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human and economic resources. Contemporary civilization armed with powerful tools of information, political, ideological, and psychological influence on the individual and the masses, as well as computer programming, has acquired dangerous dimensions. Under its pressure, man could lose his ability to think and act freely; his awareness of his “Self,” and his free will as an architect of his life and history. Meanwhile, man and his mentality are a central subject of history.
Parvin DARABADI
D.Sc. (Hist.), professor at Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).
CENTRAL EURASIA IN THE “BIG GEOPOLITICAL GAME” OF THE LATE 19TH-EARLY 20TH CENTURIES
(Pages of Geohistory)
Abstract
The author offers a glimpse of one of the most dramatic episodes of geopolitical rivalry between the Russian and British empires that unfolded in the Central Eurasian mega-region in the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. He presents an in-depth analysis of the geostrategic aims pursued by both empires,
the role of the Caucasian factor in the Crimean War, and the main stages of the empires’ confrontation in Central Asia. Prof. Darabadi pays a lot of attention to the so-called railway policy Russia and Britain pursued in Persia, as well as to the oil factor of the geopolitical games in the Caspian.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the first half of the 19th century, Russia turned its attention to the Caucasus and the Caspian once more and revived its military-political involvement to complete the struggle for Russia’s absolute hegemony there started by Peter the Great and continued by Catherine the Great. Iran and Turkey likewise turned their gaze to the same region while Russia, Britain, and France found themselves competing for the Middle East and the Caspian region in particular.
Military assistance from Napoleon’s France and Britain did not save Iran and Turkey from crippling defeats in three wars with Russia (the Russo-Iranian wars of 1804-1813 and 1826-1828 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829). The Southern Caucasus and the eastern Black Sea coast, as well as the exclusive right to keep its navy in the Caspian, were Russia’s main strategic prizes.
This buried Britain’s hope of stationing its navy in the Caspian in the more or less near future. Russia, on the other hand, secured one of its key geopolitical priorities—undivided rule in the Caucasus and the western shores of the world’s largest landlocked water body. Alexander I described Russia’s main geopolitical task as “we should stand firmly in the Caucasus.”1 In the first third of the 19th century, Russia acquired an important geostrategic toehold from which it could threaten Anatolia and Western Iran while moving toward the Persian Gulf.
The Caucasian Factor in the Crimean War
By the early 1830s, the Russian Empire gained complete control over the Southern Caucasus and the Caspian, areas described as geopolitical East-West and North-South crossroads. This vantage point allowed Russia to spread its control over the vast neighboring territories—the Caucasian mountains in the west and the deserts of Central Asia in the east. By the same token, it threatened Britain’s main communication lines connecting it to its Indian colonies. Indeed, under favorable geopolitical conditions, Russia could not only block them, but also move its armies toward India either across Iran and Afghanistan or across Central Asia.
These victories gave Russia certain military-strategic advantages: first, for a very long period it remained in control of the Caucasus’ natural riches (the Baku, Grozny, and Maikop oil); second, it moved the borders of Christian Orthodoxy far to the south with considerable geopolitical consequences; third, it gained control over the region’s key communication lines, including part of the Great Silk Road; fourth, by the mid-19th century, it finally conquered the Caucasus; and fifth, it set up a military-strategic toehold that allowed it to move into Central Asia in the 1860s-1880s, thus threatening Britain’s colonial interests in the Middle East and Central Asia. It was no accident that, in the mid-19th century, Russian military-political and academic circles revived the idea of a channel between the Azov and the Caspian seas. It was expected to strengthen Russia’s military-strategic and economic position in Central Asia and to “realize the great idea of maritime access to Asia’s heartland.”2
A Russian outpost on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, to quote General Rostislav Fadeev, Russian military theoretician of the mid-19th century, was a bridge “that connected the Russian coast and the heart of the Asian continent; it was a wall that protected Central Asia against hostile influences, and a stronghold that defended both the Black and the Caspian seas.”3
By that time, Russia was bogged down in the Caucasian War of 1817-1864, which gave London the chance to revive its involvement in the region in the hope of detaching the Caucasus from the Russian Empire. It should have been transformed from a Russian military-strategic toehold into an anti-Russian Britain-dominated buffer zone. In 1837, the “Vixen” incident caused quite a stir: the British ship was delivering gunpowder and weapons to Caucasian insurgents and was arrested by the Russian authorities. This triggered heated debates in the British parliament over the real importance of the region for British interests in the East; more than that, it nearly triggered an armed clash between Britain and Russia.4 Later, in the mid-19th century, another Eastern crisis developed into the Crimean War of 18531856, which revived the Caucasian issue of Britain’s foreign policy. This was an absolutely natural development: H.D. Seymour, a prominent British politician and diplomat of the mid-19th century, said at one time that his country never recognized Russia’s rule in Cherkessia or over the Christian provinces
1 Quoted from: L.G. Ivashov, Rossia ili Moskovia? Geopoliticheskie izmerenia natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossii, EKSM Algoritm, Moscow, 2002, p. 117.
2 Morskoy sbornik, Vol. XLIV, No. 11, 1859, p. 193.
3 Quoted from: L.G. Ivashov, op. cit., p. 127.
4 See: V.V. Degoev, Bol’shaia igra na Kavkaze: istoria i sovremennost’, Russkaia panorama Publishers, Moscow, 2001, pp. 120-138.
to the south of the Caucasus.5 Lord Palmerston said at the very beginning of the Crimean War that his cherished aim was to let Turkey claim the Crimea and Georgia and grant Cherkessia independence or else establish the sultan as its sovereign.6 When outlining the tasks of the future war, the British premier said that in future peace in Europe could have been guaranteed if Russia was deprived of some of its fringe territories: Georgia, Cherkessia, the Crimea, Bessarabia, Poland, and Finland.7
From the very beginning of the Crimean War, the allies were aware of the Northern Caucasus’ immense strategic importance as a territory on which the mountain peoples led by Shamil were still fighting the Russians. The fairly complicated military-political situation there was succinctly described by Karl Marx, who said that the legs of the vast empire (the Southern Caucasus) were detached from its body.8
Britain was resolved to exploit the favorable situation to detach the Southern Caucasus from the Russian Empire and divide Georgia into several principalities (Georgia, Mingrelia, Imeretia, Guria, and Armenia) under the joint British-Turkish protectorate and restore the territories Russia had acquired under the Gulistan, Turkmanchai, and Adrianople peace treaties to Iran and Turkey. The Times of London said in so many words that Russia should be limited by the northern lands beyond the Terek and Kuban rivers.9 It is interesting to note that, seen from the West, Armenia looked like part of Georgia.
The Western allies planned to exploit the fact that the Russian troops were tied down by the mountain peoples’ resistance to deliver a blow to Russia; they counted on the Turks and the mountain peoples to attack from the front and the rear to defeat the Russians in the Caucasus and drive them back beyond the Terek and the Kuban.10
However, despite Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War, it fought successfully in the Caucasus and captured the Turkish fortress of Kars. This not only buried the British plans, but also fortified Russia’s position in the region. On the whole, the British, who planned to detach the Caucasus from Russia while fighting in the Crimea, failed for two reasons: first, it proved impossible to fight simultaneously in the Crimea and the Caucasus; second, France betrayed no enthusiasm over Britain’s “Caucasian plans.”11
Russian diplomats skillfully used the Anglo-French contradictions to remove the “possible independence of Cherkessia and Daghestan” issue from the Paris Congress agenda. On 5 May, 1856, the House of Lords accused the Foreign Office of failing to insist in Paris on “independence for Cherkessia” as a barrier to Russia’s pressure toward India, Iran, and Turkey. Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon, in turn, explained the failure by the fact that during the war Shamil had not manifested the desire to join the allies.12
During the last Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, the Russians captured the fortresses of Kars, Ardahan, and Bayazet in the Caucasus, as well as Andrianople (Edirne) in Turkey’s European part. Under the San Stefano Peace Treaty of 3 March, 1878, Russia acquired Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, thus strengthening its military-political position in the Caucasus.
In the 1860s, when Russia had secured its position in the Caucasus, the British-Russian rivalry shifted to Central Asia, to Afghanistan. The Russian Empire’s “brain trust”—the staff of the Russian Caucasian Corps—was the first to realize that the Caucasus and Central Asian were in fact one geopolitical entity. This happened in the latter half of the 1850s-early 1860s when General Fadeev, who belonged to the “brain trust,” wrote in his Letters from the Caucasus (1865) that the situation in the Caspian-Black Sea area “is vitally important for Russia’s southern half stretching from the Oka to the
5 Quoted from: O.P. Markova, Rossia, Zakavkaz'e i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia v XVIII v., Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 298.
6 Quoted from: Istoria narodov Severnogo Kavkaza, Vol. 2, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, p. 184.
7 Quoted from: L.G. Ivashov, op. cit., p. 126.
8 See: K. Marx, F. Engels, Sochinenia, 2nd Edition, Vol. 9, Moscow, 1957, p. 408.
9 See: Istoria narodov Severnogo Kavkaza... Vol. 2, p. 185.
10 Ibidem.
11 V.V. Degoev, op. cit., p. 149.
12 See: Istoria narodov Severnogo Kavkaza. Vol. 2, p. 193.
Crimea... Russia can defend its southern basins only from the Caucasian isthmus. If Russia’s horizons were limited in the south by the snow-capped mountains of the Caucasian range, the entire western continent of Asia would be outside our influence. Today, when Turkey and Persia are weak, a new master or masters would have been quick to appear.”13
The Eagle and the Lion: A Geopolitical Confrontation in Central Asia
The sad results of the Crimean War forced Russia to seek a new weapon against Britain to counterbalance its domination on the seas; it should have been quite effective, even if foggy Albion allied with another power against Russia. In 1882, Russian Foreign Minister Nikolai Girs instructed Russian Ambassador to London Baron de Morenheim: “This was the aim of our advance in Central Asia.”14 During the Crimean War, the Russian military were working on several combat operations that recommended pressing on toward India and shifting the main thrust of the fighting against Britain to that country. Since maritime communications were easy to develop, it was recommended that the onslaught begin from the southeastern Caspian coast and Ak-Kale be used as an outpost.15
Although the Russian top military remained convinced that it would be advisable to move toward India from the Caspian shores, along the border of Northern Iran via Herat and Kabul, the War Ministry rejected the projects as unrealizable at that time. On 28 February, 1856, the ministry issued a resolution that recommended, in particular: “1. To use all means and forces to cement our domination in the Caspian by developing navigation and strengthening our flotilla. The Cabinet has grown accustomed to the idea and has begun implementing it. 2. Communication between the coastal and inland areas of the Trans-Caucasian territory should be improved together with navigation; this done, we shall be able to turn Baku into the main military depot of the Trans-Caucasian forces. 3. When the depot receives sufficient amounts of military supplies and foodstuffs—this can be done without stirring up suspicion—we shall be able to exploit the favorable circumstances to carry out a surprise move of our troops to the southeastern Caspian coast and entrench ourselves on the Persian border in Turkestan. 4. If the present war (the Crimean War.—P.D.) lasts for many more years, we shall probably manage to develop navigation on the Caspian and build up military depots in Baku to the extent that some time later we shall be able to undertake something against the British domains in India.” The document said at the same time: “This bold adventure, which demands complete secrecy, will require many years of preparation. Today this enterprise can be described as unrealizable.”16
This obviously geopolitical document proves beyond doubt that the top Russian military attached great importance to the Caspian Sea and Baku in view of the future military operations against Britain “in the Afghan-Indian sector.” Defeated in the Crimean War, however, Russia was unable to realize these grandiose geopolitical plans. Turkestan was on the agenda.
In 1870s-1880s, Russia and Britain clashed in Central Asia in an effort to carry out further expansion. Both were seeking stronger power over the already conquered lands by demonstrating their military might and establishing control over the key trade and communication routes. Afghanistan found itself in the very center of confrontation.
The Russians moved into the Trans-Caspian area back in 1869 when the troops of General Sto-letov landed on the eastern Caspian coast and founded the port and city of Krasnovodsk as a toehold. In 1877, the Russians took Kyzyl Arvat. The Russian Empire hastened to cement its position in Turkestan; in 1881, General Skobelev took the Akhal-Tekin oasis; three years later the Russians took
13 Vostok, No. 3, 2003, pp. 70-71.
14 G.A. Khidoyatov, Britanskaia ekspansiia v Sredney Azii (Pende, mart 1885), Tashkent, 1981, p. 32.
15 See: Ibid., p. 33.
16 Ibid., p. 35.
Merv; on 12 January, 1881, the Geok-tepe fortress; and several days later, on 18 January, the village of Askhabad. A year later, in 1882, the Russians set up the Zakaspiyskaia Region with its center in Askhabad as part of the Caucasian Region ruled by a governor-general. In the late 1890s, the newly formed region became part of the Turkestan Area.17 The Trans-Caspian railway built in 1880-1888 was an important military-strategic and economic tool of further expansion.
In a relatively short period of time, the Russians moved into Turkestan to find themselves in the region bordering on Afghanistan; in March 1885, they came dangerously close to the Afghan troops at Panj. A war between Russia and Britain looked imminent.
In March 1885, during the Panj crisis, the contradictions between the two countries in Afghanistan reached their highest point and brought the rivals to the brink of war. At that point, Russia could have gained a military and strategic advantage by moving to Herat and by building a railway to connect the Akhal-Tekin oasis and the Caspian coast. It was at that time that the War Ministry ordered mobilization of two army corps in the Caucasus; there were also plans to move enough troops across the sea from Baku to Krasnovodsk on ships chartered from the Kavkaz i Merkuriy Company.18
When planning its war with Russia, Britain intended to strike from the Black Sea to repeat the Crimean War maneuver. The British counted on Turkey’s help to land on the Caucasian Black Sea coast for the simple reason that the enemy was using the Caucasus as a toehold for its operations beyond the Caspian—their communication routes connected Krasnovodsk and Baku. Russian diplomats upset these plans by putting pressure on Turkey: as a result, the Caucasus and the western Black Sea coast were out of British reach. Russia also managed to come to terms with the Emir of Afghanistan by exchanging the Zulfagar area for Panj; the Russians, however, retained their control over the exit to the Zulfagar mountain pass. Britain, too, had to recognize Panj as a Russian domain.19
Prof. F. Kazemzadeh (Yale University, the U.S.) has pointed out: “From London’s point of view, Russia’s presence in Central Asia was disturbing, if not threatening. From St. Petersburg’s point of view, it was the natural outcome of consecutive steps that began three centuries earlier under Ivan the Terrible, Fedor Ioannovich, and Boris Godunov. The British, treated as aliens in Asia, were shattered to see that the Cossacks on the Oxus banks felt absolutely at home among Turkic peoples, who for centuries had been their neighbors, rulers, and subjects.”20 On the whole, the advance of the Russians in Central Asia in the 1880s caused a lot of apprehension among the British administrators in India, who feared that Horasan, Seistan, and Afghanistan might become the next victims.”21
Railway Policy in Persia: Britain and Russia
The Russian-British rivalry was not limited to Central Asia; the two empires competed for domination in Persia as well. Britain looked at this large Eastern country as a terrain from which it could oppose Russia in the Southern Caucasus and undermine its position in Turkestan. Southern Azerbaijan was the key to possible military actions against the Russian Empire, while Horasan could have played an important role in weakening Russia’s influence in Turkestan.22 F. Kazemzadeh has provided us with a formula that best described Persia’s place and role in the events that unfolded in the 19th-
17 See: Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia, Vol. 26, Moscow, 1977, pp. 344-345.
18 See: G.A. Khidoyatov, op. cit., p. 153.
19 See: Istoria diplomatii, Vol. II, Diplomatia v novoe vremia. 1871-1914, GIPL, Moscow, 1963, p. 204.
20 F. Kazemzadeh, Bor’ba za vliianie v Persii. Diplomaticheskoe protivostoianie Rossii i Anglii, ZAO Tsentrpoli-
graf, Moscow, 2004, pp. 10-11.
21 F. Kazemzadeh, Bor’ba za vliianie v Persii. Diplomaticheskoe protivostoianie Rossii i Anglii, ZAO Tsentrpoli-graf, Moscow, 2004, p. 336.
22 See: Istoria diplomatii, Vol. II, p. 75.
early 20th centuries in Central Eurasia: “Evil fate placed Persia between the Russian hammer and the British anvil.”23 He goes on to say: “The clashes between the two giant empires, be it over Constantinople, Central Asia or the Far East, immediately echoed in Tehran. After two decades of Russia’s continuous onslaught in Turkestan and the Trans-Caspian, Persia was very much aware of the pressure coming from St. Petersburg and London.”24
In the latter half of the 19th century, Persia became a de facto Asian semi-colony of both empires; since 1879, the Persian shah used Russian Cossacks, another lever of Russia’s influence, as his personal bodyguards.
The Russian troops stationed in the Caucasus could easily occupy Persia’s richest and densely populated northern provinces, while the British naval forces were in control of the Persian Gulf coast.
While in Afghanistan, the two powers found themselves on the brink of war, in Persia, they remained mostly economic rivals. Their competition over concessions for transportation projects, railways in particular, was known as the railway policy.
In the early 1870s, the issue of railways in Persia was raised by Paul Julius Baron von Reuter (the founder of the famous news agency) who intended to build a railway between the southern Caspian coast and Tehran and to extend it later to the Gulf. Despite Nasir al-Din Shah’s preliminary agreement and the fact that the British had lain the first 12 km of rails, the Iranian side, not without Russia’s interference, annulled its permission.25
In 1873-1878, Ferdinand de Lesseps, the famous builder of the Suez, put forward the idea of Le Grand Central Asiatique railway to connect Calais, Orenburg, Samarkand, Peshawar, and Calcutta. The Russian side approved the project, which failed in turn thanks to the diplomatic maneuvers of the British who feared (with good reason) that it would bring Russia into Afghanistan and India.26
A Russian company, which late in the 1880s tried to build a railway between Rasht and the Chahbar Bay on the Indian Ocean coast to realize Russia’s dream of reaching the warm Indian Ocean, likewise failed.27 In his article “Russkaia politika na Blizhnem, Srednem i Dal’nem Vostoke” (Russian Policy in the Near, Middle, and Far East), which appeared in the Rech newspaper on 1 March,
1911, Pavel Miliukov was very open about the purposes of the Indo-European and Trans-Persian projects: “Our old railway projects in Persia were intended to bring us to the ‘warm sea.’”28
In the late 1880s, Henry Wolff, British envoy to Persia, worked hard to implement a project for a Trans-Persian railway and draw the Russians to his side by demonstrating the project’s obvious advantages to them. In his letter to Prime Minister Salisbury, he argued that while the Suez had shortened the route between London and Bombay by 2,492 miles, the Trans-Persian railway would shorten the route between Baku and Karachi by 3,072 miles to Russia’s advantage.29 On 16 February, 1890, Russian War Minister Petr Vannovskiy opposed the project at a special meeting on Persia and insisted that a railway between Tiflis and Tabriz would be strategically more advantageous. He was dead set against a railway along the Caspian’s western shore because, as he put it, “we have always been aware of the Caspian’s exceptional importance. For this reason, any project that will attract foreign interest to the Caspian basin should be regarded as incompatible with our position.”30 According to Director of the Asian Department of Russia’s Foreign Ministry I. Zinoviev, the Tiflis-Tabriz railway was primarily important in the military-strategic respect. Control over Azerbaijan could become an important factor in the next Russo-Turkish war, but unconnected with the Russian railways it would remain useless.31
23 F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 124.
24 Ibidem.
25 See: M. Pavlovich, “Istoria Prikaspia,” Kaspiyskiy tranzit v dvukh tomakh, Vol. 1, DI DIK Tanais, Moscow, p. 517.
26 See: Ibid., pp. 518-523.
27 See: Ibid., p. 523.
28 Ibid., p. 552.
29 See: Istoria diplomatii, Vol. II, p. 82.
30 F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 187.
31 See: Ibid., p. 190.
Finally, under the conventions of 1885 and 1889, Britain and Russia agreed to refrain from building railways in Persia and to keep third countries away until 1910. In this way, Persia was deprived of this type of communication for a long time to come.32 The commanders of the Indian army expressed their opinion of a Trans-Persian railway in an article that appeared in The Times on 21 July, 1912. One of the British officers wrote that the idea of a Russian invasion of India looked an absurdity at first glance, in same way as before the Russo-Japanese war a half-million invasion of Manchuria had been unthinkable. The Trans-Persian railway would force us to considerably increase the Indian army. No matter how large the army was, the public would have a nervous response to all the alarming signs. We should always bear in mind that even if there was complete agreement between Britain and Russia, this attitude would survive in the suburban theaters with their penchant for melodrama—there were millions of them—in which a villain, who abducted a British virgin and bribed a killer to get rid of a valiant bridegroom, always appeared in a uniform that brought Russians to mind. Our Tommies high up in the gallery (in the garrisons of India the enemy was invariably imagined as clad in a Cossack uniform) enthusiastically applauded.33
Still, early in the 20th century, Britain rejected its traditional railway policy in Persia. On 11 July,
1912, speaking in the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Grey said that the cabinet considered it unwise to continue opposing construction of a railway that would be built sooner or later anyway. In fact, to protect its interests in this area Britain should have immediately joined the Trans-Persian project.34
The recommendation was prompted by the fact that despite the earlier agreements with London, Russia tried to build a Trans-Persian railway to reach Bandar Abbas. In his book, Zheleznodorozhniy put’ cherez Persiu (A Trans-Persian Railway), which appeared in St. Petersburg in 1900, Russian engineer P. Rittikh pointed to the project’s special military-political importance, which could help Russia establish its domination over entire Persia and bury the “plan of dividing it into spheres: the Northern under Russian and the Southern under British influence. No division and no spheres can be tolerated: all of Persia should be ours.”35 The planned railways—the keys to India of sorts—were obviously of huge geopolitical importance as a powerful weapon of struggle for the hegemony in Central Eurasia Russia and Britain would not hesitate to use.
Naturally enough, Russia’s greater involvement in Persia, which by the late 19th century had grown even weaker, caused a lot of concern in the British ruling circles bogged down in South Africa. In fact, the British-Russian rivalry eased the British pressure on South Africa. According to George Curzon, a brilliant expert in the Orient, the British interests in Persia could be divided into three categories—economic, political, and strategic; the latter two, said Curzon, were of especial importance for India.36
He was also convinced that geography and history supplied Russia with a dominant role in Northern Persia, while Britain should have concentrated on establishing its domination over Central and Southern Persia.37
Being absolutely aware of Russia’s intention to penetrate Central and Southern Persia to reach the Gulf, Lord Curzon concluded that, no matter how heavy the financial and military burden caused by the ever shortening distance between the Russian Empire and the northern and northwestern borders of India between the Pamirs and Herat, his country was also very concerned about the prospect of Russia becoming a neighbor of Eastern or Southern Persia. This would inevitably make the burden much heavier, warned he.38
In the final count, both powers needed a united but weak Persia; any plans for its dismemberment were blocked by an important factor: Russia’s probable move toward the Gulf, something that
32 See: Ibid., p. 192.
33 See: M. Pavlovich, op. cit., pp. 556-557.
34 See: Ibid., p. 530.
35 Quoted from: Ibid., pp. 525-526.
36 See: F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 278.
37 See: Ibid., p. 279.
38 See: Ibidem.
Britain could not tolerate. Its main rival in Central Eurasia should have been deprived of this geopolitical victory. In the spring and summer of 1900, Britain’s fears were confirmed by Russia amassing its troops on the Persian and Afghan borders and sending its warships to the Gulf. The situation never developed further: Russia turned its attention to the Far East and preferred other forms of rivalry with Britain in the Middle East.39
Following the defeat of the Iranian revolution of 1905-1911, not without Russia’s contribution, early in 1913 the Russian government obtained a concession to build the Julfa-Tabriz railway; this was the first step toward annexing Southern Azerbaijan and the Urmian district, which could be turned into a strategically advantageous operational terrain for further pressure on Eastern Turkey.40
The Oil Factor in the Geopolitical Games in the Caspian
In the 1870s-1890s, the oil factor moved to the fore in everything that was going on in the region. In the latter half of the 19th century, the western Caspian area and Baku acquired a much more ramified industrial and transport infrastructure. In 1873, Baku became the main base of the Caspian flotilla. In 1883, the Baku-Tiflis railway was commissioned; in 1900, the Baku-Derbent-Port-Petrovsk (Makhachkala) railway was completed. Later it was extended to Grozny and Beslan to join the Russian railway network. It was at that time that Baku, in which the oil industry was rapidly developing, became the best equipped and the largest Caspian port; it held the first place among all the other ports on the empire’s inner seas, where the total tonnage of merchant sailing ships was concerned; his steam-powered fleet was larger than those of the White and Baltic seas and was second to the Black Sea and Azov fleets. By the early 20th century, about 80 percent of oil products were taken to the world markets by sea, the rest was moved by railways. At that time, Baku produced over half of the world’s total oil.41
In the late 19th century, the Grozny and Maikop oil areas, the cities of Novorossiisk, Ekaterinodar, Vladikavkaz, Port-Petrovsk, as well as the Vladikavkaz railway with the Mineralnye Vody and Tikhorets-kaia stations, acquired great military-strategic and economic importance for the Russian Empire.
In 1901, over 90 percent of kerosene used in India came from Baku; India also served as a transit base for the Russian oil deliveries to the Far East.42 At the same time, due to the transportation problems, Baku oil was losing its competitiveness on the world markets: it was taken from Baku to Batum on the Black Sea coast by rail where it was loaded onto ships to be taken through the Suez Canal to India and the Far East.
In 1884, a Russian project of an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf appeared.43 If implemented, it (which Nicholas II described as a “tremendously important issue”) could have created Russian commercial interests in the Gulf and ensured Russia’s military presence in the form of Russian troops deployed to protect the pumping stations, repair shops and other structures along the pipeline. By the same token, Russia would have increased its influence on the Indian Ocean coast.44 The pipeline could have added competitiveness to Baku’s oil industry, which was losing money under pressure from Standard Oil, its main rival, which was pushing Russian oil products from the European and Asian markets.45
The British worked hard to thwart these plans. The Russian Empire was denied the pipeline concession, while the British confirmed the D’Arcy concession. According to B. Anan’ich, this
39 See: Ibid., pp. 287-288.
40 See: M. Pavlovich, op. cit., pp. 558-561.
41 See: Istoria Azerbaidzhana, in three volumes, Vol. 2, Baku, 1960, pp. 231-235.
42 See: F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 293.
43 See: Ibid., p. 294.
44 See: Ibid., p. 295.
45 See: Ibid., p. 311.
meant “one of the first defeats of Witte’s economic policy in Persia on the eve of the Russo-Japanese war. It only took the Russian government a few years to grasp the meaning of it.”46 While chasing two birds in the bush, Russia missed the bird in the Persian Gulf. British Ambassador to the Russian Empire Sir Arthur Nicholson put this in a nutshell by saying that the Japanese War buried Russia’s dream of a vast Asian empire.47
Russia’s Attempt to Reach the Warm Seas: A Shelved Geopolitical Dream
The 1907 agreement brought Russia and Britain closer, but by 1909 Russia had concentrated considerable military force (150,000-strong) in the Turkestanian and Caucasian military districts, the closest to India. The British could not help but be concerned about the security of their Indian colonial possessions.48 Meanwhile, Persia’s decline continued. In the early 20th century, the country was in an acute social and political crisis, which added vehemence to the Russo-British rivalry there. The threat of a Russian invasion became very real, something that the British could not overlook. In the event of Russia’s invasion of Tabriz or Mashhad from the north, they were prepared to establish their control over the strategically important area of Seistan (which bordered on Afghanistan and Baluchistan) and the Gulf. British envoy Ch. Harding believed, with good reason, that the Russians aimed to reach Seistan in the south to finally approach the borders of India.49 George Curzon, in turn, pointed out that a Russian port in the Persian Gulf, the cherished dream of the patriots from the banks of the Neva or the Volga, would have caused uneasiness in the West even in peacetime. It would have destroyed the balance, the result of persistent efforts, destroyed trade worth of many millions of pounds sterling, and unleashed hostile nationalities always ready to go for each other’s throats.50
By that time, however, the old rivals were tied down elsewhere—Britain was fighting the Boers, and Russia the Japanese. They were obviously unable to pay enough attention to their strategic interests in the region and be more actively involved militarily. Their rivalry over influence on the Persian shah was limited to diplomatic battles and intrigues of their secret services.
The revolution that started in Persia in 1905 prompted the sides to sign an agreement in 1907. Russia’s direct military interference in Persia’s domestic affairs during the revolution and Britain’s diplomatic maneuvers helped to suppress the revolution, which threatened the interests of both powers.
Persia was seen as a strategic key to the security of the Russian Empire’s southern borders in the Southern Caucasus and across the Caspian. It was in a state of permanent border conflict with Turkey, the common enemy of Persia and Russia; their relations with the Ottoman Empire were strained in the 1870s. The fairly large military force Russia kept in the Southern Caucasus and Persia’s dependence on the Russian market added weight to Russia’s influence on Persia. In the fall of 1873, under St. Petersburg’s pressure, Nasir al-Din Shah had to annul the concession treaty signed in 1872 with British banker Julius Reuter for a railway between Rasht on the Caspian and the Gulf. It was presumed that the railway would later be extended to the railways of other countries “in the direction of Europe or India.”51 If realized, Persia’s economic development would have been controlled by the British. The memorandum issued by the Foreign Ministry stated that Russian trade along the Caucasian border and in the Caspian would have been dealt a heavy blow.52
46 Ibid., p. 316.
47 See: Ibid., p. 431.
48 See: M. Pavlovich, op. cit., p. 556.
49 See: F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 338.
50 See: Ibid., p. 351.
51 Istoria diplomatii, Vol. II, pp. 78, 80.
52 See: Ibid., p. 80.
Russia’s victories beyond the Caspian strengthened its strategic position on Persia’s northern border and in the northern provinces of Southern Azerbaijan, Gilyan, Mazandaran, and Horasan. On 9 December, 1881, Russia and Persia signed a convention in Tehran that delimited their domains to the east of the Caspian.53
Britain dominated Southern, Southeastern, and Central Persia; its navy controlled the Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean. The country was de facto divided between Britain and Russia; the latter’s intention to reach the Indian Ocean via Persia and Afghanistan remained a geopolitical dream.
C o n c l u s i o n
By the early 20th century, Russia found itself on the Iranian and Afghan borders: it began its geopolitical pressure along the Western Caucasian coast and the Eastern and Central Asian Caspian coast in the 18th century and never relented throughout the 19th century, pressing on in the Persian and Afghan directions.
Russia’s conquests in the Caucasus and Central Asia, joining Georgia, Northern Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenia to the Russian Federation, and the vassal dependence of Khiva and Bukhara brought the northern empire dangerously close to India. By the late 19th century, the British reassessed their ideas about Iran as a factor of India’s security. This, and the emergence of a new center of power in Europe, the German Empire, which nurtured ambitious plans in the Orient, forced the old rivals to abandon at least some of their political disagreements. Early in the 20th century, they brought their viewpoints on Iran much closer than before and registered the positive shifts by signing an agreement on 31 August, 1907 on delimiting the spheres of influence in Iran, Afghanistan, and Tibet. This ended in the creation of Entente.54
At the same time, by the late 19th century, Russia already controlled 90 percent of the Caspian shoreline, thanks to its active expansionist policy. It entered the 20th century as the dominant geopolitical force in the Caspian.
Britain, in turn, was seeking protection over Iran, the closest neighbor of India, its largest colony. Russia was pursuing different aims: it was seeking military and political control over northern Iran, over highly unstable Southern Azerbaijan, to be more exact. This explains its active military-political interference in the revolutionary events of 1905-1911 and its temporary occupation of Southern Azerbaijan and Gilyan. Britain did not remain passive either—it moved in to control Southern Iran. The rivals wanted to preserve the Iranian state intact—on the one hand, it blocked Russia’s access to the Indian Ocean, on the other, it did not allow the British to infiltrate the Caucasus and Western Turkestan.
On the whole, it can be said that the acute Russian-British rivalry preserved Iran as an independent state and saved it from becoming a colony. George Curzon put this in a somewhat flowery way: “Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia—to many these names breathe only a sense of utter remoteness or a memory of strange viccisitudes and of moribund romance. To me, I confess, they are the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the dominion of the world.”55
These words, said at the dawn of the 20th century, are still pertinent in the early 21st century.
53 See: Istoria diplomatii, Vol. II, p. 206.
54 See: M.S. Ivanov, op. cit., p. 220.
55 Quoted from: F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 10.
