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29Original Papers / Оригинальные статьи
Modern Understanding of Law / Современное правопонимание
UDC 340.1
DOI: 10.37399/2686-9241.2021.1.14-30
Legal Understanding, Law Making and Law Implementation
Valentin V. Ershov
Russian State University of Justice, Moscow, Russian Federation For correspondence: evv@rsuj.ru
Abstract
Introduction. The article analyses the opinions of a number of scientific and practical workers about the debatable problems of legal understanding, law making and law implementation. Theoretical Basis. Methods. The article uses a systematic approach to the study of theoretical and practical problems of legal understanding, law making and law implementation. A comparative legal analysis of works by Russian and foreign authors allowed the establishment of common and different characteristics of these legal categories in the approaches of different scientists. Results. From the position of scientifically grounded concept of an integrated legal understanding the following conclusion is made: each form of national and (or) international law receives its "justification" only as a "moment of the whole" in a unified, developing and multi-level system of legal forms, outside of which it is an "unreasonable assumption or subjective confidence". In this general scientific approach the analysis of interrelated and complementary processes of legal understanding, law making and law implementation, self-sufficient legal phenomena, including elements of the system of law forms, should be conducted as the study of "moments of the whole". Discussion and Conclusion. The following advantages of an evidence-based concept of integrative legal understanding can be identified.
Firstly, the possibility of implementing a non-traditional, fundamentally different research strategy on the legal regulators of legal relations.
Secondly, to systematically study qualitatively different legal problems (in particular, the elements of the system of legal forms, its integrity, direct and inverse connections), and see new properties of law not inherent in its individual elements.
Thirdly to develop concrete, practical answers to contemporary theoretical questions.
Keywords: legal understanding, law making, law implementation, legal positivism, syncretism, integrative legal understanding, metamodern, systems theory; unified, evolving and multi-level system of national and/or international law forms
For citation: Ershov, V. V., 2021. Legal understanding, law making and law implementation. Pravosudie/Justice, 3(1), pp. 14-30. DOI: 10.37399/2686-9241.2021.1.14-30.
© Ершов В. В., 2021
Правопонимание, правотворчество и правореализация
В. В. Ершов
Российский государственный университет правосудия, г. Москва,
Российская Федерация
evv@rsuj.ru
Аннотация
Введение. В статье проанализированы точки зрения многих научных и практических работников относительно дискуссионных проблем правопонимания, правотворчества и пра-вореализации.
Теоретические основы. Методы. В исследовании использованы системный подход к трактовкам правопонимания, правотворчества и правореализации российских и зарубежных авторов. Сравнительно-правовой анализ их работ позволил установить общие и отличающиеся характеристики этих правовых категорий в подходах разных ученых. Результаты исследования. С позиции научно обоснованной концепции интегративного правопонимания сделан вывод: каждая форма национального и (или) международного права получает свое «оправдание» лишь как «момент целого» в единой, развивающейся и многоуровневой системе форм права, вне которого она есть «необоснованное предположение или субъективная уверенность». При таком общенаучном подходе анализ взаимосвязанных и взаимодополняющих процессов правопонимания, правотворчества и правореализации, самостоятельных правовых явлений, в том числе элементов системы форм права, должен производиться как исследование «моментов целого». Обсуждение и заключение. Изложенное позволяет назвать следующие преимущества научно обоснованной концепции интегративного правопонимания.
Первое: возможность реализовывать нетрадиционную, принципиально иную стратегию научных исследований правовых регуляторов правоотношений. Второе: осуществимость системного изучения качественно иных правовых проблем (в частности, элементов системы форм права, ее целостности, прямых и обратных связей), а также новые свойства права, не присущие его отдельным элементам. Третье: основа для выработки конкретных практических ответов на современные теоретические вопросы.
Ключевые слова: правопонимание, правотворчество, правореализация, юридический позитивизм, синкретизм, интегративное правопонимание, метамодерн, теория систем, единая, развивающаяся и многоуровневая система форм национального и (или) международного права, реализуемых в государстве
Для цитирования: Ершов В. В. Правопонимание, правотворчество и правореализация // Правосудие/Justice. 2021. Т. 3, № 1. С. 14-30. DOI: 10.37399/2686-9241.2021.1.14-30.
Introduction
I n specialist legal literature, legal understanding, law making and law implementation are traditionally studied as independent legal phenomena. At the same time, these legal categories are objectively interconnected. First of all, the real processes of law making and law implementation depend on the type of legal understanding that prevails at a given historical stage of development of each state. At the same time, objectively speaking, law making and law implementation activities, in their turn, influence the further development and, subsequently, the change of the type of legal understanding in each state.
M. V. Nemytina argued: "law can be studied in three dimensions: first -the individual, their rights, ideas of justice, their sense of freedom; second - the coordination of common interests through various kinds of regulatory systems operating within society; third - the will of the state, given normative expression" [Nemytina, M. V., 2007, p. 105] (hereinafter emphasis added by me. - V. E.).
Theoretical Basise. Methods
Experts in the field of general legal theory usually distinguish three different basic types of legal understanding. V. V. Lapaeva believed: "With all the abundance of currently discussed approaches to the understanding of law, only three main types of legal understanding make serious claims for the status of general doctrinal direction: legist, natural law and libertarian" [Lapaeva, V. V., 2008, p. 22].
It is quite revealing that at present the problems of legal understanding, law making and law implementation are studied not only by specialists in the field of general theory of law, but also by representatives of particular branches of law. For example, E. A. Ershova, while analysing the disputable theoretical and practical issues of labour law in the Russian Federation, came to the following conclusions: "All the existing types of legal understanding can be classified into two groups. In the first group I suggest including the types of legal understanding, the essence of which is the distinction between law and the law, and in the second group - those that identify law and the law. To the first group of types of legal understanding I consider it necessary to refer natural-legal, psychological and legal-libertarian conception of law. In turn, I believe that these types of legal understanding can be subdivided into dual-istic and monistic. Among the dualistic types of legal understanding it seems reasonable to consider, for example, natural-legal and psychological concepts of law, respectively, distinguishing natural and positive, intuitive and positive law. Monistic type of legal understanding should include, in particular, legal libertarian concept of law, according to which a single (monistic) system of law may include legal laws and other forms of law that correspond to the fundamental legal principles. In the second group of types of legal understanding, which identify law and the law, legal positivism should be distinguished" [Ershova, E. A., 2008, p. 28].
Results
In my opinion, in the world as a whole, including Russia, two main types of legal understanding have emerged in the modern period - positivistic and integrative. Integrative legal understanding is itself differentiated into two types - scientifically debatable, synthesising right and wrong - ontologically dissimilar social elements, and scientifically substantiated, uniting only principles and norms contained in its different forms in a single system of law - ontologically homogeneous legal elements. This theoretical approach, I
think, allows us to significantly adjust M. V. Nemytina's position. Objectively existing law can be studied in two dimensions: the first is the will of the state that has received legal 'expression'; the second is the 'coordination of common' legal interests through the synthesis of different forms of law and legal regulators of legal relations.
Legal positivism has long been the most widespread type of legal understanding, limiting "all" law primarily to the rules of law established by the lawmaking and/or executive bodies of the state and, in some states, also to the judicial precedents of law developed by the courts. The concept of "positivism" is derived from the Latin "juspositum", "the right established by the victor" (as it is informally called by some authors). Hence, in essence, "all" law appears to be arguably "covered" only by the "will of the state" as expressed in the rules it has developed.
The term "legislation" in the special literature is traditionally considered in a narrow and broad sense of the word. In the narrow sense of the word "legislation" is identified with legal acts adopted by a representative body of the state or a direct expression of the will of the population in the form of a referendum [Pigolkin, A. S. and Studenikina, M. S., 1995, pp. 1-3; Alek-seev, S. S., 2010, p. 246]. In a broad sense, "legislation" is understood as the totality of legal acts adopted by law-making bodies at all levels, starting with laws and ending with departmental legal acts [Bobylyov, A. I., 1998, p. 24]. It is indicative that these approaches have been preserved in the special literature on the general theory of law in the 21st century [Glebov, V. A., 2007, p. 5].
The findings of experts in the field of general legal theory are reflected in Russian codes. For example, Article 3 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation is based on the understanding of "legislation" in the narrow sense and therefore includes in "legislation" the Civil Code and "other federal laws" adopted in accordance with it (Article 3(2) of the Civil Code). Article 5 "Housing Legislation" of the Housing Code of the Russian Federation defines the term "legislation" in a "broad" sense: it includes legal acts of public authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation and local authorities.
Since in practice the use of the term "legislation" in the broad sense has often led to the violation of rights and legal interests of individuals and legal entities, I suggest, firstly, not to use the term "legislation" in Russian codes and other federal laws. Secondly, instead of the term "normative legal acts" we should apply the generic term "legal acts" established in Part 1 of Article 15 of the Russian Constitution, which includes not only "norms" of law, but also "principles" of law. Thirdly, the types of national legal acts should be established: the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws, codes, other federal laws, subordinate federal legal acts, legal acts of the subjects of Russia; legal acts of authorised local authorities, authorised legal or individual persons.
From the position of legal positivism, A. Ya. Vyshinsky developed a definition of law that for a long time was considered classical: "Law is the totality of rules of conduct established by state power as the power of the ruling class in society, as well as customs and rules of social life, sanctioned by state power and carried out in a coercive manner by the state apparatus in order to protect, consolidate and develop social relations and orders, beneficial and pleasing to the ruling class" [Vyshinsky, A. Ya., 1949, p. 4].
The application of legal norms from the position of legal positivism often leads to gross violations of the rights and legal interests of individuals and legal entities. A striking confirmation of this conclusion is the case of Shof-man v. the Russian Federation, in which the applicant considered that his rights under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms had been violated because his proceedings to contest paternity had been terminated due to the lapse of time under the national law in force at that time.
On 10 August 1989 Shofman married Ms G. in Novosibirsk. On 12 May 1995 G. gave birth to a son, the father of whom the applicant was registered as the husband of G. The applicant assumed that he was the boy's father and treated him as his own son. In September 1997 the applicant's relatives informed him that he was not the father of G. On 16 December 1997 the applicant applied for a divorce and for an action to contest paternity. On 12 April 1999 the marriage was dissolved.
On 16 November 2000 the Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Novosibirsk heard a claim to challenge the applicant's paternity. In the proceedings the court found that according to the DNA tests carried out on 28 June 1999 and 5 June 2000 the applicant could not be the child's father. The court accepted that the applicant was not the child's father, as there was no objective doubt as to the accuracy of the test results. However, the court concluded that the case should have been examined under the RSFSR Marriage and Family Code of 30 July 1969, as the child had been born before 1 March 1996 (the date on which the new Family Code of the Russian Federation came into force). The RSFSR Marriage and Family Code established a one-year period to challenge paternity, which was calculated, according to the court, from the moment the person was notified of the paternity registration. Shofman did not apply to the court to challenge paternity until December 1997, when, in the opinion of the court, the limitation period had already expired. Shofman's claim was therefore rejected. The fact that the Family Code of the Russian Federation mentioned no time-limit for the court to challenge the paternity was not taken into consideration since the legal relations between the parties had appeared before March 1, 1996. On 12 September 2002 a magistrate granted G.'s application for maintenance and authorised the seizure of the applicant's share in their flat.
The European Court of Human Rights in its judgment of 24 November 2005 in the case of Shofman v. Russian Federation emphasised: "There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise... of a right except such as is provided by law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public order, the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or of the rights and freedoms of others"1.
In other cases, even by national law, the rights of citizens cannot be restricted. In my opinion, the court in Shofman was in a position to draw a similar conclusion under Part 3 of Article 55 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation which established: "The rights and freedoms of man and citizen may be limited by federal law only to the extent necessary for the protection of the constitutional order, morality, health, rights and lawful interests of other persons, ensuring national defence and state security". This legal regulation of family legal relations makes it possible to state the following: the reduction of the "entire" law to the RSFSR Code on Marriage and the Family in this case has led (and may lead in similar disputes) to a restriction of the rights and legal interests of citizens.
Legal positivism appears to leave many crucial theoretical questions unanswered, such as how to protect the rights of natural and legal persons against possible violations of the rights and legal interests of everyone by national law-making, executive and judicial public authorities; whether there are other forms and levels of national as well as international law other than "legislation", if so, which ones and how they relate to each other; is it possible to effectively regulate legal relations by implementing only the rules of law contained only in "legislation", given the diversity of legal relations that develop?
In this regard, the approach to law from the position of attributing it to the "system value" [Polyakov, A. V. and Timoshina, E. V., 2005, p. 55] and the integration of types of understanding of law seem to be more fruitful. "The concept of the rule of law, - convincingly emphasised by A. S. Konovalova, -should also be based on the pluralism of legitimate sources of law..." [Konovalova, A. S., 2005, p. 12].
An in-depth analysis of real contemporary problems of legal understanding, law making and law enforcement, in my opinion, allows us to distinguish two types of integrative legal understanding: scientifically debatable and scientifically grounded.
The scientifically debatable type of integrative legal understanding, is I believe, based primarily on the paradigm of syncretism (from the Greek synk-retismos - connection). In the 16th century syncretists were called philosophers who tried to build their concepts between the teachings of Plato and Aristotle. In the 21st century, syncretism is understood as a combination of heterogeneous phenomena and views, which ignores the need for their internal unity and non-contradiction to each other2. In law, syncretism leads to
1 Bulletin of the European Court of Human Rights. Russian edition. 2005. № 1. P. 8488.
2 Philosophical Encyclopaedic Dictionary. M. : Infra-M, 2000. P. 414.
the synthesis of ontologically heterogeneous social elements, legal, religious and moral norms; "judicial precedents", "soft" law, "standards", "quasi-law", justice, etc. into its single system. "The dimension of law" in this theoretically debatable approach becomes the inclusion of the individual person, their individual rights, and someone's subjective ideas about justice and freedom.
I am convinced that only by harmonising the common legal interests of the subjects of legal relations through their systematic legal regulation can a scientifically sound concept of integrative legal understanding be developed. This concept includes in law only the principles and norms of law contained in a unified, evolving and multi-level system of forms of national and/or international law implemented in the state. From the position of the scientifically grounded concept of integrative legal understanding, which is a type of synthetic theory, law is "measured" not by separate and often contradictory social interests of subjects of diverse social relations, but by interrelated and interdependent rights, obligations and legal interests of subjects of legal relations - one type of social relations. The essence of such legal relations is expressed in the coordination of common legal interests as a result of the effective interaction of various legal regulators of legal relations. The scientifically substantiated concept of integrative legal understanding in the modern period seems to be the most promising both in theoretical and practical terms, as it removes the mutually exclusive extremes of traditional, centuries-old dominant types of legal understanding - natural-legal, sociological and posi-tivistic.
The Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation V. D. Zor'kin presented metamodernism as a new approach to the philosophical understanding of social phenomena in his lecture "Metamodern law: posing the problem" at the IX St. Petersburg International Law Forum on 16 May 2019.
The concept of 'metamodernism' "...was launched in 2010 by two young Dutch philosophers (Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker in their "Notes on Metamodernism". 2010). It is not yet a theory of metamodernism, but rather a concept, that is an idea containing a certain conception of a new view of the world. The essence of this new view... is the desire to rise above the extremes of modernism and postmodernism and to see the world in the unity of its diversity... the metamodern approach attracts the idea of synthesis of different types of legal understanding ... as special paradigms of thinking"3.
The essence of metamodernism seems to be a conscious effort to move away from a simplified understanding of any social phenomena and to examine them in their diversity and unity, including legal phenomena - in a unified, evolving and multi-level system of legal forms. To my mind, from a metamodern position, law will objectively succeed in overcoming the arti-
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ficial extremes and linear approaches of modernism and postmodernism, in achieving a synthesis of different types of legal understanding, the integrity of the system of national and (or) international law in the unity of the diverse legal elements that comprise it. In the context of the metamodern paradigm and from the position of scientifically grounded concept of integrative legal understanding, law is objectified in ontologically homogeneous legal elements - primarily in the principles and norms of law contained in a unified, evolving and multi-level system of national and (or) international law forms, implemented in the state [Ershov, V. V., 2019].
The scientifically substantiated concept of integrative legal understanding, like anything new, inevitably provokes active discussion and attacks. For example, A. F. Cherdantsev in his article "Integrative Understanding of Law" made the following conclusion: "...legal science... does not need an integrative approach to law..." [Cherdantsev, A. F., 2016, p. 14]. It is quite characteristic that the author himself (like many other staunch supporters of legal positivism) did not offer a solution to the current contemporary problems of the theory of law and practice. However, it should be noted that even with a negative attitude to the concept criticised by him, A. F. Cherdantsev could not help asking the question: "...what can and what should be integrated?" [Cherdantsev, A. F., 2016, p. 6].
I believe the most general answer to this question can be found in a striking article by V. V. Lazarev "Integrative Perception of Law", published in the pilot issue of Kazan University Law Review, the English-language journal of Kazan Federal University. V. V. Lazarev, analysing G. D. Gurvich's position, noted that: "...his dialectic removes the opposition of one method to another in the framework of methodological pluralism, ensuring the construction of a single synthetic line in understanding law" [Lazarev, V. V., 2016, p. 19].
Then the author gave his own (in my opinion, controversial) definition of law: "Law is a totality of what is recognised in a given society with officially protected norms of equality and justice, regulating the struggle and coordination of free will in their relationship with each other" [Lazarev, V. V., 2016, p. 21]. At that, as emphasised by the scientist, "...norms may be established not only in normative acts, but also in individual decisions. In their content, they reflect the formal requirements of equality and fairness" [Lazarev, V. V., 2016, p. 23].
The provisions formulated by the author qualify him as a proponent of the scientifically debated concept of an integrative legal understanding, characterised by the synthesis of law and other social regulators of legal relations, law norms and other "norms of equality and justice" contained also "not only in normative acts, but in individual decisions as well".
Many pre-revolutionary scholars also addressed the topic of law synthesis. Thus, B. A. Kistyakovsky distinguished several notions of law - state-organised (or state-ordered), sociological, psychological, and normative [Kistya-kovsky, B. A., 1916, pp. 321-324]. A. S. Yashchenko, from the position of the
scientifically debated concept of integrative legal understanding, defined law as "...the totality of the norms of conduct acting in society, due to the collective-psychic experience of members of society and enforced by authorities, which establish a balance between the interests of individual freedom and the public good. Law has its basis both in the nature of man and society, inseparably united in one common life, and in the highest moral principle...", in accordance with which the task of creating a "perfect communal life" is set [Yashchenko, A. S., 1912, p. 129].
According to some modern legal researchers, the integrative approach to law is only an unsuccessful attempt of eclectic (syncretic combination of contradictory positions), which does not give anything to either science or practice, and can only "cloud", but not clarify the essence of the problem [Rodio-nova, O. V., 2003, pp. 12-13]. René Guénon, one of the researchers, who also studied this issue, stated that "...the synthesis is always based on some principles - in other words, on what constitutes the inner unity of existence and what is symbolised by the centre of the circle" [Guénon, R., 2010, pp. 42-43]. Synthesis, according to the scholar, is opposed to syncretism, which "...always deals with the periphery, with the area formed by uncoordinated single elements, which are 'atoms' closed in themselves, detached from the true source of their existence" [Guénon, R., 2010, p. 43].
How objective are the above-mentioned provisions from the position of scientifically grounded concept of integrative legal understanding? Firstly, law, in my view, is synthesised in its ontologically homogeneous principles and norms contained in a unified, evolving and multilevel system of forms of national and/or international law implemented in the state. Secondly, the fundamental forms of national and international law are the fundamental (general) principles of both national and international law that form the 'centre of the circle', that is, the system of law that allows the system of objective (actual) law to coexist in internal and external unity. Thirdly, this theoretical approach from the perspective of a scientifically grounded concept of integrative legal understanding makes it possible to distinguish (using the French scholar's phraseology) both the 'centre of the circle' of the system of legal forms and the 'periphery of the circle'. Fourthly, forms of national and/or international law are not "uncoordinated" single elements, "self-contained "atoms", but rather interrelated elements of a unified, evolving and multi-level system of forms of national and/or international law. Fifthly, it is necessary to differentiate legal and individual regulators of legal relation (including individual judicial regulation of legal relations) [Ershov, V. V., 2013a; Ershov, V. V., 2013b].
The traditional definition of "legal relation" as a social relation regulated by the norms of law, the participants of which are bearers of subjective rights and obligations secured by the state [Alekseev, S. S., 2010, p. 246], is in my opinion, theoretically debatable. N. G. Aleksandrov's viewpoint, which he for-
mulated as early as 1947, is characteristic: "In the mind of a lawyer-dogmatist, a legal norm is identified with an article or paragraph of a law or other written normative act issued by the state power. He is little interested in the fact that the history of law knows other forms of expression of legal norms: legal custom... etc. The lawyer-dogmatist does not think about the reason for the content of this or that article of the law, why this variant of human behaviour and not another is elevated to the law. It seems to him that... legal norms owe their emergence not to economic relations, but to formal establishments of the state" [Aleksandrov, N. G., 1947, pp. 1-3].
The current political, economic and legal situation at this turning point, using Lotman's terminology, can be characterised as a "moment of unpredictability" [Lotman, M. Ju., p. 108]. The "moment of unpredictability" in law is expressed in the fact that the former "axioms" of legal understanding that dominated the world, in particular, in the 19th and 20th centuries, in the 21st century seem theoretically debatable and practically (and this is the main point) unproductive. This leads to the need for a theoretical rethinking of many "established" and "indisputable" "truths" in law, the development of new paradigms of legal understanding, law making and law implementation, most particularly judicial law enforcement [Ershov, V. V., 2020].
The fundamental and objective criterion for valid scientific knowledge is the study of any phenomena in a system of interrelated elements that constitute them. The crucial role of the systematic approach in the process of investigating complex objects was ingeniously stressed by G. Hegel, as any content that "acquires justification only as a moment of the whole, outside of which it is an unreasonable supposition or subjective certainty" [Hegel, G., 1974, p. 100].
Developing this thought, I. V. Blauberg and E. G. Yudin noted: the concept of integrity in scientific cognition primarily guides a researcher in formulating problems and developing research strategies [Blauberg, I. V., 1977; Yudin, E. G., 1970]. The above-mentioned general scientific positions make it not only possible but also objectively necessary to study law as a holistic phenomenon. L. Bertalanffy put forward the outstanding idea of studying social phenomena from the position of the general theory of systems, which is based on the principle of system integrity, allowing us to overcome the traditional mechanistic worldview. This proposal was regarded by many researchers as an bold theoretical idea, a fundamental scientific discovery, and a key factor in research that determined the way to new views and principles.
Unfortunately, many researchers are sceptical about Bertalanffy's fundamental idea. For example, M. V. Antonov categorically disputes the conclusions of systems theory: "The use of this concept can easily lead to dubious conclusions based on the substitution of different meanings of the term 'system' in the course of reasoning. A critical look at the notion allows us to see its connection with uncontested objectivist attitudes in social philosophy and to explain its persuasive power by revealing such truisms on which argu-
ments about the systemicity of law rest. The use in jurisprudence of terms derived from the concept of 'system' is fraught with unacceptable simplification of understanding the normative nature of law, in the context of which emergent nature, integrity, structure, functionality, completeness and other systematic properties attributed to law is not an objective given, but a possible result (rather, the goal, 'rational ideal') of systemising creative activity of lawyers" [Antonov, M. V., 2014, с. 26].
In my opinion, the founder of systems theory formulated a general scientific conclusion: "The concept of a system is not limited to the theoretical sphere, but is becoming central in certain areas of applied science" [Sadovsky, V. M. and Yudin, E. G., pp. 23-24].
Traditionally, the integrity of scientific research has been viewed through theconcepts of structure and function. The systematic approach to social phenomena is opposed to structural-functional analysis. In the systematic approach, as E. G. Yudin emphasized, the central concept is a broader one - "system", closely related to a number of other concepts, such as "structure", "organisation", "connection", "relation", "element" and "control" [Yudin, E. G., 1978]. As the main characteristics of the system E. G. Yudin called an element as its indivisible component in a given method of disintegration, the minimum component of the system or the maximum limit of its disintegration [Yudin, E. G., 1978, pp. 182-184]. In relation to our theme (system of forms of national and international law) such elements, first of all, can be recognised as forms of law. Thus, when considering law implemented in Russia, it seems reasonable to introduce the notion of a "system of legal forms" consisting of two subsystems - national and international law - formed by their constituent elements - the corresponding forms of domestic and/or international law. The system of forms of national and/or international law is characterised by its integrity, sustainable structure, and the interrelation and interdependence of its ontologically homogeneous elements. In my opinion, such a conclusion theoretically can only be based on a scientifically sound concept of integrative legal understanding. Only with such a holistic approach to the study of law is it possible to distinguish, for example, the fundamental (general) and special principles of national as well as international law, trends of their further development, interaction, convergence and differentiation.
This concept is gaining more and more supporters. M. V. Nemytina noted that in the modern period "adherents of different scientific concepts gradually come to a common idea about the need for some kind of integral legal understanding, within which the right is considered as a systematic value. Their views concur on the fact that it is not necessary to oppose types of legal understanding, but rather to search for points of contact between them... Exactly integral (or integrative) legal understanding allows to form a holistic view of law, to consider law in a variety of manifestations and at the same time in its unity" [Nemytina, M. V., 2007, pp. 115-116].
From the position of a scientifically grounded concept of integrative legal understanding, I believe, it is debatable. This is because firstly, it reduces "all" law which is implemented, in particular, in the Russian Federation, only to national legal acts containing solely law norms. Secondly, it rigidly distinguishes between domestic and international law, artificially creating "independent", "interaction" on a "parity" basis, and separating systems of national and international law. It seems more theoretically justified and practically necessary to study "all" the law implemented, for example, in the Russian Federation, as a unified, evolving and multi-level system of forms of law, consisting of subsystems of national and (or) international law. I think the unified system of forms of national and (or) international law primarily synthesises the fundamental (general) and special principles of national law, national legal acts, legal treaties, as well as customs of law; fundamental (general) and special principles of international law, international treaties and customs of international law.
Discussion and Conclusion
The above allows us to name the following advantages of a scientifically grounded concept of integrative legal understanding.
Firstly, the possibility to implement a non-traditional, fundamentally different strategy of scientific research of legal regulators of legal relations.
Secondly, to systematically study qualitatively different legal problems (in particular, elements of the system of legal forms, its integrity, direct and inverse relations), as well as new properties of law that are not inherent in its individual elements.
Thirdly, to develop concrete practical answers to contemporary theoretical questions.
Paraphrasing the quoted statement of G. Hegel, I think, from the position of the concept supported by me, it is possible to admit that every form of national and/or international law (including national legal acts) gets its "justification only as a moment of the whole", i. e. in the unified, developing and multi-level system of law forms. Thus, the analysis of the interrelated and complementary processes of legal understanding, law making and law implementation, separate legal phenomena, including legal forms as elements of the system of law, should be conducted as the study of "moments of the whole", i. e. not in isolation and independently, but within a unified, developing and multilevel system of national and/or international law forms.
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Information about the author / Информация об авторе
Valentin V. Ershov, Dr. Sci. (Law), Professor, Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, Honored Worker of Science of the Russian Federation, Academician of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, President of the Russian State University of Justice (69 Novocherеmushkinskaya St., Moscow, 117418, Russian Federation)
Ершов Валентин Валентинович, доктор юридических наук, профессор, заслуженный юрист Российской Федерации, заслуженный деятель науки Российской Федерации, академик Российской академии естественных наук, президент ФГБОУВО «Российский государственный университет
правосудия» (Российская Федерация, 117418, г. Москва, ул. Новочеремушкинская, д. 69). E-mail: evv@rsuj.ru
Submitted 14.12.2020; reviewed 29.01.2021; revised 02.02.2021. Дата поступления рукописи в редакцию издания: 14.12.2020; дата одобрения после рецензирования: 29.01.2021; дата принятия статьи к опубликованию: 02.02.2021.
