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55PREHISTORY OF RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO IN THE NEW ERA (1991-2012). (PART TWO)
Sanjay Deshpande, Shoaib Khan
Centre for Central Eurasian Studies, University of Mumbai, Mumbai, India
Abstract. The article is devoted to the problem of relationship between Russian Federation and NATO in the XXI century. The relevance of the question is indisputable considering the fact that the global stability in the world depends on both positive or negative tendencies in this relationship. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the new quality of cooperation between NATO and Russia seemed to be outworked. But still there is a huge list of factors and unsolved problems between this two key actors of the international relations which cannot grant permanent security and stability in the world. The present-day crisis that forms the political and international agenda today grows on the soil of this complex of issues which were either ignored or underestimated in the 1990-s - first decade of the 2000-s and now we just yield what we've got. The article doesn't have the objection to analyze the ongoing crisis in Ukraine or disagreements between Russia and the USA on Syria e t.c. The authors wanted to analyze pre-historical backgrounds of the relationship between NATO and Russia and, maybe, reveal some crucial points responsible for turning this relationship on the road of new confrontation. That's why our research chronologically includes two decades past the collapse of the USSR (1991-2012). The authors consider that it was the crucial time when the fundamental basis of the potential cooperation between Russia and NATO was formed.
Working on the material the authors applied to the methodology of political science and international relations. The methods of political analysis, structural analysis and in-vent-analysis (studying the official documents) were used in the article.
For the better understanding of the issue and in order to prevent the readers from the danger of being "over-informed" the authors divided the material into two parts. The first part published in №1 of the Journal was devot-
ed to the historical analysis of the Cold War. The second one, introduced in this number, reflects the post-Cold war situation in the world in the last decade of the XX-first decade of the XXI-st centuries.
Keywords: Russia, NATO, cooperation, missiles, disarmament, expansion, defense.
The Post Cold War Situation
Five years into the brave new world ushered in by the collapse of the Communist system and the dramatic reshuffle of global geopolitics there emerged a novel paradigm of Russian- American relations. This paradigm was no longer predominantly rooted in adversarial competition of the Cold War period, but neither may it be interpreted in terms of well established partnership and genuine cooperation notwithstanding occasional official declarations to this effect on both sides [Wallander: 1999].
Russia under Yeltsin never really tried to challenge the US on matters that were important for Washington. Especially during the Kozyrev-led Russian-Western honeymoon which lasted well into 1995 despite raging protestations from innumerable Russian nationalists of all shades, Russia demonstrated unprecedented self-restraint, verging on isolationism, particularly in dealings with Third World regimes known for their anti-Western inclinations, as Russia proved receptive to American wishes and even demands in the conduct of its relations with specific developing countries. While trying to forge a partnership with Iran a southern neighbor that may have crucial importance in terms of Russia's relations both with Muslim-oriented New Independent States and the larger Muslim World, the Yeltsin government was extremely cautious not to cross a line that would displease Washington. Likewise, having been virtually eliminated from the centre-stage of the Middle East peace process, Russia made no attempt to get back through resuming its support for radical Arab regimes and political factions [Trenin: 2010].
The surprisingly smooth and shock-resistant mode of US-Russian relations during the early 1990s may also be due, paradoxically, to the diminishing importance of each side to the other. With Russia preoccupied by its uneasy competitive cooperation with other CIS countries, and the US focused primarily on
Prehistory of Russia's Relationship wit places like Bosnia, the Middle East and China, both nations have clearly diverging foreign policy agendas. When playing their games at different tables, Russian and US leaders may have the luxury of being tolerant and even indulgent toward each other [Kortunov: 1997].
Russia has been disgruntled with the expansion of NATO ever since the alliance began courting new members from the former Soviet bloc in the early 1990s. However, Russia's economic and military decline and the West's primacy encouraged NATO members to discount the potential consequences of Russian discontent.
The strategic landscape has since changed dramatically, however, and the costs of excluding Russia from the Euro-Atlantic order have risen substantially. The Kremlin's decentralization of power and Russia's economic rebound thanks to higher energy prices have brought the country back to life. Russia now has the confidence and the capability to push back against NATO, just as the West urgently needs Moscow's cooperation on a host of issues, including the containment of Iran's nuclear ambitions, arms control and non-proliferation, the stabilization of Afghanistan, counterterrorism, and energy security [Kup-chan: 2010].
The problem of Russia-NATO relations involves Cold War legacies, differences in strategic culture, and a preoccupation with process over substance. Cold War legacies still shape mutual perceptions. Russians still view NATO as an anti-Russia organization which remains a threat to their security, despite NATO's clear statement that the Alliance is defensive and not directed against anyone. Russian policymakers also view NATO as an instrument of US policy in both Europe and Eurasia. Finally, they believe that NATO enlargement is a zero-sum attempt to provide security for NATO states at Russia's expense.
NATO Allies are divided in their perceptions of Russia. Many Western European states do not view Russia as a threat, as the president of France reiterated at the Munich Security Conference in February and want to build a partnership with Moscow to manage regional and out-of-area problems, including Afghanistan. But a number of member states, including some of Russia's neighbors, still
TO in the New Era (1991 -2012). Part Two. view Russia as a potential threat, due to a large extent to historical grievances and Moscow's increasingly assertive posture. A number of these states sought membership primarily for the Article 5 commitment to deter potential aggression from Russia. The 2007 cyber-attacks on Estonia and the cut-off of natural-gas supplies from Russia in 2009 as a result of a dispute between Moscow and Kiev only confirmed that threats still exist and are becoming more complex. The new pressure to reaffirm the Article 5 guarantees through explicit contingency planning to reassure Russia's neighbors could reinforce Russia's concerns over NATO endorsement of US missile-defence plans and its continued open-door policy with regard to future enlargement. NATO argues that it will not, and should not, relinquish its decision-making autonomy, but an awareness of the deep-rooted historical suspicions on both sides would certainly help to avoid misunderstandings [Kanet, Larive: 2012].
The history of NATO-Russia relations is one of problems, mistrust and misperceptions; the relationship could hardly be characterized as a true partnership even before August 2008. Moreover, the fabric of cooperation, including the NATO-Russia Council, has not produced meaningful strategic rapprochement in terms of overcoming the legacy of Cold War perceptions or developing a common assessment of threats and capabilities to deal with them. From Moscow's perspective, relations during the 1990s and early 2000s involved a string of humiliating experiences in which NATO or significant member states exploited temporary Russian weakness: NATO enlargement in 1999 and again in 2004, the war in Kosovo, the non-ratification of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Western support for the 'color revolutions' in Georgia and Ukraine, US plans for deploying missile defences in Europe. While Russian interpretations of some of these may be somewhat peculiar, others do support the claim that the West does not hesitate to ignore Russian positions when doing so carries little cost [Kozin: 2012].
The Russia-Georgia war caught NATO completely unprepared. It was the EU, benefit-ting from the activism of the French presidency, which helped negotiate the ceasefire and
deployed a civilian observer mission to monitor it, with the side effect that Russia has discovered the EU as a potential security actor. Together with the time-honored Russian preference for bilateralism over engagement with multilateral institutions, currently reflected in an attempt to develop a new security dialogue with the new American administration, this has, for Moscow, put relations with NATO on the back burner. Russian leaders have accused NATO of breaking off relations and say it is now up to NATO to restore them. Moreover, senior Russian policymakers repeatedly assert, with thinly veiled reference to NATO operations in Afghanistan, that NATO needs Russia more than Russia needs NATO [Antonenko, Giegerich: 2009].
The Missile defence deal
When NATO leaders met in Lisbon, the possibilities for cooperation with Russia on missile defense looked promising. The NATO-Russian Council, with the participation of Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, specifically agreed on joint ballistic missile threat assessment and to continue dialogue in this area. The Council also agreed to resume Theatre Missile Cooperation and to develop a comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future framework for missile defense cooperation1.
Obama's decision to curtail missile defense systems in Central Europe had a positive effect on the U.S.-Russian relationship as the initial stages of the new approach no longer foresaw capability to target Russian ICBMs in addition to potential Iranian ones; this dual capability was the main reason Russia had cited in opposing the missile defense plans of the previous administration. These developments, along with Obama's other efforts to "reset" U.S.-Russian relations, including the signing of the New START Treaty in 2010, then set the stage for the positive NATO-Russia announcements at the Lisbon Summit [Babaeva: 2010].
Medvedev proposed a "sectoral" approach to the defense of Europe. According to his proposal Russia would be responsible for the defense of Europe from missile launches from
1 NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement, November 20, 2010
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68871.htm
the South-East effectively, from Iran so that NATO would not need to create a missile defense in the Eastern and South-Eastern sector i.e., one that could be theoretically used against Russia. Close integration of the NATO and the Russian missile defense systems was supposed to help provide a stable foundation for long-term cooperation between Russia and the Alliance.
The Russian desire for limits on the projected missile system continues to dominate the U.S./NATO-Russian dialogue. At root is the Russian concern that the projected system might, in the future, acquire the capability to intercept Russian strategic missiles and thus undermine the situation of mutual deterrence that Moscow regards as the foundation of its security. While Obama's decision has somewhat alleviated the tension that had dominated the U.S.-Russian discourse during the George W. Bush administration, Russian concerns now centre around Phase IV of the current program, set to begin in 2018, which will feature SM-3 Block IIB interceptors that are intended to intercept Iranian strategic missiles, but could, in theory, also intercept Russian ICBMs. The prospect of the United States moving ships equipped with interceptors in the Baltic Sea and to the north of Russian territory i.e., on the path of Russian missiles launched toward the United States appears particularly troubling to Moscow, especially since such deployment would take little time to implement. To prevent such a development, Moscow wants to establish legally binding limits on the future system: although Moscow has not precisely defined the parameters of such limits, these clearly include the number and the deployment areas of interceptors and some have also indicated the desirability of limits on the technical features of interceptors2.
The deployment of a global missile defense system by the United States and NATO undermines strategic stability in the world and prompts Moscow to take appropriate steps in response, says a leading Russian engineer.
2 See CNS analysis of that statement in Nikolai Sokov, "Medvedev's Statementon Missile Defense Might Mean Russia Postpones Further Dialogue until 2013," December 2, 2011.http://cns.miis.edu/stories/111202 medvedev stat ement.htm
In light of these developments Russia's plans to deploy tactical missile systems near the NATO borders are absolutely justified. The same thing concerns the creation of other forces and systems capable of destroying or disabling missile systems on the territories of neighboring states.
NATO announced at its Chicago summit in May that an interim European missile defense system is already on line, and that the alliance is determined to proceed with its expansion until it fully realizes the system's potential. The European missile defense system is certainly designed not to defend from a mythical threat on the part of Iran and North Korea, but from what Western politicians believe could be a possible attack by Russian ballistic missiles, according to him any NATO military plans classify the Russian nuclear missile potential as posing a threat to the alliance, which envisions certain measures to neutralize [Bridge: 2012].
Missile defenses will ostensibly protect allies against limited regional threats from the Middle East, but Moscow fears the system will eventually undercut its nuclear deterrent and has threatened dangerous military counter-measures. Yet the two sides are not as far apart as they seem and cooperation on missile defense can satisfy both.
Two years ago, in Lisbon, NATO and Russia resolved to work together and are still onboard. In April, Russia's foreign ministry explained that joint missile defense could "change the matrix" of Russia-NATO relations. The U.S. State Department has called missile defense "the metaphor for the opportunity of getting things right".
NATO says the defense, while facing daunting technical challenges, will be effective enough against a nuclear novice like Iran but will be useless against a sophisticated nuclear force like Russia's. U.S. Missile Defense Agency officials claim the system is "not positioned or designed to intercept" Russian longrange missiles [Creedon: 2012].
Moscow accepts that the hardware being deployed in the next six years is not the problem. However, Russia says its Ministry of Defense simulations show that modernized sensors and faster interceptor missiles in greater numbers and locations are worrying.
Moscow has not explicitly called for limits on future defense capability or a veto over future deployments. It wants "legal guarantees" specifying "technical-military criteria" ensuring that the system does not target Russia and allowing it to judge whether NATO actions correspond to plans. But any agreement requiring U.S. Senate ratification is a dead end. Instead, the State Department has offered political assurances, which Moscow claims are worthless because policies can change [New York Times, May 17, 2012].
Yet there are many opportunities for cooperation, and progress has already been made. Joint NATO-Russia and U.S.-Russia intelligence assessments of the missile threat have already been successfully completed and should convince Russia that NATO's plans are appropriate for the anticipated threat.
Both sides agree that preventing missile proliferation through diplomacy is essential. The Russian Foreign Ministry has pointed out it would be cheaper to tackle challenges before they evolve. Washington has said that: "Should the ballistic missile threat from nations like Iran be reduced, our missile defense system can adapt accordingly."
NATO and Russia have resumed joint theater missile defense exercises, the last one took place in Ottobrunn, Germany from 26th - 30th March 2012. Using computer simulations, the group has begun analyzing five concrete options for joint operations. Both sides agree that either side could pull the trigger, but there is no consensus yet on whether or how the two systems could be fully integrated.
Washington now proposes joint early warning and response planning centers - an idea originally suggested by Moscow in 2007. Last year, NATO and Russia demonstrated how data on potentially threatening aircraft could be shared; this could serve as a model.
There are several ways to address Russian concerns and simultaneously increase NATO security, and there is time. But Russia and NATO are talking past each other. Both sides seem driven more by politics than real threats. Russia resents that a major security decision is being made without consultation. NATO cannot allow the appearance of a major concession [Hendrickson: 2005].
New foreign policy challenge
The old NATO was based on the principle of collective security to militarily guarantee the territorial integrity of the clearly defined area of the NATO member states, against possible attacks by the then Soviet Union. (Article 5 of the 1949 Washington Treaty). The view of collective security is narrow, insufficient to counter the more sophisticated and subtle dangers it has faced until now and that NATO must broaden its strategic perspective to protect all its interests from the complex asymmetric threat and place new emphasis on the unpredictable and multi-directional nature of threats such as regional conflict, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism.
It was predicted that NATO's strategic orientation will shift in the coming years from East-West scenario to a North-South or a West-South East scenario, and thus cover an operational area which stretches from South Asia to Morocco.
For Russia, NATO represents a major foreign policy challenge that continues to create friction within the European security architecture. Although many expected the end of the Cold War to usher in a new era of cooperation, Russia and NATO have continued to harbour mutual suspicions and old biases. This work primarily analyses former Russian President Vladimir Putin's foreign policy against the backdrop of the evolution of Russia's relations with NATO leading up to the founding of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).
Russia under Boris Yeltsin experienced turbulent with NATO throughout much of the late 1990s. Espousing Russia's hopes of deepening itsties to the West, Yeltsin, during his visit to NATO headquarters in December1991, suggested that his country could apply for membership [Trenin: 2007]56.
However, this episode was quickly forgotten since neither NATO nor Russia followed up on the then Russian President's proposal. Since it had become apparent in the early 1990s that NATO, would not disintegrate but rather would evolve into a permanent fixture on the European security landscape, Russia began to more openly oppose NATO. We can trace early post-Cold War friction between NATO and Russia as far back as the reunification of Germany. In 1990 the immediate question for Soviet policy makers arose whether a
newly unified Germany would stay in NATO or not. During intensive diplomatic bargaining, Moscow is said to have accepted Germany's membership in NATO in exchange for the promise of not deploying troops or nuclear weapons eastwards. Therefore, when NATO began contemplating possible expansion into Central Europe, Russia viewed the policy as NATO's broken promise [Polikanov: 2004].
Faced with mounting opposition from nationalists and communists in the Russian Duma, Yeltsin and his pro-Western Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev were pressured to pursue a more confrontational policy towards NATO. Putin may be credited for recognizing Russia's weakness and adjusted his country's foreign policy to its diminished position. Putin's foreign policy has offered fewer "idle promises and bold initiatives" than his predecessor [Bobo Lo: 2003].
As for the overarching goal of his foreign policy, it appeared that Putin strove first and foremost to secure favourable conditions for Russia's internal development, concentrating on reducing tensions and improving relations with the outside world. Naturally, this approach was to be gradually reflected in Russia's approach to NATO [Bobo Lo: 2003].
Following its withdrawal from the PJC, Russian-NATO relations were at all time low though two major areas of discomfort with NATO stand out. First, Russia had difficulty coming to terms with the fact that NATO - a Cold War military organization whose main purpose had been to defend Europe against "Soviet aggression" - still operated. Russia wasted no time expressing its dissatisfaction with what it perceived as the Western-centric organization. To this end, Russia's 2000 National Security Concept spoke about the negative effects of "the attempt to establish a structure of international affairs based on the domination of the US-led developed Western nations over the international community [Melville, Shakleina: 2005].
In addition, the 2000 Military Doctrine expressed Russia's frustration over integration processes in the Euro-Atlantic region being carried out on a selective and limited basis [Melville, Shakleina: 2005]. Furthermore, NATO, at its 1999 Washington Summit approved a new strategic concept providing for
the possible use of force outside NATO's defense perimeter [Marcel de Hass: 2005]. With air strikes against Serbia, there was a growing anxiety about the possible use of coercive diplomacy against Russia1.
The 1999 NATO enlargement and the prospects of further expansion into Eastern Europe continued to irk Russia. A statement released by the Russian Foreign Ministry noted that the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance will not facilitate the strengthening of trust and stability in international relations, but can, on the contrary, lead to the appearance of new lines of division2.
The aftermath of September 11, characterized by the improvement in relations between the United States and the Russian Federation, laid the ground for U.S. aspirations to move forward with further NATO enlargement to the east and include even the former Soviet Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Indeed, Putin made a number of statements signaling a change in Moscow's stance on NATO eastern enlargement. Hence, Putin stated that if NATO takes on a different shape and is becoming a political organization, of course, we would reconsider our position with regard to such expansion, if we are to feel involved in the processes3.
Another concern of Moscow was the encirclement of the Russian enclave, Kaliningrad, by the new NATO member states. The apprehension of Moscow was that the existing military transit through the territory of Lithuania would be disrupted.
In the light of the vulnerability of the Kaliningrad region, Moscow started seriously thinking of deploying tactic nuclear warheads
1 James Sherr, "Russia and the West: A Reassessment," (Defense Academy of the UK, Advanced Research and Assessment Group, 2008), http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/
2 See Itar-Tass domestic news digest (12 March 1999). Retrieved 1 November 2008, from East View database.
3 V.V. Putin, cited by Suzanne Daley in "A Nation Chellenged: The Allies; Putin softens His Stance Against NATO Expansion," The New York Times, 4 October 2001 available at
http ://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/04/world/a-nation-
challenged-the-allies-putin-softens-his-stance-against-
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expan-
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in the Kaliningrad region. There was a strong assurance in Moscow that the expansion of NATO to the former Soviet Republics represented a red-line which Moscow should not allow the Alliance to cross. Despite fierce opposition from Moscow, the Bush administration not only ignored Moscow's national interests and concerns but also took advantage of its prevailing relative power to push forward with the eastern enlargement with even more determination. The Baltic States were given a special role in the process of NATO eastern enlargement on the territory of the former Soviet Union that is the role of a promoter of reforms and policy changes that could lead to the inclusion of CIS members in NATO.
The Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004with the accession of pro-Western Presidents to power facilitated the promotion of pro-NATO aspirations and the demise of Moscow's influence in its sphere of interest [Boro-nat: 2010].
Since the geographic border of the former USSR, with the accession of the Baltic States, has been crossed, the "eastward NATO expansion cannot stop with the second wave." The main interest of the USA, with the accommodation of NATO to the achievement of its policy interests, is to secure its presence in zones rich in energy resources and containing strategic energy routes as well as to obtain a strategically more favourable position in regard to the regional powers such as the Russian Federation and China, capable of even potentially disrupting the realization of the U.S. goals [Bogaturov: 2004].
Moscow's and U.S. interests are at stake in the Caucasus, Black Sea and Caspian regions for the control of energy resources and energy routes. Hence, the USA strongly promoted the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, carrying Caspian oil to the Mediterranean Sea and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. There are also plans initiated by the USA for the construction of the Nabucco gas pipeline from Turkey across Bulgaria-Greece-Romania diluting to Austria and Italy.
In the 2008 Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation, in order to achieve its interests, Russia will use all the available in-
struments: political and diplomatic, legal, military, economic, financial and other.
This perfectly illustrates Henry's Kissinger 'raison d'Etat concept which assumes that a state can use any means in pursuing its interests. The 'sticks and carrots' strategy that the same Kissinger conceptualized, is also, used by the Russian Federation in its foreign policy [Griffiths: 2003]. For example, it uses the 'carrots strategy' to offer benefits in the field of energy policy to the states that remain faithful and helpful to Moscow, thus being the cases of Belarus and Armenia, which pay less for the gas. 'The stick strategy' is used to punish the states that do not respect its interests. Examples in this sense: the punishments applied to the states that strengthened their ties with the West: gas crisis in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova and the war against Georgia. From 1997, the NATO expansion is perceived in all Russia's foreign policy documents as a threat to its national security. Russia sees the expansion as an intrusion in its sphere of influence, as an attempt to ignore Russia's interests and to weaken its influence in the world.
As member of an anarchic system, Russia considers that no one is entitled to command and no one indebted to obey [Waltz, Kenneth: 2006]. Therefore, the states must take into account other state's interests because as the war in Georgia signaled it, Russia has no moral obligation to restrain from any action if its interests are at stance. In this way we can understand why Russia is so constant in opposing to NATO's enlargement and some NATO's actions as it considers the NATO's open-door policy a direct affront to its national interests. The New Russian Military Doctrine from February 2010 also asserts that the main threat to the military security of Russia is NATO's expansion and its approach to its borders1.
A sensitive aspect for Russia's interest is the open-door policy that remains at the core of Alliance's goals "the door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Al-
1 Gramada, Angela, Noua Doctrina militara a Federatiei Ruse- document nou, pretentii vechi, in Brief Analysis (14 feb 2010) available at
http://www.cseea.ro/publicatii/view/brief-analysis/noua-doctrina-militara-a-federatiei-ruse-document-nou-pretentii-vechi (accessed on 28/01/2011.
liance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability2.
In respect to this aspect the provision regarding the will of the Alliance to continue and develop the partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia within the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions, based on the NATO decision at the Bucharest summit 2008, and taking into account the Euro-Atlantic orientation or aspiration [Gallis: 2008].
On 20th January 2009, Obama sent Vice President Joe Biden to Munich to present an outline of his foreign policy. Speaking specifically of Washington's relations with Russia, he said that The United States rejects the notion that NATO's gain is Russia's loss, or that Russia's strength is NATO's weakness.
In July 2011, Obama made his maiden, official visit to Russia where he signed a deal with Moscow on the use of Russian air space for transporting lethal materials and troops over Russian airspace to Afghanistan.
A rail route passing through Russia and Kazakhstan from Riga, Latvia, to the Uzbek-Afghan border had already become operational. In a speech to the students of New Economic School in Moscow, Obama expressed his appreciation for Russia's help in sending supplies to American troops in Afghanistan. There is one reality that there are more groups in United States who are critical of Russia and that no group came forward to support a friendly approach show the hesitation and suspicion which still exists in the NATO towards their traditional cold war rival and that in spite of the two powers moving closer the doors for confrontation are open in the future in different parts of the world for their respective geopolitical economic interests [Tsygankov: 2009].
Conclusion
U.S. relationship with Russia has been and will, for the foreseeable future, remain a mix of issues on which the two countries can cooperate and issues where their positions conflict. The goal for Washington should be to make progress on those issues where U.S. and Rus-
2 See NATO's New Strategic Concept, 25th November, 2010
Prehistory of Russia's Relationship wit sian interests coincide while protecting American positions and managing differences where interests diverge.
Washington and NATO should continue to pursue a cooperative missile defense arrangement with Russia. That prospect is currently stalled by Moscow's demand for a legal guarantee that U.S. missile defenses in Europe not be directed against Russian strategic missile forces. While it is reasonable for the Russians to be concerned that missile defenses could affect the offense-defense relationship that is a concern for the future. It is very difficult to see the U.S. plan for missile defenses in Europe over the next decade posing any serious threat to Russian strategic missiles.
A cooperative missile defense arrangement would be a significant achievement. It would remove one of the thornier issues from the U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia agendas; provide for a better defense of Europe than just a NATO system alone; and give the Russian military greater transparency about U.S. and NATO missile defense capabilities. Such transparency could help assure Moscow that those missile defense capabilities pose no threat. Such cooperation, moreover, could prove a "game-changer" in attitudes by making NATO and Russia genuine partners in defending Europe against ballistic missile attack.
Though Russia has a long and painful list of differences with the Western alliance, chiefly US-led plans to install a missile defense shield in Europe, it has grown increasingly anxious about NATO's loss of enthusiasm for the war in Afghanistan.
Withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan would be a very unfavorable development for Russia, as it would lead to dramatic worsening of the situation in Afghanistan, and perhaps a repeat of all the turbulence that followed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989.
Despite their persisting differences, Russia and NATO look set to turn a page in Lisbon and move on to end the division of Europe into hostile East and West. NATO continued to treat Russia as a threat, if no longer an outright enemy. It granted membership to not only former Warsaw Pact allies of the Soviet Union but also the ex-Soviet Baltic states, breaking its promise to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorba-
TO in the New Era (1991 -2012). Part Two. chev that it would not expand beyond the Cold War borders. It again breached its word to President Boris Yeltsin that it would desist from deploying military forces on the territory of its new members. NATO endorsed President George W. Bush's plan to set up missile defences in Poland and the Czech Republic that could target Russian strategic arsenals. America's European allies joined Washington in sponsoring "colour revolutions" in the former Soviet Union under the guise of promoting freedom and democracy. Russia saw these policies as aimed at isolating, encircling and weakening it.
The real game-changer in Russia-NATO relations has been the Alliance's deepening quagmire in Afghanistan. NATO badly needs Russian help for a face-saving endgame. In Lisbon, Russia and NATO are expected to sign agreements for increased Russian assistance to the U.S.-led NATO force that will include supply of gunship and transport helicopters, training of Afghan pilots and mechanics, and expansion of the overland transit arrangement to allow the so-called reverse transit of non-lethal armour and other equipment from Afghanistan. Russia will reiterate its commitment to renovate infrastructure and industrial projects it built in Afghanistan in Soviet times. Moscow said it would just stop short of sending troops to Afghanistan.
NATO has put behind its plans to grant membership to Ukraine and Georgia and has given the green signal for Russia's purchase of western arms: the path-breaking deal to sell Russia French Mistral amphibious assault ships is expected to be clinched shortly. NATO's new Strategic Concept to be unveiled in Lisbon will neither name Russia a potential challenge nor contain "any unpleasant surprises" for Moscow, according to Russia's NATO envoy (at that period) Dmitry Rogozin. The two sides are expected to present a joint review of common security challenges in the 21st century such as terrorism, piracy, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and natural and man-made disasters, and agree to enhance cooperation in these areas. Brussels has further accepted the Moscow proposal to launch an open dialogue in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council on ways of providing peace and stability in Europe.
At the same time, Russia and NATO remain wide apart on key strategic issues. Russia is firmly opposed to NATO extending its global reach over the head of the United Nations as the Alliance seeks to reposition itself for new challenges. "It's not a global Alliance but it is a global actor," U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder said defining NATO's new role under the new Strategic Concept. "We can't agree with the concept of global policeman," according to Russia's NATO envoy Dmitry Rogozin. Russia is particularly worried over NATO's decision to declare the Arctic Ocean a zone of its responsibility. Russia's military doctrine, approved in February, says one of the main external threats that come from plans to assign NATO a global role that will be played in violation of international law and the Alliance's expansion east of Russia's borders. The new NATO doctrine is expected to reaffirm the policy of open doors.
The transatlantic alliance is in the spotlight. Its summit meeting in Chicago is taking place at a time when the world's largest military organisation is in a dilemma of its own as far as its offshore engagements are concerned.
NATO's of late adventures, in fact, have blessed it with a new lease of life. Libya is strongly a case in point. Though its precision was not up to mark, its role was still appreciated, as it was instrumental in dislodging a well-entrenched dictator and that too by virtue of plugging off his military muscles before he put them to use. Irrespective of the fact that France, Britain and other European stalwarts depended highly on the United States expertise in choreographing the episode of bomb and retreat. The issue of what should enable Brussels to create a defence shield of its own and with little of Washington's input remains a policy doctrine for NATO. Similarly, the newly surfacing geopolitical realities in the form of a resurgent Russia, but cordial to the very concept of a Western-based defence umbrella, would keep policy-makers glued to their chairs until and unless they strike the right chord. Annoying Russia as it floats its own Eurasia vision is next to impossible and interdependence remains the hallmark of collaboration. Intricate issues such as fighting terrorism, missile defence shield and START II are indispensable aspects that would have their impact
on the structure and growth of the military-political organization.
NATO will continue developing cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia, according to the alliance's new strategic concept accepted in Lisbon by the 28 NATO members.
NATO intends to "continue and develop the partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia within the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions, based on the NATO decision at the Bucharest summit 2008, and taking into account the Euro-Atlantic orientation or aspiration of each of the countries," the document reads. The Strategic Concept will serve as the alliance's roadmap for the next ten years.
Ukraine has been seeking NATO membership under the previous leadership of President Viktor Yushchenko. His successor Viktor Yanukovych, who came to power in February, has said the country does not seek alignment with any military bloc, but pledged to maintain good strategic relations with NATO. The growing NATO-Russia defence cooperation agenda was welcomed as a sign of increasing trust and shared interests. Tangible projects to counter terrorism, the exchange of classified information; developing technology able to detect explosive devices; and ways to improve protection of critical infrastructure and Russian fighter jets are holding their first ever joint exercise over Poland and the Black Sea. This Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI) aims to prevent attacks such as 9/11 by sharing information and coordinating interceptions of renegade aircraft. And a Russian submarine joined for the first time a NATO submarine rescue exercise.
Moscow views NATO's military effort in Afghanistan as crucial for its own security interests, including helping to prevent instability from spreading into ex-Soviet Central Asia.
But the former Cold War rivals remain sharply at odds over a U.S.-led NATO missile defense plan in Europe that Washington says is aimed at deflecting a potential Iranian threat. Moscow fears it will eventually become powerful enough to undermine Russia's nuclear deterrent.
Despite those differences, Russia has also cooperated with the alliance in suppressing piracy off the Somalia coastline and in such
Prehistory of Russia's Relationship wit areas as anti-terrorism, counter-narcotics and search and rescue at sea.
Throughout the post-Cold War era, the Alliance has enjoyed an unprecedented ride in the driver's seat of international security. Its unparalleled resources, both material and symbolic, have drawn a line-up of membership applicants eager to change themselves and adjust to Brussels' requirements. Through seminar diplomacy, joint exercises, and other mechanisms, the Alliance was able to exert enough authority to transform the social and political fabric of many European countries.
From its very creation, the NRC (NATO-Russia Council) as well as its predecessor, the PJC (Permanent Joint Council) was the result of incompatible expectations. NATO wanted to engage with Russia, but only to an extent and without constraints. Moscow, for its part, was looking for an exclusive forum where significant matters of European security would be decided on equal terms. The mismatch got even worse after the Georgia War, which aroused fears among many of the newer Alliance members.
There is certainly a lot that the NRC can do, and it deserves the best energy from both Russia and the Alliance. But so long as it remains a meeting of 28 family members with their neighbour next door, expectations need to be reasonable.
With the benefit of 20 years hindsight, we now know a few things for a fact. To put it bluntly, Russia does not want to play Brussels' junior partner; and NATO is unprepared to let Moscow constrain its freedom. For better or for worse, these rules of the game are unlikely to change anytime soon. In this symbolic standoff, one should note, nobody is inherently right or wrong; the tension is relational, not individual. Moral blaming is part of the problem, not the solution.
By all accounts, it is startling that NATO-Russia relations remain structured by nuclear deterrence more than 20 years after the end of the Cold War. The political fight is long gone, yet thousands of warheads remain. This makes no financial sense in these hard-economic times. It makes no political and strategic sense either: deterrence is incommensurate with the politics of today's relationship and in any
TO in the New Era (1991 -2012). Part Two. event, it does not require current levels of armament and alert.
The nuclear arms race was a joint product of Moscow and NATO allies in a by-gone era of confrontation. Dealing with the fallout is, in the deepest sense of the term, a shared responsibility. The material incentives to disarm are huge; the symbolic payoffs are just as well. This is an opportunity for both parties to enjoy equal ownership of a peaceful initiative that would not fail to enlist other countries of the world. The political and strategic wind is blowing in the direction of nuclear disarmament; now is the time for Russia and NATO to re-assume world leadership together, while reaping significant benefits for themselves and putting their relationship on more fruitful tracks.
Unless mutual expectations are readjusted, NATO's traditional approach of waiting for the Russians to come around and understand that their country is not anymore, the Great Power that it used to be appears doomed to fail; and Moscow's age-old concern for status will keep meaningful cooperation hostage to symbolic power struggles.
After 20 years of half-hearted cooperation embroiled in fights over the new rules of the security game, it is time for NATO-Russia diplomacy to become less introspective and open up to the outside world. Nuclear disarmament seems a great opportunity to do just that.
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About the authors: Sanjay Deshpande -Director, Centre for Central Eurasian Studies, University of Mumbai; Shoaib Khan - Mahim Social Workers' College, Mumbai, Associated with Centre for Central Eurasian Studies.
