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12Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences 5 (2015 8) 852-863
yflK 165.324
"Plane of Immanence"
and Apology of Transcendence
Vitalii N. Drobyshev*
Russian Christian Academy of the Humanities 15 naberezhnaia reki Fontanki, Saint-Petersburg, 190000, Russia
Received 14.11.2014, received in revised form 19.12.2014, accepted 17.01.2015
The motive of immanence and its excogitation in philosophy of Gilles Deleuze is investigated in the article. Author shows the impossibility of equation of the existential absurdity and philosophical inconceivability, and, basing on this affirmation, excludes the possibility of theological perspective of the "Plane of immanence", in spite of the fact that the renewed concept of transcendental lies outside the realm of idem perspective. The overcoming of faith in Deleuze's philosophy strings along with circumstantiation of the terms of real experience, opposable to terms of its possibility as such. However, the analysis of this philosophy in its apophatic perspective shows the impossibility of replacing hypothetical character with the reality of experience.
Keywords: Deleuze, apophasis, faith, transcendence, immanence, existential.
Research area: philosophy.
Christian theology, focused on a real life of man and speaking about the immanence of God, is not surprising us today. In this behalf the advantages of immanent God over the transcendent appear to be tempting, since they open a ways for topical sermon, which advocates for improvement of the world in alignment with its inner divine deepness.
There are no difficulties to see that this theology feeds up not only by the common transformation of religiosity, in which all the evidence of fatigue of transcendent can be simply discovered, but also by the thought which propels pan(en)teism to the new level of conceptualization. Among the modern concepts that feed up immanent theology, the major ones seems to be the "faith without faith" that inherits
the deconstruction, and "plane of immanence". In this article we will turn to the philosophy of G. Deleuze with intent to, by the example of this philosophy, trace the disruption of transcendent and resolve the issue of the possibility of immanence to become a theological condition.
1. The motif
"Plane of immanence" appears as a explicate substantiation of the motif of immanence. Agreeing with this motif, live can be only justified by the multiplicity, whereas endurance that underlines it can not be enchained by discrete cohesions of totalizations and subjectifications. Founding of authorities, which unify life and keep under the multiplication of differences, as it peculiar, according to Deleuze, to the Plato's ideas,
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* Corresponding author E-mail address: v.drobyshev@mail.ru
renders it into the iteration of "The Same", which it, per ce, can not be. Transcendental represents proximate implementation of this strategy, which is as peculiar to human's nature, as it appears as something that has to be surmounted. Following Deleuze and Guattari:
"There is not the slightest reason for thinking that modes of existence need transcendent values by which they could be compared, selected, and judged relative to one another. On the contrary, there are only immanent criteria. A possibility of life is evaluated through itself in the movements it lays out and the intensities it creates on a plane of immanence: what is not laid out or created is rejected"1.
Here they also stress, that the "men of a transcendence or a faith", even ones like Paskal and Kierkegaard, practically pursue a purpose of intensification of life, so far as they preoccupied "with the infinite immanent possibilities brought by the one who believes that God exists".
Subject appears to be an essence oflife flowing inside it, and as it becomes more automatic and void of wholeness, as freely its flow performed. The problem of human subjectivity lies in the fact that it gets caught into the net of representation with the pole as identity of "I". This identity determines all the illusions of transcendence, including God, which is invoked to give the subject eternal meaningfulness. Transcendental, even when its freed from "I", serves the same purpose as transcendent, as long as it is determined by the dimension of consciousness2. Plus, explicated by Kant, it appears to be the same abstraction towards conditions of the real experience, as empiricism, that has been rejected by him, whereas in both cases thought is not able to explain (more precisely, implement) the process of individualization3.
Persuasion of this argument is based on an idea that conditions of real experience of life could
not be subordinated to the conditions of potential experience that compose the first step towards the transcendent. Here we deal with apparency, i.e. with the kind of experience that proves itself. But in any of this apparency the moment, in which this proof can not be accomplished, shows up sooner or later.
Undoubtedly, in the name of Deleuze we deal, by no means, not with "speculative thinker" that organizes the system of mediations. But the paradox of temporalizing towards eternity, of which Kierkegaard spoke, appears to be wider than the conditions of the real experience, on which Deleuze's system based on. If higher activity is unconscious, and self-consciousness appears to be its mode in which it runs out and can resurrect only through self-destruction of this negative power, then such game of virtuality with itself appears to be too primitive compare with transcendent aspirations of existential. Absurd eternity of soul, that beginning in time, goes beyond representation and isn't a result of pushing it to the «orgiastic» limits, not least because it excludes meaningless iteration of fold/unfold Being and appeal to experience, which spreads far beyond limits of not only transcendental conditions ("indifference of possibility", as Kierkegaard spoke), but the conditions of reality as well. That output has its circumstantiation based on idea that consciousness can not be determined by anything more «stupid», than itself, whereas this «something» makes semblance of possessing resources (matter or virtual powers) aimed to make an actual being. With allowance for immateriality of virtual we can repeat well-known arguments against the concept of matter that produces consciousness. Thus, ascention towards superconciousness stands against reduction to unconsciousness.
The motif of immanence stops in a point that Kierkegaard explains as «religiousness A».
Nevertheless, existence doomed to become an eternal solution in time, i.e. to determine itself in eternity, even if this eternity is a «eternal return». Discrepancy between «now» of existence and eternity, in only which this «now» gains significance, can not have a meaning of just an illusion, by virtue of the fact that it is constitutive for existence that exceeds own extremity.
Here, following Bergson, it seems possible to say that this «existential surplus» only shows that there is the delay at the base of the mode of human existence in response to external impact, which, by its nature, tends to complicate. I.e. there would be a question of reason as an ability that determines human being, and of weakness of arguments (from value, from the absurd and from conflict - Deleuze mentions them at the very beginning of its work on Kant4) in favor of the gap between nature and culture. But the matter is not in the production of the transcendent itself, which occurs as if it's being forced to, due to the fact that the mind requires a completed synthesis, but in its content. Immortality and eternal bliss are the subjects of faith. Although Deleuze did not consider faith as an independent ability, it is clear that the transcendental use of reason would be devoid of any existential meaning if it did not meet the requirements of faith in the conjugation of its absurd things with a real life experience. Therefore, the work of the reason is determined not only by need of completed synthesis, but mainly by the question of the meaning of existence. And this meaning does not stop only on a human's life (here Bergson's objections could be extended), but about being in general. Even statement that the question of the meaning of life is not valid, because being is its own meaning, means, that at the moment this illegal questioning being does not belong to himself unreservedly. This is most noticeable when it comes to novelty as the essence of life. Discourse on «vanity of
vanities» problematizes this novelty in the same existential sense in which it is intended to serve as a basis for understanding and transformation of the person as it turns out that in human being who rose above the vanity, life continues and absents at the same time.
However, the motif of the transcendent is not able to establish itself completely. How to call "the eternal bliss" something that is not determined by earthly experiences, without which this concept in general might not occur, remains under wraps for this motif. In other words, this motif transcends life only negatively, requiring such of it transformation, which excludes vitality, despite the fact that it comes out of it. Thus, transcendental bliss appears an immanent figure and receives meaning only out of it. Although the motive of immanence also can't dispense without the requirement for the transformation of human existence, he pushes it to life to become the most adequately to its essence. At the same time, its strong words that the human self is vindictive by nature, saddled with a bad conscience, etc. destroy themselves, because they assume some absolute subjectivity, in which all these negative assessments are possible. Isn't then Being become God that conquered subjectivity, i.e. in result no less absurd than transcended life?
Thus, the rivalry of immanent and transcendent motifs on the existential level does not give benefits to any of them. Therefore, each of them is committed to the secondary substantiation by which he could establish itself as a principle of life.
In this area, where the reason is called for serving the faith, the authority of Kant is, in our opinion, immutable, as the end result of any criticism of his teachings became, at best, one or other modification of what he called the regulative principle of reason. In this respect, the theory of immanence from Hegel to Deleuze5 is no exception.
2. Three senses of the transcendent
In the "plane of immanence" transcendent is a figure of this plan, which is always conceptual, i.e. anyway laying out, inventing, and creating according to the philosophical faculty of coadaptation of these three elements. Immanence appears here radically different than in the dialectic, but the principle of returning to the world of what was taken from it by transcending remains unchanged. Following Zizek we can say that, according to this principle, transcendent destiny is radically contingent corporeal leftover6, in which it is forced to incarnate: the figure of resemblance, «fractured I», dead God. Transcendent appears transformed form of immanent, requires overcoming for the truth's sake. Despite the fact that the task of overcoming has been set for a long time in a variety of versions, it still can't succeed due to ambiguity of what actually has to happen. Deleuze, on an encyclopedic scale, tried to show the sprouts of this new reality in many different areas of life, but it did not result in the destruction of other views on the same things. In addition, competition theories that return transcendental to immanence excludes an option that would be acceptable to everyone, which could become a real scientific paradigm or social principles. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the «transcendental empiricism» that replaced dialectic will not suddenly become helpless in front of a new vision of reality. But lets assume that this overcoming has happened. Then it must become a memory, in the name of which the highest academic judgment of the theories and opinions would be carried out. Apostates will be blamed for an intent to unify life in spite of its diversity and adopt any one of its tendency as dominant over at the expense to others. Apart from the fact that in this way the principle of selection of suitors, for which Deleuze did not like Platonism, will be revived, that will also come to the fact that memory itself has ceased
to be the pure past, which, according to Deleuze, has never been real. This memory will differ little from what Hegel called the end of history: the spirit that reached an absolute identity, should be forever guarding over its own degradation to what he has already overcome.
We do not bring the idea of immanence to the level of absurd by such thinking, but show that it has its transcendental degree and exists only in its perspective. Whenever transcendence returns to earth, it's recreated once again, because it turns up to be the idea that every time slipping out of the entity into which has been caged by mind in order to return to the immanence. Speaking in Derrida's terms, it appears to be an impossible idea, or rather the idea of impossibility as such. Even by accusing a category of possible in predetermining Being in alignment with unification, totalization and subjectivation, then, on this basis, will not be impossible to suspect that it is a superlatively possible, claiming semantic commonality between the actualization of Being and, as a consequence, the supremacy of Identity, since no Equality can rely on supremacy that sanctioned by transcendent, which is not defined by analogies and resemblances. "One and the same cast of Being", of which Deleuze often says, is another name for the transcendent, which in itself is not differenciated, and even not differentiated. That is why differentiated Virtuality is essentially a regulatory principle that cages transcendent into the rigid framework of Differences. Being, Memory, Impersonality replaced God, immortal soul and good sovereign. As we can see, it is not necessary to declare the transcendence as supreme being and settle it in heaven in order to save its transcendence. It only expresses the fact that no sort of experience reaches its own grounds, which would be given in it as well as its objectivity that composes it, and therefore tends to its completion by the configuration that it can offer to itself as what it
defines (makes it real), according to one or the other "philosophical taste."
Whatever this taste happens to be, it states as a last truth of Being either becoming, repeal any purpose, or some of its perfect condition to which or in which it is becoming carried out. And if the sense of the transcendent is determined only by this statement, then we would be dealing only with which of the antinomy of pure reason it is possible to build one or another "plan of immanence" and how best to configure the "thing-in-itself" to connect, with the least contradictory, the real experience with what it is not given in it, but claimed by it.
Although this sense is well founded, it remains a very abstract with respect to motivation, which was the subject of discussed above. Whatever to be the content of such transcendence, it is unable to resolve the existential paradox of temporalizing to eternity. At this point, the Reason is useless for other abilities that were hoping for him as a force capable of bringing them beyond their limits. Among all the abilities, faith is different in the fact that such withdrawal means its death. As soon as one of the ability achieves a configuration in which it imagines that it has performed itself absolutely, an activity of faith ends. In contrast, when each ability finds out that it can not serve as either themselves or to others for their ultimate goals, only faith harmonize their action, using the combined services of all of them. The retribution for such harmony is absurd, which also appears to be the rational absurd (e.g., creatio ex nihilo), moral (Abraham) and aesthetic (Cross). Deleuze keeps away from the faith and takes absurd beyond the abilities, where it becomes a "para-sens" of virtual Ideas that stimulate the disjointed and paradoxical using of abilities7. But such a move obviously transcends experience in the direction of the Difference that acquires features of hypostatized reality, and thus remains as a move of a «speculative thinker».
For Deleuze games with the transcendent mean intensification of life which is inspired whenever its call for the re-developing of the aligned space where it can fulfill it's potential in a new way and, on this basis, to require the virtual additional funding. But every intensification of such kind can be understood also as building a hierarchy in which the concepts of immanence become the figures of transcendent. If we return to the motivation, we can see that life is motivated by the death of no less than the living, and that every renovation brings the same unattainable, to which human life is closer than any of those that are known to us, and therefore able to be cultural. Maybe someone excites becoming-wolf, but this excitement would not subsist if it was not a man. Therefore, it can't be excluded that the formation as a becoming-god is the sense of human life, which defines and because of what there are all the other senses. To put this becoming to a reverse movement in the plan of immanence means to lose the opportunity to ever perform it. Thus, the second sense of the transcendent determined by the ability of faith and lies in absurd overcoming of earthly life. It is impossible cancel or reduce it to the first meaning, because it is religious by its own nature and provides a radical transformation of immanence.
Here it should be noted that the concept, by which faith determines the Reason on its antithetical way, is nonbeing. And Deleuze, following this path, objectively can not deal without this notion, contrary to the critic he subjected it to putting a false problem. Being, which smoothes its folds, gives, seemingly, good reason to assert complete disappearance of subjectivity, the unity of which is, moreover, illusory. But the problem of total disappearance can not be solved in this way, even if we endow transcendent virtuality with attribute of undifferenciated, which is quite clear for the language of actuality8 (like the ocean, which rolling on its surface, not separated from it,
and at the same time contains it all as it may be, in itself). The fullness of the virtuality excludes such disappearance, but assumes an infinite non-actuality of the person, which made its way of life, and the same non-identical repetition of it in other worlds. This endless «reincarnation» occurring at the behest of the supreme cause, establishes a kind of eternity - eternal duration, which passes into moments of actualization. But as only difference repeated (actualized) rather than identity, «zeroing mechanism» must take its place in a virtuality, which although presents itself not a universal fire, as of the Stoics, but still excludes an accumulation of the actual memory9. Otherwise, Being should be replenished despite its entirety, even if to think it as infinite. (If fullness is an infinite flow within itself, then infinity turns into limit, which this fullness can not cross to be determined only by itself. Moreover, the novelty, the difference, deviation, etc. have its meaning only in relation to something antecedent, concluded in resemblance, analogy, etc.). Ontological meaning of forgetting is impossible without non-being, which doesn't belong to Being, i.e., is not a «being of the problematic» or negation, managing the actuality of existence. But in the order of univocity there is no such a non-being. This means that in the very existence there must be a mechanism that is contrary to its nature, but at the same time belongs to it as its own. It is not difficult to see the same paradox here, by which the existential is determined, with the difference that the temporalizing towards eternity turns into eternal temporalizing, in which a single cast of Being and eternal forgetting «always return». This is quite subjective structure by its nature that, even freed from the «personal measuring», becomes absurd object that faith claims beyond its philosophical denial in a «plan of immanence».
Not every person can be gladden by the perspective of memory lapses that frees him away from the endless, even though diverse,
state of being in the «vanity of vanities.» Some would prefer that metaphysical oblivion deals with him forever in spite of the joy that Deleuze promised from behind Spinoza. But, in any case, transcending life towards eternity, intensification or absolute extinction is determined not by the dictates of experience, but by a thirst for death, which is driven by faith that mobilizes ability to conquer the absurd that it claims by itself.
Generally, the reason (and not only the reason) is not willing to put up with this reality. Often enough power of thought inspires it so much that the reason, as it seems to itself, is able to overcome the absurd and destroy the faith, and it is exemplified by the philosophy of Deleuze. Those passages of thought by which he reduces to a minimum the possible gap between the virtuality and the actuality10, form configuration that claims the Difference as the principle of Being, enclosed in itself, and not in any transcendent source.
Here we come to apophasis, in which the third sense of the transcendent is defined. This meaning is established through denial, leading to mutual «first-origination»11 of being and thinking, i.e., through the absolute negation of the Other or the One and positing such a Being that does not possess its own beginning, and non-being that does not belong to being in any sense. This transcendence can be denied for the benefit of the immanence of Identity or Difference toward Being that contains the non-being as its own negativity, which is conceptualized dialectically or acquires a sense of what Deleuze called the (non)-being, or ?-being12 (other conceptualizations are possible as well). But this denial is as hypothetical as statement that opposed to it, and also derived from it.
Modern critique of metaphysics comes from the fact that the transcendence in this third sense represents hyper-person called God that creates world. This statement is true with regard to theology, using the apophatic method
for the ascent to the «God without being» and equivocity interpretation of the uncreated and created being. But it is not effective against apophatic transcendence13. As it well-known, the second part of Plato's "Parmenides" was not of the benefit, neither of an immortal soul, nor of the creation. Although the One of this dialogue presumes its teologization which reached the top in neo-Platonism, it is inherently unteological and strictly hypothetical, what is particularly well seen from the end of the dialogue. We note in passing that Deleuze certainly right in saying that the Other has the same rights as the One14, and this is true not only for the Other as a «model» for the simulacrum, i.e. not only in the sense of «transcendence in immanent «, but first and foremost as an apophatic principle that determines the being, but is not defined by it.
To the hypothetical procedure that, according to Deleuze, distorts the true movement of thought, he opposes the motion from the problematical to the question15. The motif of the proliferation of differences is a leading thing in this opposition, for which the hypothesis is something that contains the principle of choosing the best, i.e., determines the selection of claimants for the truth according to the moral imperative, and thus prevents the approval of fortuity, through which the eternal return of differences occurs. But it is obvious that in such a manner the Difference is excluded from hypotheses and becomes imperative that appeals to the conditions of a well-defining «real experience», including moral one, because it condemns resentment, «bad conscience», etc. From the apophatic point of view this denial of hypothetical remains hypothetical, because it sets the rules of interpretation of the experience and criteria for the of actual creativity, making a circle in justification. Apophatic reason goes away from the concreteness of experience to identify the limiting conditions of its possibility. The reality is not completed by Reason. Even when Reason
says about the coincidence of thinking and being, it is not able to carry out such an experience that would exceed its capabilities. It is possible to derive the rules from the «transcendental empiricism» and «mysticism of concepts»16 that reason must follow to «make, remake and unmake» its concepts, but not what lies at the basis of the conditions of reality of its experience. Hypothetical is the essence of absolute experience of Reason and it does not specify not only the rules of the game, but the game itself, equalizing the rights of sedentary and nomadism. Game is set by faith or ability that declared the abolition of faith17.
Badiou insists that behind the visibility of rejection of the opposition of the One and Multiple Deleuze's univocal Being asserts the renewed concept of the One18. However, in one of those passages to which he refers, Deleuze writes: None the less, the core of the notion is the constitution of a substantive in which 'multiple' ceases to be a predicate opposed to the One, or attributable to a subject identified as one. Multiplicity remains completely indifferent to the traditional problems of the multiple and the one, and above all to the problem of a subject who would think through this multiplicity, give it conditions, account for its origins, and so on. There is neither one nor multiple, which would at all events entail having recourse to a consciousness that would be regulated by the one and developed by the other19. Is it possible, following Badiou, to say that univocity of Being more or less speaks in favor of the fact that such withdrawal from the opposition of one and multiple provides qualitative raising up of one of its terms (One)? In the cited passage transcendental field is implied, the field that is free from determination as that of a consciousness, which, as we know, always requires subjectivation. In addition, as Badiou reminds us, Deleuze rejects
intentionality also because all manifestations of being are external to each other and none of them (including consciousness) has the advantage of implication the others, to represent them. In this light, the One and the Other appear as forms of Identity, through which consciousness is trying to implicate the Being, i.e, as if to make it out of itself. Therefore, if the statement Badiou is correct, thus only in the sense of the One-All of which he speaks, i.e., in the sense of "the transcendent in the immanent." For consciousness, that demands a subject to itself, to deny themselves in favor of the higher unconscious activity, it needs to be regulated by the one and developed by the other, i.e. be capable of such a denial, unless of course it does not consider this unconsciousness more "stupid" than itself.
The One and the Other are indistinguishable at the level of first hypothesis. The difference between them comes along with being, and exactly on the basis of this distinction one of them becomes approved as the foundation of being. Since the principle of being, for Deleuze, is the Difference (moving horizon, an always decentred centre), One-All refers rather to the apophatic Other than to the One. The Other, when it comes down to the level occupied by the One in the second hypothesis of "Parmenides" appears as a continuous simulation of unity, which serves the return of the Other. This simulation is, actually, being, defined by the Other. To be is to make a golden figurines and immediately throw them into smelting chamber.
Deleuze's virtuality, always remaining superfluous in relation to the actual, deprives relationship between the actualities its productive creative force, as it was in the Stoic ontology20. Since the distinction and communicating do not belong to the essence of things, but being concentrated in essence of Being, from which they come, all becoming-of-something embodies not transcendent pattern that refers to the One, but
the inherent power of Difference, which provides identity fleeting sameness of existance and realizes that what Hegel called as "concreteness of the absolute". Like the Absolute Spirit, Deleuze's Virtuality does not receive content from the current becoming (although the motif of infinite novelty hampers it), but it differs by infinitely avoiding identity and at the same time it preserves the unity of «cast of Being» - higher simulation of its identity.
3. The Immanence and Theology
Theology is based on the existential sense of transcendent, so whenever the border of this sense being trespassed, it risks to mingle with philosophy. We must admit that to define this border in some specific cases can be very difficult. Disputes around the theme of negative theology in the works of Derrida clearly showed that even apophasis remains a territory of mixed philosophical and theological discourses, even though it should primarily serve their differentiation, making the clearest distinction between inconceivable and absurd. Inconceivable, when it somehow conceived, tends to displace the absurd with the assistance of the faith. Therefore, the analysis of a particular philosophy in its apophatic perspective is able to show how this displacement occurs. By Deleuze, as we see, in negative Otherness substantiates the mechanism of One-All, which provides comprehension of the higher unconscious activities of the virtuality and in a new way repeats the formula of Nicholas of Cusa - "attingitur inattingibile inattingibiliter21». A bit different mechanism finds himself in «impossible» of Derrida and Caputo. But the driving force for all of these configurations is faith, which reason for existence is its own death.
Since man is doomed to believe, the cases of overcoming faith remain a private matter of «speculative thinker» and those who managed
to lug off (on the other side is fanaticism, when faith commits suicide without the help of other abilities). But even in these cases, faith can't disappear without a trace, saving as a passive synthesis of assurance. We noted above that in the depth of Deleuze's thought concluded the absurd that permeates the «eternal return», since the fact that the great Forgetting is impossible without non-being, whereas it has no place even in being. This absurd is safely protected by the sight of Being, which smoothes its folds, and by the denial of the transcendent seen in univocity of Being. However, from the apophatic point of view it is clear that the Difference remains hypothetical, like Identity, and that the way in which Deleuze learned its incomprehensibility, can not overcome the absurdity of existence in order to take its place. Denial of the soul and eternal bliss enclosed in this comprehension, fully inherits the hypothetical, which characterizes denial of apophatic transcendence and the Difference. However, the power of thought of Deleuze is so high that creates the apparition of a complete overcoming of faith.
Is it permissible, in that case, to talk about Deleuze's theology? Of course, his philosophy can be interpreted theologically, just like any other22. One may wonder whether to consider a "plan of immanence" as a challenge to the faith, to which it must respond, or as a condition of faith, i.e. a moment of its own that hasn't been realized by it yet. There's also a great temptation to follow the path of moral obligation, which is approved by Deleuze, to discover his religious motives. But all of these approaches will not respond to the question ad rem, especially now, when the word "ontotheology" became a shibboleth that marks the accordance of discourse to contemporary philosophical process. If theology is a thematizing of faith, then we don't find it in Deleuze's ideas, because he does not thematizes even assurance behind which the absurd of Forgetting hides.
This means that we, basically, can only talk about the denial of theology by Deleuze, i.e., about his methods of overcoming those motives and configurations that were born by faith in revelation. His thoughts on this subject are known too well to repeat them here, so we emphasize only on their anti-theological focus, which subject is to expose the existential illusions. Nietzsche's concept of the death of God is crucial here. However, as Deleuze says, the last philosopher of "death of God" was Feuerbach, and for Nietzsche the essence of this event is the death of a man who is not longer determined by the God-form23. At Foucault, about whom Deleuze repeats a question of Overman, he finds four folds of subjectivation, the latter of which - fold of the outside itself - determines the force that shapes human beings as creature of expectation, i.e., implying the meaning and destiny of his self24. Hence it becomes the defining question of what is the outside itself, which will participate in the future becoming of subjectivity. It is obvious, that a Virtual should become this external, abolishing God and the perspective of eternal bliss in favor of diversity and new forms of life. Although the claim that Virtuality revives the transcendental under a different name is not unreasonable25, it is «transcendent in immanent,» as we have already noted, can be considered as theological only in the virtue of mixing absurdity and inconceivability, negative theology and apophasis, i.e. in on behalf of Reason that considers itself as the winner over faith or in the interests of faith that considers itself being conquered by Reason and became what Zizek calls «unfaith» 26.
The formula of Overman confronts the existence, challenging its paradoxical nature at one side of which is temporalization to eternity, and on the other - the abandonment into a fallen world, or worse, a faceless Being, generating personality in a amazing manner27. The true form time, according to Deleuze, contains only
the past and the future, which subdivides the of the elusive Time does not prevent from the
present to infinity in both directions, depriving «dialectic of uncertainty», which casts doubt on
present of its extension, which would allow the possibility of understanding reality, based
subjectivity to subdue the time, caging it in only on conditions of real experience. It appears to
the networks of teleology28. The present is not be too senseless in its endless renewal, giving the
lost. It is simply absent, like the monolithic soul impression of Being, which expelled its creator
which made it up to impose Being a problem of and now doomed to multiply itself with its own
eternity, and through it to establish itself as its repetition, in which one can only infinitely die
last truth. and believe that God still gives people traceless
Probably, human spirit did not know such a death, which is impossible, but it remains the
dizzying fall in impersonality after Buddha. But only hope if the rejection of eternal life already
even this captivating by its depth interpretation can not be cancel.
Deleuze G., Guattari F. What is Philosophy? New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. P. 74. Ref.: Deleuze G. The logic of sense. London: The Athlone Press. 1990. P. 98 - 99, 102, note 5 on p. 343 - 344. Detailed on this issue: Bryant L.R. Difference and givenness: Deleuze's transcendental empiricism and the ontology of immanence. Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2008. P. 38 and other.
Deleuze G. Kant's critical philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties. London: The Athlone Press, 1984. P. 1 - 2.
Just as Hallward remarks, Hegel was not much an antagonist but a rival of Deleuze. Ref.: Hallward P. Out of this world.
Deleuze and philosophy of creation. London, New York: Verso, 2006. P. 6.
Zizek S. The Sublime Object of Ideology. London, New York: Verso, 2008. P. 234.
Deleuze G. Difference and Repetition. London, New York: Continuum, 2001. P. 194.
Perhaps we are mistaken, but if virtuality, in everything that Deleuze says about it, shows itself as an intensification of the actuality, we have to admit that the actuality represents virtuality.
Deleuze speaks of forgetting, or, to be more exact, about the «forgetting of forgetting» (Deleuze G. Essays Critical and Clinical. London, New York: Verso, 1998. P. 93. Deleuze G. Foucault. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2006. P. 107 - 108) as of something that is coextensive to memory, and about the memory as a necessity of renewal, re-making. See also: Deleuze G., Guattari F. Politique et psychanalyse. Alencon: Des mots perdus, 1977. P. 58; Deleuze G. Proust et les signes. Paris: Quadrige / Presses Universitaires de France, 1998. P. 90; Deleuze G. Cinema 1. The Movement-Image. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. P. 127 and note 4 on p. 234; Deleuze G. Difference and Repetition, P. 7 - 8, 140.
On the method of this minimalization ref. to: Badiou A. Deleuze The Clamor of Being. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000. P. 31 - 42.
Библер В.С. От наукоучения - к логике культуры: Два философских введения в двадцать первый век. - М.: Политиздат, 1990. С. 396. Deleuze G. Difference and Repetition, p. 64.
Светлов Р.В. До Витгенштейна ли Дамаскию? // Вестник Русской Христианской Академии, 2011, Т. 11, 2010, вып. 4 С. 51-55.
Deleuze G Plato and the Simulacrum / Deleuze G. The logic of sense, p. 258, note 3 on p. 361. Deleuze G. Difference and Repetition, p. 197. Ibid., p. XX.
We understand the difficulty of the question of faith which lives only because it dies, but we can not strike into the «dialectic of uncertainty « any deeper in this paper. Badiou A. Deleuze. The Clamor of Being, p. 10 - 11. Deleuze G. Foucault, p. 13 - 14.
For more information on this issue ref to: Hallward P. Op. cit., p. 48.
It can be interesting to note that S.L. Frank, continuing the work of Nicholas of Cusa and developing his theory of possibilities-being through the concept of «being able» (das Können, vis), says that the things that make up the cause-and-effect series actualize transfinite reality «x», which considers the limit to rational determinism . The obvious similarity of this panentheistic «x» and Deleuze's virtuality suggests One-All as one of the main strategies of immanence.
For the examples of such interpretation ref. to: Hallward P. Op. cit., p. 54; Simpson C.B. Deleuze and Theology. London, New Delhi, New York, Sidney: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2012 Deleuze G. Foucault, p. 129 - 130. Ibid., p. 104.
Simpson C.B. Op. cit., p. 79. According to Simpson, Deleuse repeats the gnostical narrative of resurrection of the lost perfection. In view of fullness of Virtuaityl and univocity of Being, we can hardly speak of such repetition, but it is
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undoubtfull that this fullness is problematique due to the imperative of novelty that Deleuze follows. Slavoj Zizek. Towards a Materialist Theology, Angelaki, 2007, Vol. 12, № 1. P. 26.
Jonas H. The gnostic religion: the message of the alien God and the beginnings of Christianity. Boston: Beacon Press, 2001. P. 320 - 340.
Deleuze G. The logic of sense, p. 164.
References
1. Badiou A. Deleuze The Clamor of Being. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
2. Bibler, V.S. Ot naukoucheniia - k logike kul'tury: Dva filosofskikh vvedeniia v dvadtsat' pervyy vek [From Epistemology to the Logic of Culture: Two Philosophic Introductions into the Twenty First Century]. Moscow: Politizdat, 1990.
3. Bryant L. R. Difference and givenness: Deleuze's transcendental empiricism and the ontology of immanence. Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2008.
4. Deleuze G., Guattari F. What is Philosophy? New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
5. Deleuze G., Guattari F. Politique et psychanalyse. Alencon: Des mots perdus, 1977.
6. Deleuze G. Foucault. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2006.
7. Deleuze G. Difference and Repetition. London, New York: Continuum, 2001.
8. Deleuze G. Essays Critical and Clinical. London, New York: Verso, 1998.
9. Deleuze G. Proust et les signes. Paris: Quadrige / Presses Universitaires de France, 1998.
10. Deleuze G. Cinema 1. The Movement-Image. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1997.
11. Deleuze G. The logic of sense. London: The Athlone Press. 1990.
12. Deleuze G. Kant's critical philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties. London: The Athlone Press, 1984.
13. Hallward P. Out of this world. Deleuze and philosophy of creation. London, New York: Verso, 2006.
14. Jonas H. The gnostic religion: the message of the alien God and the beginnings of Christianity. Boston: Beacon Press, 2001.
15. Simpson C.B. Deleuze and Theology. London, New Delhi, New York, Sidney: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2012.
16. Zizek S. The Sublime Object of Ideology. London, New York: Verso, 2008.
17. Svetlov, R.V. Do Vitgenshteyna li Damaskiiu? [Would Nicholaus of Damascus Care Of Wittgenstein?] // Russian Christian Academy Newsletter, 2011, Vol. 11, 2010, issue 4. P. 51-55.
18. Slavoj Zizek. Towards a Materialist Theology, Angelaki, 2007, Vol. 12, № 1. P. 19-26.
Плоскость имманентности и апология трансцендентности
В.Н. Дробышев
ЧОУ ВПО Русская христианская гуманитарная академия Россия, 190000, Санкт-Петербург, набережная реки Фонтанки, 15
В статье исследуется мотив имманентности и его концептуализация в философии Ж. Делёза. Автор показывает невозможность отождествления экзистенциальной абсурдности и философской непостижимости и на этом основании исключает возможность теологического прочтения "плана имманенции", несмотря на то, что за ним открывается обновленное понятие трансцендентного. Преодоление веры в философии Делёза следует за обоснованием условий реального опыта, противопоставляемых условиям его возможности и гипотетичности как таковой. Однако анализ этой философии в ее апофатической перспективе показывает невозможность замещения гипотетичности реальностью опыта.
Ключевые слова: Делёз, апофазис, вера, трансцендентность, имманентность, экзистенциальный.
Научная специальность: 09.00.00 - философские науки.
