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79Challenges for India in Central Asia Shoaib Khan
Centre for Central Eurasian Studies, University of Mumbai, Mumbai, Republic of India
Abstract. Central Asia emerged as an important economic linkage between continents. Rich with deposits of natural mineral resources like uranium ore, hydrocarbon deposits, vast hydropower potentials that made the region of great significance and prime attention of big and regional powers. India as one of the players took keen interests in the region. New Delhi's major concerns with the Central Asian Republics trade, investment, infrastructure development, energy security and fight against Wahabi radicalisation.
Keywords: Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, China, Central Asia, Energy.
Интересы Индии в Центральной Азии Шоаиб Хан
Центра евроазиатских исследований, Университет Мумбаи, Мумбаи, Республика Индия
Аннотация. Центральная Азия стала важной экономической связью между континентами. Богатый залежами природных ресурсов, таких как урановая руда, углеводороды, огромный гидроэнергетический потенциал, сделали регион очень важным и привлекающим внимание крупных и региональных держав. Индия, как один из игроков, также проявила большой интерес к региону. Основные интересы Дели сосредоточены в сферах торговли, инвестиций, развития инфраструктуры, а также в вопросах обеспечения энергетической безопасности и борьбе с радикальным ваххабизмом.
Ключевые слова: Афганистан, Индия, Пакистан, Китай, Центральная Азия, энергетика.
The Afghan Factor
Afghanistan remained important especially for connectivity and security. The landlocked country facilitates Indian objectives in Central Asia. The re-emergence of extremist forces in Afghanistan and their spill over effect to both South and Central Asia that compelled India to focus its policy towards the region.
With its geo-strategic location, Afghanistan has remained a focus of India's regional foreign policy, despite the emergence of several events that led India's diplomatic isolation in Afghanistan like the coming of Mujahideen, disintegration of USSR, ousting of Rabbani government considered to be pro-Indian. The support of non-Pushtun groups by India which were opposing the Taliban regime and formed the Northern Alliance that controlled areas in the north of Afghanistan. India also provided technical support, high altitude warfare equipment, and medical facilities in the borders of Tajikistan by establishing a hospital in Farkhor on the Afghan-Tajik border and provided medical assistance to soldiers1.
Since 2001, India has already pledged more than $2 billion on various projects, emerging as the fifth largest bilateral donor to
Afghanistan. The Indian assistance was largely directed towards education, health and infrastructure related activities. This civilian centric policy helped in augmenting mutual trust. Despite periodic attacks on Border Roads Organisation (BRO) personnel, India has till now successfully constructed the 218-Km long highway linking the town of Zaranj near the Iranian border to Delaram in the northeast Afghanistan.
India has also played a significant and commendable role in constructing roads which have improved Afghan connectivity with strategic ports thereby reducing Kabul's dependence on Pakistan. India has so far been able to increase Afghan connectivity with the Iranian port of Chabahar which has led to an indirect decrease in Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi2.
Indian endeavour in construction of the Chabahar Port in Iran is also based on the fact that it provides India with the most viable option of gaining access to Afghanistan since Pakistan's refusal to provide transit route to Indian goods bound for Afghanistan through its territory. In 2012 the port was used by India to deliver humanitarian aid to Afghanistan
demonstrating that the sea-route access to Afghanistan through Pakistan is not the only option available to India in the long run3.
India has successfully renovated the damaged Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health and has regularly dispatched teams of doctors to Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar to attend to the massive medical needs of Afghanistan. On December 25, 2015, Prime Minister Narender Modi inaugurated the Afghan parliament building that was constructed by India at a cost of USD 90 million4.
The Kazakh and Indian armies engaged in a joint exercise earlier to strengthen bilateral defence ties and exchange information and skills. In India-Central Asia security cooperation, Afghan issue remains an important aspect. Tajikistan and India signed an agreement on terror financing and money laundering in December 2006. There have been talks with the Tajik government by Prime Minister Modi for the lease of a former Soviet airbase. There has been progress on the Chabahar project along with shipment of Indian wheat to Afghanistan, considered an important facilitator of trade to and from Central Asia through the landlocked country.
In various fields in the last few decades there have been strong relations between Central Asian countries and India such as textiles, metallurgy, chemicals, mining, hydrocarbon, mineral processing, construction, and industrial production. Under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program one of the largest beneficiaries has been the Central Asian countries. Their cooperation with India has also been in other sectors including information technology, food processing, and courses in English.
There have been significant gains by India in exploration and investing in the region, there continue to be issues relating to the transportation of oil to India due to lack of regional connectivity. It is said by Shahid Khaqan Abbasi the then Pakistani Prime Minister that the transnational gas pipeline, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI), critical for connecting India with the Central Asian region, would start operation in five years there was continuation of security and its related problems of security attached to it. Analysts hope that the problems related to the project
will be addressed in the meeting of the steering committee5.
Ignorance and Neglect of the Region
India's current trade figure of about USD 100 billion with the SCO members is asymmetric - about 90 billion is with China, with Russia it is 8 Billion and 1.5 billion with the Central Asia states in which Kazakhstan accounts for 1 billion.
Central Asian countries, along with Uzbekistan, may not be key export markets or investment destinations for Indian companies yet, but they are fast getting accessed to the supplies of raw materials, global market production and services. They are also increasingly getting integrated into the East-West Trans-Eurasian transit economic corridors6.
In Afghanistan the Indian investments are intended to strengthen that state and reduce the terrorist threat. To promote Indian economic growth as indicated by the TAPI pipeline which is also their aim. Even if the energy is a crucial one it is not the sole factor. The proclaimed Silk Road by the US even though not much is being done to promote it, is largely intended to promote ties between Central Asia, and Europe and India.
If Afghanistan is destabilized and Pakistan hostile or if Central Asia itself becomes convulsed with violence, India's commercial exposure abroad as well as its access to Turkmen gas will be seriously negatively affected. Since 1997 the idea of TAPI pipeline cannot gain traction amid increasing violence as that will scare off investors and any company that thinks about actually managing the project.
India will forcibly turn to Iran for energy and to other actors like China and Russia for support in Central Asia. Iran whose nuclear issues are by no means resolved is at best a questionable partner. Iran in the earlier negotiations had constantly raised the price for tariffs and changed the conditions it was prepared to accept. Therefore, for its repeated action there is not guarantee. In other words, the impending allied withdrawal from Afghanistan places India in a situation where it risks isolation in Central Asia7.
There had been long traditions of socio-cultural, religious, political and economic connections throughout the recorded history
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between Central Asia and India. The British Empire in the mid-nineteenth century along with Czarist suzerainty over the Central Asian region, which was continued till the 1990's ties between both regions on historical and civili-zational front had weakened. The emergence of the Central Asian Republics which has been out of the result of disintegration of Soviet Union. The New Great Game of which the Central Asian states soon became part of it in which the United States, Russia, China, and the European Union have been playing a strategic role in the region.
The geo-cultural and economic relations have bonded the connections of both regions. Their external and internal dynamics has not been due to these ties. Central Asia and India in the past two centuries had been separated by colonization and later the great power politics. Trade and cultural ties have been cut off.
During the colonial period there have been shift by the Indian side toward the Western countries. Central Asia on the contrary had lost its independent identity under the Soviet empire. Both the regions drifted from each other according to the interests of their colonial master which had contrasted with each other. Even after the independence, under Nehru's vision of the world, Central Asia had remained in oblivion8.
Even though with abundance of rich mineral sources and geographical proximity, new great game and strategic interests, scholars have strongly argued that India has remained disengaged and passive towards Central Asia since their independent notwithstanding diplomatic ties. There were no sincere efforts from the Indian side to prioritize and include this region in its foreign policy and consequently lags external and regional actors in Central Asian Republics9. It is for this attitude of India many factors have been responsible for not extending relationship with these countries on account of various factors, and one of them was deteriorating its economy.
On account of its weak economy India at that time was not in a position to capitalise the investment opportunities in these countries. India with its look east policy has been one of the factors of moving away from this region. This policy which focused on the development of extensive and comprehensive relations with
Southeast and East Asia has been concentrated by its economic and diplomatic resources10.
Central Asia has been ignored by India in spirit despite of its high strategic importance. The end of the bipolar world coinciding with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union had left indelible imprints on the Indian foreign policy. The dramatic shift in the foundations and framework, India's Central Asian policy has been entrapped in the dilemmas of conceptual tensions, strategic uncertainty, and geopolitical constraints11.
The Indian foreign policy against this backdrop in the absence of a well-defined and well-articulation had displayed a sense of the incoherence and indistinctiveness towards the region has argued that despite historical belonging to India's strategic neighbourhood, it has not been giving enough attention to Central
Asia12.
India's total trade turnover with Central Asia has grown from US$108m in 2000 to US$1.5bn in 2017, according to the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics. The bulk of this trade consists of imports of crude oil and chemical products from Kazakhstan. There is potential for the relationship to develop further, primarily through Indian importation of additional mineral resources from Central Asian countries. Economic links have remained constrained, however, as there is no shared border. The shortest route from India to Central Asia passes through a hostile Pakistan and an unstable Afghanistan. Therefore, trade between the two regions is presently conducted through China.
India's economic links with Central Asia are minuscule in comparison to those enjoyed by China. In 2000-17 Central Asia's merchandise trade with China grew from US$1.8bn to US$36.3bn, partly driven by an increase in oil and gas exports through the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline (CAGP) and the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline. China has become the biggest investor in the region through its BRI, superseding Russia, which had historically enjoyed a position of relative economic dominance. India unlike China did not have any significance energy deal with these countries. Beijing received 37bn cu m of natural gas through the CAGP in 2017; it plans to increase this amount in 2019.
The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)—a proposed 7,200-km land-and-sea route connecting Russia, Central Asia, Iran and India—could be one solution to this problem. The project, first discussed in 2000, aims to strengthen economic ties through upgraded transport links. However, progress on building trade and transit infrastructure along this corridor has been very slow. Unlike the BRI, the project suffers from the lack of a single co-ordinating authority13.
India itself was never really part of any competition for regional influence. Some scholars accused India of indulging in wishful thinking toward the region rather than develop a coherent strategy. With no direct road transportation access and difficult market conditions, Central Asia has not attracted many private Indian companies, and its economic significance for India declined considerably in the 1990s.
Politically, Indian officials were comfortable dealing with the region's authoritarian leaders, who were part of the former Soviet elite and with whom New Delhi had worked for decades. They also appeared to provide stability and were committed to fighting Wahabi extremism and terrorism. Many multilateral organizations other than US and European Union seeking to spread democracy and free-market economics to the region, India has focused primarily on ensuring political stability there, viewing any turbulence as a serious threat. India obviously would have welcomed a more democratic Central Asia, but it preferred to allow democratization to happen at its own
14
pace14.
Challenges for Indian Foreign Policy in the Region
Unlike Russia, China, and the United States, India starts from a lower base of engagement with the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is despite India's relatively substantial economic presence in Afghanistan, where Pakistan's involvement has long defined India's policies that are only now starting to be proactive, go beyond India's obsession with Pakistan, and reflect Delhi's appreciation of Afghanistan's role as an interregional integrator.
It also faces major economic and social development constraints that keep its energies
focused on internal rather than regional challenges and opportunities, which are both restricting and facilitating its expansion as a great power. Moreover, India does not have as much cash as China to throw around and has a lot to do at home first. Partnering with other actors on a strategic level could open doors to financial, diplomatic, and military support India needs to achieve its objectives15.
With India's progress on the Chabahar Port in Iran, it is now required to strategize an effective regional approach which involves Iran and Central Asian countries, in addition to Russia. Along with a close alignment to the US this will be helpful for India to safeguard its interests in Eurasia. Russians too are interested in creating one such inventory in this context where it can bring Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan, US, Central Asian countries and India on the same table.
The Great Game over Eurasia unfolded between Russia and Britain, and later the US in the 20th century; the 21st century Great Game is now finally unfolding in Eurasia, with multi-alignment approach projected by all nations projecting multi-alignment approach tested India's Eurasian strategy constantly.
It is for the development of India that the Eurasian region is important. With energy resources being the primary trade commodities, India is keen to connect with the region, stimulated by fast tracked infrastructure installation and policy implementations. India, as such does recognize its position in the geopolitical arena and is working towards proposing an alternative to China's OBOR16.
The fundamental requirements which drive India's Central Asian policy. Particularly the area which is full of natural resources. From Kazakh and Turkmen oil and gas, to Uzbek uranium, India sees a lucrative source for its energy procurement, which it has been seeking to diversify for some time now.
The ever-volatile Middle Eastern region, the Western and now US sanctions against Iran, the steadily rising price of oil, with India's ever-increasing energy demands depending mostly on imported products for which Central Asia turns to be important for India. In fact, ONGC Videsh Ltd., the overseas investment arm of India's state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corp had entered Kazakhstan's hydro-
carbon sector in 2011 through the purchase of the Satpaev oil block, though it has not met with any luck till now.
The second requirement is connectivity. All the Central Asian States are landlocked states, and though it once was a contiguous neighbourhood for India. This has hampered trade and the movement of goods and people. The much touted TAPI (Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India) gas pipeline project for instance, has still not been implemented despite being floated way back in the 1990s precisely for this reason; Pakistan-India rivalry has hampered overland trade routes to and from India to Eurasia.
Therefore, India has engaged in the construction of the multi-modal International North South Trade and Transport Corridor which ambitiously seeks to connect India's Mumbai port with St. Petersburg in Russia. To that end India has invested majorly in developing Iran's Chabahar port through which the corridor will run. The Central Asian countries form a major component of the INSTC17.
India does not look at Central Asian countries the way powerful countries around the world look at the Central Asian resources. With the high growth in Indian economy, the increase in consumption and imports of oil and gas has been rising very fast. In its efforts to diversify the sources of oil imports, India has been looking at the Central Asian countries18.
Since 1991, Central Asian countries and India have established bilateral trade and economic relations in several fields like pharmaceutical sector, textiles, metallurgy, chemicals, hydrocarbons, mining, mineral processing, construction and industrial production. Central Asian countries have been one of the largest beneficiaries under ITEC programme and New Delhi has been offering human resource development training.
Though there had been ancient linkages with Central Asia, India's economic, strategic, security relations with the region remains unsatisfactory. India's strategic relations with the five Central Asian countries got a fresh momentum in the twenty first century more specifically from 2012. During the past few years, New Delhi has stepped up its engagement with the Central Asian Republics with an aim of
building long-term partnership, both bilaterally and collectively19.
Strategy Adopted by India towards Central Asia
India currently sources almost threequar-ters of its oil consumption from abroad, much of it from the volatile Middle East region. In India's national security and foreign policy energy security has been its central component. With India projected to become ever more reliant on imported energy, reducing dependence on the Middle East and cultivating alternative sources of energy has become a vital concern. Central Asia contains vast hydrocarbon fields both on-shore and off-shore in the Caspian Sea. These are home to an estimated 4 per cent of the world's natural gas reserves, and approximately 3 per cent of oil reserves20.
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have large concentration of these resources, although Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also have potential for generating hydro-electric power. In addition, Central Asia has reserves of uranium ore plus the potential for its enrichment; so, the region could be tapped as a source of uranium for India's civilian nuclear programme, which would in the long-term help diversify its energy base21. In India's energy security policy Central Asia holds a place of prime importance. India's state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) in the past decade has sought to invest in Kazakhstan, which has three of the world's richest oilfields. ONGC acquired sizeable stakes in the Alibek-mola and Kurmangazy oilfields in Kazakh owned areas of the Caspian Sea22.
More recently ONGC attempted to buy a share of US company Conoco Phillip's holding in the Kashagan oilfield. The Indian Government though has begun investing in oil fields in Central Asia, its policy on how to transport this oil to the Indian market or work out oil swap deals is still evolving. There have been engagements by the Indian government in its negotiations regarding the 1680 km-long Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, estimated to cost US$7.6 billion to construct. The TAPI project is intended to transport 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas from natural gas fields in Turkmenistan via Afghanistan and Pakistan to India23.
It was for various reasons that the construction of the pipeline has been stalled, including prior commitment of Turkmen gas reserves to Russia, difficulties of engaging with the regime in Ashgabat, and the security risks associated with a pipeline that will run through southern Afghanistan. As a result, despite the hype around the TAPI project, there are doubts as to whether international companies will be willing to finance it24. Therefore, practical implementation of the project is still at an early stage25. Furthermore, following Chinese Premier Xi Jinping's visit to Turkmenistan in September 2013, there was speculation that the TAPI project may be derailed altogether but the construction on it has begun26.
In Central Asia's security matrix India is keen to play a bigger role and to prevent real and perceived threats to its national security. New Delhi in the past decade has sought to enhance its security assets in the region, notably through the acquisition of a first foreign military outpost in Tajikistan. Since only a narrow 20 km stretch of Afghan territory separates India from Pakistan-administered Kashmir. In 2004 the airbase at Ayni was refurbished by India, reportedly spending $70 million as part of its aid to Tajikistan. Though the intentions of New Delhi were never open to public there was speculation in the media that a squadron of MiG 29 bombers would be stationed at the air-base27. The Ayni airbase was seen by some as emblematic of India's growing strategic aspirations and an attempt to project Indian military power in Central Asia28.
In terms of trade with Central Asia, India is also far behind the first- and second-rank players although its commercial relations with the region are growing steadily and rapidly. The total figure from its bilateral commerce with the Central Asian States was estimated at $200 million in 2008, a far cry from China's $15 billion though a dramatic increase from the paltry $95,000 recorded in 200029. It was listed as the 16th most important trading partner for Uzbekistan and the 22nd most important for Tajikistan. The next two years showed a further increase, with the total figure for India-Central Asia trade reaching $ 467.7 million. Kazakhstan made up two-thirds of this figure at $ 305.72 million and Uzbekistan followed in far second place at $ 71.82 million30.
A significant minority—30%—of India's export to the Central Asia belongs to pharmaceuticals, and pharmaceutical plants also make up a share of its investments in the region. Other export commodities are tea, medical equipment, machinery, tobacco, and consumer items. Major items of import for India beyond the energy field are asbestos, wheat, steel, aluminium, wool, and raw hides. India's FDI in the region is meanwhile too low to figure in reports. The only Indian company that has established itself in Central Asia so far is Arce-lorMittal—Indian only in origin but based in Rotterdam—which specializes in metallurgy in Kazakhstan31.
While India's commerce with Central Asia has met with considerable difficulties, its gradual growth nonetheless stands testimony to the fact that both the inventory and the scope of the commodities exported to the region can be further expanded. One underexplored area is information technology, in which India has already made strides by opening centres in all the Central Asian States. In 2011, Kazakhstan and India signed an MoU for establishing a joint IT centre at the University of Astana. While this is a beginning, there are more opportunities for higher levels of collaboration here, such as a reinvigorated set of cooperation initiatives between the Indian technology sector and the innovation city in Kazakhstan's Alatau, called Park of Information Technologies (PIT) Alatau, which was established in the wake of a 2002 agreement32.
As Indian bilateral ties with its five Central Asian partners show, despite the best of intentions, the Indian relationship with Central Asia has been rife with slow-starters, dead ends, and missed opportunities, due to the combined force of circumstances and lack of imaginative thinking. There are arguments that India should engage more actively in the region's economic development—a holding strategy as it awaits better access to Central Asia' s energy resources. To succeed in this strategy, however, India should team up with another power with whom it already has a strong relationship and from whose experience in the region it can learn.
To protect and preserve its interests in the region, India has no alternative but to closely consult and cooperate with the other major
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powers who have an interest and a presence in Central Asia33. It is now time that the Indian government took this advice since it patently cannot act alone successfully in the Central Asian States and requires a strategic partner which is also invested in securing better access to Central Asian resources and the geopolitical influence they bring namely, Russia34.
The Russian and Indian governments have long discussed their intention to sign an FTA (Free Trade Agreement) or a CEPA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement) that will draw the economies of Russia and India closer together and work to increase their trade turnover, if not in the immediate future, then some years down the line. Another measure being considered by India's Ministry of External Affairs as having even greater potential is a trilateral trade treaty joining Russia, Kazakhstan and India35.
Conclusion
In India' s extended neighbourhood policy, the important players are Central Asia and Afghanistan. Under this policy, India had started to strengthen strategic outreach, develop economic and cultural interactions, and build regional collaborations. Nevertheless, both Central Asia and India have encountered challenges such as issues of connectivity, terrorism, socio-economic development, instability in Afghanistan and religious extremism. Bringing to fruition the existing projects on establishing physical connectivity with Afghanistan as well as to Central Asian region is essential for India to become a critical actor in the region.
China shares long borders with three Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan which is not in the case of India. Due to its growing military, economic, and defence cooperation with Central Asia, China has become a threat to India's ambitions in the region. In its efforts to build its own new silk road China has made much advancement, India is still struggling to capitalize on its potential role in Central Asia. In terms of trade and security cooperation it is still behind both Russia and China.
India's inclusion in the SCO was seen as positive news for India, which hopes to have a greater say in pushing for effective action in combating terrorism and on issues relating to
security. The development on the grounds that India might find itself isolated in a perceived strategic triangle of China-Pakistan-Russia, who might have a common position on certain issues there has been scepticism on the part of some analysts.
There has been opposition to terrorism for good reason from Russia, China and India. Russian and Chinese records indicate that they do not support the other key goals of Indian policy in Central Asia and without any interests in the improvement in the region's governance. Due to internal factors in Central Asia the volatility or a possibility of a regime change, India's interests will suffer if it cannot play an independent role there along with the Central Asian Government's interests.
The internal crises in Central Asia which is not directly challenged towards India, however, if they occur in conjunction with a breakdown of the Afghan situation then both Central Asian and Indian vital interests will be at stake. To cooperate effectively against those challenges the means available to both sides will have been seriously reduced along with the chances for an effective resolution of such crises. India is being forced to confront the question of its ability to develop the policy resources necessary to secure its interests in this volatile period as both Afghanistan and Central Asia are being faced by strategic challenge and transformation.
Most Indian policymakers and analysts consider the region important because of its strategic location, cultural and civilizational linkages with India, energy resources, and trade opportunities, among other factors. Focusing on the region's location, oil and gas reserves, and competition for pipeline routes, many analysts advanced the narrative of a new Great Game in the 1990s, akin to the international struggle for supremacy in Central Asia in the nineteenth century. With time, competition for military bases in the region as well as regime change through colour revolutions added another dimension to this rivalry.
As a potential power, India is losing out to all other great powers in the region, including Russia, China, the EEU, and the United States. It also finds itself struggling to compete with actors as middle and small-ranked as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Iran.
Perceptions of its potential emergence as a cut a major figure there are more aspirational great power notwithstanding, India remains a than actual and its discursive activity by far ex-middle-ranked power confronting a whole ceeds the reality of bilateral relationships. range of internal challenges that will likely pre- The presence of US in Afghanistan dimin-
occupy it for at least the next couple of decades ishes, the more established regional players no-before it can turn itself into a major global tably China and Russia will continue to con-power. To make this transition faster, India strain India's ability to project meaningful eco-needs partners to help it enhance its presence nomic or military power in Central Asia. Notin Central Asia and beyond. Otherwise, its ex- withstanding the recent bilateral talks between pansion as a great power will proceed primar- Chinese and Indian officials regarding cooper-
ily along the rimlands of Eurasia. ation in Central Asia, the risk is that India will
Whether India is willing and able to invest continue to face challenges on energy issues by the considerable amounts of economic, mili- China and militarily by Russia. tary, and diplomatic capital required to turn the India may have missed out on the first
Connect Central Asia policy into practice is round of foreign investment distribution in still not clear. In Indian foreign and security Central Asia. Yet, with the help of Russia, its policy Central Asia has been proclaimed a pri- budding projects in the Central Asian States in ority, India is not at present among the major such areas as IT, infrastructure development, influential powers in the region. The priority and education will gain greater reach and sig-
New Delhi gives to Central Asia and efforts to nificance.
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About the author: Shoaib Khan - Centre for Central Eurasian Studies University of Mumbai (y-mail: shoaibk_92in@yahoo.com).
Сведения об авторе: Шоаиб Хан, Центр евроазиатских исследований Университета Мумбаи (у-mail: shoaibk_92in@yahoo.com).
