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"Kaspiisky region: politika, ekonomika, kultura," Astrakhan, 2014, No 2 (39), pp. 244-249.
N. Kuleshova,
Political analyst, Institute of Asian and African Countries at Moscow State University CERTAIN SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE PARTY-POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN
Just as other Soviet republics, Uzbekistan has taken the road of economic reforms after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., and begun political transformation of the country.
It should be remembered that in Soviet times political processes in the Soviet republics were largely determined by the Center, however, it was precisely this period that was characterized by the intensive development of clans in Uzbekistan.
Interaction between the Center and the political elite in Uzbekistan in the person of political clans was built on the basis of mutual exchanges of resources and loyalty on the part of the Uzbek population, which contributed to the preservation of stability in the region, and quite satisfied the Center. Experts note that the peak of the hey-day of the clans of the Uzbek Republic was during the "stagnation"
period. During that period there were no strong nationalistic sentiments in Uzbekistan. Separatist and anti-Russian sentiments and manifestations were effectively suppressed by the special services of the republic, because the leadership of Uzbekistan was greatly interested in maintaining the balance of forces, which served as a guarantee of the preservation of their own power.
The development model of industrialization and "non-shock therapy" chosen by Uzbekistan has allowed it to reach the GDP level of 1991 already by 2000.
The political system of the republic has been transformed from the communist into authoritarian one, in which all power was concentrated in the hands of the President and political clans.
The modern political system of Uzbekistan is in many respects a continuation of the Soviet system. Under the Constitution of 1992, Uzbekistan is a presidential republic. All power and political and legislative initiatives are concentrated in the hands of the President. He is personally immune from any legal prosecution. Not a single government body is capable to lift this immunity. After the expiry of presidential powers, the head of state receives the status of lifelong member of the second chamber of parliament - the senate.
The President appoints and recalls the heads (khakims) of twelve regions of the republic. The lower level of political power is represented by rais - chairman of the makhalla committee, which usually consists of five to six elders.
A characteristic feature of the modern political system of Uzbekistan is the presence of special groups of loyalties in the country's political system, which includes individual families, makhallas, and neighboring communities. It should be noted that clans have taken the most active part in the political transformation of the country, which resulted in the establishment of an authoritarian regime.
Today, the political system of Uzbekistan answers to all characteristics of the authoritarian regime (with a definite degree of accountability of its institutions). Despite the fact that many institutions and practices have been borrowed from the former Soviet Union, one of the main features of Uzbekistan is the preservation of the so-called informal sector. It is necessary to notice certain specific features of this process, namely, the formation of state institutions answering the interests of clans and the person of the President, concentration of economic resources, control over the special services, the greater role of the head of state, and certain independence of clan and inter-clan relations.
Thus, President Islam Karimov, from the very beginning of his rule, has been placed under certain dependence on clans. An important condition of his staying in power is the preservation of a balance between regional clans, without letting one of them gain dominant position and broader access to the country's resources. Islam Karimov has brought to power representatives of clan elites. At the time of Karimov coming to power, the most influential clans whose interests he had to take into account were the Ferghana, Dzhizak, Samarkand, Kashkadarya and Khorezm clans. The President had to give government and other important posts to people originating from these clans. Rivalry of regional factions plays a crucial role in the formation and structure of the state and government apparatus, which thereby gain access to the main resources of society. It is quite important to note that despite the fact that Karimov himself belonged to the Samarkand clan, he restricted power of representatives of this clan, and restored the rights of the Ferghana and Khorezm clans. Muhamad Salikh (Saloi Madaminov) , the head of the opposition party "Erk" ("Freedom"), was an influential member of the Khorezm clan (He was forced to leave Uzbekistan because he was an implacable opponent of the incumbent president).
At present the President's entourage includes mainly representatives of the Tashkent elite.
Thus, it can be stated that the clan factor has been playing an important role in the modern political processes of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
Today, the President of Uzbekistan comes out as the guarantor of balanced relations between political clans, groups and individual leaders. However, if he leaves the political scene, struggle for power may become unpredictable in the future. Thus, potential political instability in Uzbekistan can lead to the growing activity of radical extremists, which in turn will create instability and a certain danger for the entire Central Asian region, as well as for Russia.
The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan (articles VII-X) guarantees its citizens democratic rights and freedoms: of speech, assembly, religious views, property ownership, ethnic and gender equality. The Constitution also guarantees all citizens the equal right to vote, freedom of political movements and associations on condition that their activity does not encroach upon the state system of the republic, does not fan national, religious and other discord, and is not directed to destabilization of law and order in the country. Any changes in the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan can be made in due order according to the Law adopted by voting results and endorsed by two-thirds of all deputies to the lower and upper chambers of the country's parliament.
The Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan "On Political Parties" adopted in 1996, and the Law of 2004 "On Financing Political Parties" legitimate the creation and functioning of voluntary associations of the country; they also aim at improving and raising the role of political parties in society's life. The latter law determined the sources and basic principles, accessibility of information about financing and the use of
financial and other means of these political parties and organizations, as well as the activity of the factions in parliament, etc.
Table 1
Party Number seats Representation
Liberal-democratic party 41 34,2
People's democratic party 28 23,3
National-democratic party "Fidokorlar" 18 15
National-democratic party "Milliy Tiklanish" 11 9,2
Social-democratic party "Adolat" 10 8,3
Candidates put forward by citizens' initiative groups 12 10
At present there are five officially registered political parties in the Republic of Uzbekistan: the People's democratic party, Social-democratic party "Adolat," National-democratic party "Milliy Tiklanish," National-democratic party "Fidokorlar," Movement of entrepreneurs and businessmen - Liberal-democratic party of Uzbekistan. The political parties function in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Law "On Political Parties," and other legislative acts.
Representation of political parties in the Legislative Chamber of parliament by the election results in December 2004 and January 2005 was as follows:
The leading party of Uzbekistan (ruling party) is the National-democratic party of Uzbekistan (Halq Demokratik Partiyasi), which was officially registered in November 1991, and which was transformed from the Communist party of the republic. This party proclaims adherence to the market economy and multiparty system and fully supports the political course of President Islam Karimov. Having preserved in the main the personnel and organizational structure of the
former Communist party, it is a mass party (its membership is about 600,000). President Karimov quit the party in June 1996 and left the post of its chairman. However, this tactical step did not mean the loss of his control over it, all the more so since the deputies elected from this party have taken more than half of all posts in government ministries. The successor of the head of state on the post of the party chairman A. Dzhalolov took part in the presidential elections of 1999-2000 as Karimov's rival, and was supported by only 4,2 percent of the voters. Almost all members of the People's democratic party voted for Islam Karimov, which confirms this party's position as the presidential party.
The National-democratic party "Fidokorlar" has existed since 1998; it was formed in compliance with I. Karimov's proposal to set up a new party "free from corruption," a party of "younger leaders of the future." As a result, this party received 34 seats in the lower chamber of the country's parliament in the election held in December 1999. The "Fidokorlar" played the decisive role in the presidential elections in January 2000. In April 2000 this party and the moderate conservative party "Progress of the Motherland ("Vatan Tarraqiyoti") founded in 1992 officially announced their merger, thus creating "Fidokorlar." In July 2000 the first congress of the new united party was held, its membership was more than 45,000 in 2004. Most of its members are entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and young people.
The Social-democratic party "Adolat" ("Justice") was formed in 1990. In February 1995 it proclaimed its support of the President's course and denounced Islamic intellectuals who advocated radical ideas. This party had about 60,000 members in 2006.
Another popular party among the Uzbek intellectual circles supporting President Karimov's course is the Democratic party "National Revival" ("Milliy Tiklanish Partiyasi") created in 1995. Among its aims was political work in the interests of "national progress
and national consciousness" on the basis of liberal principles with due account of Uzbek specific features. The party scored certain success in the 1999 elections, having won ten seats in the lower chamber of parliament. However, it was unable to score tangible results in the elections of 2004.
In 2003 the Liberal-democratic party (UzLiDeP) was set up on the initiative of the country's authorities, which is regarded as a movement of entrepreneurs and businessmen. It has shown itself as a party protecting the interests of owners, industrialists and private capital. The party became widely known in 2006 when it stood at the head of the Democratic bloc consisting of "Fidokorlar" and "Adolat" in the lower chamber of parliament.
Examining the party-political system of Uzbekistan, mention should be made of the role of the opposition. However, the present legislation considerably narrows down the sphere of its activity.
There are unregistered or banned opposition parties and sociopolitical movements. In the experts' view, the opposition to the President and government can conditionally be divided into three groups: 1. national-democratic opposition which comes out for the creation of a democratic civil society; 2. clan opposition based on interclan contradictions; 3. Islamic opposition, which advocates the creation of an Islamic state. It should be mentioned that the opposition always demands to take into account national specificity.
Analyzing the reality of Uzbekistan, one feature of the Uzbek model draws the attention of experts, namely, that the state plays the decisive role in all economic and political reforms in modern Uzbek society.
Uzbekistan is one of the most totalitarian states of the region with a harsh autocratic regime. However, it should be examined in a historical context: we cannot deny that the existing ruling system after
the country has gained independence succeeded to implement modernization processes in Uzbekistan. Time will show whether the authoritarian regime has become obsolete, and whether the present stage of the country's development will allow it to make transfer to another, more democratic development road. However, it seems that the further, more "highly technological" development of society is unfeasible in the conditions of authoritarianism.
The development process of the newly-independent states of the Central Asian region has shown that democracy is not a universal form of society's organization, and it cannot be brought from the outside.
It is evident that after the proclamation of a democratic course and even after the introduction of the institutional foundations of democracy, its structural elements do not emerge all by themselves. The process of democratization is always prolonged, taking the character of political modernization in the conditions of traditional society. Sharing the view that democracy "cannot be imported" and is always a product of the original culture of a people and their historical and spiritual development, and, as it was justly noted by Uzbekistan's President I. Karimov," democracy cannot be introduced by force, it is fostered, sometimes for a long time. Genuine democracy is not decreed and forced by the authorities; people create it themselves, by their culture and realization of their social needs."
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