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and banking facilities. Due to the nature of the ruling clan system that has prevailed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent petrodollar windfall, the IDB has had to operate in a manner that does not threaten the various clan-based political structures. Moreover, it is believed that the IDB approves of the policy of catering to the rentier state structure where the ruling elite must remain an integral part of any banking and finance projects. In any case, if Islamic banking and financial institutions desire to expand business and operations in the future, they must account for the politics of these rentier states.
Aside from the difficulties faced in building relations with a rentier state, the rise of religiosity and Islam across the region has also been a major issue for the six Muslim republics examined in this paper. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the governments that formed in the 1990s were largely secular in nature and still mired in a closed Soviet-style one party system. However, due to the influence of rising radical Islamic forces that have engulfed the region in the past decade, they have been forced to fuse old Soviet structures with new Islamic ones. As posited in this paper, it is believed that most of the countries in the region have used the IDB to demonstrate Islam’s incorporation into government effectively. Moreover, these governments can use Islamic banking and finance to further mitigate vocal Islamic opposition groups that have rejected the secular-style rule that has emerged since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Indeed, the IDB has penetrated to varying degrees all of the Muslim republics of Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus. However, only Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan appear to have the most promising future in the area of Islamic banking and finance. The other four countries are either presently too politically unstable and economically underdeveloped, as in the case of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, or too politically closed, like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, Islamic banking and finance has only just begun to flourish in a region that is ripe for socioeconomic development and the establishment of Islamically-compliant financial and banking institutions.
ISLAM AND THE POLITICAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MODEL OF THE MUSLIM STATES
Shukhrat YOVKOCHEV
Ph.D. (Political Science), associate professor at the Department of Political Science, International Relations, and Law,
Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)
In the last quarter of the 20th century, the political processes in the Islamic world showed beyond the shadow of a doubt that religion is still a viable part of public life in the Muslim countries. Moreover, certain states, such as Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, have
restored religion to its rightful place in their policy. The comment by American political scientist John Esposito to the effect that Islamic ideology, symbols, slogans, and actors became prominent fixtures in Muslim politics suits these countries well.1
The stable influence of Islam on sociopolitical life is largely explained by the particular features of Muslim teaching. Islam is usually considered a system that regulates many aspects of people’s lives. In this interpretation, Islam is not only a religious system, but also offers a model for organizing society. Moreover, some Muslim scientists believe that sociopolitical activity is a religious duty in Islam, and that it is a religious obligation for a Muslim to remain aware of the political realities around him.2 The “ideological meaning” of Islam, in the opinion of Shaukat Ali, a representative of Islamic thought, is also increased by the fact that every Muslim is under religious obligation to understand and respect the past.3 The “past” implies the “unique period” of the life of the Prophet Muhammad and the four righteous caliphs.4 In this way, the “ideal past” serves as a model for a perfect human society, to which believers should strive.
As Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949),5 an Egyptian ideologist of Islamism, claimed that the conflict characteristic of Europe between spiritual and secular principles, between religion and the state, has no place in Islam ...The Christian idea of “give to Caesar what is Caesar’s, and to God what is God’s” is missing here, since everything belongs to Almighty Allah.6 From this point of view, Islam is not only a religion, but also a “way of life,” it contains the solution to social, political, and other secular issues.7
According to Muslim fundamentalists, reform in Islam does not mean modification or changes in the way of thinking and practice established by the Prophet and his companions, rather “purifying Islam” of “alien” elements which supposedly deprive it of its original clarity, simplicity, and power.
Such ideologists as Hasan al-Banna and Pakistani fundamentalist Abu al-A’la al-Maududi (1903-1979)8 upheld “theocracy” as an ideal form of statehood. But the representatives of reformative thought in Islam categorically rejected theocracy as a phenomenon incompatible with faith and not espousing the institution of clergy. As Muhammad Abdo (1834-1905)9 emphasized, Islam placed man face to face with God and taught him to manage without any intercession.10 More radical reformers were consistent “secularists.” Ali Abd ar-Razik (1888-1966), who was under the great influence of Muhammad Abdo, “went much further than his ideological mentor, emphasizing the need to separate religion from the state. He referred to the fact that Muhammad was only a prophet and his preaching was not political in nature.”11 According to the provisions of Ali Abd ar-Razik, the Prophet did not leave an example of an Islamic state.12 Therefore, according to him, Muslims should rid themselves of
1 See: J.L. Esposito, Islam and Politics, Third Edition, Syracuse University Press, 1984, p. 153.
2 See: Sh. Ali, Islam and Politics, Southeastern Massachussets University, Aziz Publishers, USA; Urdu Bazaar, Lahore, July 1990, p. 2.
3 See: Ibid., p. 3.
4 The righteous caliphs (Arab. al-hulafa'ar-rashidun) (632-661) are Abu Baqr, Umar, Usman, and Ali who, after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, headed the Muslim community for 30 years and, during the Prophet’s life, took part in the community’s activity. They were also related to the Prophet by bonds of blood kinship or marriage. In later centuries, the rule of the righteous caliphs was called the Golden Era of Islam, when “original Muslim virtues flourished” and the caliphs themselves were given the title of “ar-rashiduri”—“taking the righteous path.”
5 Founder and main ideologue who developed the doctrine of the Society of the Muslim Brothers.
6 See: R.P. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers, London, 1969, p. 244; M.T. Stepaniants, Musulmanskie kontseptsii v filosofii i politike (XIX—XX vv.), Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p. 110.
7 This is where the Muslim Brothers’ slogan “Islam is the solution” comes from.
8 Founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami Society, one of the main ideologists of radical Islam.
9 One of the Islamic reformers, a mufti, the first to issue a fatwa on the legitimacy of bank interest.
10 See: O. Amin, Moslem Philosophy, Cairo, 1958, p. 138.
11 M.T. Stepaniants, op. cit., p. 112.
12 For more detail, see: J. Delaneau, “Nekotorye aspekty vozrozhdeniia islama v Rossii. Musulmanskiy reformism v araboiazychnykh stranakh (1800-1940),” Transl. from the French, in: Islam v tatarskom mire: istoriia i sovremennost. Dokumenty mezhdunarodnogo simposiuma, Kazan, 29 April-1 May, 1996 (special issue), No. 12, Moscow, 1997.
the belief that they need a caliphate and use their own minds (aql) to look for solutions to social and political problems.
Questions regarding the interrelations between Islam and politics, as well as between religion and the state, are still one of the most urgent topics of discussion in the Muslim countries. In many of them, Islam is an important source of national identity, ideology, and values.
The Muslim states that once chose a “socialist type” of modernization (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria) are a good example. Contrary to the hopes for accelerated development of all spheres of public and economic life, these countries have not succeeded in resolving all of the problems they have accumulated. As we know, the local private sector in the mentioned states did not strive to invest in the national economy, the volume of production shrank due to the loss of management staff and technology, and the agrarian reforms were made difficult due to insufficient finances. The overall political situation remained critical. State measures (nationalization, industrialization, and the introduction of state control over religious institutions) undermined the traditional patronage-client social system existing in these countries.13 In order to strengthen its own legitimacy and glean the support of the masses, the national leaders were forced to turn to the religious symbols traditionally used by the antigovernment opposition forces that declared their “adherence to Islam.”
The Egyptian leaders Gamal Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak, as well as the domestic political forces opposing them, serve as a graphic example. As Russian researcher A. Ignatenko rightly noted, in Egypt, the politicization of Islam largely acquired “archetypical features,” which were then reproduced in various Muslim countries.14 Gamal Nasser, striving to reinforce his leadership in the Arab world and simultaneously fortifying his own position in the face of the domestic opposition, expanded the framework of Egyptian nationalism to include everything Arab, substantiating this by the shared Arab-Islamic heritage. What is more, he tried to use state control over the leading Egyptian Islamic University of Al-Azhar and the High Council for Islamic Affairs (HCIA) to promote Arab socialist ideology and policy.15
After the death of President Nasser (1970), power in Egypt went to Anwar Sadat (1918-1981). Economic problems, as well as the opposition from the Nasserites and Marxists who were against the introduction of market mechanisms, objectively pushed him toward relying on Islam. President Anwar Sadat actively bolstered his image as a pious Muslim ruler. He came to power at the height of Islamization of the state after the socialist orientation of President Nasser’s rule, and when radical groups, including At-Taqfir wa-l-hijra (Accusation of Infidelity and Withdrawal from the World), Jihad, and others appeared. It is known that in 1971, Anwar Sadat met with the Muslim Brothers, declaring “common goals in the struggle against atheism and communism,” and by 1973, Islamic clubs began forming in Egyptian universities for the purpose of “fighting atheist Marxism.” Using “religious arguments,” Anwar Sadat tried to invest the Egyptian-Israeli war of 1973 with a “special transcendental religious meaning.”16
But the attempts to play at democracy, making advances to the Islamists and religious clergy, using religious rhetoric, changing social orientations and foreign policy partners, as well as establish-
13 See: D. Rustow, A World of Nations. Problems of Political Modernization, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1967; idem, “Language, Modernization and Nationhood—An Attempt at Typology,” in: Language Problems of Developing Nations, ed. by Joshua A. Fishman, Charles A. Ferguson and Jyotirindra Das Gupta, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1968, pp. 87-105; S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, London, 1968.
14 See: A. Ignatenko, “Islamic Radicalism: A Cold War By-Product,” Central Asian and the Caucasus, No. 1 (7),
2001.
15 In particular, the theologians of Al-Azhar issued fatwa, and the religious figures of the HCIA published articles proving the compatibility of Islam and Arab socialism.
16 The war was waged in the holy month of Ramadan. Whereas Nasser had employed the secular motto “Earth, Sea, and Sky” in the 1967 war, Sadat used “Allahu Akbar!” .. .”Allahu Akbar!” was on the lips of Egyptian troops as they stormed across the Suez Canal (see: J. Esposito, op. cit., p. 213).
ing the centralization of power could not strengthen Anwar Sadat’s power and fend off the looming domestic political crisis, which ended in an antigovernment coup and the murder of the president by the Islamists.17
Serious economic problems, as well as cooperation with the West with simultaneous reinforcement of the position of Islam, strengthened the position of the Egyptian fundamentalists and became a breeding ground for political Islam. As reality at that time showed, Anwar Sadat was unable to draw the Egyptian bourgeoisie into the national development processes. Local investors preferred to invest money only in spheres with rapid circulation of capital, such as trade and services. The liberalization of foreign sales gave rise to an inflow of cheap imports, which was detrimental to the light industry and led to the formation of a negative foreign trade balance. As a result, Egypt found itself in a financial crisis.18 The intention to cancel state subsidizing of prices on foodstuffs and other goods, which left a significant portion of the population without a means of existence, gave rise to mass spontaneous demonstrations throughout Egypt in 1977 and was abandoned. As the economic situation in the country worsened, social differentiation increased; in 1975, 90% of the Egyptian population was on the brink of poverty.19
President Hosni Mubarak (born in 1928), who came to power in the wake of Anwar Sadat, carried out a program of structural reforms in the 1980s-1990s. By developing the infrastructure, introducing state support of business, denationalizing the state sector, and encouraging foreign investments, he succeeded in significantly improving the economic situation in the country.20 In the political sphere, Hosni Mubarak renewed the liberalization process, at the same time severely suppressing extremists, the number of whom began to drastically rise after the return of fighters from Afghanistan in 1992. At the same time, he put considerable clamps on the activity of the opposition, including by controlling the elections to the executive power branches. This policy put the pro-presidential political forces in a dominating position.
By applying measures that prevented the Islamic opposition in the form of the Muslim Brothers from participating in the country’s political life, Hosni Mubarak created a sufficiently stable system of centralized state power.
Today, the opposition parties of Egypt are not influential associations, do not enjoy mass support, and are personal organizations reminiscent of “family clubs.” An exception are the Islamists who, despite the harsh provisions of the Law on Elections and the Law on a State of Emergency21 that has been in effect for more than 20 years, succeeded, by acting as “independent candidates,” to obtain 17 deputy mandates in the lower house of parliament in 2000. At the parliamentary elections in November 2005, during which an acute struggle arose between the ruling National Democratic Party of the Arab Republic of Egypt (NDP) and the Muslim Brothers, the Islamists managed to obtain 88 seats. Since in the parliament of the previous convocation, the NDP had 404 seats and the Muslim Brothers 17, observers evaluated this new result of the party in power as a defeat.
17 See: M.Sh. Umerov, Formirovanie politicheskoi modeli Arabskoi Respubliki Egipet (posledniaia chetvert XX v.), Abstract of a Ph.D. (Political Science) Thesis, Moscow, 2001, p. 17.
18 The payment balance deficit rose from 68 million dollars in 1970 to 1,360 million in 1975; the budget deficit reached 2,840 million dollars in 1979 (see: A.V. Borisov, Arabskiy mir: proshloe i nastoiashchee, Moscow, 2002, pp. 145-147).
19 See: Ibid., p. 147.
20 In the 1990s, Egypt’s economic development became sustainable. The growth in GDP increased from 1.9% in 1990 to 5.7% in 1998, overtaking the growth in population (1.6% a year), and agricultural production growth rates reached 3.2%.
21 A state of emergency was introduced in Egypt in October 1981, after the murder of President Sadat. Before the presidential election in September 2005, Hosni Mubarak promised the voters he would abolish the Law on a State of Emergency, which made it possible to use tribunals to fight radical political opponents, primarily religious-political, and permitted the activity of parties and press publications to be halted. But in 2006, after the terrorist acts in Dakhab, the Egyptian parliament extended the state of emergency in the country by an overwhelming majority of votes to two years on Hosni Mubarak’s initiative.
On 26 March, 2007, a referendum on constitutional reform was held in Egypt, during which the voters supported Mubarak’s proposed amendments,22 which called for balancing the Basic Law and thus preparing the country to accept the modern ideas and tasks. Thirty-four amendments expanding the parliament’s functions, limiting the president’s powers, and lowering the restrictions on party activity were introduced into Egypt’s Constitution.
One of the main changes was introduction of a provision on nominating presidential candidates according to party lists by political parties with no less than 3% of the seats in parliament; contenders from religious-political organizations were not permitted to participate in the elections. Egypt has also introduced a ban on creating parties based on the religious principle. This amendment directly affects legitimization of the banned Islamic organization, the Muslim Brothers. Finally, the Law on a State of Emergency was cancelled after 1981 by adopting the Law on Fighting Terrorism, which increases the powers of the power-related structures.23
As most observers noted, the main purpose of the reforms was to create conditions for removing the radical Islamists from the republic’s political life as it moved toward modernization.
Despite these measures, the Islamists remained the most significant opposition force in Egypt, although it would seem that their influence would be hindered by the policy being conducted by the government (increased economic efficiency with the state’s guiding role, “dosed” political liberalization, steps to settle ethno-confessional contradictions, opposition to financing Islamist structures, harsh repression of acts of violence, transfer of mosques to the control of the state, and so on). Islam is retaining its position in Egyptian society and policy: what is more, the presence of Islamists is increasing in trade unions and student election councils at Egyptian universities. The same situation is also being observed in other Arab countries.
Another major Islamic state—Iran—represents a special model of political and socioeconomic development. Between 1960 and the mid-1970s, the economic growth rates of this country, which is taking the Western development path, were one of the highest in the world,24 but Iranian society was unable to adapt to the rapid socioeconomic changes and tough “authoritarian modernization.” The necessary political reforms were not carried out in the republic, despite the democratic traditions, whereby this proved fraught with a loss of national identity and independence. This led to an increase in the anti-shah opposition. It included both the opponents of “Westernizing modernization”25 (peasants, craftsmen, petty bourgeoisie, and clergy) and the supporters of revolutionary-collective modernization, political liberalization, as well as national minorities whose rights were infringed upon.
In this respect, it seems that the national revolution in Iran of 1978-1979 was society’s attempt to establish a new balance. Religious figures were able to take advantage of this, who gave the revolution an organizational framework and ideology. Consolidation of the Islamic regime in Iran showed how the socioeconomic and political tools of Islamism based on the following postulates could be applied in practice:
—the principle of velayat-e faqih,26 on which the idea of creating a contemporary Islamic state is based in the absence of the Prophet’s heir;
22 See: M. El-Nahhas, “Awaiting Judgment,” Al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), No. 839, 5-11 April, 2007.
23 See: G. Essam el-Din, “Changing Gears,” Al-Ahram Weekly, No. 827, 11-17 January, 2007; idem, “Winner Takes All,” Al-Ahram Weekly, No. 837, 22-28 March, 2007.
24 In 15 years, the GDP increased 13-fold and per capita income rose 8-fold, reaching 1,600 dollars; at the end of the 1970s, Iran was ahead of Greece and a little behind Portugal and Spain in terms of the socioeconomic structure of society; the capitalist mind-set was both system-forming and predominant (see: Iranskaia revoliutsiia 1978-1979. Prichiny i uroki, Moscow, 1989, pp. 15-23).
25 J. Esposito gives a term coined by one secular intellectual, “Westoxification or Weststruckness,” that is, indiscriminate borrowing from and dependence upon the West” (J.L.Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, Expanded Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991, p. 176).
26 Supervision of a theologian-lawyer who substitutes or represents an “absent” Shi‘ite imam.
—a dichotomous view of the world divided into oppressors and the oppressed whose interests are “protected by the Islamic revolution;”
—nationalistic (essentially pan-Islamist) call to fight against the “forces of evil” (the West and the superpowers).
In so doing, the principle of “export of the Islamic revolution” was expressed not only in the striving characteristic of revolutions to spread experience, but also in an attempt to create a single anti-imperialist and anti-communist Islamic front and to uphold Iran’s strivings for leadership in the region.27
During Islamization of the country, the Iranian president and parliament acquired high-standing “theocratic counterparts,” which were formed without participation of the voters—the Supreme Religious-Political Leadership (rahbar) and the Supervisory Council. The Assembly of Experts, entrusted with the right to choose a new spiritual leader or Supervisory Board, was called upon to ensure succession of the highest power.28 The judicial system was completely Islamicized. A military-political organization called the Islamic Revolution’s Guards Corps (IRGC) acquired broad administrative, police, and ideological powers.
The Iranian theologians also began establishing fundamentals of an Islamic economic system. In so doing, they were not against the principles of free competition, business, or the protection of private property. The main problem for Iran was the degree of state control and planning.29 Disagreements over this in the upper echelons of power were expressed in a stand-off among the Iranian bourgeoisie itself. A solution was found by creating a council that was responsible for making decisions favorable to the Islamic system, the task of which was to smooth out the disagreements among the parliament, government, and Supervisory Council.
Economic liberalization began in order to overcome the post-war slump. The First Five-Year Plan was adopted and reforms were introduced, including liberalization of import and domestic trade, state price formation, transfer from import substitution to an export-oriented economy, development of export branches of the manufacturing industry, and so on.
In the second half of the 1990s, trends appeared in Iran’s political sphere toward democratization, which was related to ex-president Mohammed Khatami (since 1997). He opened up a new direction in Iranian political thought by justifying the idea of a multi-level dialog (holding a dialog of civilizations; developing cooperation among the Muslim states based on common heritage and interests; and establishing pluralism in Iranian society). In so ding, the Iranian leader emphasized that the obliteration of traditions in Muslim society meant a loss of identity. In this context, he put forward the idea of an “Islamic civil society.” Concern for the spiritual demands of the people, respect of their rights, and people’s control over governance of the country are the top priorities of such a society, in his point of view.30 This gave reason for many observers to say that the radical Islamic regime in Iran was showing signs of being able to evolve in the direction of reformism.
Moreover, in recent years, particularly after President Ahmadinejad came to power, trends in Iran intensified once more toward the consolidation of an “Islamic regime,” which was largely due to unfavorable foreign factors, primarily the political-ideological standoff between Iran and the U.S.
Under present-day conditions, the development model of the political system in Turkey is also interesting. As we know, due to the Kemalist revolution, secularization, Europeanization, and statism,
27 F. Halliday, “The Politics of Islamic Fundamentalism: Iran, Tunisia and the Challenge to the Secular State,” in: Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity, ed. by A.S. Ahmed, H. Donnan, London, New York, 1994, p. 99.
28 The Assembly of Experts is an assembly of 96 of the elders of the Shi‘ite clergy chosen every 8 years by direct universal voting (the last election was held in 2006). Its three main functions consist in appointing to a life term, control over the activity, and, if necessary, dismissing the “first person” of the Iranian state—the Supreme Leader (Rahbar).
29 See: V.P. Tsukanov, “O realizatsii finansovoi polititki Irana v usloviakh neftianykh shokov,” in: Iran: islam i vlast, Moscow, 2001, pp. 83-84.
30 See: M. Khatami, Islam, dialog i grazhdanskoe obshchestvo, Moscow, 2001, Ch. 2, 3, 9, 10.
manifested primarily in the economy, became a strategic area of the reforms in this republic. The Republican People’s Party (RPP) created by Kemal Ataturk acted under conditions of mobilized post-liberation authoritarianism. Democratization of the country after World War II made it possible to withdraw from the policy of statism, but at the same time led to an increase in the opposition in the form of the Islamists, leftist forces, and Kurdish separatists, as well as to destabilization of the political system. The army, which considered itself the custodian of the traditions of Kemalism, moved to the forefront of political life in the state, and beginning in the 1960s, periods of direct military intervention began to interchange with periods of pluralistic civil rule in Turkey’s development. Army subdivisions repeatedly succeeded in settling crisis situations, but the main problem of modernization—achieving a balance among the economic, social, and political sub-systems— was not resolved.
The Turkish Constitution of 1982, drafted by the military, intensified the role of the executive power in the form of the president and Cabinet of Ministers. Laws were adopted on political parties and parliamentary elections, which by 1987 led to the restoration of plurality. Since then, the following main political forces compete at the parliamentary elections: the rightist liberals (Homeland Party and True Way Party), the leftist centrists (Democratic Leftist Party and Republican People’s Party), the Islamists (Welfare Party—Refah, Virtue Party—Fazilet, Justice and Development Party), and the ultra-nationalists.
Beginning in the 1980s, neo-liberal modernization aimed at opening up the economy led to a curtailment of the country’s business activity and, correspondingly, of state paternalism. Intense development of the main branch of the economy—agriculture—was accompanied by the appearance of surplus manpower, an increase in migration to the cities, and aggravation of the employment problem. Chronic unemployment at a level of 12-20% made it possible to maintain a low salary level. Emigration of the population assumed mass proportions, in particular, to West Europe. The drastic change in the position of the traditionalist strata led to a gradual increase in the Islamist forces. In March 1996, the rightist-liberal parties united, creating a rightist-centrist coalition government. But two months later, the True Way Party left the coalition and a new government was formed headed by N. Erbakan, the leader of the Welfare Party. For the first time since Turkey declared itself a secular state (1923), a government headed by an Islamist party was formed.
The rural periphery, middle urban strata, students, young “Westernized” technocrats, who accept the fundamentalist ideology, and nationalists are the most supportive of the Islamists in Turkey. The first Islamist party that came to power in the state headed by N. Erbakan announced that “the past hundred years in Turkey’s development, during which it remained in the mainstream of Western policy, was a tragic mistake.”31 The party was in favor of further industrialization of the country and intensive development of the economy. But N. Erbakan and his party, oriented toward radical Islam-ism, could not cope with the unfavorable economic situation.
In 1997, relations between the army—the bastion of the secular principles of Turkish statehood— and the government became more tense. The military forced N. Erbakan to retire and a new government was formed from members of the Homeland Party, the Democratic Leftist Party, and the Democratic Turkey Party. In January 1998, the Constitutional Court prohibited the activity of the Islamist Welfare Party, but its members immediately created the Virtue Party, which took third place in the early parliamentary elections.
In 2002, the deterioration in the economic situation, corruption of the power structures, unemployment, aggravation of the relations between Turkey and the EU, and the crisis involving Iraq led to the collapse of the ruling coalition and victory at the special election of the Islamist Justice and
31 S.B. Druzhilovskiy, “O teorii i praktike islamskogo pravleniia v stranakh Srednego Vostoka (Iran, Afganistan, Turtsiia),” in: Islam i politika, Moscow, 2001, p. 63.
Development Party (JDP) headed by R. Erdogan, which obtained 363 of the 550 seats in parliament.32 For the first time in Turkish history, the Islamists created a one-party government. The Islamist elite had reached the national political level.
The democratic trends that helped the JDP to legally come to power and the simultaneously restraining role of the army are making it possible to achieve a certain balance in Turkey between the Islamists and pro-Western supporters. However, several factors are tipping the balance in favor of the Islamists. First, genuine secularity with respect to public institutions has not been reached in Turkey. Second, many external factors are intensifying Muslim self-awareness (the situation around Iraq and Iran, the increase in anti-American sentiments, the problem of joining the EU, and so on).
* * *
So the Islamic factor in the Muslim states is expressed in different ways, both in their cultural heritage, and in political practice. The attempts made in several Muslim countries to restrict the role of religion in public life and encourage different forms of secular nationalism are the result of the long years of European colonialism. Use by the state and ruling parties of traditional Muslim rhetoric in their search for ways to achieve political legitimization was a necessary step and led to the sanctioning of political and economic reforms with principles of egalitarianism and justice, which are so clearly expressed in Islam.
32 See: A.A. Volovich, “Novye otnosheniia Turtsii s arabami: ostanetsia li mesto dlia Izrailia?” in: Turtsiia v novykh geopoliticheskikh usloviiakh, Round table documents, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS; Institute of Israel and Middle Eastern Studies, Moscow, 2004, p. 52.
