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26REFLECTING THE EVENTS OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT IN THE MIRROR OF THE GREAT GAME
Sergey Grinyaev, Gagik Harutyunyan"
The beginning of 2010 was marked by an onset of a series of powerful transformational processes on the African continent. The majority of the “civilized world” rediscovered Africa after the 2010 FIFA World Cup in Johannesburg, which attracted not only tourists, but also the attention of the world mass media to South Africa and its problems
However, the recent events in Egypt drew a very special interest as they led to change of the political course in this key African country. These events are determinative in many respects for the destiny of the whole continent; it is not for nothing that Egypt was called “gateway to Africa” since prehistoric times.
Let us attempt sorting through what stood behind such turbulent events that swept through the “black continent” like a tsunami.
Africa on the Geopolitical and Geo-economic Maps of the Modern World
By the beginning of the 19th century only two continents on the planet remained unaffected by globalization processes; these were Africa and Antarctica. Remoteness and harsh climate of the latter held back its industrial development, whereas recolonization of the former essentially was only a matter of time.
The “black” continent covers an area of 30.3 million km2. The distance between the northernmost and southernmost points is 8,000 km, and between the westernmost and easternmost points in northern part of the continent it is 7,500 km* 1.
* General Director, The Centre of Strategic Estimations and Forecasts. ** Executive Director, Noravank Foundation.
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Africa
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Africa is known for its mineral resources, especially the rich deposits of diamond (RSA, Zimbabwe) and gold (RSA, Ghana, Mali, Republic of Congo). There are large oil fields in Nigeria and Algeria. Bauxites are mined in Guinea and Ghana. Phosphorite resources, as well as manganese, iron and lead-zinc ores are concentrated in the northern coastal zone of Africa (see Fig. 1).
Figure 1
Mineral resources of Africa (source: http://baigigitov.narod.ru/kartu.htm).
Historically, due to climate traits the continent remained outside the limits of the industrial society’s expansion. However, it did not skip the attention of the western countries. The African continent fell in the meat grinder of colonization since the 16th century.
After the World War II, decolonization process in Africa gained momentum. 1960 was declared the Year of Africa (the year of freedom for the largest number of colonies), when thirteen states gained independence (today the number has reached 37 - see Fig. 2). Most of these were former French colonies or French governed UN mandate territories: Cameroon, Togo, Malagasy Republic, Congo (formerly French Congo), Dahomey, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Chad, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Mali. The most
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populous African country, Nigeria gained its independence from the United Kingdom, and the largest country by area, Belgian Congo also achieved independence. British Somaliland and UN trusteeship territory of Italian Somaliland were united and became Somali Democratic Republic.
Figure 2
Political Map of Africa (source http://baigigitov.narod.ru/kartu.htm).
Upon gaining independence many of the African countries plunged into civil wars, which was caused by the realities that, on one hand, during the “Scramble for Africa” the borders of African countries were drawn in an artificial manner, without any regard to the actual settlement areas of various ethnicities and tribes, and on the other hand, the traditional African society was not ready for democratic governance reforms. In many countries power was seized by dictators. As a result, such regimes are notorious for their neglect of human rights, bureaucracy, totalitarianism, which lead to, above all, economic crises and growing poverty.
State borders in Africa are just one example out of many as far as the postcolonial policies of Great Britain and its allies are concerned. These policies boil down to the following: having realized that political transformation processes along with their dynamic would not allow a full control over the colonial territories, the UK leadership would make a decision to “declare sovereignty.”
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Being well aware of the actual state of affairs and clearly realizing the conflictgenerating potential of their former colonies, the United Kingdom actively participated in building the statehoods of the independent nations, as a “sophisticate” political adviser. It is in this very matter that the craftiness of the UK colonial policy manifests itself; the state borders were drawn in a manner that a hidden potential of conflicts has been preserved or formed anew for many decades (if not longer) ahead, and any time a minor external thrust may bring these conflicts from their dormant state to a heated confrontation in an internecine war. Such policies have been implemented in relation to Israel and Palestine, India and Pakistan, to some extent also in Central Asia, and especially this is the case for Africa.
Hence, most of the modern conflicts on the African continent had been programmed beforehand by the “enlightened West”, so that there would always be an excuse to return back to their colonies under the banner of “the mission to pacify” the feuding parties.
And the time for this came at the beginning of the 21st century, characterized by deep financial and economic shocks of the Western civilization, which resulted in years-long financial and economic crisis, as well as inter-confessional clashes.
Competitive Struggle of the Transnational Corporations for Africa
Before the beginning of the 21st century transnational corporations (TNC) were especially interested in Africa as a source of raw materials supplied for giveaway prices. On one hand, such interest led to exacerbation of internal conflicts caused by unscrupulous competition, on the other hand, it allowed maintaining a relative “tranquility” as each TNC would calm down after having gained access to the needed resource. The struggle between TNCs in Africa is best illustrated by the situations in Congo and neighboring Rwanda.
Rapid development of the Western industrial economy requires access to new resources. The case of one such resource, coltan, is well described in the article The Blood in Cell Phone1, the author of which correctly points out the following remarkable facts about one of the African countries, Congo. Congo is regarded as one of the richest countries in the world for its resources, while its population is at the bottom of the poverty list.
We all use cell phones. Up to half billion phones are sold annually and each of them contains columbite-tantalite extracted from coltan ore. 80% of the world col-tan reserves are in Congo. In addition to that one-third of diamond deposits, half of cobalt and one-quarter of uranium reserves, as well as considerable oil reserves, copper, gold and silver deposits are in the same country. As one of the richest nations of
1 http://commons.com.ua/archives/8523.
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the world Congo could have afforded a standard of living at least equal to that of Emirates. However, there is a company called America Mineral Fields Inc., and also Nokia, Siemens, not to mention Cabot (USA) H.C. Starck (Germany), Ningxia (China) and scores of others that would not let that happen...
The fighting dubbed Congo Civil War or Second African War or World Coltan War hardly ever stopped in the country over the last 50 years.
The coltan supply scheme per se is very complicated1. Individual diggers in Congo manually mine it and pass it to small resellers. These, in turn, rent privately owned Ukrainian and Russian airplanes to transport the unprocessed ore to the neighboring countries (mostly Rwanda). Then the cargo exported from Congo is shipped to Europe through government companies that belong to the relatives of Rwandan and Ugandan presidents. Here Belgian companies play the primary role. Most of the shipments arrive in Ostend airport (a transit center); the planes transport back weapons, while the coltan cargo is dispatched to processing plants through companies registered somewhere, say, in Cyprus. The number of these plants is small, and their owners are in essence the main sponsors of the war in Congo: Cabot (USA), H.C. Starck (Germany), Ningxia (China) and a processing plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan.
The Chinese Development Vector for Africa
The global geopolitical situation began to change drastically at the end of the 20th century, when a new supernova, China, emerged on the horizon. Analysts of the world’s leading think-tanks forecasted that the forthcoming years will pass under the sign of China’s development. In the second half of the 20th century the forwardlooking policy of the Soviet leadership supported by Cuba, GDR and Yugoslavia brought the USSR to the forefront in Africa. However, the collapse of the USSR left a geopolitical vacuum, which undoubtedly, could not remain for too long, and other actors came forward, among which China was the one to take over the USSR’s place.
The situation change became even more dynamic in the first decade of the 21st century. For instance, in 2008 American intelligence forecasts, as well as those of other analytical centers of the Western countries stated with alarm that by 2025 China may become the second most powerful nation in the world in terms of economy and military strength, and after 20 more years it may even take the first position1 2.
A developing economy needs resources. Essentially, China faces a serious and crucial choice in determining the key vector of its own development. However, there are not too many vectors to choose from.
1 http://commons.com.ua/archives/8523.
2 http://www.csef.ru/studies/politics/projects/china/articles/875/.
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Figure 3
Russia and China in Africa
(source: http://www.krasrab.com/archive/2010/11/09/07/view_article).
One of them is South-East Asia and Oceania. It is quite a promising direction, but it may lead China to a conflict not only with Japan and USA, but also with the United Kingdom, which has its own interests in the countries of the British Commonwealth. For China it is still impossible to handle a competition like that.
Another vector is Siberia and the Russian Far East. It is a very attractive direction that gives the Chinese economy an opportunity of access to the Russian oil and gas reserves. Nevertheless, substantial problems exist here (in addition to the harsh climate) which cannot be fully resolved by China, although it successfully implements a program of soft expansion into the Russian lands.
The third vector is Africa.
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In an article most comprehensively analyzing the evolution of the African vector in China’s foreign policy, the renowned Russian author Roy Medvedev1 remarks that political cooperation between China and many of the African countries has already been developing in 1960-1970s, within the framework of alliance for antiimperialistic struggle.
Since mid-1990s the main focus shifted to economic cooperation between China and Africa. As early as 1996 the Vice Premiers of China three times toured Africa visiting total 18 countries. In 1996 PRC President Jiang Zemin visited Kenya, Ethiopia, Mali, Egypt, Namibia and Zimbabwe. In May 1997 PRC State Council Premier Li Peng visited six countries of the African tropical zone. In these years PRC trade turnover with African countries was about $4 billion annually. That was an insignificant number even then, as it comprised just about 1.5% of China’s total foreign trade turnover1 2.
R. Medvedev notes in his article that in the late 1990s a plan of cooperation with African countries was developed in China, which was extensively implemented afterwards in 2000-2009. Just the fact that by early 2008 the trade turnover with African countries reached $108 billion is a proof for that. China’s direct investments in the Black Continent reached $8 billion in 2008 alone. In 2009 China became the second largest trade partner of Africa, after Europe. Volumes of trade between China and Africa have been growing 30% annually over the last five years. In 2000-2003 China partially or fully wrote off the debts of some African countries amounting to over $1.5 billion3.
Unlike the Western countries, China does not put forward such requirements of developing democracy that are still premature or impossible to meet. For instance, China actively cooperates with the regime in Sudan, overlooking the fact that in 2008 the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for the Sudanese president Omar Bashir. China badly needs the oil resources of Sudan estimated at approximately 2 billion barrels. This is where almost all of the oil exported from Sudan end ups. However, China lends money to Sudan for building not only oil pipelines, but also schools, hospitals and roads4.
In these circumstances the January, 2010 referendum for independence of South Sudan5 was a serious blow to the Chinese interests, because the key oil fields are concentrated exactly in the south of the country. Quite characteristically, the conflict between North and South Sudan was programmed since the times of British protectorate over this country6.
1 http://www.krasrab.com/archive/2010/11/09/07/view_article.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 http://www.noravank.am/rus/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5322.
6 Ibid.
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As it is noted in R. Medvedev’s article, since spring 2007 China launched a major project for establishing “special economic zones” in Africa. In this case the successful experience of 1980-1990s in creating such zones in China itself is used. The first “special zone” is being set up in the “Copperbelt” in Zambia. The second one is on Mauritius Island and it will serve as a trade center for China to provide a privileged access to trading structures of 21 member-states of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa for over 40 directions of Chinese businesses. Mauritius will afford China a freer access to the Indian Ocean and markets of Eastern and Southern Africa. A third “zone” is supposed to be created in Tanzanian capital Dar es Salaam to turn it into a shipping hub. Two more “special zones” were planned for Western Africa, and Liberia, Nigeria and Cape Verde have been competing to host those1.
It was also mentioned that in November, 2009 a diligently prepared summit took place in Beijing attended by 48 leaders from African countries. In his address to the summit the Chinese president Hu Jintao criticized the policies of the Western countries in Africa and promised a twofold increase of aid to the African continent in 2009. This promise has been fulfilled. A multi-billion dollar investment fund has been established for Africa and besides, large investments and credits will be directed to specific countries. For example, after having received a $2 billion loan from China, Angola lost interest in IMF credits, which are tied with numerous conditionalities1 2 3 4.
Thus the African vector in China’s foreign policy development was practically implemented in a scrupulous manner.
The Struggle for World Supremacy is Currently Decided Africa
Understandably, the main geopolitical competitor of China - the USA - could not have put up with the fact that the Chinese economy received a powerful boost through enormous resources of the African continent.
For the analysts’ forecasts on growth of the Chinese economy to materialize, that economy needs to be fed by inexpensive raw materials. At the beginning of the 21st century it became crystal clear that Africa is the source for such raw materials for China.
Intensifying struggle for Africa initially manifested itself in the early 21st century by the phenomenon of “piracy” off the Somalia coast34. Increase of pirate activity in 2006-2007 coincided with the launch of China’s program of economic expansion to Africa.
1 http://www.krasrab.com/archive/2010/11/09/07/view_article.
2 Ibid.
3 http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2010/26-05- 10.htm.
4 http://badnews.org.ru/news/kto_rukovodit_somalijskimi_piratami/2010-05-19-1210.
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Somalia Piracy Map (source: http://www.unitar.org/unosat/).
Figure 4
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Peculiarities of these pirate raids allow one to assume that their activities are controlled and directed by some “firm hand.” The widely publicized capture of the Ukrainian vessel MV Faina with heavy weapons on board was carried out based on information passed to the Somali pirates from Odessa1. It is also interesting that the USA and UK are major opponents of international legislation on fighting piracy and have blocked relevant initiatives put forward by other countries at the UN level2.
The severity of the USA-China confrontation especially heightened by dispute of these powers over the world financial and currency system reforms, which surfaced after the 2010 G20 Seoul Summit. The dispute of two superpowers crystallized into a “hot” conflict between their dominions on the Korean Peninsula. Against this backdrop it is obvious that the ensuing events in a number of African countries in early 2011 are a reflection of the struggle between the USA and China for the leadership role in the world.
As mentioned above, the developments in Sudan contributed to strengthening of the US positions in the country and diminishing the influence of China in oil-rich regions there.
In very much the same manner, turmoil in Egypt was also caused by the standoff between the USA and China, though in this case it was also intersected by effects of the regional tension, first of all between Israel and Iran.
Escalating developments around Iran required Israel to take measures for upholding the situation in the neighboring countries. In this context the Mubarak regime in Egypt no longer suited the interests of Israel, and any further complication of the situation around Iran might have led to hazards posed on Israel from this direction.
Conclusions
The example of Egypt events is an evidence of the Great Game actions on the global chessboard.
The fact that the Russian president’s visit to Israel in January, 2010 was canceled is also one of the components of the same game and the Israeli diplomats’ strike had very little to do with that. Simply, on the eve of critical events for the region presence of the leader of Russia, successor of the great USSR, in an official state visit to one of the key countries of the region was considered inexpedient by the “masterminds.”
http://www.newsru.com/world/13feb2009/pirates.html.
http://blog.i.ua/user/3169528/512534/.
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The severity and dynamism of developments yet again prove the tension in the global state of affairs, as well as that there is no clear-cut plan to overcome this grave situation.
Once again we were convinced that the world is on the verge of fundamental geopolitical transformations: there is no doubt that the occurring events will not skip China’s attention and it will prepare a response in a very near future. Whether it is going to be overthrows of ruling regimes in the regional US satellites (first of all, Saudi Arabia) or a more sophisticated response staged elsewhere on the planet, it is something we shall know soon.
March, 2011
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CIVILIZATIONAL FACTORS OF ARMENIAN SEA TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN THE 17th CENTURY1
Eduard L. Danielyan'
Prior to the great geographical discoveries international trade relations had been developing within the boundaries of the known world or oecumene [1] in the Eastern hemisphere, via land, river and sea routes [2]. Participation of various countries in the international trade depended on availability of raw material sources and product lines.
Armenia had been involved in international trade since ancient times, given its important strategic location between the East and West and its civilizational developments [3, pp. 203-227]. As far back as the Neolithic and Chalcolithic, obsidian had been exported from the Armenian Highland to Mesopotamia and regions of the Eastern Mediterranean [4, p. 46]. In the Early Bronze Age Sumerians made use of copper mined in the Armenian Highland [5, pp. 21-25; 6, էջ 140]. In the Bronze and the Early Iron Ages metallurgy in Armenia allowed exporting processed metal products to the countries of the Orient. With high appreciation of Armenia’s contribution in the world civilization, David M. Lang wrote in his book Armenia: Cradle of Civilization: “The ancient land of Armenia is situated in the high mountains... Although Mesopotamia with its ancient civilizations of Sumeria and Babylon, is usually considered together with Egypt as the main source of civilized life in the modern sense, Armenia too has a claim to rank as one of the cradles of human culture... Again, Armenia has a claim on our attention as one of the principal homes of ancient metallurgy, beginning at least five thousand years ago ...” [7, p. 9].
Existence of trade relations of the Armenian kingdoms with Mesopotamia, including the Persian Gulf basin, and Mediterranean countries, are corroborated by references to Aratta1 2 in the Sumerian epic of the 3rd millennium BC [8], as well as to
1 A paper presented at the international conference The Discovery of the Quedagh Merchant organized by NAS RA Institute of History and “ANAHIT” Association (October 5, 2010).
* Doctor of History, Noravank Foundation consultant.
2 L. N. Petrosyan proposed Armenian Highland as the location for Aratta, comparing it to the name of Ararat [9, p. 123; cf. 10, pp. 68-70 and 11, pp. 29-32].
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Armanum, Hayasa and Nairi, correspondingly, in the Akkadian, Hittite and Assyrian cuneiform inscriptions of the 3rd and 2nd millennium BC. It has been testified by the Egyptian, Mittani, Kassite and Assyrian seals and seashells of that period discovered in archeological excavations on the territory of Armenia [12, էջ 64-65; 13, էջ 43-44].
City of Susa (the ancient capital of Elam, and later the winter quarters of the Achaemenids) in the Persian Empire [14, III, 140, V, 49, 53] and the Lydian capital Sardes in western Asia Minor were connected by the Royal Road that passed through southwestern regions of Armenia [14, V, 52]. From ancient times Armenia was connected with lands of Mesopotamia through waterways as well. Herodotus (c.484 BC – c.425 BC) provided information on navigation from Armenia to Babylon by Euphrates and Tigris rivers: “The city (Babylon – ED.) is divided into two portions by the river which runs through the midst of it. The river is the Euphrates, a broad, deep, swift stream, which rises in Armenia... the Tigris has its source in Armenia” [14, I, 180, V, 52]. Herodotus describes: “The boats which ply on the river and go to Babylon are round, and all of skins. They make these in Armenia, higher up the stream than Assyria. First they cut frames of willow, then they stretch hides over these for a covering, making as it were a hold; they neither broaden the stern nor narrow the prow, but the boat is round, like a shield. They then fill it with reeds and send it floating down the river with a cargo; and it is for the most part palm (date palm - ED) wood casks of wine. Two men standing upright steer the boat, each with a paddle, one drawing it to him, the other thrusting it from him.When they have floated to Babylon and disposed of their cargo, they sell the framework of the boat and all the reeds. The hides are set on the backs of asses, which are then driven back to Armenia, for it is not by any means possible to go upstream by water, by reason of the swiftness of the current. It is for this reason that they make their boats of hides and not of wood. When they have driven their asses back into Armenia, they make boats in the same way” [14, I, 194].
Armenia’s strategic location in Western Asia had secured an important role for it in the global trade, especially in the Silk Road international system that has been prominent since long ago. Known for its urban development traditions, Armenian kingdoms experienced an upturn distinctly during the reigns of Sarduri I (845 BC -825 BC), Ishpuini (825 BC - 810 BC), Menua (810 BC - 786 BC), Argishti I (786 BC -764 BC) and other kings of the Kingdom of Ararat (Urartu) or Van, the Ervandians (VI - III cc. BC) and the Artashesians, particularly, Artashes I (189 BC - 160 BC), king of the Kingdom of Great Armenia, and especially Tigran II the Great (95 BC - 55 BC), King of Kings of the Armenian Empire. Capital cities Van (as well as Erebuni - the present capital Yerevan), Armavir, Artashat, Tigranakert, as well as other newly built cit-
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ies (in Artsakh, Goghtan and others) also named after Tigran II the Great confirm the high level of the Armenian architecture coming since antiquity. Activities of Tigran II the Great, emanating from millennia-long civilizational developments, expanded over most of the Western Asia that was incorporated in the Armenian Empire [15, էջ 3-12]. Tigran the Great took the control over the Silk Road portion from the borders of India to the commercial ports in Cilicia Pedias, Syria and Phoenicia [16, XIV, 5, 2].
The early medieval Armenian educational and scientific system attached much importance to geography and cosmography. Ashkharhatsuyts (Geography) of the 5th century, authored by Movses Khorenatsi and later continued and edited by Anania Shirakatsi (Anania of Shirak) in the 7th century, informs about navigation on Indian, Greek (Mediterranean), and Vrkanits (Caspian) seas. Ashkharhatsuyts data on natural resources and ethnic composition of India [17, pp. 266, 274, 308-310] confirm the existence of Armenian-Indian relations since old times. In his Cosmography Anania Shirakatsi provides interesting information about navigation by the stars. He writes that the stars called Yerknibever (Pole Star) and Sayl (the Wain) in Ursa Major constellation were visible pointers for the seafarers [17, էջ 96].
Along the Silk Road passing through Armenia such cities as Jugha, Nakhijevan, Karin, Manazkert, Dvin flourished in early Medieval Ages, as well as Ani, capital of the Armenian Bagratids in the 10th-11th centuries [18, с. 70-71; 19; 20], which were large centers of science, education and culture, crafts [21] and commerce.
Navigation among Armenians developed intensively in the 12th-14th centuries, when the Armenian Principality and later the Kingdom of Cilicia became a maritime state with navy and commercial fleet that was involved in the sea trade system of the Mediterranean [22; 23, с. 400]. Cilician Armenia was a sea gateway to the European ports for the Silk Road coming from China and India. It also introduced progressive changes to the international maritime law.
A number of European countries used to take advantage of Jus naufragii (Jus litoris) which allowed the lord of a territory to seize the cargo, crew and passengers washed ashore from the wreck of a ship along its coast. This law was also exercised in coastal countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. As Yu. Barseghov mentions, the Byzantine Empire had issued decrees in 1290 and 1320 protecting the shipwrecked Barcelonans, France did the same in 1227 and 1461 for Italians, and later for the Flemish, Dutch and Brabantians, but these were most of the times to no avail and it was impossible to prevent robbery [24, с. 100-101]. In Cilician Armenia the struggle against Jus naufragii was more profound and persistent.
In 1184 Mkhitar Gosh condemned this practice in his Datastanagirk (The Law Code), warning to keep away from that “if it happens that our nation possesses the
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sea” [25, էջ 415]. Yu. Barseghov noted that from partial restrictions of the 10th-11th centuries to international agreements and conventions of the 19th-20th centuries, it took a millennium to eliminate the Jus naufragii. As the researcher notes in this regard, the clauses of Armenian Datastanagirk compare favorably to similar legislations of other countries not only by predating them chronologically, but also in terms of progressive contents [24, с. 95-98,103].
The king of the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia Levon II the Magnificent (11981219) struggled against piracy and applied great efforts to eradicate the Jus naufragii. First time the rejection of Jus naufragii took the form of an international legal standard in 1201. King Levon abandoned then the “right of shipwreck” in relation to the Republic of Venice, as he did earlier for the Genoese [24, p. 105]. Application of this legal standard in Cilician Armenia was further developed during the reigns of Hethum I (1226-1269) and Levon III (1270-1289) [26, pp. 106, 110, 126; 24, pp. 105106]. Cilician Armenia was a law-abiding and reliable partner in sea trade, which is corroborated by numerous references in commercial documents signed in the European and Middle Eastern ports of the Mediterranean.
Armenian seafarer merchants also actively participated in the “Manila trade”, establishing business relationship with the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, especially after the discoveries of Dias and Vasco da Gama. Interestingly, back in the 16th century the Portuguese poet Luis de Camoes wrote in his The Lusiad: or, the Discovery of India. “And those who cultured fair Armenia's lands, Where from the sacred mount two rivers flow, And what was Eden to the Pilgrim shew,” referring to the Biblical Paradise, sacred Mount Ararat and headwaters of Euphrates and Tigris rivers [27, p. 118].
The role of Armenians in the “Manila trade” grew in the 17th century. Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, a French merchant and traveler, states that at the time “there was no type of commerce that Armenians were not involved in” [28, vi, pp. 158-159, Appendix, pp. 76-77; 29, с. 73-78], whereas Francois Martin, the Commissary of the French Government mentions that other than the Portuguese, “Indian and Armenian merchants were allowed access to Manila” [30, p. 125]. English documents recorded in 1711-1714 in Madras indicate that the Armenians controlled half of the Indian private trade with Manila and China. Having thoroughly studied the participation of Armenian seafarer merchants in the “Manila trade”, Yu. Barseghov has come to a conclusion that in practice, only Armenian merchant ships had access to Manila, because England, France and Netherlands most of the time were at odds with Spain. At the same time, the English, French, Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish
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made use of services provided by the Armenian merchants. Records made at Fort St. George of Madras indicate that vessels flying Armenian colors traveled from Madras, Surat, Bombay, Calcutta and other ports to Manila. Khoja Minas, Khoja Stepan Mark, Hovhannes Markar were among the owners of the ships traveling between Surat and Manila [31, p. 169; 29].
During the Ottoman–Persian Wars of the 16th-17th centuries the demographic and economic situation in Armenia deteriorated due to both destructive Ottoman raids and the “great deportation” forced by Shah Abbas I of Persia, when the ancient Armenian economic and cultural center Jugha and some other settlements were devastated. In order to enrich his treasury, Shah Abbas embarked on turning the direction of Western Asian trade toward Persian Gulf [32, էջ 325]. Out of his own interests, he awarded priveleges to the Armenian merchants deported from Old Jugha to New Jugha, which was granted a right of autonomy. The problems related to New Jugha have been thoroughly studied by Leo, A. Hovhannisyan, L. Kha-chikyan, H. Papazyan, V. Baiburtyan1, Sh. Khachikian and other researchers.
After establishment of New Jugha, using the silk trade routes the Jugha merchants’ or khojas’ capital [34] penetrated, on one hand, through Caspian-Volga basin waterways into Russia and further to Europe, and on the other hand, through Iran into India. In both cases sea shipping played an important role.
In the 16th-17th centuries the sea trade from Baku and Astrakhan was controlled mainly by Armenians [35, էջ 442; 36, с. 274; 37], and was further boosted owing to Armenian merchants of New Jugha as a result of conclusion of the 1667 and 1673 Russian-Armenian trade agreements1 2.
The first signs of competition between the Armenian merchants and European companies surfaced when the Russian Empire, aiming to protect its domestic markets, revoked English East India Company’s privileges of maintaining connection with Iran through Russia. In effect, the monopoly to use this route for international trade remained in hands of the Armenian merchants. Meanwhile, Spaniards and Italians competed with the Dutch and English, whereas the neutral political stance of the Armenian merchants rendered an opportunity to cooperate with different parties.
1 V. Baiburtyan, in his studies of the New Jugha Armenian community’s role in the 17th century trade relations between Iran and European countries deliberated also on the previous periods, particularly the Armenian merchants’ silk shipments in 1580 from the Persian Gulf to Spain and Portugal via oceanic routes [33, էջ 31-33]
2 Sh. Khachikyan revised the traditional view that the Armenian Trading Company of New Jugha was the signatory of the 1667 agreement, and came to a conclusion that Stepan Ramadanski and Grigor Lousikov who signed the agreement were authorized representatives of the New Jugha self-governing bodies [38, էջ 24-25]. Her investigations of genealogical trees of the Armenian nobility settled in New Jugha deserve a special attention, particularly those of Aghazarian family, later named Lazarian, descending from son of a Nakhijevan native Manouk [39, VII]
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Armenian-Dutch trade relations were most successful, leading to strengthening of the Armenian Diaspora community in Amsterdam which is known for its great cultural achievements, particularly in Armenian printing. For instance, thanks to the efforts of the Vanandetsi family, in 1695 the Sharaknots (Armenian Hymnals), Hamatarats Ashkharhatsuyts (The World Atlas), History of Armenia by Movses Khorenatsi and other publications were printed [32, էջ 616-617]. The role of Jugha Armenians’ capital in the national matters has been remarkable over the centuries. Covering numerous Armenian centers in Iran and India, Armenia, Russia, Italy and elsewhere in Europe, this capital had much greater significance than that of mere benevolence. Several centuries of development of the Armenian scientific, educational and cultural cause among the Armenian communities in India eventually led to maturation of a plan (in the late 18th century) devised by Armenian patriots of Madras for liberation of the Motherland, both Western and Eastern Armenia.
According to Constandine Jughayetsi’s late 17th century textbook Ask-harhazhoghov girq, Armenians were involved in artisanship and commerce in dozens of Indian trade and crafts centers [32, էջ 335 , 337, 447; 38, էջ 11]. The use of “maritime loan” was widespread in the Indian sea trade, information about which has been preserved in relation to the Armenia khojas’ capital [38, էջ 161-167].
The English, French and Danish East India Companies initially availed themselves of the opportunities provided by Armenian commercial methods and trade relations, especially in India. They made huge profits as Armenians initially tended to rent European vessels. The 1688 agreement between Khoja Kalantar and London traders’ company guaranteed the rights and privileges of the Armenian merchants in India. Over the time Armenians bought and built their own ships, thus becoming competitors to the European merchants. For instance, two high-class merchant ships of Hovhan and Hovsep Markarians, “New Jerusalem” and “Sancta Cruz” fell victim to piracy [40, с. 62-69]. Yu. Barseghov remarked that the centuries-long history of Armenian sea trade is also a dramatic saga of a struggle against European piracy, as the Armenians promoted progressive principles of establishment of free seafaring and open seas policies [41, с. 35-42].
The fate of “Quedagh Merchant” is similar to those of Armenian merchant ships fallen victim to piracy [42, с. 70-73]. Discovery and study of its wreckage off Catalina Island, Dominican Republic [43; 44, pp. 47-49; 45] is a valuable contribution to the assessment of the Armenian legacy in the world history of merchant shipping.
October, 2010
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