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ПОЛИТИКА
СМОТРИЦКАЯ Мария Александровна
Магистрант Прикарпатского национального ун-та им. Василя Стефанюка (Украина) и Классического ун-та Центрального Китая (КНР) Электронная почта: SmotrM_S@mail.ru
Chinese factor in contemporary international relations
УДК 327 doi: 10.24866/2542-1611/2017-3/35-46
«Китайский фактор в современных международных отношениях». В данной статье рассмотрены основные геополитические и геоэкономические стратагемы, которые выступают в роли фундамента внутренней и внешней политики Китайской Народной Республики в XXI веке. Автор статьи анализирует и подчеркивает то, как эти подходы и китайское стратагемное мышление влияют на внешнюю политику и дипломатическую повестку дня КНР в современных международных отношениях и в мировой политике в целом. На основе проведенного анализа сделаны выводы о роли стратагемности во внешней в внутренней политике Китая. Дан прогноз дальнейших действий КНР на мировой политической арене. С помощью нынешних возможностей страна может реально влиять на мировые процессы и действовать на международной арене совершенно независимо, не глядя на своих «стратегических» партнеров. Исследование показало, что КНР на мировой арене использует инструменты мягкой силы для глобального контроля над своим жизненным пространством, что позволяет государству самостоятельно создавать новую архитектуру безопасности региона.
Китай,
геополитика,
внешняя политика,
стратагемность,
международные отношения,
мировая политика,
геоэкономика,
дипломатия
A famous Chinese economist Han Detsyan compares the path of China for the past half century with a trip on a bicycle through the mountain: «At first the economy was crawling up and it was hard. And then rolled down from the top down and everything became easier» [14, p. 17]. Commenting on this statement, it would be appropriate to observe and take into account all the factors of the hard way. Foreseeable scenario of this path does not exist. One can only assume the difficulties through which to pass and underline the questions to be answered, including:
a. How to move from a policy of «openness» to the policy of «integration» in a globalized market. This problem was solved by China by joining the WTO1 (2001) and initiating a number of projects of regional integration in East Asia.
b. How to move from the public non-market to the market private capitalist economy. In this task, China has moved most far, resolutely following the path of market reforms [9, p. 87].
c. How to switch from party authoritarianism and monopoly of CCP2 on power to pluralist democracy and the rule of law, and thus to avoid the threat of a new «bureaucratic» and «corruption»
World Trade Organization. Chinese Communist Party.
authoritarianism. Here China only starts to take the first steps without, however, a complete vision of political reforms [16, p. 20].
d. How to switch from the ideology of communism and socialism with Chinese characteristics» to the ideological pluralism. Here the situation is the following one — in the conditions of information globalization, on the one hand, and in the attempts to «enrich» Marxism through the «three representations theory» on the other — it is (situation) developed spontaneously rather than under the control of the CCP.
Thus it can be underlined an exact number of factors which have a significant impact on the transformation processes in China. Each of them determines the nuances of the script of the further development of China in general and Chinese foreign policy in particular.
Now «the Chinese leadership shows itself rationally and sensibly, it is fully aware of not only the rise of China, but also of the continuing weakness of the country». Today China has a mixed economy, where there is also a traditional agrarian economy of the XIX century, thanks to which hundreds of millions of people live in the same XIX century (by the way of life). But on the other hand Chinese economy stays in the XXI century (rise of the GDP, investitures etc) [12, p. 33]. Currently China is at a very important stage of transition to a new development strategy — taking into account all major social problems. This strategy is called the «five harmonies Strategy» not in vain [6, p. 7]. It is focused on the rapid liberalization of the economy, but not politics. This fact helps to justify the existence of the one-party system, creating a rather paradoxical situation — dynamic economic growth, while maintaining an authoritarian political system. Now China's leaders, meanwhile, believe that they can maintain one-party system even under dynamic economic growth. In this situation, however, the main strategic calculations of the West, primarily of Washington, is based on the fact that sooner or later China's economic development will create conditions for political democratization, and to the authorities in Beijing will come more stable regime, which will not compete with the US [34]. But today the ruling circles of China do not plan large-scale political transformations, continuing to strengthen its relations with strategically important partners and each year more and more increasing the factor of influence of their country and its geopolitical weight in the world.
International prestige, economic power and political influence of China in the world is continuously increasing in the past 40 years (since the first stages of the transformation of China in 1970 years), and this is natural. China was a great power thousands of years ago, when the Roman Empire existed. The modern China, owing to the wise leadership and industrious, brought up in Confucian tradition people every day and this increases not only its influence but also its geopolitical weight in the world. Chinese geopolitics in the XXI century overstepped its national borders and started to affect actively the redistribution of spheres of influence of world powers (the US, Europe) to its advantage, displacing them from many regions where they dominated until recently. In this regard, not only scientists, but the political elites of other countries should know and take into account the representation of China about the world geopolitical architecture and the place of their country in the hierarchy of interests of «Great Eastern Dragon».
In the context of these ideas, special attention should be paid to the foreign policy objectives of China, which include the following:
1. Foreign economic strategic objectives: 3 Assodation of
1) The establishment of the area of Asian prosperity (the supporting of Natkhnr* A'ian sustainable economic development of the Asian States);
2) The ensuring access to markets;
3) Ensuring energy security. Overall, China's energy strategy, which was established in the tenth five-year plan (2001) and is still being implemented, is aimed at diversifying energy suppliers, reducing the dependence of the economy on Middle Eastern oil (switch to Russian vector of Cooperation). Chinese companies sign different agreements in exploration with the countries of Central Asia, Africa and Latin America for expansion of energy suppliers [18, p. 15].
4) Saving the competitiveness of the export potential of the national economy and further linking the economies of other countries to Chinese economy;
2. Political and diplomatic strategic objectives:
1) Further use of the globalization to their advantage (The positive attitude of the Chinese leadership to economic globalization is not accidental, because China substantially owes (because of the significant Chinese economic successes) to the globalization and the arrival of multinationals that attract Chinese cheapness and abundance of manpower [4, p. 117];
2) The maximum weakening of the USA positions in East and South Asia (China's foreign policy strategy involves the inclusion of these areas to the sphere of its direct influence);
3) Prevention of the formation of a military strategic alliance between the US and Asia-Pacific countries that have close relations with the United States (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Japan, Thailand) and Taiwan;
4) Strengthening of its presence in the forum of ASEAN3 + China and other multilateral formats of Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region;
5) The transformation of the country to the center of integration in East Asia (China intends to become the central East Asian country, which is using its economic and political mechanisms to create a conglomerate of«young Asian dragons» around it);
6) Preservation of «freedom of maneuver» in regional and global international organizations. Prevention of the retraction of the country into the international war on terrorism;
3. The military strategic objectives:
1) The creation of its own defensive Pacific barrier — the use of «tactics of the silkworm» (step by step to expand its territorial sea boundaries and a military presence in this important strategic area). Currently China controls 70 islands, Vietnam — 21, Malaysia — 3, Philippines — 8, and Taiwan — just one, but the largest, however, in the near future China plans to expand its defensive barrier by directly strengthening of its military presence in these areas [24].
2) Ensuring access to advanced military technologies and technological modernization of the armed forces;
3) The creation of powerful naval forces and the achievement of the naval supremacy in coastal seas;
4) The achievement of the lifting the arms embargo from the EU and the lifting of restrictions on the supply of advanced weapons from the United States (arms embargo against China was imposed after a suppression of
demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in 1989) [19]. The development of military-technical cooperation with Russia and Israel;
5) The further development of its nuclear potential. Peoples Republic of China has developed and owns the weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear. According to the Federation of American Scientists, in the nuclear potential of China in 2009, there were about 240 nuclear warheads, including 180 on duty. This makes it the fourth largest nuclear arsenal among the five major nuclear powers (after the US, Russia and the UK). According to some estimates, the country could more than double increase «the number of warheads on the missiles that could threaten the United States by the middle 2020s» [21, p. 23].
Analyzing the strategic goals of China, we can identify the main directions of the Chinese foreign policy at the present stage:
1. Further development of diplomatic relations between China and the United States. Sino-US relations during the XX century were very complex and unstable. In the 1950s China opposed the US aggression in the Korean People's Democratic Republic, which led to a further prevention of accession of China in the UN Council and signing the agreement between the US and Taiwan on cooperation and common defense [11]. Relations deteriorated further after the Americans unleashed the war in Vietnam. Only in 1969, China and the US made the first steps towards peace. In 1971, China finally joined the United Nations. Since then there has been warming in a relations between the two countries. In 1972, US President Nixon declared Taiwan a part of China, and in 1979 the diplomatic relations were formally established. However, relations cooled down a little after the rebellion in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989, when the West strongly condemned the actions of the Chinese government; however, in general it did not weaken economic relations between the two countries.
2. The normalization and development of relations with India.
Relations between India and China deteriorated as a result of the suppression of the rebellion by Chinese troops in Tibet in 1959, after which the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan people have found refuge in India, where they met the official support of the Indian government [31]. The rapprochement was possible only in 1977, when countries again exchanged their diplomats. Official diplomatic relations were established only in the early 80's. Although there is still a number of unresolved territorial issues between China and India, India is an important strategic partner of China and trade relations are actively developing between countries [31].
3. The development of Sino-Japanese relations. For more than 40 years, Japan is a major trading partner China, but despite this, the political relations between two countries remain difficult and occasionally are experiencing a period of tension. The main obstacles to the normalization of political relations between the two countries are the following: Japanese position on Taiwan, Chinese discontent on the forms of apologies for Japan's aggression in 1937-1945. (Japan conducted an aggressive and occupational policy towards China), differences in the interpretation of history, the growing military power of China etc [30, p. 57]. The last conflict took place in September 2010, when in the disputed waters of the East China Sea, where the natural gas deposits were discovered, Japanese authorities detained a Chinese fishing vessel [30, p. 58]. Until now the territorial dispute still remains unresolved, but both countries are interested in its peaceful settlement and further development of political and economic relations.
4. Relations between China and Russia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs characterizes the Russian-Chinese relations as stable and dynamically developing relations in all spheres. In 2001 an agreement on good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation was signed among the countries. This agreement reflects the basic principles of relations of two countries. In the same year China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the main objective of which is to strengthen stability and security; fight against terrorism, separatism, extremism, drug trafficking; economic cooperation; energy partnership; scientific and cultural interaction [5, p. 257-258]. In 2008, all territorial issues were finally settled between China and Russia, discussion of which began in 1964. Thus, today Russia recognizes Tibet and Taiwan integral part of China. It should be noted that in recent years (2010-2016) the dynamic changes in Russian-Chinese relations took place and the development of cooperation vector is strategically important for both Russia and for China.
5. The restoration of territorial integrity. In 1980-90-ies China returned Hong Kong and Macau as a result of peace talks [29, p. 306]. But the conflict with Taiwan is still unresolved. In 1949, the Communists, who won the civil war, announced the creation of the People's Republic of China. After losing the government of the Kuomintang (Chiang Kai-shek) fled on Taiwan, where the regime of the Kuomintang was established, receiving a big support (economic and military) from the USA. After that mainland China, claims for significant periods of time to sovereignty over the island and does not exclude a military solution of the problem. Thus, the recognition of Taiwan an integral part of China is one of the main conditions for establishing diplomatic relations between China and other countries. In recent years with the arrival of new leaders in the US and Taiwan appeared an opportunity to closer and more constructive cooperation between the three parties in the near future [33].
6. The development of the African vector of cooperation. Friendly relations between China and African countries in recent years have given a new impetus for the further development: every year the trade between China and African countries are increased by several times. China has become the second largest trading partner of Africa after the US and its presence on the continent is steadily increasing [17, p. 19]. Most African countries have recognized Taiwan as part of China and cut off diplomatic relations with the Taiwanese government. Thus, China has not only become an important commercial and strategic partner, but also received an additional support on the issue of Taiwan. Every three years since 2000, the countries take part in the Summit«Forum of China-Africa cooperation» in which the social projects on the African continent are discussed.
7. The further cooperation with international and regional organizations.
China is a country that is a part of the UN Security Council. This gives it the opportunity to influence the adoption of key international decisions directly. China is also seeking to expand influence in making financial decisions in the «G-20». The global financial crisis has given Beijing a reason to return to talks about the creation of a «new international financial architecture» - apparently the modification of the favorite child of Chinese political circles in mid 1990s — «just and rational world's economic and political order» [8]. In addition, China is increasingly involved in the
4 The acronym for an association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
5 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
6 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
regional organization of ASEAN and is seeking to expand its influence in making financial decisions within the BRICS4 and the SCO5. An important element of China's diplomatic capacity is a non-governmental Asian Boao Forum. The so-called Boao Asian Forum was established in 2001. The geography of the countries covered by the organization is very important for China, because it today excluded such global players as the US and Russia. However, Boao Asian Forum includes several sub-regions of the modern world. It presents the state of North-East and South-East Asia, Oceania, South Asia and Central Asia Region [15]. Also in 1991, China became a full member of APEC6, which has an important symbolic significance for establishing close relations with many Chinese partners. In addition, China is a member of Forum of East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) [1], which gives it certain powers and priorities for cooperation with developing countries.
8. «Belt and Road Initiative» Development and The concept of Asia-Pacific Dream.
Today, China, whose economy is considered the second in the world after the US economy, on the margins of the Asian summits (the G20 summit on September 4-5 2016 in Hangzhou, the summit of the ASEAN countries and the countries-dialogue partners of the organization 8-9 September 2016 in the capital of Laos, Vientiane, the Beijing Silk Road Summit on May 14-15, 2017) made significant efforts to create the conditions for an equal American-Chinese strategic dialogue, as well as for the transformation of relations with the leading countries of the world as a whole [2].
According to the Chinese position, changes in such relations should ensure China's entry into the global economy on equal terms with developed countries. Assessing the current level of Chinese industry, Beijing seeks to take a greater part in the «global chains of added value», in particular at the high-tech research and development and design stages, as well as in after-sales services [32]. In regards with it, at the G20 summit, China called for building an innovative, robust, interconnected and inclusive world economy. China relies on a geo-economic strategy in carrying out such global tasks, within which it hopes to enlist the support of Asian developing countries and gain access to global markets for goods and technologies.
The most important for the Chinese side is the practical embodiment of the geo-economic «Belt and Road Initiative», also known as «One Belt — One Road», which united the projects of the «Economic belt of the Silk Road» and the silk Road of the XXI century» [23]. The initiative, announced in 2013, was included in the list of important tasks of the Chinese government and provides for the formation of a new model of China's international cooperation with the countries of the Eurasian continent. Thus, China hopes to increase its role in international economic cooperation and strengthen its ties with the countries of the continent in the field of science, culture and education.
It should be noted that the implementation of the«BRI» goes beyond the traditional view of the development of only land routes. Recently, the Chinese side has paid special attention to the development of aviation communications in Central Asia and the Caucasus [35]. Today, China has signed agreements with all the Central Asian countries on aviation communications, formally creating the basis for the integration of the regional aviation communication system. In addition, the Chinese side is providing assistance to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia in the
modernization of their aviation infrastructure and improving aviation security standards [20]. Thereby, China continues to develop Eurasian logistics ways to simplify its communication with the European Union.
Considering the possibility of the participation in the Chinese geo-economic project, countries take into account both the positive aspects and risks that are retained in the initiative. The main advantage is that many countries in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa, participating in the program and receiving investments, will be able to restore their economies and strengthen their security and statehood. They will have a lot of economic links with the second economy of the world; they will also receive modern technologies and significant economic benefits. However, it should be noted that the «BRI» conceals a significant number of risks. Thus, the main threat of the initiative is that it will definitely increase the influence of China in these countries [36].
An example of the transformation from constantly asking for help country into a state making concrete and effective proposals in the international arena was shown by Greece. At the invitation of the Chinese leadership, the Prime Minister of Greece arrived to Beijing in May in order to participate in the forum «One Belt-One Road». So, it was agreed that China is rebuilding one of the Greek ports located in the Mediterranean Sea, so that in the near future Greece will become one of the sea bridges connecting China with Europe. It can be seen that not the Chinese were interested in the unprofitable Greek port, but the Greeks presented the Chinese with a convincing business program and received the money. After the restructuring, the port will bring profit to both the Greeks and the Chinese [22].
It should be noted that there are certain conditions and peculiarities of participation of countries in the geo-economic project [13]:
1. Investments can be obtained only if the country will present Beijing a well-designed business program. The requesting party must prove to the Chinese that in case of a fruitful result that will be obtained due to the amounts of money provided or Chinese technology, China will make a profit.
2. Countries are divided into conditional groups. Each country should also examine from which programs, envisaged for a particular group in accordance with its economic capacities, it will be able to obtain a grant.
3. The maps that are already drawn for the «Economic belt of the Silk Road» and the sea Silk Road» actually do not mean anything. The initiative can involve all countries that are able to present good business programs.
4. There is also a special fund for low-income countries. China is ready to provide «gratuitous» assistance (withdrawn from production, not in demand on the domestic and foreign market equipment) to those countries that are not able to submit serious programs independently. By this step, China intends to «write off» obsolete equipment with the hope of supplying its spare parts in the future. This can become one of the levers of soft Chinese politics, through which Beijing will win dividends in these countries.
Thus, China is trying to create a new economic network where it will sell its products, and through investment and credit provision will create an area of influence for the realization of its own political and economic aspirations. Also it should be understood that those countries which will be included into this territory by their own will or at the dictation of the West will not be able to refuse to cooperate with China. Nevertheless,
7 people's Repubhc Beijing seeks to see the BRI as an economic initiative, not as a geopolitical project [7]. The Chinese authorities emphasize that everyone can join the project and it promises benefits to all participants. Thus, the PRC7 tries to counteract the skepticism and mistrust with which a number of states perceive the idea of the initiative.
It should be noted that the integration processes in the Asia-Pacific and in Asia in general are gradually strengthening, and China takes a very active part in the development of the newly established multilateral frameworks for a comprehensive defending of its own interests. Today in the Asia-Pacific region is actively discussing dialogues about the formation of integration groupings «East Asian community» and also can be heard an ideas about the formation of the Organization of the security of East Asia. Part of the «East Asian community» includes China, 10 ASEAN countries, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand [1]. It is a significant fact that China managed to convince its partners not to include the United States to this group, although this country has, in turn, planned to enter into the composition of this structure. Instead, at the constituent Summit of the organization as a guest observer attended Russian President V. Putin [1].
Thus, it is possible to trace that now China adheres to a path of peaceful development, advocates a diplomatic course of «good appeal to neighbors and consideration of the neighbors as partners» and is also ready to share its developments with neighboring countries. As a former Minister for National Defense in the PRC Liang Guanglie noted in 2008, «it does not matter what changes may occur in the international arena, China will always follow the path of its peaceful development». Also, China has always pursued the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, following its 8 concepts of the development of domestic and foreign policy. In January 2011, the Vice President of China Xi Jinping (the ruler of China from 2012 till today) said that the first priority of the foreign policy activities of the Communist party of China is the creation of a peaceful and favorable international environment for the country's development during the first 20 years of the XXI century. In this way he underlined that «in Chinese foreign affairs the primary and most important task is to ensure the successful use of important strategic opportunity for China» [27].
At the beginning of the III millennium Peoples Republic of China is building a new diplomacy step by step, or rather it modifies its foreign policy, adapting it to changing circumstances and abandoning the dogmatic ideas. Today experts underline the «new maturity» of Chinese foreign policy (emphasizing its beginning in 2002-2003), with a clear display of accents enhance pragmatism, with the taking into account the vital interests of the country, with the recognizing of the importance of relations with the US and Russia [3]. The normalization of relations with neighboring countries and active regional diplomacy in Africa and Latin America perfectly fits to this policy [25, p. 18]. Moreover it must be said that «the Chinese foreign policy is different today. It is much more cautious than it was in the days of Mao» [28, p. 7]. Despite the seriousness of the current country problems, rapidly growing role of China in international relations, its remarkable economic growth (as the most important prerequisite for consistent, sustainable development), illustrate the reality of the deployment of «a period of great strategic opportunities» claimed by China, in which (as agree in opinion different researchers), the leading trend of Chinese foreign policy is a
pragmatism, aimed at ensuring long-term national goals. However, we should be aware that, in terms of the overall balance of forces on the world stage, a large and highly educated population of China, its huge market and growing role in the world economy promise to the world not only the new opportunities but also the new risks.
Over the past ten years, China has gradually become one of the centers of world geopolitics and was recognized as such by the whole international community. In my opinion, the impressive change of geopolitical parameters of China, above all, contributed greatly for this. Thereby, by the level of GDP (PPP) China confidently takes the place of the first world economy (based on 2014) and also in many other spheres China is a leader: in the industrial production (overtook the US in the real economy), in the foreign exchange reserves ($3.2 trlln), in the volume of foreign trade ($3.75 trln), in the loans (over IMF8), in the army ($2.3 mln), in the opportunities to conduct global operations (for a short period from 22 February to 5 March 2011 from Libya were exported 36 thousand citizens of the PRC by military aircraft transport and ships of the PLA) [26, p. 19].
In my opinion this capacity allows China to exercise real influence on the world processes and allows it to act quite independently in the international arena, without looking at many strategic partners. Although, if it is necessary, if China has a willing it can use its growing weight and influence in global international organizations and unities (UN, IMF, the «Group of 20» BRICS) and regional organizations (APEC, ASEAN + 1, SCO). Notwithstanding the joint declaration on a multipolar world in global politics China, in my opinion, is positioning itself as a new center of power in world politics (along with US and EU) and, of course, it does not plan to engage in equitable political alliances and blocs, including the mentioned above, without any claims on leadership and dominance. This principled position also remains because there is a big difference between China and its partners in international cooperation. Thus, in 2010, China's economic potential (GDP — $5.9 bln (At that moment)) exceeded the total capabilities of other BRICS members ($5.4 bln) [10]. Now we can discuss only one obvious fact: we can observe the formation of a new pole of world power, led by China. And the rest of the countries compared with China (in the SCO or even BRICS) can act only as observing satellites in the global economic and financial struggle between the US and China.
To sum up, I suppose that, given the growing scale of Chinese expansion in the global economy, China now generates a geopolitical space that can be compared with any great empire of antiquity. China is creating a free trade area with more than 20 countries (criticized by Americans as a structure parallel to the WTO), provides loans on a bilateral basis in scales larger than the IMF (and obviously competing with this international organization), binds help to the countries in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America with a stringent requirements to buy exclusively Chinese goods (creating thereby the dependence on China). To all these we also ought to add the elements of soft» power, which are now used by China on the world stage for the global control of its living space. Chinese humanitarian influence on the world is also increasing — the leadership of the PRC encourages interpersonal contacts with the European, Asian and Africans countries, especially through tourism, student and youth exchanges, etc [37]. China's credibility in the region is also growing, because now almost any project of cooperation on a bi-versatile basis is served under the brand «One Belt-
One Road», which allows China to demonstrate real (albeit small) successes literally every year [38]. This is especially noticeable against the backdrop of crisis phenomena in the European Union and the weakening of the ties between the CEE region and Russia.
In this case we can observe that International Relations in its original understanding do not work. Thus, we cannot talk anymore about unipolar world, where US plays the main role. In the international arena a great amount of international global actors exists now (not only great powers, but also NGO, international organizations, religion units etc) and they all try to play separate, independent role in the international affairs. So, cooperating with each other in different spheres, they also compete mainly in the field of business, finance and defense. And China, using its soft power stratagems, every day becomes more and more serious contender for the US on the international arena, contributing a lot to the construction of a new security system and international relations system in general.
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