unfaithful wives with stones "...) [11]
However, the degree of the "rightism" of these "new right" requires some clarification and ranking: a closer look reveals points of their ideology, both similar and different. The further split of the European society along the line of "shared values" and "identity" is becoming dangerous: even those, who initially did not hesitate to play on the brink of a foul, pursuing pragmatic goals, understand that. By the way, Norbert Hofer, taking part in the post-election debate with the winner (at the time) van der Bellen, obviously wanted to make the most favorable impression not on his constituents only, but also on those who deliberately voted against the right-winged. "Not dangerous" impression, as it was described by "Der Spiegel", that was the obvious intention of the Austrian politician. [4] As well as the "Jobbik" members are permanently trying to get away from the image of political outcasts and gain a
respectable and attractive image, with an eye on elections in 2018. The very existence of such ambitions -the transition of the counter-elite to the elite (using Pa-reto's classical dichotomy) calls for clarification of terminology: what parties should be called right, and even the "very" right, but not the "ultras" or "radicals". Such an observation was made by a writer, a columnist of the French "Le Figaro", Renaud Girard, who believes that the ultra-right (as well as the ultra-left) rather despise their own representative democracy and want to overthrow it, not to integrate into the existing political model. In this sense, general Boulanger and Paul Dé-roulede were the ultra-right, Lenin and Trotsky were the ultra-left, but Norbert Hofer and Marine Le Pen are definitely not, as well as Gabor Vona (the "Jobbik" leader). [2]
Despite the difference of styles and tactics, the European right-wing populists are united in their rejection of multiculturalism. The problem is largely facilitated by the fact that the politicians, far from radicalism, have expressed skepticism about the acceptability of this strategy for Europe before. The overall tone of the discussion: multiculturalism in Europe has not justified itself and failed. Not so long ago, in 2010-2011, the statement, almost simultaneously, was made by several European leaders: the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the British Prime Minister David Cameron and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy. This change in political rhetoric is still relevant today, maybe even to a greater extent.
Initially multiculturalism as a theory and as a project of practical public policy was "invented" in Canada and the USA to describe ethno-cultural diversity of society, implemented at the state level, maintained as a strategy... In the opinion of one of the most prominent theorists of multiculturalism, Will Kymlicka, it is culture that provides the individual the possibility of autonomy along with his membership in a group, the "ethno-cultural justice." [7] But, as observes the Russian researcher Vladimir Malakhov, these recipes were and remain relevant primarily for a particular type of community, which was originally formed as "immigration state". The situation in Europe is fundamentally different: here the nation-states were formed before the massive influx of immigration and, therefore, attempts to transfer multicultural mechanisms on European soil mechanically were not particularly successful. The difference between the rhetoric and the practical realization of multiculturalism was quite obvious, and the variations between, say, Sweden (which have adopted multicultural recipes in more or less its original form) and France, where the idea of assimilation always dominated as a national idea, are significant enough. [8] At the same time, as it was noted by the Norwegian researcher Atle Hetland, the term "multiculturalism" is used in Europe quite extensively - mostly, in order to describe changes in the cultural composition of the population in general. While in 1960 the population was relatively homogeneous, now European countries are inhabited by people from 50 and even 100 different countries, in addition to their "old" minority groups. In most European capitals, a quarter or a third of the population in general are the residents of foreign countries,
and a significant proportion of them are immigrants from developing countries. In addition, there's a high proportion of internal migrants who have moved from rural areas and small towns to the capital and other major cities. [5]
Does the unified Europe still exist, not just formally, but symbolically? This question is particularly relevant due to the events that originate in the August-October 2015, and stirred up Europe in an unprecedented way, by the standards of recent years at least. We mean the new wave of migration from the Middle East and Africa to the EU territory. This situation has highlighted not only the problems of organizational, bureaucratic and financial constraints in the pan-European "house", but also raised substantive issues related to the identity and values in the different sub-regions of Europe. In this case we are interested in the specifics of Central and Eastern Europe: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland. These countries are much less the ultimate goal for arriving foreigners, compared to Germany or the Scandinavian countries, but, due to their membership in the European Union they also got the necessity to participate in the decision of a European problems. What is to be done with the migration flows? How are they to be distributed and managed? These questions of strategy and tactics are being developed at the level of the internal politics of states, and no consensus on these issues can be observed by now. Referring to the figures: in particular, 69% of the Czech opposed the adoption of the refugees from the Middle East and North Africa. These are the data obtained from the results of a survey conducted by the Czech Centre for Public Opinion Research (Centrum pro vyzkum verejneho mineni) in 2016. Receiving refugees is supported by only 25% of respondents, and, according to the researchers, these are the mostly highly educated people with good incomes. Only 4% of respondents did not object to the fact that the refugees would remain in the country permanently. In August 2016 the president of the Czech Republic Milos Zeman said, in his turn, that Europe is not able to cope with the influx of refugees, and the Czech Republic even should bring the army to protect their borders, if the situation gets worse. Meanwhile, Zeman rejected charges of xenophobia against Czechs, saying that "if Czechs were xenophobes, not tolerant people, then there would exist a serious party with a xenophobic programs on our political scene. Such as "Jobbik" in Hungary and "National Front" in France "... [9]
In Hungary the reaction to the wave of migration was quite hard, and not even because of the presence of the ultra-right party in the political field. The party, occupying a part of the seats in parliament, is still far from being the primary political force though. In this case, the anti-migrant rhetoric came from the public authorities. "Our borders are in danger. Hungary and the whole of Europe are in danger. They do not knock on our doors, they knock them out ", - said the Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orban. Hungary took the most drastic measures to "protect the borders", causing considerable dissatisfaction in the EU (mainly in Germany, which is not surprising). [6]
In the context of the discussions about the new migration policy of the Central and Eastern Europe the position, articulated by the Polish journalist Piotr Zuk. The current events is interpreted by Zuk through the prism of criticism of the traditional "capitalist" values of individual freedom, including the freedom of locomotion. In the modern world, he said, "for some people visas are cancelled, for others the immigration laws are being tightened... Some, within the global capitalism, get privilege to travel, for others, whose place of origin is "worse ", restrictions are imposed. Some may leave and return as tourists... others do not move on their own, but under the influence of factors: political, economic, military. Some people fly on airplanes, others float on inflatable boats... "[13] Zuk draws attention to the non-uniform attitude to newcomers to the Polish society: if the EU makes to accept refugees, the "real Poles" say, let them at least be white and worship the same Christian God... More and longer, the solidarity in the European society becomes ethnic rather than any other, concludes the publicist -is it not contrary to the very Christian spirit of the European civilization?..
Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are now facing the problem of distinguishing between social and cultural aspects of migration, although this problem is not new for Europe. Attempts to explain the social problems on the basis of cultural differences - that's a way, too simple to be true. Very precisely, in our view, this phenomenon was described by the American political scientist Seyla Benhabib.
Recently, the concept of "identity" in the public consciousness has been almost identified with "culture", says Benhabib. [1] Culture, in this interpretation, is conceived as a permanent creation, modification and discussion of imaginary boundaries between "us" and "others." Moreover, says Benhabib, the "we" exists only in comparison with the "other", which serves as a marker of a difference with the "self». That "other" can be even imaginary one, that doesn't reduce the significance of the phenomenon. The danger of this "struggle for the recognition" is associated with latent or explicit denial of human dignity, the rights and the possession of any kind of "culture" of those, whose membership in the "other" is obvious. Meanwhile, the purism of nationalist ideologues, seeking to cleanse "their" culture of everything introduced in it, is as meaningless today, as never before, taking into concern the very fact that the "real nation", "pure" language groups and uncomplicated ethnic identities are particularly evident "imaginary communities" of nowadays.
Brief summary: among all the existing types of "nationalism" (there are many of them) the one is adopted and is being realized: the one, that Rogers Bru-baker designated as "defensive, protectionist, nationalpopulist nationalism". Brubaker gives distinct and detailed explanation to this type of ideology: it seeks to protect "the national economy, language, mores or cultural patrimony against alleged threats from inside". These "threats" and enemies, including imaginary ones, are quite diverse; "immigration, strong cultural influence from abroad", certainly, are among them. Na-
tional-populism, says Brubaker, is used by different political forces, both the official parties and organizations ("as a legitimizing strategy" - here, we believe, the example of the Hungarian "Fides" is appropriate) and the opposition.
Which can contrast with this scenario? Could it be something like what Jürgen Habermas has once designated as a "deliberative democracy"? The socio-political system, involving a much larger volume of approvals and communicative acts between members of the political system, of course, would make demands to the EU members more complicated, but the current situation makes them urgent. It's not an easy task to link under the auspices of European values and norms the interests of Germany and Bulgaria, Hungary and France, the UK (unless we're talking about it in the past tense) and Romania... But today, when the price of these discussions is, in fact, the entire European architecture, it is hardly reasonable to abandon its attempts of the further discussion and the possible decision. Otherwise, the alternative is the mosaic conglomerate of national states, living by the principles of political realism and, preferably, at the coincidence of political and cultural boundaries. Is it a viable Europe of the XXI century? The question is still open.
References
1. Benhabib S. The Claims of Culture. Moscow, Logos, 2005. P.40 [in Russian]
2. Girard R. Le rejet du multiculturalisme en Europe // Le Figaro, May 24, 2016. URL: http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/2016/05/24/31002-20160524ARTFIG00067-le-rejet-du-multiculturalisme -en-europe.php [in French]
3. Hazak G. The European Union—A Federation or a Confederation? // Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 22280588), Vol. 2, No. 1 (11). P. 43
4. Hengst B. Bundespräsidentenwahl in Österreich: Das gespaltene Land // Der Spiegel, URL: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/praesidentenwa
hl-in-oesterreich-das-gespaltene-land-a-1093556.html [in German]
5. Hetland A. Multiculturalism in Europe. URL: http ://nation. com.pk/columns/20 -Feb-2014/multiculturalism-in-europe
6. Hungarian security officials were allowed to shoot at migrants rubber bullets. URL: http://ru.rfi.fr/evropa/20150921-vengerskim-silovikam-razreshili-strelyat-po-migrantam-rezinovymi-pulyami [in Russian]
7. Kymlicka W. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Moscow, the Higher School of Economics (HSE), 2010. P.462 [in Russian]
8. Malakhov V. Multiculturalism in the Western Europe: beyond rhetoric. URL: http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=1155#top-content [in Russian]
9. Milos Zeman: on the last photo, China and Alexander Dubcek, who lost his honor. URL: http ://www. radio.cz/ru/rubrika/radio gazeta/milosh-zeman-o-poslednej-fotografii-kitae-i-aleksandre-dubcheke-lishivshemsya-chesti [in Russian]
10. Vernet D. Battue, l'extrême droite autrichienne l'annonce: elle sera au pouvoir en 2018 // Slate.fr, URL: http://www.slate.fr/story/118479/extreme-droite-autrichienne-pouvoir [in French]
11. Ziele, Parolen, Wahlprozente: Rechtsnationale in Europa - der Überblick // Der Spiegel, 1.06.2016. URL: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/karte-und-ueberblick-wo-rechtsnationale-in-europa-erstarken-a-1090873.html [in German]
12. Zielonka J. Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006
13. Zuk P. Ludzkie odpady // Przegl^d, 31.08.2015. URL: http://www.tygodnikprzeglad.pl/ludzkie-odpady/ [in Polish]
