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CRISIS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION PROJECTS IN THE EAST OF EUROPE
Vladimir Dounaev
Summary
A downgrade of European policy in the East paralyses regional integration processes in Eastern Europe to a considerable extent as seen on the example of GUAM. After a short revitalization in the second half of 2010, inspired by the hope to involve Belarus in this regional alliance, GUAM went back into stagnation.
The year 2011 was not productive for another European project in the east of Europe - the Eastern Partnership initiative. Russia has become less concerned about the European Union's activity on its western border that indirectly pointed at the Eastern Partnership crisis.
The Eurasian oil-transport corridor launched in 2011 did not step up integration of the countries between the Baltic Sea and the Caspian Sea either. The situation which compromised political and economic integrity of the region is aggravated by the growing conflict of national historical mythologies.
Trends:
• Russia's increasing expansion against the background of fading interest of the West in Eastern Europe as a buffer zone weakens integration processes in the region.
• The crisis of regional solidarity is manifested by the growing conflict of national historical and political myths, evasion from consolidated policy shaping in relation to the European Union and Russia and retardation of large regional energy transport projects.
Historical policy
Multinational regions as virtual communities require a symbolic division of their territory with the help of transnational historical myths. The Jagiellonian idea of Poland's responsibility for the future of the eastern neighbors used to be looked at as a tool of symbolic Eastern European integration. Poland intended to claim leadership over the peoples which once were a part of Rzech Pospolita and establish it in the entire territory from the Baltic Sea to the Caspian Sea. However, since 2009, the Civil Platform party started to push the Jagiellon paradigm out with the ideology of primacy of all-European Neighborhood over Polish eastern policy
and succeeded in it quite well. Rejection of the Jagiellon mythology was mainly caused by its inability to play the role of regional historical policy which could reconcile national historical myths.
New historical policy pursued by Minsk appeared to be the most hostile towards the regional historical-political paradigm. After the cautious attempts to implant Belarusian history in the Eastern European Grunwald myth in 2010, Belarus pivotally redirected the vector of integration rhetoric. As soon as January 2011, during an extraordinary session of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of Belarus, President Lukashenko accused Poland of territorial claims to Belarus1. On October 7, 2011, he told Russian journalists that "they dream of the border of Poland passing near Minsk. They just cannot accept today that the border is there, before Grodno; those eastern bounder markers2." Warsaw did not react to the territorial claim accusation, but then considered it necessary to emphasize that Poland had never disputed the post-war borders in Europe.
As the Jagiellonian idea was rejected, Belarus' historical insinuations looked even more groundless and exhibited the intent to provide an historical background for the Belarusian-Polish political confrontation. The TV series titled "Talash" poured oil on the flames kindling anti-Polish sentiments. The negative interpretation of the Polish-Soviet war of 1919—1921 in this screen adaptation of Drygva short novel by Jakub Kolas was meant to replace the image of Eastern European brotherhood in arms depicted by the Belarusian five-episode miniseries Grunwald (2010) with an image of a hostile western neighbor.
Lukashenko's demand to put an end to "dissolution of our past in the history of Poland and Lithuania3" addressed to Belarusian historians follows the same logic of isolation from Eastern Europe. In the opinion of the Belarusian leadership, a true historical narrative must justify the eastern vector chosen for Belarus by its leader.
In 2011, Belarus was officially done with the idea of integration into Eastern Europe, and the other countries of the region made little effort to harmonize the transnational history.
Interpretations of the so-called Volhynia Massacre which Warsaw regards as genocide of the Polish population in Ukraine in
See: http://www.interfax.by/news/belarus/86782.
See: http://president.gov.by/press107111.html.
See: http://news.tut.by/it/272771.html.
1943 still remain a sensitive point in Polish-Ukrainian historical-political relations. As before, Poland and Ukraine disagree over the attitude to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) responsible for the massacre of the Poles. Although Kyiv tries to act smoothly not to irritate the western and eastern neighbors by glorification of the nationalist military units, Warsaw cannot achieve a distinct estimation of their actions in relation to the Poles4.
The disputes over interpretations of the past still complicate mutual relations between Lithuania and Poland as well. The entanglement between the history and current policy in bilateral relations which seemed to be forgotten long ago reminded of itself with a new upsurge of the historical-political conflict in 2011. The new law on education, which the Polish minority believes is violating their right of using their native language, brought back reciprocal claims concerning the historical status of the Wilecski kraj (Vilnius County) where the most part of the Polish diaspora lives. The historical policy was rendered relevant by both parties and, according to a number of experts, Polish-Lithuanian relations reached a freezing point in 2011.
Lithuania's concerns over possible historical claims of Belaru-sian nationalists to Vilnius County give rise to suspicions and mistrust toward the Belarusian opposition. This viewpoint on historical threats to the integrity of Lithuania found support among European parliamentarians from Lithuania in February 2011 during the debates hosted by its embassy in Brussels. Some Lithuanian politicians consider the Lukashenko regime to be not that bad an alternative given the atmosphere of mistrust to the democratic camp in the neighboring country.
Growing politicization of history in almost all countries of Eastern Europe impedes integration processes in this region sowing suspicions among the states and peoples.
4 The book Друга польсько-укратська вшна. 1942—1947 у документах ОУН та УПА (Second Polish-Ukrainian War. 1942-1947 in documents of OUN and UPA) by Vladimir Vyatrovich released in 2011 could give hope for resolution of the historical-political conflict around the Volhynia Massacre. The Ukrainian historian, former chief record keeper of the national security service, tried to offer a compromise in interpretation of the 1943 events in Volhynia as an episode of the Polish-Ukrainian war, rather than an act of genocide. However, this intellectual provocation has not led to reconciliation of historical-political interpretations on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian border.
Institutionalization of regional cooperation
In the history of the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, the year 2010 was marked by a burst of hope for expansion through inclusion of Belarus and then disappointment over the failure. Initially, the geostrategic value of GUAM was in many respects determined by the opportunity of creating an energy transport corridor from the Caspian Sea to the Baltic Sea. There was a place for Belarus in this meridional project and the country exhibited its ability to influence the strategic decision on hydrocarbons transportation via the Eurasian oil-transport corridor in 2010. This route, which had been remaining a mirage in Eastern European geopolitics for years, could take shape owing to involvement of Belarus.
However, Minsk made a U-turn towards the union with Russia in December 2010 that shattered the hopes of GUAM expansion. Although Lukashenko did not officially reject an opportunity of bilateral cooperation with the alliance members, he ruled out the regional format of political and economic interaction.
Meanwhile, the regional projects were in decline even without that, being unable to work out viable solutions in response to strategic challenges, such as unexpected signing of a new free trade zone treaty by two of four GUAM members at the session of the CIS prime ministers council on October 18, 2011 that posed a threat to GUAM unity. Ukraine and Moldova, which used to criticize the treaty before, joined the other six signatories. There is a free trade zone inside GUAM too: it was created in 2006 when the organization's activity reached its peak.
During the fifteenth summit held on September 29, 2011, GUAM foreign ministers were quite optimistic about the future of economic cooperation. The joint statement released at the summit says the GUAM members have successfully overcome the recession of 2010 and reached the pre-crisis level of mutual trade. The objectives include doubled sales turnover within five years, generation of a stabilization fund, etc. In order to stimulate particular programs and projects, the foreign ministers council adopted an action plan for stepping up cooperation5. However, three weeks later, several GUAM members joined the CIS free trade agreement in St. Peters-
burg that revealed poor coordination of actions and a solidarity crisis within GUAM.
None of the organization's missions is being properly accomplished. Russia's aggression against Georgia in 2008 showed very clearly that GUAM is unable to withstand external threats in a consolidated manner possessing no effective mechanisms for resolving conflicts. The statement of the foreign ministers council made in Warsaw during the Eastern Partnership Forum of September 29, 2011 actually suggests the European Union taking care of conflict resolution6.
The year 2011 did not see any appreciable efforts aimed at ensuring energy security of GUAM members and their European neighbors. The launch of Odessa — Brody oil main did not result in large-scale transit of hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea region to Europe. Ambitious energy forums which gathered leaders of many countries from the Baltic Sea to the Caspian Sea are history now. Summits of the GUAM heads of state have not been held since 2008, which is actually against the organization's protocol. It means that GUAM has lost its attractiveness as an integration institution.
Its crisis is bound up not only with the new EU program, Eastern Partnership, but also the United States and European Union's lesser interest in integration policy in the east of Europe. Two regional leaders went off the scene. Polish President Lech Kaczynski tragically died in an accident on April 10, 2010 and Victor Yush-chenko lost the 2010 presidential election in Ukraine that beheaded regional policy. None of the incumbent presidents have attempted to assume leadership in their stead in 2011.
Eastern Partnership
The Eastern Partnership prioritizes backstopping of bilateral cooperation projects in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus, rather than promotion of regional integration at the eastern border of the Union. At the same time, the program can perform certain functions of a regional initiative in the context of multilateral cooperation.
Sure enough, the post-Soviet republics with different geopolitical orientation and often contradicting interests hardly can create a common political-economic space. Nevertheless, the year 2011
provided examples of impressing solidarity of the six countries in the face of the European Union's determination to put pressure upon Belarus.
The first demarche was made by the parliament speakers of the Six in response to the European Parliament's decision to open Euronest keeping Belarus away. Since October 2009, the task group for creation of a parliamentary assembly of the EU and Eastern Partnership member states tried hard to work out a compromise for participation of Belarus' delegation in the assembly given that the parliamentary elections in Belarus were dismissed as flawed and not complying with the OSCE standards. On May 3, 2011, the European Parliament decided to start Euronest without Belarus although parliamentarians from the member states opposed it. The EU faced the consolidated position of the partners for the second time when trying to add a special paragraph criticizing Belarus for violation of fundamental human rights and liberties in the final variant of the summit declaration issued on September 29 — 30, 2011 in Warsaw.
Whatever the motives of those demarches might be, in 2011 the Eastern Partnership was turning into a platform for manifestation of political solidarity of the states. Resolutions of the internal contradictions in this mosaic post-Soviet space in many respects came as an answer to the European Union's attempt to impose its political standards on the partners. It was an effect the Europeans were never looking to. It showed the growing disappointment in the Eastern Partnership's efficiency.
Russia has become less concerned about the European Union's activity on its western border that indirectly revealed a crisis in the Eastern Partnership. Large-scale modernization projects, which the Eastern Partnership participants put high hopes on at the initial stage, never came to implementation due to serious problems with financing. Unwillingness of the West to strain relations with Russia and the fierce competition for resources in the Mediterranean Union cast strong doubt about good geopolitical prospects of the Eastern Partnership. Although the European Commission's review of the European Neighborhood Policy titled "A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood7" calls on to address both dimensions, most members of the Union prefer the southern vector.
See: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/press_corner/all_news/ news/2011/20110525 ru.htm.
France and its allies grow stronger in the European framework as they insist on the redistribution of funds for the benefit of what is called the "new Roman Empire." Even now, two thirds of the program's funds allocated to support neighborhood policy in 2007 — 2013 are channeled to the South. Seven EU members — France, Italy, Slovenia, Greece, Spain, Cyprus and Malta — addressed Catherine Ashton stressing relevance of an increase in the share of financing for the Southern Mediterranean countries. They pointed at a support disproportion in comparison with the Eastern Partnership members. For instance a Moldovan gets 25 euros from the EU budget on the average; seven euros go to a Tunisian and 1.8 euros are given to an Egyptian.
Eastern policy of the Union quickly loses expansion momentum that comforts Russia but alarms Poland, the traditional promoter of this policy, which was most evident during the latter's EU presidency in 2011. Poland has given up independent eastern policy but it is still eager to influence the post-Soviet neighbors using European tools for this purpose. Germany, which seeks to contain growing influence of France on the European Union's foreign policy, remains Poland's ally in securing the eastern dimension. However, this intricate game of interests has not resulted in increased efficiency of regional projects of the Eastern Partnership.
Regional energy transport cluster
Over the past few years, it looked like development of the trans-European and international transport corridors, first of all the 9th multimodal corridor which connects the north and the south of Europe and goes on along the Silk Route down to the new industrial district in the northwest of China, as well as the meridional Eurasian oil-transport corridor (EAOTC) from the Caspian region to Western Europe, could provide a large capacity for regional integration in the near future. Serious doubts about feasibility of such projects arose in 2011.
The Ukrainian Odessa — Brody main used for a long time in the reverse mode for transportation of Russian oil was a key element of the EAOTC. Ukraine had to reanimate the corridor after Russia stopped supplies through Brody — Odessa and partly drained the southern string of Friendship oil main in mid-2010 and Belarus suggested filling it up with Azerbaijani oil. On January 17, 2011, Ukrtransnafta and Belarusian Oil Company entered into a contract
on transit of four million tons of oil a year through Odessa — Brody to the Mozyr oil refinery in Belarus in 2011—2012. The main was supposed to deliver Azerbaijani oil as a replacement of Venezuelan oil. The project started working on February 13, 2011.
Minsk managed to put the main in the direct mode as the EAOTC initially planned, but it did not stimulate further development of the project. Minsk fails to gain credibility as a partner in creation of the regional economic cluster due to nontransparent oil contracts with Venezuela and Azerbaijan, unclear economic motivation for Caspian oil purchases, doubtful ability to fully load the main, political risks resulted from Belarus' increasing dependence on Russia and the aggravating conflict with the West. The agreement on terms of Russian oil supplies to Belarus in 2012 — 2015 signed on December 15, 2011 in Moscow finally made deliveries of Azerbaijani oil to Mozyr economically senseless.
Belarus' ability to load Odessa — Brody main was questionable from the very beginning. In 2011, Belarusians pumped only one quarter out of the four million tones, thus Ukraine is to be paid for transit of the entire amount every year until 2013 no matter how much Belarus is transporting as established by the Ukrtransnafta-Belarusian Oil Company contract. In September 2011, Ambassador of Ukraine to Belarus Victor Tikhonov confirmed that Minsk was paying for the use of Odessa — Brody in due time and said that the project was beneficial for Belarus and Ukraine both economically and politically8.
These benefits are probably not directly connected with the amounts of oil. Ukrainians call the situation with Odessa — Brody "an energy illusion." Lately, every year begins with declarations about a substantial increase in deliveries of Azerbaijani oil through the Ukrainian oil-transport system and then, at the end of each year, it is found out that the volumes are not actually required. Then comes a new year and new declarations about fascinating prospects are made. Despite the arrangements with Russia, Belarus willingly keeps the ball rolling. In such a way, the Odessa — Brody main keeps performing its function as a political tool without fail: Russia turns the heat on the transit countries by using alternate routes for hydrocarbons supplies and the transit countries have their own leverage to respond to the challenge.
See: http://president.org.ua/news/news-308128.
In the never-ending haggle with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus still place their stake on the Odessa — Brody main but both are playing their own games regardless of the other partner's plans, which makes EAOTC development very uncertain. The project could survive, though, if Poland decided to join. In 2011, Ukraine tried to get a distinct answer about Poland's probable involvement in the EAOTC, but Poland wanted to see clear economic prospects first, before starting to lay its section of the Brody-Polotsk-Gdansk pipeline. During the visit to Kyiv in April 2011, as a reply to Ukraine's concerns, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said it was time "to move on from political declarations to joint resolution of financial and organizational issues for economic advance9."
This economic advance largely depends on the demand for Caspian oil in Poland. The Polish government tried to sell the state-owned 53.2% stake in Grupa LOTOS which owns four oil refineries including one in Gdansk. Neither Ukrainian, nor Azerbaijani businessmen took any interest in equity investments.
Kazakhstan was not motivated to get involved in EAOTC extension either. Most likely, Ukraine will have to give up the initial function of the Odessa — Brody pipeline as an element of the regional and European energy security system for the sake of the current economic and political goals unless Warsaw starts pushing the EAOTC forward.
A different situation arises with the transport-logistic cluster. In 2011, the integration possibilities of the 9th Pan-European transport corridor were actualized again. After the recession of 2010, transport-logistic projects, such as the shuttle trains Viking and Zubr capable of mobilizing the Eastern European transit potential for development of regional communications, were dying and the year 2011 re-energized them. Until 2011, cargos were moving almost exclusively within the limits of Lithuania and Belarus. They could hardly reach Black Sea ports because of the Ukrainian transit adversities. Officially, there was a multimodal route from Klaipeda to Ilyichevsk, but the Ukrainian haul distance was only used for 10% of cargoes at the very most that just nullified its basic value as a link between North European and Asian markets.
Some key problems were solved as a result of long negotiations in 2011. Firstly, on July 13, 2011, Ukraine's Cabinet removed a
See: http://www.unn.com.ua/ru/news/331233-polsha-zainteresovana-v-realizatsii-proekta-odessa—brody—plotsk—gdansk—d.-tusk/?print.
great deal of obstacles for high-grade functioning of the Ukrainian route section. After Viking started running through Ukraine on a regular basis since January 19, 2012, the freight turn-over went up 380% in the first month only. Secondly, Moldova and Georgia announced joining to the Viking project and Azerbaijan, Turkey and Syria were on the way.
All these changes make involvement of the Eastern European countries in the transit of cargoes between the EU and China and between the EU and other Asian markets through the Caucasus via the 9th transport corridor more realistic. At the same time, it has been recognized that development of this transport-logistic complex is mostly free from the intention to use it for the purposes of political integration of the region.
Conclusion
For Eastern Europe, the year 2011 was marked by increasing disintegration and a regional solidarity crisis. Internal problems and controversies of the states in this geographical space are amplified by Russia's massive energy expansion and fading interest of the West towards regionalization processes in the east of Europe. Meridional political and economic relations in the region, which contributed to preservation and reinforcement of its integrity years ago, presently cannot withstand the pressure as it tears them apart between the East and the West.
