Geopolitics and terrorism in the North Caucasus: consequences of EU-Russia confrontation/cooperation and jihadist propaganda Текст научной статьи по специальности «Политологические науки»

Коммуникационный менеджмент и стратегическая коммуникация в государственном управлении

Бифолки Д.

Геополитика и терроризм на Северном Кавказе: последствия конфронтации / сотрудничества ЕС и России и пропаганда

джихадистов

Джулиано Бифолки — аспирант, Римский университет Тор Вергата, Италия. E-mail: giuliano.bifolchi@gmail.com

Аннотация

Северный Кавказ является стратегическим регионом в составе РФ, который привлекает внимание Запада и арабских стран. После распада Советского Союза здесь получили развитие исламистская пропаганда, этническая напряженность, кровавые конфликты, которые вызвали рост террористической угрозы. В настоящее время регион находится под влиянием пропаганды так называемого «Исламского государства»1, что угрожает его безопасности и стабильности. В последнее время Европейский Союз начал понимать фундаментальную роль Северного Кавказа в борьбе с терроризмом. Присутствие северокавказской диаспоры в Европе, в частности чеченцев, и угрозу возвращения иностранных боевиков на родину с использованием Северного Кавказа в качестве «моста» между Европой и Ближним Востоком можно рассматривать как потенциальную угрозу для безопасности Европейского Союза. По этим причинам сотрудничество между Москвой и Брюсселем в области борьбы с терроризмом и безопасностью имеет большое значение, но это сотрудничество подрывается конфронтацией / конкуренцией между ЕС и Россией в области международных отношений после украинского кризиса.

Цель этой статьи — дать оценку влияния пропаганды и стратегической коммуникации террористических групп в таком важнейшем регионе, как Северный Кавказ, охарактеризовать последствия нынешней конфронтации / сотрудничества между ЕС и Россией для международной безопасности и борьбы с терроризмом.

Ключевые слова

Северный Кавказ, Россия, Европейский Союз, Исламское государство, терроризм, пропаганда джихадистов, «Имарат Кавказ», стратегическая коммуникация.

Introduction

The North Caucasus is a strategic region in the south of Russia which can be considered as an epicentre of international events and of a historical process whose repercussions have a global impact. The North Caucasian Federal District has attracted the interest of local and international actors which aim at playing a leading role in this area that is considered to be a significant centre of interconnectivity, not only for large-scale projects but also for the cooperation among Eurasian countries2.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the region has been targeted by both Western and Gulf countries' attempts to influence the regional dynamics and contrasting the local Russian

1 Организация запрещена в Российской Федерации.

2 Оаё2кву К.Б. Геополитика Кавказа. Москва: Международные отношения. 2003. С. 44.

policy. As noted by the Russian media and often discussed in Russian academic literature, the First and the Second Chechen Wars, the East Prigorodny Conflict (also referred to as the Ossetian-Ingush conflict), and the ethnic tensions among ethnic North Caucasian minorities have been exploited by external actors as a geopolitical leverage against the Russian Federation.3

Among the consequences of foreign actors' efforts to interfere in the region were the rise of extremist religious groups and the creeping terrorist threat, particularly after the First Chechen War, as well as the creation of the so-called Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus Emirate) by Doku Umarov in 2007, a terrorist organisation which aimed at expelling the Russian presence in the North Caucasus and establishing an emirate in the region under the sharia (Islamic law).4 Although during the first decade of the 21st century, the West was involved in the 'Global War on Terrorism' which led the United States and its allies to start military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the rise of religious extremist groups and terrorist activities in the North Caucasus was not perceived as a global threat in Europe and the United States ,or not completely understood as such. When in 2014, the North Caucasus started to be involved in the Islamic State's activities and jihadist propaganda, after Daesh created the Vilayat Kavkaz (Caucasus Province), and due to the presence of North Caucasian foreign fighters among the ranks of the Islamic State, Western governments and international organisations began to pay attention to the regional dynamics and their repercussions on the European Union.

This paper aims to underline the rise and evolution of terrorism in the strategic geopolitical region which is the North Caucasus and the consequences of the lack of cooperation between the European Union and Russia in the field of counter-terrorism and security for this

3 See f.e.: YazkovaA. Кавказ: оценка ситуации, возможные пути преодоления кризисов и конфликтов // Кавказ и глобализация. 2008. № 1. С. 36-45. URL: http://cvberleninka.ru/article/n/severnvv-kavkaz-otsenka-situatsii-vozmozhnve-puti-preodoleniva-krizisov-i-konfliktov (accessed: 09.11.2017); Eneev D.O. Интересы западных стран на Северном Кавказе как угроза национальной безопасности России // Науковедение. 2014. № 3 (22). С. 86. URL: http://cvberleninka.ru/article/n7interesv-zapadnvh-stran-na-severnom-kavkaze-kak-ugroza-natsionalnov-bezopasnosti-rossii (accessed: 09.11.2017); Sokurov S.N. Северный Кавказ как актуальный геополитический и геостратегический узел // Вестник РУДН. Серия: Юридические науки. 2014. № 4. С. 415-422.URL: https://cvberleninka.ru/article/n7severnvv-kavkaz-kak-aktualnvv-geopoliticheskiv-i-geostrategicheskiv-uzel (accessed: 09.11.2017); Guler K. Геополитические Процессы на Северном Кавказе и их Влияние на Этнополитические Ситуацию в Карачаево-Черкесской Республике // Власть. 2015. № 5. С. 194-197; Serderov R.M. Интересы Западных стран на Северном Кавказе как угроза национальной безопасности России // Власть. 2015. № 6. С. 202-206. URL: http://cvberleninka.ru/article/n/o-vnutrennih-i-vneshnih-ugrozah-rossii-na-severnom-kavkaze (accessed: 9.11.2017); Gadzhev M.M. Религиозный фактор в межнациональных отношениях на Северном Кавказе // Общество: политика, экономика, право. 2016. № 1. С. 15-18. URL: https://cvberleninka.ru/article/n7religioznvv-faktor-v-mezhnatsionalnvh-otnoshenivah-na-severnom-kavkaze (accessed: 9.11.2017 Kovalev V.V. Samigin P.I., Samigin P.S. Геополитика и проблемы обеспечения национальной безопасности России на Северном Кавказе // Гуманитарные, социально-экономические и общественные науки. 2017. № 4. С. 29-32. URL: http://cvberleninka.ru/article/n/geopolitika-i-problemv-obespecheniva-natsionalnov-bezopasnosti-rossii-na-severnom-kavkaze (accessed 9.11.2017).

4 DobaevI. PonedelkovA. Тенденции в эволюции терроризма на Северном Кавказе // Власть. 2013. № 10. С. 17-22. URL: http://cvberleninka.ru/article/n7tendentsii-v-evolvutsii-terrorizma-na-severnom-kavkaze (accessed: 9.11.2017).

area. Also, this research briefly analyses the impact of strategic communication5 used by terrorist groups to spread Salafi-jihadi ideology in the North Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Within this context, particular attention will be given to the Islamic State. Furthermore, this investigation attempts to explain why it is fundamental that the European Union and the Russian Federation restore their cooperation in the field of security and counter-terrorism because they are both exposed to the threat of terrorism.

Indeed, the European Union and Russia share the same concern about the return of foreign fighters to their homelands. Considering the strategic position of the North Caucasus as a 'bridge' between Europe and the Middle East and the importance of the North Caucasian diaspora that lives in Europe, as well as given the consistent presence of North Caucasian foreign fighters among the ranks of the Islamic State, it is desirable that Moscow and Brussels overcome their conflict regarding the Ukrainian crisis and join their forces in the fight against terrorism.

Until now, such cooperation between Brussels and Moscow has been undermined by the strategic communication perpetuated by political and social actors such as non-profit organisations, media agencies, and think tanks which have, particularly after the Ukrainian crisis, influenced EU-Russia relations, creating a distance in various strategic fields (security, economy, environmental protection, etc.).

Methodology of research

This research is a qualitative study that attempts to explain the geopolitical role of the North Caucasus, the use of strategic communication and propaganda in the rise of the Islamist threat in the region as well as the competition/cooperation between the European Union and Russia in the field of counter-terrorism and security.

The methodology used in this paper is based on review of literarture on geopolitics, history, security, ethnography and strategic communication as well as scholarly literature and NGO reports concerning the North Caucasus, its decisive role in the fields of geopolitics and international relations, terrorist activities in the region and Russian and European strategies to combat the jihadist phenomenon. Most of the studies related to the North Caucasus focused on its geopolitical role as the so-called "inner abroad" or "domestic abroad".6 Particularly, since the

5 A useful definition of 'strategic communication' can be found in Cornish P., Lindley-French J., Yorke C. Strategic Communication and National Strategy. Chatham House Report. London: Chatham House, 2011. P. 4. Strategic communication is defined as 'a systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted across strategic, operational and tactical levels, that enables understanding of target audiences and identifies effective conduits to promote and sustain particular types of behaviour'.

6 See f.e.: Huntington S. The Clash of Civilization // Foreign Affairs. 1993. Vol. 72 (3). С. 22-49 Cohen A. 'The New Great Game': Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia / The Heritage Foundation [Электронный ресурс] 1996. URL: https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/the-new-great-game-oil-politics-the-caucasus-and-central-asia

collapse of the Soviet Union, the region attracted the attention of scholars and journalists because of the Chechen conflict and the general North Caucasus insurgency,7 while less attention has been paid to the role of strategic communication methods used by Western countries and Russia as well as by terrorist groups which conditioned the future development of the region.

Within this context, this research paper consists of three parts:

An introduction to the region contextualising its geopolitical role and strategic position which has attracted both Western countries' and Gulf states' interests after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

A description of the current situation taking into account security issues and the terrorist threat with particular attention paid to the rise of the Islamic State in the North Caucasus after the creation of the Vilayat Kavkaz and the link between the local insurgency and the global terrorist network. In this section, further attention will be paid to the role of propaganda used by terrorist organisations in the North Caucasus to promote their ideology and recruit fighters, especially among the younger generations.

The cooperation/confrontation between Europe and Russia in the field of counter-terrorism taking into account the considerable presence of North Caucasian foreign fighters among the ranks of the Islamic State.

I. The Geopolitical role of the North Caucasus: Russian and Western interests

Given its position between Europe and Asia, the entire Caucasus region plays a pivotal strategic role in the field of geopolitics and international relations. Whereas the North stands under control of the Russian Federation, the South, that is, the republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, are independent since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Although there is a high connection between the two regions, the North Caucasus is often differentiated from the

(accessed: 6.11.2017); Matveeva A. The North Caucasus: The Russian Inner Abroad // Borderland in Transition / N. Petrov (ed.) Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Centre. 2000; Trenin D., Malashenko A. Russia's Restless Frontier: the Chechnva Factor in Post-Soviet Russia. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016; Malashenko A. The North Caucasus: Russia's Internal Abroad? Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Centre, 2011. URL: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/MalashenkoBriefing November2011 ENG web.pdf (accessed

20.10.2017).

7 Further information on the topic: Benningsen-Broxup M. The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance Towards the Muslim World. New York: St Martin's Press, 1992; Dunlop J.B. Russia Confronts Chechnva: Roots of a Separatist Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1998; Bennet V. Ciying Wolf: The Return of War to Chechnva. London: Pan, 2011; Politkovskaya A. A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnva. London: Harvill Press. 2001; Smith S. Allah's Mountain: the Battle for Checnva / New York: I.B. Tauris. 2001; Schaefer R.W. The Insurgencv and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad. Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International. 2010; Markedonov S. Radical Islam in the North Caucasus. Evolving Threats, Challenges, and Prospect. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2010; Cohen A. Russia's Counterinsurgencv in the North Caucasus: Performance and Consequences — The Strategic Threat of Religious Extremism and Moscow's Response. Carlisle: U.S. Armv War College Press, 2014. URL: http://ssi.armvwarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub 1189.pdf (accessed 15.9.2017); Souleimanov E.A. The North Caucasus Insurgencv: Dear or Alive? North Charleston: Create Space Independent Publishing, 2017.

South not only because it stands under the Kremlin's rule, but similarly because of its socioeconomic problems and difficult security situation which have led the majority of scholars and journalists describe the region as the most volatile and unstable area of the Russian Federation, particularly affected by a low level of economic development, unemployment, corruption, local insurgency, terrorist activities, and ethnic tensions.

Regarding its ethnoterritorial characteristics, the North Caucasus shares local, regional, and international interconnected power centres with major global key players in the Eurasian area. For instance, the geopolitical interests regarding Chechnya, a regional power centre, might be associated with the Turkish need to fortify its position in the area. While Russia controls the Adygea - Karachay - Circassia territorial segments, Dagestan, because of its peculiar ethnoterritorial feature, could be considered an independent centre of power connected with neighbouring countries such as Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey as well as Russia.8 Russian foreign and domestic policy and the entire network of international relations have influenced the interdependence of the Caucasian regional power centres and have created interconnection with the Middle East and Central Asia.

Regarding the ethnopolitical space, the North Caucasus does not end at the southern border of the Russian Federation but extends into the territories of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia thus assuming a greater geopolitical value and becoming an element of interest for various geopolitical actors which operate in the Southern Caucasus.9

Marie Benningsen-Broxup described the North Caucasus as a barrier between the Orthodox Christian and the Muslim worlds and an obstacle to the Russian expansion towards Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East.10 George Friedman considered the North Caucasus as a Russian buffer zone which prevents external attacks from the south and defends the core of the nation from NATO expansion. Furthermore, there are some of the most vital agriculture, population, and logistic hubs in the region.11

The Kremlin has several times underlined the North Caucasus' role as 'bridge' between Europe and Asia: the Ministry of the North Caucasus Affairs has promoted the strategy of the development of transport and logistics clusters in the Caspian basin thanks to the advantageous role of the Republic of Dagestan and the city of Makhachkala as hotspots in the field of trade and social exchange.12

8 Prokopenko E. The Caucasus in the Contemporary Geopolitical Dimension // The Caucasus & Globalization. 2010. Vol. 4 (3-4). P. 24-28.

9 EmirovR. К вопросу о национальной безопасности России на Северном Кавказе // Власть. 2013. № 4. С. 192-195. URL: https://cyberleninka.m/article/n/k-voprosu-o-natsionalnoy-bezopasnosti-rossii-na-severnom-kavkaze (дата обращения: 20.9.2017).

10 Benningsen-Broxup M. The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance Towards the Muslim World. New York: St Martin's Press, 1992.

11 Friedman G. The Geopolitics of Russia: Permanent Struggle / Stratfor [Электронный ресурс]. 2012. URL: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics-russia-permanent-struggle (accessed: 20.9.2017).

12 Концепция развития транспортно-логистического кластера в Каспийском бассейне / Minkavkaz. [Электронный ресурс]. 2017. URL: http://www.minkavkaz.gov.ru/upload/iblock/678/kontseptsiya-razvitiya-transportnologisticheskogo-klastera-v-kaspiyskom-basseyne.pdf (дата обращения: 6.11.2017).

Because of its unique sociocultural and strategic characteristics, the North Caucasus has always attracted the interest of Russia and foreign countries: in the 18th - 19th centuries, the Tsarist Empire fought against the Safavids and the Ottomans to control the region and to gain access to Central Asia. In the 20th century, under the Soviet rule, the central government reshuffled several times the North Caucasus' administrative configuration with serious repercussion on its ethnic minorities: during the Second World War, several North Caucasian ethnic groups, notably the Chechens, the Ingush, the Karachay, and the Balkars, were forced to abandon their homeland as they were accused of collaborating with the Nazi regime and were deported to Central Asia till 1956 when they were rehabilitated and allowed to return to their homes.

The collapse of the USSR caused the spread of independent movements and ethnic tensions in the North Caucasus. Due to the lack of a reliable central authority, Western and Arab countries have attempted to gain influence in the region by promoting their political strategies and ideological views focusing their attention on the desire of independence of the local population. Decades of 'Russification' by the Soviets had affected the North Caucasus which experienced a lack of Muslim religious figures. Since the 1990s, some Arab countries have exploited this situation to spread propaganda and ideology and attract the young generations in their madrasa. Therefore, Salafi ideology and political Islam have been propagated in the region, and the North Caucasus began to host non-profit organisations and cultural associations financed with Arab capital. The Kremlin perceived these efforts to interfere in the region as a threat to its authority and decided to ban specific NGOs which were involved more in financing and supporting extremist religious groups and terrorism than with humanitarian projects.

The vacuum of power left by the collapse of the Soviet Union was an invitation for the United States to intervene in the regional dynamics of the former Soviet space by exploiting the weakness of the infant Russian Federation, especially in the first years of Boris Yeltsin's presidency. The White House saw in this temporary vacuum of power the opportunity to reduce Russia's influence through the promotion of the territorial sovereignty of the newly independent states in the South Caucasus. The primary goal of the United States was to create a US influence zone formed by Turkey, the Caucasian republics, Ukraine, and the Central Asian republics. Also, the White House sought to establish a buffer zone that could contain the Russian Federation, separate it from Iran and at the same time deter the Chinese commercial and political expansion towards Europe.13

13 Nation C.R. Russia, the United States and the Caucasus / Carlise, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute.2007. URL: http://pubhcations.armvwarcollege.edu/pubs/1862.pdf (accessed: 20.9.2017).

Ethnocultural and ethnolinguistic problems have been used as means to interfere in the macro area Azov Sea - Black Sea - the Caspian Sea which was included by Haushofer and Mackinder in the world's most important areas of contrast. US - Russia confrontation still affects this macro area: according to the concept of 'geopolitical axes' elaborated by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the White House started the prevention of Russian expansion to the south and towards the geopolitical pivots in the second decade of the 21st century through the North Caucasus and the exploitation of ethnic, cultural, and religious differences as an element of instability. The United States began this strategy of destabilisation in the Caucasus region and exploitation of ethnic tensions after the Kremlin completed its internal political and economic process.14

Ethnocultural and ethnolinguistic issues have become an essential soft power tool in the geopolitical and strategic communication confrontation: undeniably, the US Intelligence think tank Stratfor defined the North Caucasian Muslim population as one of Russia's most vulnerable fronts.15 Hence, the Kremlin's attention to the North Caucasus is due to the need to integrate the area into Russia and avoid a disintegration process seen as the major threat to its national security. Any scenario of destabilisation in the Caucasus may have substantial negative consequences for the Russian Federation, especially considering the interlink between the conflicts in the North and South Caucasus.16

Sergey Markedonov highlighted the geopolitical and strategic value of the North Caucasus for Russia and the necessity to allow its integration and direct connection with domestic and foreign policy. On the one hand, Russian internal stability depends on the Caucasus because the loss of this region could support the desire of secession in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Tyva, and Yakutia, or push members of the Cossack Movement to consider themselves as non-Russians and thus seek the creation of an exclusive space for the Cossacks. On the other hand, in foreign policy, the North Caucasus grants Russia the opportunity to participate in the interests of the strategic areas of the Muslim world and the economic and political agenda of the Middle East and Southeast Asia regions17.

14 Avksentyev V. Ethnocultural and Ethnoreligious Problems as Instruments of Geopolitics // Научный альманах стран Причерноморья. 2016. Т. 3. № 7. С. 6-11. URL: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/ethnocultural-and-ethnoreligious-problems-as-instruments-of-geopolitics (accessed: 6.11.2017).

15 Goujon R. Ruthless and Sober in Syria / Stratfor [Электронный ресурс]. 2016. URL: https://www.stratfor.org/weeklY/ruthless-and-sober-svria (accessed: 10.10.2017).

16 Emirov R. К вопросу о национальной безопасности России на Северном Кавказе // Власть. 2013. № 4. URL: https://cYberleninka.ru/article/n/k-voprosu-o-natsionalnoY-bezopasnosti-rossii-na-severnom-kavkaze (дата обращения: 20.9.2017). P. 193.

17 Markedonov S. The North Caucasus: The Value and Costs for Russia / RIAC [Электронный ресурс]. 2013. URL: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-North-Caucasus-The-Value-and-Costs-for-Russia-16287 (accessed: 10.10.2017).

Because of its geopolitical, commercial, and cultural role and importance, not only the Russian Federation, but even the United States, the European Union, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and Israel have shown interest in the North Caucasian dynamics, while seeking to intervene directly or influence the region indirectly18. Besides the United States, one of the most active foreign actors is Riyadh which continues to support the construction of mosques and madrasa in the North Caucasus and promote the education of young imams whose duty is to spread Salafi ideology. Because of this strategy and interference in its domestic policy, the Kremlin has considered Saudi Arabia as one of the most dangerous actors in the region and a direct opponent in the Middle East, besides the United States.19

Although the European Union has proved not to be able to influence the Caucasus as much Russia and the United States, Brussels is trying to become a regional player by pursuing its Energy Security Strategy and, while at the same time, reducing Russian influence. The Ukrainian crisis has deteriorated the EU-Russia relations making the Caucasus a strategic region of confrontation between Moscow and Brussels. In the South Caucasus, the European Union supports Azerbaijan because of its oil and natural gas resources which could help European countries to decrease its dependence on Russian energy exportation. Also, Georgia plays a strategic role in the EU strategy because it is a logistic and energy corridor which borders with the Russian Federation to the north and Turkey to the south.

Brussels has not directly affected the North Caucasus because this region is part of the Russian Federation, but any action and strategy ideated by the EU in the neighbouring countries has repercussions on the stability, security, and socio-economic development of this strategic area.

Terrorism in the North Caucasus

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, radical Islam has spread in the North Caucasus as a consequence of the two Chechen Wars and the propaganda activities carried out by Muslim Arab countries. The region started soon experiencing the rise of Salafi ideology adopted by Sunni extremist local armed groups engaged in the fight against the central Russian authority. Even though the Kremlin managed to regain the control over the region after years of fighting and huge investments and thanks to military campaigns and counter-terrorist measures, particularly in the Chechen Republic, the North Caucasus has always presented elements of instability.

18 Zhanimov R.M. Геополитическая ситуация и проблемы межэтнических отношений на Северном Кавказе // Власть. 2007. № 9. С. 45-48. URL: https://cvberieninka.m/article/n/geopoHticheskava-situatsiva-i-problemv-mezhetnicheskih-otnosheniy-na-severnom-kavkaze (дата обращения: 10.10.2017).

19 Saunders P.J. Tensions Rise Between Saudis, Russian / Al-monitor.com [Электронный ресурс]. 2015. URL: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/russia-suadi-arabia-rivalrv-us-oil-chechnva-iran.html (accessed: 6.11.2017).

In 2007, Doku Umarov created Imarat Kavkaz to unite all the Islamic militants across the Caucasus: this organisation has threatened Russia in the last decade and has been responsible for the most significant terrorist attacks against military forces, politicians and civilians both in the North Caucasus and other regions of the Russian Federation. Among the most deadly and influential terrorist attacks organised by Imarat Kavkaz were the explosions in the Moscow metro (2010) and at Domodedovo international airport (2011)20 as well as the suicide bombings in Volgograd in 2013 approximately a month before the start of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games.21

The Caucasus Emirate has used foreign social media platforms with the aim of spreading its propaganda and recruiting new members: since 2007, it has had an online presence which promoted the idea of the Emirate and celebrated successful terrorist attacks against Russian security forces and civilians.

Russian-speaking nations, particularly in the North Caucasus, prefer to use media platforms different than those prevalent in the West (for instance Vkontakte or VK, Odnoklassniki, Mail.Ru — My World, Facebook, and Twitter).22 Milan Villareal's research focused on the Caucasus Emirates's use of VK. VK has become the most extensive European social media network with 290 million registered accounts that share opinions, status, videos, and pictures in Russian but also in English, Ukrainian, Chechen, Persian, Arabic and many more languages. The Caucasus Emirate understood the importance of social media and used VK as a propaganda tool and platform for recruitment. Even though VK started a vast and robust campaign against any malicious activity and terrorism, due to its rapid growth, Russian security forces hardly managed to control any action and had difficulties to prevent the creation of terrorist accounts or groups.23

20 On March 29, 2010, two women carried out two suicide bombings attacks at the metro stations Lubyanka and Park Kulturi causing more than 40 victims and over 100 injured. The Russian investigators stated that the two women were connected with the Caucasus Emirate; on March 31, 2010, Doku Umarov, leader of Imarat Kavkaz, claimed responsibility for the attacks. On January 24, 2011, Domodedovo International Airport in Moscow was the theatre of suicide bombing attacks organised by a 20-year-old from the North Caucasus. The attack caused the death of 37 people and injured 137 others; on February 8, 2011, a faction of the Caucasus Emirate claimed responsibility for the attack.

21 In December 2013, the North Caucasus Islamist terrorist organised two separate suicide bombings attacks in the city of Volgograd in the Southern Russia. The attacks targeted the Volgograd-1 station and the trolleybus N. 1233 which connects a suburb to Volgograd's city centre and caused 34 victims. These attacks occurred two months before the Sochi Olympic Winter Games; Vilayat Dagestan, a terrorist group inside the Caucasus Emirate, claimed responsibility for the attacks.

22 Top 5 Social Networks in Russia: Traffic and Time Spent / Digital Strategy Consulting Limit [Электронный ресурс] 2013. URL: http://www.digitalstrategvconsulting.com/intelligence/2013/09/top 5 social networks in russia traffic and time spent.php (accessed: 27.10.2017).

23 VillarealM. Exploiting VKontakte to Better Understand the Caucasus Emirate's Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures / El Paso: National Security Studies Institute, University of Texas. 2015.

Furthermore, the Caucasus Emirate's propaganda and activities remained supported through the website "kavkazcenter.com" which has Russian, Arabic, Turkish and English versions. Although, this site is considered a threat by the Russian authorities, the Kremlin has not been able to close it, given the protection of some European countries. The story of the existence of the Kavkaz Center servers and central offices is controversial, complicated and involves besides Russia, also North European and Baltic countries. Since 2003, the website has been hosted in Estonia, Lithuania, Sweden, and Finland and moved from one server to another because of Russian pressure and requests to shut down the website which the Kremlin considers to be linked to terrorism. Even though the United Nations Security Council put "kavkazcenter.com." in July 2011 on the sanctions list, the website is still operative and supported by the Finnish-Russian Civil Forum (Finrosforum, Suomalais-venalainen kansalaisfoorumi) and Pro-Caucasus, an in Sweden registered association financed by the Soros Fund which has vast interests in Finland.24

Since 2013, the Russian government has accomplished several successes in the fight against the Caucasus Emirate. The death of Doku Umarov in 2013 and the subsequent elimination of the most influential militant leaders hugely affected the activity and existence of Imarat Kavkaz. In fact, the Russian strategy and reorganisation of the region have proved to have a positive impact on the security situation in North Caucasus. In 2009, the area registered 1,381 terrorist attacks (about 2-3 per day), but since the creation of the North Caucasus Federal District in 2010 the level of violence has significantly diminished. During the period 2010-2015, terrorism caused 6074 victims but registered a sharp decay. Dagestan was the republic most affected by terrorist attacks (3,291 victims) followed by Chechnya (873), Ingushetia (753), Kabardino-Balkaria (727), North Ossetia-Alania (239), Stavropol Krai (149), and Karachaevo-Circassia (54). During these five years, the number of victims of terrorism dropped from 1,705 in 2010 to 258 in 2015.25

In 2016, the number of victims caused by armed conflicts or terrorist activities was 287 (202 casualties and 85 wounded). The key attacks and episodes of violence were registered in Dagestan (204 victims), Chechnya (43), Ingushetia (19), Kabardino-Balkaria (15), and Stavropol Kray (6).26

24 Giacalone G. The Kavkaz Center and the Jihadist Threat / Radical Islam Monitor in Southeast Europe [Электронный ресурс] 2014. URL: http://www.rimse.gr/2014/09/the-kavkaz-center-and-jihadist-threat.html (accessed: 4.11.2017).

25 Infographics. The statistics of the number of victims in the North Caucasian Federal District regions for a period of 6 years / Kavkaz Uzel [Электронный ресурс]. 2016. URL: http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/34546/ (accessed: 30.10.2017).

26 Infographics. Statistics of victims in Northern Caucasus for 2016 under the data of the Caucasian Knot / Kavkaz Uzel [Электронный ресурс]. 2017. URL: http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/38325/ (accessed: 30.10.2017).

During the first quarter of 2017, armed conflicts caused 45 victims (36 casualties and nine wounded) in Chechnya and Dagestan (Kavkaz Uzel 2017, April 17). The second quarter experienced a decline of victims (20 losses and six injured) caused by armed conflicts in Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Stavropol Kray.27

Although the number of terrorist attacks has declined and the security situation in the region has improved, there is still scepticism about the socioeconomic development and stability of the North Caucasus. Indeed, academic literature and media agencies have underlined that life and cohabitation between different ethnic groups have not progressed. There is still a confrontation between ethnic Russian and North Caucasian groups which want to control some specific territories claiming their historical rights and aiming at expelling members of other ethnic groups.

Ethnic tensions are correlated to the threat of terrorism which still represents a challenge for the security of the region. Currently, on the one hand, the Caucasus Emirate is striving for its survival after the elimination of its leadership, but on the other hand, the Islamic State has gained popularity among the young generations and the Muslim umma. Thanks to its propaganda of 'victory' and due to the presence of North Caucasian fighters among the ranks of the Islamic State, some of them capable of reaching the highest and most influential position such as Abu Omar al-Shishani28, several leaders of the North Caucasian militancy decided to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Europol released in 2015 a report where the Islamic State propaganda in Russian language was analysed highlighting the importance of the North Caucasus as a strategic region and a possible terrorist logistic hub between the Middle East, the former Soviet space and Europe. Furthermore, the report focused its attention on the threat of North Caucasian foreign fighters for the European security.29

27 Infographics. Statistics of victims in Northern Caucasus in Quarter 1 of 2017 under the data of the Caucasian Knot / Kavkaz Uzel [Электронный ресурс]. 2017. URL: http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/39081/ (accessed: 30.10.2017).

28 Tarkan Batirashvili (Abu Umar al-Shishani) was born in 1986 in Birkiani, a village located in the Pankisi Valley. His father is Christian while his mother is Muslim. After leaving school, Tarkan joined the Georgian army and worked as an Intelligence officer participating in the Second Chechen War and the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 where he fought on the Georgian side. After a serious injury which did not allow him to continue his carrier in the army and to find a job as a policeman, he was arrested and convicted because of illegal arms trafficking. Released in 2012, Tarkan went to Turkey and then Syria where he started to fight against Bashar al-Assad's troops. He led the organization Jaish al-Muhajireen wa al-Ansar before pledging his allegiance to Daesh. He covered different highprofile roles inside the Islamic State; according to the U.S. State Department, Tarkan was killed in 2016 during a raid of the international coalition forces in al-Shirqat in Iraq.

29 Europol. North Caucasus fighters in Syria and Iraq & IS Propaganda in Russian Language. The Hague: Europol. 2015.

Jean-François Ratelle noted that "Although severely weakened, the North Caucasus insurgency, mostly driven by IS-affiliated fighters, has begun to reorganise and plan limited attacks against security forces and terrorist attacks outside of the North Caucasus".30 In fact, in 2016-2017, the Russian security forces have prevented potential terrorist attacks organised by members of the Islamic State or Imarat Kavkaz and arrested militants linked to terrorist groups. The Russian counter-terrorist operations against terrorist organisations have demonstrated that the Islamic State propaganda has affected the North Caucasus and the Russian Federation.

Though currently, terrorists and militants in the North Caucasus are not capable of organising an offensive or a guerrilla warfare, the return of foreign fighters to their homeland might represent an opportunity for Imarat Kavkaz and the Islamic State to improve their guerrilla activities and challenge security forces and the central authorities. The North Caucasus is not the only region where foreign fighters and Salafism could find fertile ground in the Russian Federation: Tatarstan, the Urals, the area in the Far North and the Central Asian diaspora in Moscow are potential targets of jihadist propaganda and potentially a future threat to the Russian stability and security. Whereas the Russian Federation shares its western borders with the European Union, and the Caucasus region is part of the EU Energy Security Strategy, the destabilisation of Russia and the North Caucasus could have serious repercussion in Europe.

The impact of the Islamic State propaganda in Russian has increased since 2015 and should not be underestimated. It represents now the third most used language by the terrorist group after Arabic and English. This propaganda has used radio, video channels and magazines with the purpose to impact the Muslims in Russia and the post-Soviet States: in March 2015, al-Bayan Radio started broadcasting its daily news bulletins online in Russian. In May 2015, Furat Media channel started to release videos supporting Daesh's propaganda. Also, the Islamic State began publishing its magazine Istok in Russian: if the first editions of this publication had concentrated their attention on the description and life of the Islamic State and the explanation of the ideology, the last issue dedicated a full article on Europe and promoted the idea of war and terrorist attacks.

Moreover, the Islamic State has exploited online social media networks such as Facebook and Twitter to transmit its propaganda and recruit new members. Actually, Twitter is the platform most used by terrorist groups and members affiliated to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.31

30 Ratelle J.F. The North Caucasus Insurgency: a Potential Spillover into the Russian Federation? // Caucasus Anaytical Digest. 2017. No 93. P. 2-5.

31 Ajbali M. How ISIS Conquered Social Media / Al-Arabiya English [Электронный ресурс] 2014. URL: http://english.alarabiva.net/en/media/digital/2014/06/24/How-has-ISIS-conquered-social-media-.html (accessed 28.10.2017).

At its peak in 2015, the Islamic State's strategic communication aimed to promote itself as an efficient organisation in the field of military and governance capable of establishing and managing a significant portion of territory in Iraq and Syria described as the new 'caliphate'. Moreover, Daesh's propaganda wanted to attract and retain recruits, disseminate Salafi-jihadi ideology, instil fear and polarise societies. The Islamic State's narrative has used different sources combining Islamic religious texts, conspiracy theories which describe the Muslim umma as a target of Western subjugation, and youth culture narratives used as a leverage on the young generations in Europe, the MENA Region and the post-Soviet space often affected by unemployment and dissatisfied by the state's social policies. This narrative is based on six elements (brutality/violence, mercy, victimhood, war, belonging, and utopia) strategically balanced and whose purpose is to promote an alternative lifestyle adopted inside the proclaimed caliphate which is described by the Islamic State as a restoration of the Islamic Golden Age. The target audiences consisted of people who lived under the Islamic State control, Muslims across the Middle East and the North Africa, non-Arab Muslims in Europe and the former Soviet Republics, and the formal enemies labelled as the 'Zionist-Crusaders'.32

In the North Caucasus, the primary goal of this strategic communication is the diffusion of the message of the Islamic State among Russian Muslims and the creation of a link between the Russian-speaking foreign fighters who are fighting in Syria and Iraq and other militants. Since its beginning, this propaganda has affected the situation of the insurgency in the North Caucasus and motivated several leaders of the Caucasus Emirate to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Furat Media is the Russian-language branch of the Islamic State's propaganda apparatus which started its activity with the purpose of recruiting fighters among the Muslim umma in Russia, the North Caucasus, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia. Islam Atabiev, well-known with the nom de guerre Abu Jihad, is a 34-year-old ethnic Karachai from Russia who has managed Furat Media and organised the Islamic State's propaganda in Russian. According to different sources, Atabiev is the mastermind behind all the Russian-language propaganda of the Islamic State and the architect of several attacks in Russia, including the April 2017 bombing on the Saint Petersburg metro.33

32 Missiroli A. et al. Strategic Communications. East and South // Report N. 30. July 2016. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies. P. 29-32.

33 Islam Atabiev studied the fundamentals of Islamic theology at al-Azhar University in Egypt. After coming back home to the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia, Atabiev joined the jihadist groups involved in the local insurgency against the Russian and the local authorities in the North Caucasus. He was arrested on charges of banditry and he spent a year in prison. In 2011, he left the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia and moved to Syria where he joined the

The Russian-language propaganda has influenced some members of the North Caucasian Diaspora in Europe and helped the Islamic State to recruit fighters for its caliphate capable of conducting terrorist attacks on European soil. In fact in 2016, German police have conducted several raids across the country which resulted in the arrest of eleven Chechen men and three women with Russian citizenship suspected of being involved in financing terrorism or organising terrorist attacks.34 On October 27, 2016, two days after the arrests in Germany, four Chechens were arrested by the Polish security forces on charges of terrorism and financing terrorism.35 In July 2017, the Italian police stated that they arrested a Chechen man suspected of being a militant of the Islamic State connected to an attack in Grozny in 2014 which targeted a media office and a school and caused 20 victims.36 In October 2017, the Austrian authorities sentenced a Chechen man accused of promoting Islamic State ideology in the country; as reported by the local media, the 22-year-old man from Chechnya tried even to buy firearms and to convince his friends to go to Syria and fight among the ranks of the Islamic State.37

These series of arrests of Russian citizens (some of them were ethnic Chechens, others were Russians and/ or of other nationalities) who migrated to Europe underline that the terrorism threat in the North Caucasus has a significant impact even in the European Union.

II. Russia — Europe confrontation/cooperation against terrorism

The Ukrainian crisis could be considered as the breaking point of the collaboration between the European Union and Russia in the battle against terrorism. Although before 2014, Moscow and Brussels cooperated in the field of counter-terrorism achieving some essential results, after the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis and the entry of Crimea into the Russian Federation every form of collaboration has been cancelled and the relations between the two parties have been affected by an ongoing information warfare.38

Islamic State. Abu Omar al-Shishani tasked Atabiev with establishing Furat Media as a Russian-language media branch of the Islamic State.

34 Batchelor T. 'Imminent ISIS Attack' after Tip-off Sparks Mass Arrest of Russians across Germany / Express [Электронный ресурс] 2016. URL: http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/724911/ISIS-terror-arrests-Germanv-police-arrest-Chechen-suspects-dawn-raids (accessed: 4.11.2017)

35 Four Chechens Face Terrorism Charges in Poland / RFE/RL. [Электронный ресурс] 2016. URL: https://www.rferl.org/a/poland-chechens-charged-islamic-state-terrorism/28078132.html (accessed: 4.11.2017).

36 Segreti G. Italy Arrests Chechen Man Suspected of Islamic State Link / Reuters [Электронный ресурс] 2017. URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italv-chechnva-arrests/italv-arrests-chechen-man-suspected-of-islamic-state-link-idUSKBN19T0HF (accessed: 4.11.2017).

37 Native of Chechnya Convicted in Austria for Promoting IS / Kavkaz Uzel [Электронный ресурс]. 2017. URL: http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/41188/ (accessed: 4.11.2017).

38 Golounov S. Not All is Lost in Russian-EU Cross-Border Cooperation // PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo. 2017. No 481. P. 1. URL: http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policv-memos-pdf/Pepm481 Golunov August2017.pdf (accessed: 6.11.2017).

The EU-Russia cooperation in the field of security and counter-terrorism dates back to the beginning of the 21st century, during the Second Chechen War, because of the rise of the terrorist threat of al-Qaeda. On November 6, 2003, Moscow and Brussels signed in Rome a Cooperation Agreement which established the legal framework for the EU-Russia cooperation in the fight against international terrorism and transnational crime.39 The Russia-EU Road Maps on the Common Spaces of External Security40 and of Freedom, Security, and Justice41 invigorated the Cooperation Agreement and strengthened the partnership between the EU and Russia.

On January 28, 2014, the Russian Federation and the European Union issued a Joint Statement on Combating Terrorism which invigorated the Joint Statement of the Russia-EU Summit of October 3, 2001, and the Joint Statement on Combatting Terrorism of November 11, 2002. The new document defined it as fundamental for European and Russian security to contrast the radicalisation phenomenon and the recruitment process of terrorist and foreign fighters.

The European Parliament resolution adopted on February 6, 2014, on the EU-Russia Summit, underlined that the Russian Federation "remains one of the EU's most important partners in building strategic cooperation, sharing not only economic and trade interests but also aspiring to the realisation of commonly agreed democratic values", condemned the terrorist attacks which occurred in Volgograd at the end of 2013 and "welcomes the adoption of the joint EU-Russia statement of 28 January 2014 on combating terrorism, in which the EU and Russia agreed to consider possibilities for further strengthening cooperation in response to crimes committed by terrorists and organised crime, to expand cooperation in exchanging best practices vis-à-vis counterterrorism and training experts in counterterrorism, and to intensify their cooperation both within the UN framework and in other multilateral forums.".42

39 Agreement on Co-Operation Between the European Police Office and the Russian Federation / Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union. [Электронный ресурс]. 2003. URL: https://russiaeu.ru/userfiles/file/agreement on co operation between the european police office and the r ussian federation 2003 english.pdf (accessed: 27.10.2017).

40 Road Map on the Common Space of External Security / Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union [Электронный ресурс] 2005 URL: https://russiaeu.ru/userfiles/file/road map on the common space of external security 2005 english.pdf (accessed: 27.10.2017).

41 Road Map on the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice / Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union [Электронный ресурс] 2005. URL: https://russiaeu.ru/userfiles/file/road map on the common space of freedom, security and justice 2005 e nglish.pdf (accessed: 27.10.2017).

42 European Parliament Resolution of 6 February 2014 on the EU-Russia Summit (2014/2533 (RSP)) / EUR-Lex [Электронный ресурс] 2014. URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014IP0101(01) (accessed: 27.10.2017).

Unfortunately, the cooperation between the EU and Russia in the field of security and counter-terrorism was suspended in 2014 as a European form of protest against Russia's military intervention in Ukraine. Brussels has accused Moscow to have violated the Ukrainian territorial integrity with the annexation of Crimea which is considered illegal and a deliberate attempt of destabilising a neighbouring sovereign country. Therefore, the EU has imposed restrictive measures against the Russian Federation and has severed any form of cooperation.43

The sanctions have forced the Russian Federation to find alternative partners in the fight against terrorism: instead of cooperating with the European Union, Russia has intensified its activities in the framework of the Commonwealth of the Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Russia has also initiated counterterrorism cooperation with China, India, and Iran by holding regular meetings with their defence ministers.44

Even though the Ukrainian crisis has mined the relations between the Russian Federation and the West, in October 2014, US Secretary of State John Kerry highlighted the necessity of cooperation with Russia in the field of counter-terrorism.45 Also, Gabor Iklody, head of the EU Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), stated that the European Union and the Russian Federation have a great opportunity for counter-terrorism cooperation but till now they have not exploited it because of the Ukrainian crisis.46 The Kremlin shares the desire for cooperation with the West, particularly with Brussels, as reported by the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union when it states that there is a".. .urgent need to jointly elaborate a model of Russia-EU relations in the region of our 'common neighbourhood' which would ensure due consideration of the interests of all parties concerned and all countries of the region, thus instead of being a source of tension, becoming an instrument of enhancing and strengthening our cooperation.".47

43 EU sanctions against Ukraine / European Union Newsroom. [Электронный ресурс] 2017. URL: https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis (accessed: 27.10.2017).

44 Pawlak P., Gopffarth J. Countering extremism and terrorism in Russia / Brussels: European Parliament Think Tank [Электронный ресурс]. 2016. URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/582024/EPRS ATA(2016)582024 EN.pdf (accessed: 27.10.2017).

45 Sharyl N. Russia and Countering Violent Extremism in the Internet and Social Media: Exploring Prospects for US-Russia Cooepration Beyong the "Reset" // Journal of Strategic Security. 2013. Vol. 6. No 4. P. 1. URL: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1247&context=jss (accessed: 6.11.2017).

46 EU, Russia Have Great Opportunity for Counterterrorism Cooperation - Official / Sputnik [Электронный ресурс] 2017. URL: https://sputniknews.com/europe/201706071054406018-eu-russia-counterterrorism-cooperation-iklodv/ (accessed: 7.11.2017).

47 Brief overview of Russia-EU Relations / Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union [Электронный ресурс] URL: https://russiaeu.ru/en/brief-overview-relations (accessed: 27.10.2017). Regarding China, the Chechen Republic might play a fundamental role in the field of security and defense: at the end of 2016

The tensions between Moscow and Brussels have attracted the interest of the global media because the European Union has already at several occasions depicted the Russian Federation as a threat accusing the Kremlin of conducting a propaganda campaign against the European integrity and values. Brussels considers the Russian strategic communication and the Islamic State's propaganda the most dangerous challenges for its survival and has compared the Russian activities with those of a terrorist organisation that has organised attacks on European soil. According to a report released by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, the Russian strategic communication has caused several incidents such as the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007, the war in Georgia in 2008, the Smolensk crash in 2010, the downing of MH-17 in 2014, the annexation of Crimea, and the migration crisis.48

As a consequence, the European Parliament decided to reinforce the EU strategic communication task force and invest more in awareness raising, education, online and local media, investigative journalism and information literacy. The East StratCom Task Force was created to contrast Russian strategic communication which Brussels considers as a disinformation campaign as well as to better explain EU policies in the Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). In addition, the East Stratcom Task Force created a website called 'EU vs Disinfo' as a part of the EU strategic communication, to contrast pro-Kremlin communication campaigns.

Not only the European Union, but also NATO considers Russian strategic communication as a threat to the European values and integrity. The Atlantic Organisation decided in 2016 to create the NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence (NATO Stratcom) based in Riga (Latvia) with the purpose of communicating its role, objectives and missions appropriately and at the same time, as appears from its website, to contrast hostile propaganda produced in Russia. NATO Stratcom described Russian strategic communication as dangerous as the Islamic State's propaganda, following in the same steps and statements released by the EU Parliament.49

Daniil Martynov, Director of the International Special Forces Training Centre based in Gudermes (Chechnya), paid an official visit to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region where he exchanged experiences with the Chinese in combating terrorism

48 Draft Report on EU Strategic Communication to Counteract Propaganda Against it by Third Parties / European Parliament [Электронный ресурс]. 2016. URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REP0RT+A8-2016-0290+0+D0C+XML+V0//EN (accessed: 22.12.2017).

49 Simons G., Sillanpaa A. The Kremlin and Daesh Information Activities / Riga: NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence, 2016. URL: https://www.stratcomcoe.org/kremlin-and-daesh-information-activities (accessed: 23.12.2017).

Regardless of the crisis in Ukraine, there are other reasons for a confrontation between the European Union and Russia in the field of geopolitics and strategic communication which should be analysed and solved, if the two parties are willing to cooperate and contrast the terrorist threat. One of these reasons are the hostile relations between the Russian Federation and Georgia since the 2008 Russo - Georgian War which ended, backed by Russian support, with the declaration of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two regions which Tbilisi considers part of its sovereign territory.

Georgia has a particular role in the field of regional security and counter-terrorism because of its strategic position in the Caucasus and its proximity to Turkey and the North Caucasus Federal District. Furthermore, the presence of ethnic Muslim minorities in Georgia has a significant meaning for the national and regional stability since these minorities have provided foreign fighters to the Islamic State and helped the North Caucasian insurgency. Indeed, the Kremlin has several times accused the Georgian authorities to lack the control of the Pankisi Gorge, a region which borders with Chechnya and Dagestan and where Chechen militants during the Second Chechen War escaped and organised their activities against the Russian security forces. Some of the most notorious North Caucasian foreign fighters such as Abu Omar al-Shishani came from the Pankisi Valley, and this fact demonstrates the importance of this region for the international terrorist network. Even if the Security Service of Georgia (SSG) has denied any security problems in the country stating that the situation is entirely under the control of the Georgian administration, in 2016, 11 Georgian citizens were killed in Syria and Iraq among the ranks of the Islamic State.

Due to its connection to the North Caucasus and Turkey, and because of its strategic role in the European Energy Security Strategy and the New Silk Road, Russia and Georgia need to cooperate in the field of security and counter-terrorism and the European Union should support this collaboration. In August 2017, Europol signed an agreement with the Georgian government to boost the border control and avoid criminal and terrorist activities in the region: this agreement cannot be considered complete without Russian involvement.50

50 Europol. North Caucasus fighters in Syria and Iraq & IS Propaganda in Russian Language. The Hague: Europol. 2015.

III. Conclusion

In October 2017, supporters of the Islamic State have threatened twice the Russian Federation and the organisation of the 2018 FIFA World Cup, an international event which will be organised in eleven Russian cities. Daesh released banners in Arabic, English and Russian claiming that it will coordinate explosive attacks during the football world cup in Russia.51

Among these eleven cities where the football games will be held are Sochi in Krasnodar Krai, an area which could be included as part of the North Caucasus region even if it is under the administration of the Southern Federal District, and Volgograd, a city in the South of Russia which already experienced terrorist attacks in 2013, after the release of a video where Doku Umarov, the leader of the Caucasus Emirate threatened the Russian Federation and the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games .52

It is possible to state that there is a correlation between the Islamic State's threats against the 2018 FIFA World Cup and those of Imarat Kavkaz against the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games. In this situation, the North Caucasus plays a fundamental role because it is a point of contact between Europe and the Middle East and a 'bridge' for foreign fighters who have fought in Syria and Iraq. The European Union should not underestimate the terrorist threats against Russia because the 2018 FIFA World Cup will attract millions of European supporters who might become potential targets of the Islamic State.

Furthermore, there is a consistent North Caucasian Diaspora in Europe, first among all Chechens. In the 21st century, the European Union has become an important destination for North Caucasian people who escaped from the regional conflicts or were looking for new opportunities and employment. In the recent years, this phenomenon has increased particularly at the borders between Belarus and Poland where there is a constant flow of immigrants from the North Caucasus, who desire to cross Poland to arrive in Germany.53 In 2016, the migration from the North Caucasus to Europe has increased. In the first semester of the last year, the number of Russian migrants to Germany doubled compared to the same period in 2015. Because of the threats of the Islamic State and the vast flow of migrants from the Middle East, the control of the European borders has become strict, and many North Caucasians have been forced to find a new destination. Georgia is the first choice of the North Caucasian Diaspora because it is closer to the

51 Robertson A. ISIS issues chilling Russia World Cup 2018 threat with a sick poster of Lionel Messi crying blood behind bars. 2017. URL: http://www.dailvmail.co.uk/news/article-5014105/ISIS-Russia-World-Cup-threat-Lionel-Messi-poster.html (accessed: 4.11.2011).

52 BowenA.S. Sochi 2014: The Terrorist Threat / The National Interest [Электронный ресурс] 2013. URL: http://nationalinterest.org/commentarv/sochi-2014-the-terrorist-threat-8890 (accessed: 4.11.2017).

53 Petrovich A., OstaptschukM. North Caucasian Head for Europe by Train / Deutsche Welle [Электронный ресурс]. 2013. URL: http://www.dw.com/en/north-caucasians-head-for-europe-bv-train/a-17189749 (accessed: 4.11.2017).

region. In addition, under the presidency of Mikhail Saakashvili the Georgian government started a political and communication strategy which aimed to bolster the relations with the North Caucasus, while it contrasted the Russian presence in the region and attracted North Caucasians inside the country.54 Georgia has strong relations with the European Union, and from this perspective Georgian citizenship could be converted into a tool to get easy access to Europe: in this view, people from the North Caucasus might prefer to migrate towards Georgia and, after having obtained the Georgian citizenship, move to Europe.55

Brussels cannot undervalue this phenomenon particularly because Georgia has experienced threats from the Islamic State, has been confronted with terrorist training camps on its territory and is the country of origin of the most famous foreign fighters among the ranks of the Islamic State such as Abu Omar al-Shishani, Ruslan Machalikashvili56, Ahmed Chatayev57, and Murad Margoshvili58.

Chechens represent the majority of North Caucasian migrants in Europe who fled the country during the First and the Second Chechen Wars or later, as asylum seekers oppossing the current regime headed by Ramzan Kadyrov. In 2003, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated that among the 33 thousand Russian citizens who migrated to Europe and applied for asylum around 90 percent were Chechens. In 2008, the Jamestown Foundation reported that around 70 thousand Chechens live in Europe.59

The Chechen Diaspora in Europe could be a potential threat to the security and stability because of the link between some members of the European Chechen community and the global terrorist network. In recent years, security forces in Europe have arrested Chechen people accused of connection with the Islamic State proving that the European Union is not immune from the North Caucasus militancy and terrorism.

54 Amelina Y.A. Северокавказская политика Грузии после прихода к власти команды Иванишвили: ингушское направление // Проблемы Национальной Стратегии. 2014. Т. 4. № 25. С. 104-122.

55 Dzutsati V. Georgia May Become a Key Destination for North Caucasians if EU Grants It Visa-Free Entry // North Caucasus Weekly. 2016. Vol. 17 (15). Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation. URL: https://iamestown.org/program/georgia-may-become-a-key-destination-for-north-caucasians-if-eu-grants-it-visa-free-entry-2/ (accessed: 7.11.2017).

56 Ruslan Machalikashvili (Saifullah al-Shishani) is a Georgian citizen from Duisi, the main village of the Pankisi Valley. During the period 2001-2011 he was engaged in kidnappings and drug trafficking in the gorge before leaving Georgia and moving to Turkey where he continued his criminal activities. In 2011-2014 Machalikashvili

was one of the leader of Jaish al-Muhajireen wa al-Ansar.

57 Ahmed Chatayev, a hero of the Chechen war tortured by the Russian army during the conflict, is nowadays considered the mastermind behind the attack in Istanbul airport in June 2016.

58 Murad Margoshvili (Abu Walid al-Shishani or Muslim al-Shishani) is a Kist who joined the Soviet Army and served in Moldova. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and during the First and the Second Chechen Wars he fought alongside the Chechen rebels. In 2003 he was arrested by Russian special forces but he was released after two years. Even though his release occurred without any reason and some experts speculated about his affiliation with the Russian security forces as informant, he moved to the Middle East and commands the Junud al-Sham legion of the al-Nusra Front.

59 VatchagaevM. Chechnya's Exodus to Europe // North Caucasus Weekly. 2008. Vol. 9 (3). Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation. URL: https://iamestown.org/program/chechnyas-exodus-to-europe/ (accessed: 4.11.2017).

If the European Union has recently begun to discover the potential threat of the North Caucasus, the Russian Federation has a long experience in the fight against local insurgency and terrorist organisations. On the one hand, the EU has not always perceived the North Caucasian terrorist activities as a severe threat being more interested in the Middle East and North Africa. On the other hand, the Kremlin has several times charged the European countries of avoiding cooperation in the field of security and supporting local militants, referring to the United Kingdom approval to host two prominent figures of the Chechen insurgency such as Boris Berezovsky and Akhmed Zakaev who were accused of criminal charges by the Russian authorities. Furthermore, the Russian government has declared to have evidence which might demonstrate that some no-profit organisations based in Europe are involved in the financing of terrorism in the North Caucasus.60

The situation in the North Caucasus is connected to the Ukrainian crisis and the confrontation between the Russian Federation and the European Union: Chechens who live in Europe have formed a battalion under the command of the former general of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Isa Munaev, who was killed in action in Ukraine. This military unit became part of the Ukrainian army and fought against the Russian forces, although, this was never confirmed by Kiev. Russia perceives the presence of Chechen fighters in Ukraine as an evidence of the Western support for Islamic militants to fight Russia in its southern region. In Ukraine, Chechens mostly compose the Dzhokhar Dudayev and Sheikh Mansur units which also include Muslims from other former Soviet countries, such as Uzbeks and Balkars.61

Mairbek Vatchagaev underlined the presence of Chechen fighters in Ukraine among the ranks of the pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian forces. There are Chechen battalions such as the Dzhokhar Dudayev and Sheikh Mansur units who fought against the Russian troops and even a Chechen military unity deployed in Ukraine in support of the Russian forces. As a consequence, the Ukrainian crisis has offered another battleground to Chechen fighters who "are becoming an increasingly militarised nation. This will hardly contribute to peace in Russia in the short or long

60 Vulliamy E. Russia Accused Birmingham Charity of Aiding Terror / The Guardian [Электронный ресурс]. 2003. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/oct/14/russia.terrorism (accessed 4.11.2017); Batchelor T. Russia Accuses UK of Helping Islamic State by 'Protecting Terrorist Who Finance Jihadis' / Express [Электронный ресурс] 2016. URL: http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/665021/Russia-accuses-UK-HELPING-Islamic-State-protecting-terrorists-finance-jihadis (accessed: 4.11.2017).

61 Kramer A.E. Islamic Battalions, Stocked With Chechens, Aid Ukraine in War With Rebels / New York Times [Электронный ресурс]. 2015. URL: https://www.nvtimes.com/2015/07/08/world/europe/islamic-battalions-stocked-with-chechens-aid-ukraine-in-war-with-rebels.html (accessed: 4.11.2017).

term as these fighters eventually return home to share their experiences after gaining further combat experience in eastern Ukraine".62

As analysed before, the Islamic State still represents a threat in Europe, in Russia and the North Caucasus because of its propaganda which has attracted young people dissatisfied with their life condition and social policies in their countries. Since the very beginning, communication has been a model of governance and military planning for the Islamic State and the way to wage psychological warfare on its enemies, recruit fighters, support its allies, and promote its ideology.63

At its peak in 2015, the Islamic State's propaganda produced contents from 38 different media offices from West Africa to East Afghanistan using Twitter to publish about two hundred events in a single week consisting of photographs, reports, documentaries, radio bulletins, and songs. The propaganda's goal was to invite the Muslims to join the Islamic State and experience the life inside the caliphate. The Islamic State's propaganda was a mix of Islamic doctrine, victimhood, martyrdom, violence, and utopia and targeted a broad audience from the Middle East to Europe and the post-Soviet space.

Nowadays, particularly after the fall of the Raqqa and Mosul, Daesh's message has changed and focused on the war against the enemies. The geopolitical gains on the ground achieved by the International coalition forces in Iraq and the Assad forces backed by the Russian Federation in Syria have affected the Islamic State's strategic communication: at the present time more than three-quarters of the media offices have been destroyed, only in Afghanistan there is still a team capable of organising the group's propaganda, and the media arm's output has decreased to 25 products per week (of wich most are military updates). Furthermore, private companies have joined their efforts with governments to counter Islamic State's propaganda on the Surface Web, especially against those accounts on Twitter, Facebook, and VKontakte that promoted jihadist ideology and recruit fighters. As a result of this cooperation and counter-terrorism strategy, the number of Islamic State's contents on Social Networks has decreased from 900 in August 2015 to around 100 in November 2017.64

Because today it is no longer possible to talk about the caliphate after the loss of Raqqa, Mosul and many other cities in Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State's message has been transformed

62 Vatchagaev M. Under Two Flags: Chechen Fighters in Eastern Ukraine // Eurasia Daily Monitor. 2014. Vol. 11 (164). Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation. URL: https://jamestown.org/program/under-two-flags-chechen-fighters-in-eastern-ukraine-2/ (accessed: 4.11.2017).

63 Winter C. Media Jihad: The Islamic State's Doctrine for Information Warfare / London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Media-iihad web.pdf (accessed: 26.12.2017)

64 Winter C. Inside the Collapse of the Islamic State's Propaganda Machine / Wired [Электронный ресурс] 2017. URL: http://www.wired.co.uk/article/isis-islamic-state-propaganda-content-strategy (accessed: 23.12.2017)

and switched from the utopia of a better life inside the caliphate to a global war against the enemies. Images of a glorious past consisted of victorious fighters, vast arsenals of weapons and daily life activities in the caliphate have been substituted by the promotion of terrorist attacks on the enemies' soil. The purpose of this message is to inspire terrorists anywhere in the world: the series of attacks occurred in many European cities, New York, Russia and the MENA Region are the consequences of the new strategic communication of the Islamic State.65

Regarding the Islamic State's propaganda in Russian, the experts are divided: some of them such as Adam Raisman, a terrorist analyst at Site Intelligence Group, declared that there is not a significant decline in the quality of the media productions. Other specialists such as Joanna Paraszczuk, a researcher with HIS Jane's analytical centre and expert in terrorist groups, stated that there is evidence that Russian-language propaganda has weakened because the headquarter of the contingent in charge of propaganda was based in Mosul. Paraszczuk underlined that in the recent months, Daesh's Telegram channel in Russian has decreased its output and has mainly posted Russian translation of the Islamic State news released by Amaq news agency in Arabic.66

In July 2017, Furat Media, the Russian-language media branch of the Islamic State released videos and daily updates through its channels, Twitter and Telegram account with the aim of demonstrating that it is still active.

In a two-part video titled Convoy of the Martyrs, one of the fighters of the Islamic State probably originating from the North Caucasus, Abu Abdul Aziz al-Shishani (the Chechen), explained in Russian with a Chechen accent the importance of the caliphate and the necessity for Muslims to be part of it. Also, he threatened those Muslims who declined to join the Islamic State, the United States, and the Russian Federation with a new wave of jihad in the North Caucasus.67

In conclusion, the analysis of the terrorist threat coming from the North Caucasus and the geopolitical role of the region has underlined that it is of fundamental importance for EU-Russia cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism and security. Unfortunately, till today Moscow and Brussels have been more involved in a confrontation/competition than collaboration; strategic communication and propaganda have played a fundamental role in

65 Ridgwell H. Huge Decline in ISIS Propaganda Mirrors Losses on Battlefiel / Voice of America [Электронный ресурс]. 2017. URL: https://www.voanews.com/a/isis-propaganda-declies-mirrors-losses-on-battlefield/4144838.html (accessed: 23.12.2017).

66 Tlis F. Islamic State's Russian-language Propagandists Show Little Sing of Slowing Down / Voice of America [Электронный ресурс]. 2017. URL: https://www.voanews.com/a7islamic-state-russian-language-propagandists-little-sign-slowing-down73953268.html (accessed: 23.12.2017).

67 New video message from The Islamic State: "Caravan of Martyrs #2: Abu 'Abd al 'Aziz al-Shishani / Jihadology. [Электронный ресурс]. 2017. URL: http://jihadologv.net/2017/07/06/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-caravan-of-martvrs-2-abu-abd-al-aziz-al-shishani/ (accessed: 26.12.2017)

creating more distance between the parties, particularly after the start of the Ukrainian crisis because Brussels considers its resolution an obligatory step to restore the relations with Moscow.

Both the European Union and the Russian Federation will not be able to elaborate a strategy to contrast the imminent terrorist threat, while avoiding collaboration: in the specific case of the North Caucasus, some European countries have hosted former Chechen militants and protected the owners of websites and media agencies which promote insurgency and Islamist propaganda against Russia (for instance, the cases of "kavkazcenter.com" or Akhmed Zakaev). The European Union has several times declared its commitment in the fight against all form of terrorism and crime and the will to improve the cooperation with the Russian Federation in the field of security: unfortunatley, the EU's behaviour on the North Caucasus, its partnership with Georgia, and its support of some members of the former Chechen Republic of Ichkeria have been perceived by the Kremlin as a threat to its national security. These behaviours have reinforced the Russian idea of Brussels' double-standard policy and creating a distance in the field of cooperation and international relations.68

The European Union considers both the Russian strategic communication and the Islamic State's propaganda severe threats to its security and stability even if only Daesh has organised terrorist attacks on European soil. Brussels has invested a considerable amount of money to improve its strategic communication task force to counter the Russian communication avoiding any form of collaboration with Moscow against the jihadist propaganda because of the Ukrainian crisis.

The Islamic State's strategic communication has evolved and is nowadays promoting the ideology of war and terrorist attacks on European and Russian soil. The confrontation between Moscow and Brussels only advantages jihadist propaganda which in the past, that is, after the fall of the Soviet Union, has proved to be able to exploit the vacuum of power and is nowadays capable of transforming the North Caucasus in a terrorist logistic hub from where it can attack Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, given the lack of EU-Russia cooperation.

68 Koshkin P. Russia and West, Trapped by Their Own Double Standards / Russia Direct [Электронный ресурс]. 2016. URL: http://www.russia-direct.org/qa/russia-and-west-trapped-their-own-double-standards (accessed: 5.11.2017).

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Bifolchi G.

Geopolitics and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: Consequences of EU-Russia Confrontation/Cooperation and Jihadist Propaganda

Giuliano Bifolchi — PhD student University of Rome Tor Vergata, Italy. E-mail: giuliano.bifolchi@gmail.com

Annotation

The North Caucasus is a strategic region which has attracted the interest of the Russian Federation, the West and Arab countries. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the area has been affected by Islamist propaganda, ethnic tensions, conflicts, and local insurgency which have caused the rise of the terrorist threat.; nowadays the Islamic State propaganda affects the region and threats its security and stability. Recently, the European Union understood the fundamental role of the North Caucasus in the fight against terrorism; the presence of the North Caucasian Diaspora in Europe, notably the Chechens, and the threat of the return of foreign fighters to their homeland using the North Caucasus as a 'bridge' between Europe and the Middle East could be considered as a potential menace to the security of the European Union. For these reasons, the cooperation between Moscow and Brussels in the field of counter-terrorism and security is essential, but it is undermined by EU/Russia confrontation/competition in the area of international relations after the Ukrainian Crisis.

The aim of this paper is to describe the impact of propaganda and strategic communication of terrorist groups in a vital region such as the North Caucasus and the effects of the current EU/Russia cooperation/confrontation in the field of counter-terrorism and security.

Key words

The North Caucasus, Russia, The European union, The Islamic State, terrorism, Jihadist propaganda, Imarat Kavkaz, strategic communication.