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"BERNIEMANIA" IN AMERICA: BERNIE SANDERS, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM, AND THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN THE UNITED STATES
Ralph P. Guentzel
Franklin College,
101 Branigin Blvd., Franklin, IN, 46131, USA
The article examines the surprising success of U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders and his program of democratic socialism in the first two stages of the 2016 presidential election campaign in the United States. More specifically, it identifies the key components of Sanders' program, assesses the extent to which this program can be classified as "democratic socialism" or "social democracy," analyses the sources of Sanders' electoral support, and briefly discusses the potential long-term impact of Sanders' candidacy. This article makes three key arguments. First, it contends that Sanders' program constitutes a massive attack on the concentration of economic and wealth and political power in the hands of the American upper class. Second, it refutes the suggestion that Sanders' program best be classified as "social democratic" and asserts that it possesses considerable affinity with the reformist-functional variant of democratic socialism. Third, it claims that Sanders' success stems primarily from the structural decline of the American middle class and cultural shifts that affect younger Americans in particular. In addition, this article suggests that Sanders' candidacy may have a lasting effect on political culture of the United States.
Keywords: Socialism, Democratic Socialism, Social Democracy, USA, Electoral Process, Political Behavior, Party System, Political Economy, Social Stratification, Wealth Gap.
Presidential election campaigns in the United States are notoriously rich in drama. Drawn out over the span of some eighteen months, these campaigns unfold in a three-stage process. During the first stage, which takes place in the pre-election year, potential candidates test the waters, vie for media attention, and begin collecting funds to underwrite their campaign. During the second stage, which covers the first half of the election year, candidates try to win the nomination of one of the country's two major parties, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. For this purpose, they compete in a grueling series of contests that take place in all fifty states as well as the District of Columbia and a number of dependent territories such as American Samoa, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. These contests determine how many votes candidates will receive at their respective party's national presidential nomination convention. Held after the end of the regional contests, the two parties' conventions usher in the third stage. During this stage, which lasts about five months, the two parties' presidential nominees go head to head in a final showdown that culminates in the national elections held on the second Tuesday in November (Hetherington, Keefe, 2007, pp. 67-104).
One of the most dramatic stories of the first two phases of the 2016 presidential election campaign has been the surprising surge in popularity of Bernie Sanders,
one of the three candidates for the Democratic Party nomination. Born in 1941 and a veteran of U.S. politics, Sanders has forged his political career in the State of Vermont and in the nation's capital, having served first as mayor of Burlington, Vermont, then as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, and since 2007, as a member of the U.S. Senate. A rare exception in U.S. politics, Sanders has long identified himself as a "democratic socialist." Such is his attachment to democratic socialism that he made its propagation a central motive of his campaign for the highest political office in the country.
Given that capitalism has traditionally been an article of faith in the United States and that the vast majority of American media and politicians habitually use the term "socialist" as an insult, Sanders' stance should have condemned his candidacy to instant electoral death. It was therefore not surprising that most U.S. media paid little attention when the Vermont Senator announced his candidacy in April 2015. The New York Times, for example, did not consider the event worth a story. Yet, contrary to all expectations, Sanders rose from the status of a fringe candidate to that of a serious contender. In June 2015, only 15 % of Democrats indicated that they would vote for the Vermont Senator. At the same time, the former First Lady and former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who was the declared favorite of both the Democratic Party establishment and the bookmakers, had the backing of 75 % of Democrats. By January 2016, some 34 % of Democrats declared Sanders to be their first choice while among Democrats support for Clinton had fallen to 59 %. By mid-February 2016, Sanders had reduced the gap to eleven percentage points as 42 % of Democrats opted for him while 53 % of Democrats picked Clinton (Hook, 2016).
Not only did Sanders soar in public opinion polls, he also inspired a greater degree of enthusiasm than any other candidate in either of the two parties. At his rallies, he drew record crowds: 11,000 in Phoenix, Arizona; 25,000 in Los Angeles, California; and 28,000 in Portland, Oregon (Shaffer, 2016, p. 31). Sanders also proved to be a successful fundraiser. In February 2016 alone, he received campaign donations worth some U.S. $42 million (Meckler, 2016). Virtually all of the contributions to Sanders' campaign were modest in size. In contrast, Clinton received mostly large donations. While millions supported Sanders, millionaires supported Clinton (Earle, 2016, p. 3).
Amazed by Sanders' ascent from obscurity to stardom, American journalists called the Vermont Senator a "political sensation" (Dickinson, 2015, p. 56) and coined terms such as "Bernie Boom" and "Berniemania" (Meyerson, 2016, p. 137). Even overseas, Sanders rapidly became a household name. Like their American peers, foreign journalists were stupefied by the Vermont Senator's swift rise. So were scholars. The German political scientist Armin Pfahl-Traughber, for example, dubbed Sanders' success a "baffling surprise" and the French Americanist Clément Petitjean likened the Vermont Senator to "a political UFO" that had suddenly landed (Pfahl-Traughber, http://hpd. de; Petitjean, https://www.ensemble-fdg.org). While observers agreed that Sanders' rise in popularity constituted a remarkable development they disagreed in their assessment of his program. Most pundits acknowledged the program's radicalism but many of them also questioned if it could actually be called "democratic-socialist." A number of political scientists, such as Pfahl-Traughber, Joseph M. Schwartz, and Ingar Solty, suggested that instead it ought to be labelled "social-democratic"
(Pfahl-Traughber, http://hpd.de/artikel/12141; Schwartz, http://inthesetimes.com; Solty, 2016).
Sanders' candidacy raises four questions. First, what are the main features of his program? Second, to what extent does this program correspond to scholarly definitions of "democratic socialism" and "social democracy"? Third, what caused so many Americans to support a self-proclaimed democratic socialist in his quest to become president? Fourth, which impact on U.S. political culture is Sanders' candidacy likely to have in the long run? This article will tackle each of these questions in turn.
1. The Main Features of Sanders' Program. When announcing his candidacy, Sanders boldly declared his ultimate aim to be nothing less than "a political revolution" that would "transform our country economically, politically, socially, and environmentally" (Tasini, 2015, p. 2). As became obvious in the months that followed the announcement, Sanders understands the term "political revolution" as a signifier for three central and inter-related policy projects: first, the redistribution of wealth from the upper class to the middle and lower classes; second, the expansion of public social provision; and third, the curbing of the political power of the upper class (Tasini, 2015; Frizell, 2016, p. 12; Sanders, https://berniesanders.com; Bernie Sanders for President, 2016, p. 3; Young, 2016, p. 4).
Each of these policy projects is rooted in Sanders' vision of what constitutes a desirable, or "democratic-socialist," society. Three features define this society. The first one is the general welfare of the population. "Our goal," declares Sanders, "should be a society in which all people have a decent standard of living" (Dickinson, 2015, p. 57). The second feature consists in equal economic rights. According to Sanders, every individual has a right to a clean environment, adequate food, clothing, and housing, quality health care and education, and an adequate remuneration as well as decent working conditions, which includes periods of paid vacation and parental leave (Sanders, 2016, pp. 27-28). Equal political rights constitute the third feature. In keeping with the principle of one person one vote, Sanders wants everybody to be able to participate in the political process on an equal footing (Ibid., p. 28).
Measured against this vision of society, existing conditions fall woefully short. "Tens of millions of American families continue to lack the basic necessities of life," notes Sanders, "while millions more struggle every day to provide a minimal standard of living for their families" (Ibid., p. 26). These lamentable conditions are not the result of economic underdevelopment. To the contrary: material wealth is abundant in American society. However, it is distributed unfairly. "The top one-tenth of one percent," asserts Sanders, "own nearly as much wealth as the bottom 90 percent of Americans" (Tasini, 2015, p. 41; Sanders, 2016, p. 26; https://berniesanders.com).
Sanders argues that this small class of super-rich Americans also exercises an extraordinary amount of power over politics. This power, he claims, stems largely from the rules that govern election campaign financing in the United States. Under these rules, American politicians fund their campaigns primarily through donations from wealthy individuals and corporations. Once elected to public office, they therefore are beholden to wealthy individuals and corporations. Sanders finds this system appalling. "It is unacceptable," he declares, "that we have a corrupt campaign finance system which allows millionaires, billionaires and large corporations to contribute as
much as they want [...] to elect candidates who will represent their special interests" (Sanders, 2016, p. 28).
Since his vision of society is incompatible with the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a select few, Sanders arrives at the same conclusion as did Rousseau when he famously declared his ideal society to be one in which "all have something and none [...] has too much" (Rousseau, 1987, p. 29). Sanders does not reference (and may not be aware of) Rousseau's axiom. However, his speeches are replete with variations on it, for example when he declares himself opposed to "a society in which a few people have incredible wealth while 47 million live in poverty" (Dickinson, 2015, p. 57), when he proclaims it to be unacceptable that "billionaires compete as to the size of their super-yachts, while children go hungry and veterans sleep out on the streets" (Sanders, 2016, p. 26), and when he calls for the creation of an economic system that "works for all, not just the very wealthy" (Ibid., p. 27).
To wrestle wealth and power from the super-rich, Sanders calls on middle- and lower-class Americans to form an alliance. He urges them "to develop a political movement which [...] is prepared to take on and defeat a ruling class whose greed is destroying our nation" (Ibid., p. 26). Irrespective of the outcome of the presidential elections, this movement could exert pressure on political office holders in the years to come. Its agenda would consist in working toward the realization of a catalog of reforms that Sanders puts forward and that correspond to each of his three central policy projects.
With regard to the first central policy project, the redistribution of wealth, Sanders advocates three major reforms: first, breaking-up the country's six largest banks (which hold assets equivalent to about 60 % of the U.S. gross domestic product); second, revising the labor code to strengthen trade unions; third, significantly raising taxes on the very rich by expanding existing taxes on capital gains, high incomes, and large estates, introducing a new tax on financial transactions, dismantling existing tax rebates, and making it illegal for corporations to set up fictional headquarters in offshore tax havens, (Tasini, 2015, pp. 12-13, 40-41, 45, 48-49; Sanders, https:// berniesanders.com).
With regard to the second central policy project, expanding public social provision, Sanders proposes four major reforms: first, abolishing tuition fees in public institutions of higher education; second, creating a public non-profit health insurance plan that would eliminate deductibles and co-payments (i. e. payments that patients have to make for medical services that are not covered by the private for-profit health insurance plans that currently exist in the United States); third, raising additional revenue for the public old-age pension plan (generally known as "Social Security"); and fourth, increasing public old-age pension benefits (Tasini, 2015, pp. 13-14, 28-32, 66, 69; Sanders, 2016, p. 27; https://berniesanders.com).
With regard to the third central policy project, the curbing of the elite's political power, Sanders wants to implement campaign financing rules that would make election campaigns publicly-funded and limit the amount of money politicians can spend on a given campaign (Tasini, 2015, pp. 71-75; Sanders, https://berniesanders.com).
Sanders' program includes (only) one measure that aims at expanding public ownership and control of economic activity, namely the plan to create a non-profit
public health insurance fund that would replace for-profit corporate health insurances providers (Tasini, 2015, pp. 24-26; Sanders, 2016, p. 27; https://berniesanders.com). Beyond that, Sanders does not wish to boost the public sector at the expense of the private one. "I don't believe government should own the means of production," Sanders asserts. "I believe in private companies that thrive and invest and grow" (Sanders, 2016, p. 28). While Sanders opposes nationalization, he does support expanding the cooperative sector. In the past, he repeatedly went on record in favor of creating a public support structure meant to enable workers to set up worker-owned cooperatives. In 2014, for example, he sponsored two (unsuccessful) bills in Congress aimed at providing workers with the funds and the skills and knowledge required to create and successfully run worker-owned cooperatives (Sanders Unveils Employee Ownership Legislation, http://www.sanders.senate.gov).
2. Sanders' Program and Its Affinity with Reformist-Functionalist Democratic Socialism. In order to assess the extent to which Sanders' program can be categorized as "democratic-socialist" or "social-democratic," we need to briefly discuss the defining features of "democratic socialism" and "social democracy." Since "democratic socialism" is a variant of "socialism," this discussion must begin with establishing the characteristics of "socialism." While the meaning of the term "socialism" remains a matter of some controversy, several preeminent scholars of the subject concur in defining "socialism" as a political philosophy that encompasses the following four principles (Panitch, 1989; Therborn, 1992; Miliband, 1994; McLaverty, 2005).
1. All human beings ought to be empowered to lead a free, self-determined, and meaningful life. Every member of society ought to enjoy the same freedoms as all others.
2. Human beings are by nature social beings who can realize their potential only within society. They are bonded to each other not only by ties of common interest but also by mutual obligations and, therefore, share responsibility for each other. It follows that individual empowerment and equal freedom for all can be achieved only through cooperative means.
3. To promote individual empowerment and equal freedom for all, priority must be given to serving human needs rather than profit considerations and to distributing the material wealth generated by society in fair and equitable ways.
4. The concentration of economic wealth and political power in the hands of a small minority is unacceptable. Economic activity must be based on the principles of collective decision-making. It is necessary to socialize either the legal title to or the right to dispose of (a significant part of) the means of production and distribution.
Socialism can be sub-divided into three different types: anarchism, communism, and democratic socialism. The first and the second type, which are historically associated, respectively, with thinkers and activists such as Pierre Joseph Proudhon and Vladimir I. Lenin, do not concern us here. The third one, however, does. Democratic socialism combines the aforementioned four principles with a firm commitment to democratic institutions and to the rights and freedoms that underpin these institutions. More specifically, democratic socialism champions equal voting rights, the inviolability of parliamentary procedures, the accountability of political office
holders to the people, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and free access to political education and information. Democratic socialism regards the existence of a democratic political order as a prerequisite for the creation of a socialist society and envisages the socialist political order as profoundly democratic (Droz, 1966, p. 5, 9).
Democratic socialism traces its beginnings to the 1830s and 1840s, when thinkers such as Pierre Leroux, Louis Blanc, and the publishers of L'Atelier pioneered the first comprehensive democratic-socialist political programs (Cuvillier, 1954; Loubère, 1961; Bakunin, 1976; Lanza, 2010). Three components were central to these programs: democratic institutions, public social programs, and workers' cooperatives. Having suffered a set-back in 1848 and having become marginalized in the 1850s, democratic socialism reemerged in the 1860s when the first socialist political parties in the proper sense of the word sprang up. Over the course of the following half-century, two distinct variants of democratic socialism came into being: a Marxian-statist one and a reformist-functional one.
Developed above all by Karl Kautsky, the Marxian-statist variant follows the teachings of Karl Marx insofar as it challenges the capitalists' economic and political dominance and advocates a radical rupture with the capitalist mode of production. However, unlike Marx, it wants to conquer political power solely through democratic means (Salvadori, 1979; Kautsky, 1994). Initially, this variant proposed the wholesale transfer of privately-held means of production and distribution into state ownership and the replacement of market mechanisms with centralized planning. From the 1980s on, however, it modified this stance. In the course of a debate spawned by the economist Alec Nove and his suggestions for the creation of a "feasible socialism (Nove, 1983; Stephanson, 1984-85)," it revamped its vision of socialism's economic order to include a (modestly-sized) private sector and (a modicum of) market mechanisms.
The reformist-functional variant of democratic socialism is the brainchild of a large number of political thinkers, including Jean Jaurès, Ernst Wigforss, and Michael Brie (Tilton, 1979; Guentzel, 2012, pp. 713-722; Brie, 2013; Scot, 2014). It shares with its Marxian-statist cousin the wish to overcome the capitalist mode of production and the belief in the need to wrestle economic wealth and political power from the capitalists. However, in contrast to the Marxian-statist variant, the reformist-functional one does not envisage a sudden, dramatic rupture with the capitalist mode of production. Instead, it embraces a process of transformation primarily powered by successive and progressively far-reaching reforms. It is committed to strengthening the trade-union and cooperative movements and to de-commodifying wage labor through public social provision, including free access to health services, education, and cultural activities.
Unlike the Marxian-statist variant of democratic socialism, the reformist-functional one does not aim at socializing ownership of the means of production and distribution. Instead, it proposes to democratize decision-making rights over the use of the means of production and distribution. On the macro-economic level, democratically elected governments ought to set the broad parameters for economic development through the use of policy instruments such as regulation, taxation, government contracts, and infrastructure projects. On the micro-economic level, company policies ought to be determined by boards of directors composed of the democratically elected
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representatives of all stakeholders (owners, managers, workers, consumers, local communities) rather than solely by the owners or by managers who are beholden solely to the owners.
Social democracy developed in close interaction with the reformist-functional variant of democratic socialism and sometimes gets mistaken for it. Although it is often associated with Eduard Bernstein, it owes a far greater intellectual debt to the Nils Karleby (Karleby, 1926; Higgins and Dow, 2013, pp. 131-137). Social democracy endorses the capitalist mode of production, because it sees in it a precondition for innovation and economic efficiency. It neither wants to expropriate the means of production and distribution nor to democratize decision-making over the use of the means of production and distribution. Instead, it proposes to redistribute the results of economic activity through taxes and transfers and to regulate economic activity, if, and as, needed.
As Thomas Meyer, contemporary social democracy's major theoretician explains, social democracy is committed to striking a balance between two objectives: improving the working and living conditions of the wage earners and making private enterprise flourish (Meyer, Hinchman, 2007, pp. 9-160; Meyer, 2011, pp. 35-393). It follows that, by nature, social democracy is Janus-faced. At times, it may support organized labor in its demands, call for the regulation of business activity, and promote the de-commodification of wage labor through public social provision, including free access to health services, education, and cultural activities. At other times, however, it may apply pressure on organized labor to restrain its demands, advocate the liberation of business from regulatory mechanisms, and endorse cuts to public social provision. Overall, it is consistent only in one respect: the desire to promote cooperation between employers and employees.
Critics of social democracy have accused it of failing to comprehend that a consistent policy of de-commodifying wage labor requires the breaking-up of all concentrations of wealth and power. Since social democracy rejects such a course of action on the grounds that breaking-up concentrations of wealth and power would scare off potential investors and adversely affect the economy, social democrats are condemned to be inconsistent in their social policies. Even worse, in most conflicts between social democracy's two objectives — the objective of improving working and living conditions and the objective of promoting private enterprise — social democrats tend to throw their support behind the latter. As critics of social democracy maintain, it was thus entirely within the logic of social democracy that some of its major protagonists such as Tony Blair, Gerhard Schroder, and Goran Persson embraced supply-side economics in the 1990s and early 2000s (Moschonas, 2002; Lavelle, 2009).
A comparison of Sanders' program with the basic precepts of the two variants of democratic socialism and with social democracy reveals both overlap and discrepancy in all three cases. Sanders' program and the Marxian-statist variant of democratic socialism share two underlying premises: the commitment to general welfare and equal freedom and the wish to break-up all concentrations of economic wealth and political power. However, Sanders' opposition to the notion of expropriating existing businesses puts him at odds with the Marxian-statist variant of democratic socialism in an area of central importance to this variant.
Sanders' program overlaps with the reformist-functional variant of democratic socialism in a number of areas. It shares with this variant the same underlying premises that it shares with the Marxian-statist variant: the commitment to general welfare and equal freedom and the desire to break-up all concentrations of economic wealth and political power. It further shares with this variant two central policy projects: the de-commodification of wage labor and the strengthening of trade unions. Sanders' program and the reformist-functional variant also overlap in terms of strategy. In advocating reforms that, if implemented, would open up opportunities for further reforms of an even larger scope, Sanders embraces a concept that has been a cornerstone of reformist-functional democratic socialism since Jaurès developed a synthesis between reform and revolution in 1908 (Jaurès, 2014, pp. 71-91). Furthermore, in calling for the creation of an alliance between the lower class and the middle class, Sanders replicates a concept that Brie, one of the leading theoreticians of contemporary reformist-functional democratic socialism, had developed in the German context a few years earlier (Brie, 2009; 2013, p. 24). However, despite these similarities, Sanders' program cannot be classified as belonging to reformist-functional variant of democratic socialism because it does not envisage the democratization of decision-making powers over the use of the means of production and distribution.
Sanders' program overlaps with social democracy only tangentially. Both share a desire to improve the working and living conditions of the dependently employed. Both wish to strengthen organized labor. However, while Sanders' commitments in these two areas are unswerving and resolute, social democracy's commitments are subject to vagaries. Sanders also does not see eye to eye with social democracy when it comes to relations between social classes. While social democracy reaches out to the upper class in the hope of making it a partner, Sanders sees the upper class as an antagonist who cannot be won over and whose hold on wealth and power needs to be curtailed. As the historian Christo Aivalis puts it, "what Bernie Sanders articulates frankly is that the politics of taxation is inherently a politics of class conflict." The Vermont Senator, adds Aivalis, "has reveled in — rather than shied away from — the class conflict implied in his campaign" (Aivalis, https://canadiandimension.com). In contrast to social democrats the language of class conflict is anathema.
Overall, Sanders' program defies easy categorization. It deviates significantly not only from the Marxian-statist variant of democratic socialism but also from social democracy. It enjoys greatest affinity not with social democracy but with the reformist-functional variant of democratic socialism. It is therefore misleading to classify it as "social democratic" while, taken on the whole Sanders' insistence on using the label "democratic socialist" is not altogether unwarranted.
3. The Causes of "Berniemania". Three reasons explain why a sizeable segment of the American electorate has thrown its support behind a democratic socialist candidate: first, the woes of the American middle class; second, cultural shifts that affect young Americans in particular; and third, the candidate's personality and leadership style. The woes of the American middle class stem partly from the slow and halting nature of the recovery that followed the recession of 2008-2009. Both the pace of job creation and the quality of jobs created were disappointing. Between 2009 and 2014, less than 20 % of those who found new employment were able to
procure themselves a steady full-time job (OECD, 2014b, p. 25). A large number of American wage earners were compelled to pick up employment in the low-wage sector. From 2002 to 2012, the percentage of American income earners working in this sector increased from 23.5 to 25.3 (OECD, 2014a, p. 287).
At the same time, the American public became more and more aware of the increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of an ever smaller group at the top of society. By 2014, the richest ten percent of Americans owned three quarters of all the wealth in the United States, and the richest one percent of Americans alone possessed almost forty percent of the material assets in the country (Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2014, pp. 125-126). The trend toward an increasing concentration of wealth had begun during the 1980s as a result of significant reductions in the tax rates for corporations and top income earners, cuts in public social programs, the deregulation of the finance sector, and the displacement of jobs due to the use of information technology and competition from low-wage countries. During the growth cycles of the early-to-mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, which were fueled by the globalization of trade and the rise of information technology, the growing concentration of wealth elicited little interest in mainstream U.S. media. However, in the wake of the recession of 2008-2009, not only well-known critics of the wealth gap such as the economist Joseph Stiglitz but even as staunchly a pro-business publication as the Wall Street Journal began to pay attention to this topic (Stiglitz, 2012; Moore, 2015).
By the 2010s, one could no longer ignore the fact that the enormous concentration of wealth at the top left the rest of society reeling. Since the 1970s, the middle class, a group that for many decades had been convinced of the superiority of the "American Way of Life", has seen its relative size and its share of society's total wealth decline. Between the early 1970s and the mid-2010s, the American middle class shrunk from 61 % to 50 % of the total population and its share of the aggregate income in the country fell from 62 % to 43 %. During the same period, the relative size of the upper class rose from 14 % to 21 % and its share in the aggregate national income from 29 % to 49 %. Meanwhile, the relative size of the lower class increased from 25 % to 29 % while its share in the aggregate national income fell from 10 % to 9 % (Pew Research Center, 2015, pp. 4, 7-8).
Since the recession of 2008-2009, more and more middle-class Americans have realized that they are caught in a trap of stagnant real wages and rising costs for education, medical services, and other necessities. College tuition fees in particular have become a topic of major concern. Between 2003 and 2013, average tuition fees in higher education increased by more than 75 % (Mitchell, Fuller, 2016). More and more American families have had to postpone repairs to their house, forego vacations, or make other sacrifices in order to help their children pay for their college education. While education costs have risen steeply, graduation rates and career prospects have stagnated. Growing numbers of students are forced to drop out of college as they cannot meet the financial challenge. Many of those who do graduate are shouldered with an enormous debt. As career prospects in some fields are dim and as starting salaries in many fields are modest, some of these graduates have problems paying back their debt and are thus forced to delay having a family or must wait longer before they can buy a house, start a business, or go back to college for another degree.
Middle-class woes go a long way in explaining the popularity of the Vermont Senator and his program. However, these woes would probably not have been sufficient to fuel the surge in the polls of an avowed democratic socialist had it not been for two cultural shifts that have taken place since the turn of the millennium. The first of the two resulted from the globalization of trade and the growing interconnectedness of the world. The rise of China and other emerging markets, the economic successes of older players such as Canada or Germany, and the growing awareness of the superior quality of life enjoyed by people in countries such as Finland or Sweden undermined many Americans' once unshakeable conviction that their country is in all respects the best in the world (Zakaria, 2008; Hirsh, 2010). As this conviction frayed, so did the concomitant belief in the virtues of rugged individualism, rampant materialism, and supply-side economics that had been articles of faith in the American mindset since the 1980s and the two-term presidency of Ronald Reagan.
The second shift was related to the fading from memory of the Cold War. As this conflict receded into the background so did the rhetoric that had accompanied it. The denunciation of socialism as inherently un-American, which had formed a main staple of Cold War rhetoric, waned in the public's consciousness. Both shifts have primarily affected the so-called "millennials," the age cohort of those born between the 1980s and the 2000s. Many millennials have shied away from embracing the certainties and the prejudices that defined the generations before them. Instead, they have adopted a more open mindset and, thus, have become willing to consider democratic socialism on its own merits rather than to discard it with a slight of hand.
Recent public opinion polls indicate a significant generational gap in Americans' attitudes toward socialism. Millennials, these polls find, are much more likely to see socialism in a positive light than are middle-aged and older Americans. A 2011 Pew Research Center poll found that 49 % of 19-29 year-olds had a favorable view of socialism. Among 30-49 year-olds, this view was shared by 34 %; among 5064 year-olds, by 25 %; and among those 65 years old or older, by 13 %. According to a 2016 YouGov poll, among 18-29 year-olds, only 26 % had a negative view of socialism. Meanwhile, among those aged 65 and up, this figure was more than twice as high (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 3; Jordan, https://today.yougov.com).
The combination of middle-class woes and the cultural-generational shift created an opportunity structure for the insertion into U.S. political culture of a new strand of political radicalism. Opportunity structure alone does not, however, make for a political movement. The emergence of such a movement hinges on human agency. Sanders provided this agency. His ability to do so stemmed from a set of character traits that have set him apart from most other American politicians.
Unlike most members of the American political class, Sanders comes across as principled, incorruptible, and trustworthy. Throughout his political career, Sanders never made any attempt to distance himself from the moniker "socialist" despite the fact that doing so would have made it easier for him to garner electoral support. Holding public office in the United States offers copious opportunities to enrich oneself. Sanders never made use of any of them. It is in keeping with his character that in the 2016 presidential election campaign he spurned corporate support and instead relied on small-time donors. Acknowledging Sanders' choice, the editors
of U.S. news magazine The Nation observed, "Voters can trust Sanders because he doesn't owe his political career to [...] financial overlords" (Bernie Sanders for President, 2016, p. 4).
The Vermont Senator also exemplifies sincerity and authenticity. Unlike many of his colleagues, he comes across as sincere rather than slick, as authentic rather than astute. Few would doubt that his stands are inspired by deeply-held beliefs. Unlike many other American politicians Sanders does not try to adopt another persona when he steps from the private sphere into the limelight of the public. Even in front of television cameras his demeanor remains somewhat gruff and resembles that of "a grumpy grandpa" (Meyerson, 2015, p. 138). As one of his supporters noted, while "most candidates are robotic and rehearsed," Sanders is "a real person" (Talbot, 2015, p. 64).
His approachability is another quality that sets Sanders apart from many of his peers. He has a habit of engaging in conversations with strangers even when off-duty (Talbot, 2015, p. 66). Unlike many other American politicians, he does not shun contact with the poor and the uneducated. As one inhabitant of Sanders' hometown noted, "When he would have town meetings, I was taken aback by the reception he got from people who were so far down the totem pole that they couldn't believe that a politician would actually listen to them and care what they had to say" (Abel, 2016, p. 31). The president of the current Burlington city council concurred: "He's authentic. He is very credible when he says to working people, 'I understand your problems and will work to fix them.' This guy knows constituent service" (Ibid., p. 32).
4. The Long-Term Impact of Sanders' Candidacy. Aided by his personal integrity and a favorable context, Sanders has changed the political culture of the United States in three important respects. First, he has moved topics such as the antagonism between social classes, the concentration of economic and political power, economic inequality, social justice, and public welfare provision from the fringes into the mainstream of American society. Second, he introduced the term "democratic socialism" into the U.S. political discourse. Third, he mobilized a large number of followers and thereby helped forge a potential agent of change in U.S. politics. Of course, only future can tell if these changes will be of a lasting nature. However, one can make informed guesses as to the variables that will determine the staying power of these changes.
Whether the topics Sanders introduced into the mainstream of American society will remain there or become marginalized again will greatly depend on whether or not middle-class woes will persist. There is a good chance that they will. Unless higher education and health services will become significantly more affordable or the U.S. economy will experience a particularly vigorous economic boom, it seems unlikely that these woes will disappear in the foreseeable future.
Whether the term "democratic socialism" will retain its current status in political discourse will depend greatly on the usage intellectuals and activists will make of it. Should they come to use the term in a more restrictive sense — for example, by insisting that "proper" democratic socialism entails the expropriation of businesses — it may quickly become marginalized again. If, on the other hand, they will use the term in a more inclusive fashion that leaves room for different variants — ranging from the
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ЛОЛИШЭКС- 2016. Том 12, № l
Marxian-statist one to the reformist-functional one and Sanders' rudimentary one — then it may become an important piece of U.S. political vocabulary.
Whether Sanders' followers can coalesce into a coherent movement depends greatly on two variables: charismatic leadership, be it by Sanders, a younger politician, or a group of (younger) politicians, and the ability of Sanders' followers to find common ground on strategic matters. As for the first of the two variables, it is likely that Sanders will continue to provide leadership until the end of his current term as U.S. Senator in January 2019. However, since he will be 77 years old by that time, a passing on of the torch would be imperative. As for the second of the two variables, Sanders' followers would need to agree on a political strategy that takes into account that the U.S. political system favors a two-party structure. Such a strategy would have to involve close ties between the movement, on the one hand, and the Democratic Party, on the other, to make it possible for members of the movement to run as candidates of the Democratic Party. At the same time, such a strategy would have to provide the movement with a significant degree of programmatic and organizational independence in order to prevent it from being swallowed up by the Democratic Party. In short, much work awaits Sanders and his followers in the years to come.
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Ralph P. Guentzel — PhD. (History), Associate Professor; rguentzel@franklincollege.edu.
Статья поступила в редакцию: 8 декабря 2015 г.;
рекомендована в печать: 14 января 2016 г.
Для цитирования: Guentzel R. P. "Berniemania" in America: Bernie Sanders, Democratic Socialism, and the 2016 Presidential Election Campaign in the United States // Политическая экспертиза: ПОЛИТЭКС. 2016. Т. 12, № 1. С. 156-169.
For citation: Guentzel R. P. "Berniemania" in America: Bernie Sanders, Democratic Socialism, and the 2016 Presidential Election Campaign in the United States. POLITEX: Political Expertise, 2016, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 156-169.
