CC BY
66
DOI: 10.24411/2072-9316-2021-00003
A.V. Markov (Moscow)
BAKHTIN READS BRYUSOV: SALVATION AND CREATIVITY WITHOUT A SUBJECT
Abstract. Although Bryusov was not one of Bakhtin's favorite writers, Bryusov's reflection on the genre of the novel The Fiery Angel and general attention to the aesthetics of Russian Symbolism deepened the thought of early Bakhtin about the specificity of aesthetic experience, expressed in his Toward a Philosophy of the Act. For Bakhtin, Bryusov's novel was an example of a winning rejection of the patterns of a historical and biographical novel in favor of a certain pose, and in contrast to the pose of Mayakovsky and other pop poets, which heightens attention to the middle state of the subject. In his work cited, Bakhtin puts the action as a value above the subject, while overcoming the theoretical implications of axiology and criticizing theoreticism, and here the description of the subject's anomalies in the novel The Fiery Angel and a specific understanding of the suggestive word constructions in Bryusov's article Keys of Secrets turned out to be in demand. Starting from the positions of Rickert and Simmel and changing the inner meaning of the key terms of these thinkers, Bakhtin took several terms from the works of Bryusov, which the commentators did not pay attention to. This was the term "cognitive activity" (uznanie), which meant participatory cognition, "obsession activity" (oderzhanie), meaning situational obsession, and some others, as a hidden dialogue with Bryusov. At the same time, Bakhtin disputed the concepts of obsession and the triumph of science promoted by Bryusov, covertly opposing the main concept of progress to the renewed Christology of Berdyaev and Rozanov. In this Christology, the subject in comparison with the deed may turn out to be completely useless, and here Bakhtin used Bryusov's category of "uselessness of creativity" for interpretation of salvation not as useful, but as a necessary act.
Key words: Bakhtin; Bryusov; philosophy of action; values; quotation; symbolism; terminology; salvation; theory of creativity; Russian religious philosophy.
А.В. Марков (Москва) Бахтин читает Брюсова: спасение и творчество без субъекта
Аннотация. Хотя В.Я. Брюсов не относился к любимым писателям М.М. Бахтина, рефлексия Брюсова над жанром романа «Огненный ангел» и общее внимание к эстетике русского символизма углубили мысль раннего Бахтина о специфике эстетического опыта, выраженную в «Философии поступка». Роман Брюсова для Бахтина был примером выигрышного отказа от паттернов исторического и биографического романа в пользу определенной позы, причем в отличие от позы Маяковского и других поэтов эстрады, усиливающей внимание к «нормальной» позиции субъекта. В «Философии поступка» Бахтин ставит поступок аксиологи-чески выше субъекта, при этом преодолевая теоретические импликации аксиоло-
гии и критикуя теоретизм, и здесь оказалось востребованным описание аномалий субъекта в романе «Огненный ангел» и специфическое понимание потенциала конкретного слова в статье Брюсова «Ключи тайн». Отталкиваясь от позиций Рик-керта и Зиммеля и меняя внутренний смысл терминов этих мыслителей, Бахтин взял несколько понятий из работ Брюсова, на что не обратили внимания комментаторы. Таковым было «узнание», означавшее причастное познание, «одержание», означавшее ситуативную одержимость, и некоторые другие, представляющие собой скрытый диалог с Брюсовым. При этом Бахтин оспаривал концепции одержимости и торжества науки, предложенные Брюсовым, скрыто противопоставляя его концепции прогресса обновленную христологию Бердяева и Розанова. В этой христологии субъект в сравнении с поступком может оказаться полностью бесполезен, и здесь Бахтин использует категорию «бесполезности творчества» Брюсова для интерпретации спасения не как полезного, но как необходимого действия.
Ключевые слова: Бахтин; Брюсов; философия поступка; аксиология; цитат-ность; символизм; терминология; спасение; теории творчества; русская религиозная философия.
Bakhtin's attention to the legacy of Russian Symbolism, including the article-manifesto of Valery Bryusov, Keys of Secrets, has already become the subject of research [Kling 2020, 22-23]. In this article, I use a particular method that explores Bakhtin's particular attitude to one of the Symbolists, which I may call "complex", taking into account also the psychological sense of the word: fear of influence and the need to refer to the keywords of the predecessor even if his general mind is rejected. I also take the premise that early Bakhtin's criticism of theoreticism, of any useful theory that substantiates ready-made patterns of cognition and action, was linked with his Christology, that in Christ any subject is "unnecessary" as value and as substance because salvation act has already occurred. Bakhtin disputed the category of facticity of contemporary German thought about Resurrection, implicitly relying on theological paradoxes of Berdyaev and Rozanov. Bryusov's legacy, as a radical aestheticist skepticism, not so much supported Bakhtin's thought development, as intensified paradoxical mood of his mind where it threatened to slip into the pattern of a moral attitude.
According to Duvakin's interview, Bakhtin treated Bryusov, in a word, with restraint, like a poet whom he saw only on the stage [Bakhtin 2019], opposing to him the "heavyweight" Sologub, partly in solidarity with Klyuev in dislike of Bryusov and, in solidarity with Bryusov's secretary Kuzko, speaking about fussiness, fussiness, and suspiciousness of the poet. But there is one episode that does not relate to Bryusov, but to Mayakovsky, but which clarifies precisely Bakhtin's attitude to Bryusov better than any direct statements. Bakhtin told that Mayakovsky came to Kuzko in a difficult year very fashionably dressed, but could not reproduce the real spontaneity, lightness, and, as it were, the naturalness of a dandy. "[T]he first sign of dandyism, to wear your clothes as you are having no attention to them at all." Whereas Mayakovsky it was evident that he was very worried about how he looked in the eyes of others, and how correct
the pose and gesture he took.
Then Mayakovsky received a print with his poems and was almost childishly happy, "savoring" his poems. Such a repulsive image of a pretentious darling spoke in Bryusov's favor. Bryusov was confident in his pose on the stage. It is precisely this image of an impeccable master, capable of holding himself out in public, without flirting with the public, that is also known from Pasternak's poem To Valery Bryusov (1923).
Early Bakhtin, of course, relied primarily on the German-speaking tradition, tracing the terms of Rickert or Simmel within his own philosophical discourses. But at the same time, the very status of the subject in early works as genre-oriented in its behavior and its moral decisions subject was closer to Russian symbolism than to different kinds of European symbolism, where the mane subject role was to synthesize genres than to play virtually with a particular genre. This reduction of the subject in Bakhtin is even stronger than in Bryusov's or Blok's role lyrical poetry; he promoted subject not simply deprived of the main role, but playing a secondary role within the genre. As said it very well Bibikhin: "The subject of the act is actually a parasite" [Eh6hxhh / Bibikhin 2010, 68]. Analyzing Towards a Philosophy of the Act, Bibikhin noted that the determination of action, establishing its own ethical and aesthetic orders, which, among other things, imply further previously unknown genres of being itself, does not require the subject to do anything other than belonging to a genre of active behavior, the simpler the better, for example, to the Attic comedy with its "parasites". Following Bibikhin, I insist that the later Bakhtin, canonizing marginal genres like satura Menippea or paragenre formations between genre and topic, like pastoral imagination, continued the same tradition of measuring the impersonal act that had alone created the "I" at the scale of life, in which only this act will find its true content.
I find the first appeal to Bryusov in Bakhtin's first published essay Art and Answerability. There he contrasted inspiration with what he called not "obsession," but "a state of obsession." (oderzhanie) "Inspiration that ignores life and is itself ignored by life is not inspiration, but a state of obsession." [Bakhtin 1990, 2] This word probably was taken from Bryusov's novel The Fiery Angel [Bryusov 1909], where this word means the heroine's temporary states, seizures, not permanent ones. Bryusov deciphered this word by indicating the Latin virtual original: "a state of obsession vel obsession (oderzhanie ili ovlad-enie);possessio sive obsessio" (all translations from the novel are mine). Thus, obsession was identified with complete submission to the alien's will, while a state of obsession was conceptualized as a seizure and a geste of spontaneous irresponsibility and in-answerability. Thus, inspiration an act or answerability was opposed to a state of obsession as a stage-declared or stage-blamed position of refuse.
Characteristically, from Bryusov's lines read from the stage, Bakhtin remembered only:
Is the Klassische Walpurgisnacht
Taking over Soviet Moscow
This poem, a variation of the Faust Part II, briefly affirmed the idea of The Fiery Angel, where the appearance of Faust and Mephisto foreshadowed a catastrophic development of events, in contrast to the previous regular social mechanisms. Bakhtin spoke about this novel in detail in his Lectures on Russian literature, dating back to the same time as Towards a Philosophy of the Act, seeing in the novel not a stylization or a kind popular medievalism, but an independent and complete work, an exemplary crypto-autobiographical and perfect historical novel [Ka3eeBa / Kazeeva 2016]
The he-protagonist of Bryusov's novel felt helpless in the face of Renata's seizures, moreover, he was deprived of the opportunity to reason: "I looked at the sufferings and cramps of a woman I did not know, as if I turned, together with Lot's wife, into a pillar, not moving, for I did not knew at all, how could help or relief here." That is, it was not just amechania (a state of stupefaction, I take this term from Bibikhin), but a certain moral position that requires not to move with empathy, but to practice some discipline when you cannot help. In this case, the word "relief' was not about an internal state of the object, but a mechanical impact on an object to transform it to the light state. Bakhtin argued in the same way when he says that the theoretical approach to being has led to the "lightening" (ulegchenie) of being, "a peculiar lightening of the very term" [Bakhtin 1993, 8], turning it into an object of theoretical speculations that will never be as weighty as our presence in being is. This "lightening" turns out to be an attempt at theoretical intervention when everything has already happened, including inspiration or obsession.
In the Towards a Philosophy of the Act, there is key reasoning, where an equally unexpected term is introduced, with the same prefix u-, "cognition" (uznanie) instead of "knowledge" (poznanie), "a cognition that answerably obligates me" [Bakhtin 1994, 49] (italics by Bakhtin), as "lightening" (ulegche-nie) instead of "relief" (oblegchenie). Bakhtin said that cognition is preceded by the disincarnation (disembodying [Bakhtin 1994, 48] as "[m]y abstracting from my own unique place") of the subject itself. The rejection of the previous position of knowledge, which devalues the cognized things, should be followed by the incarnation of cognition itself as participating in the cognized object. If the word "incarnation" conveys the basic dogma of Christianity, then the word "disincarnation" in Russian is rare, it was probably introduced in Russian by Helena Blavatsky to describe the subordinated position of the human world to the spiritual one, but then it was used by various authors, for example, by Berdyaev, to characterize radical Avant-guard spiritualism as opposed to the realistic everyday worldview of the 19th century - so, Berdyaev saw in the art of Picasso [Berdyaev 2018] (1914) an example of disincarnation, the refusal of artistic forms from the former "flesh" of representative art. Bakhtin also understands the disembodiment as a certain spiritual state in which the significance of an object cannot be undermined by anything, and the only right attitude towards
it will not be its description or use, but an act that can be, under certain circumstances, descriptive or use-oriented.
Such a dialogue with Berdyaev just manifested in Bakhtin's polemic against theoreticism. "If the ought were a formal moment of a judgment, there would be no rupture between life and culture as creation, between the act of judgment as a performed deed (a moment in the unity of the context of my once-occurrent life) and the content/sense of a judgment (a moment in some objective theoretical unity of science), and this would mean that there would exist a unitary and unique context of both cognition and life, culture and life (which is not the case, of course)." [Bakhtin 1993, 4] The rapprochement of culture and creativity as aspects of a single goal-setting, differing only in the subject (culture as established by society, and creativity as established by individual will), and not in content, as for Rickert or Simmel, was normal for Berdyaev, e.g.: "It is not in politics or economics, but in a culture that the goals of society are realized. (...) In this plebeian century, creative and sophisticatedly cultured natures feel more alone and unrecognized than in all previous centuries." [Berdyaev 2015] (1923, translation corrected). Here Bibikhin is right, asserting, "Bakhtin introduces a sharp, Berdyaevian in tone, border between a living unique event, an act of happening being, and the flat space of objectified culture." [Бибихин / Bibikhin 2010, 67]
Bakhtin described this transition to cognition that answerably obligates me as something equally alien and hostile to culture and creativity as belonging to the "parasite" subject. Cognition is something to which a person is responsible himself, which does not bear the ready representable content of responsibility for this "parasite" state. "Such a transformation of knowing-of [znanie] into answerable cognition [uznanie] is far removed from being a matter of its immediate utilization, as a technical or instrumental moment, for satisfying some practical need in lived life." [Bakhtin 1993, 49] But the term uznanie, as opposed to practical uses of knowledge, was first introduced by Bryusov in his programmatic article Keys of Secrets. He also contrasted knowledge to cognition, but in a different vein, criticizing science for the priority of taxonomy over intuition. "Science only brings order to the chaos of false ideas and places them in ranks, making it possible, making it easier to recognize, but not to know." [Брюсов / Bryusov 1904, 3] (translation mine). In fact, Bryusov in his anti-philistine attack on knowledge as niggling, along with his symbolist ambitions about intuitive meta-knowledge of the whole essence, describes the situation of the times of positivism, when the differentiation of disciplines required from each a taxonomic effort to identify its own capabilities, presenting not a private project of knowledge, but in the full sense the scientific approach. In this case, poetry, as Bryusov further argues, allows one to intuitively understand freedom and thematize instant insights or ecstatic insights, which allow one to understand the "core" of "the world phenomena" [ibid.]. Bryusov was not a religious person or a mystic writer in any conventional sense, he was skeptical in religious questions, but he proceeded from the point that the psychological content of art can in no way be justified by the content of any particular scientific
discipline.
Bakhtin used the word "cognition" in his polemics, no longer with positivism, but with the theoretical programs of the early 20th century, but having understood "knowledge" positively. If for Bryusov, knowledge was acquaintance with facts relevant only for particular disciplines, and not for the essence of world processes, then for Bakhtin, on the contrary, the knowledge was the only way to understand that cognition is relevant to you, to any of us, and not part of insufficiently responsible theorizing procedures.
The notion of cognition was closely related to Bakhtin's statement that the thing under cognition is not at all constructed by reason, as the "theoreticians" (Simmel, Rickert e.a.) believed, which lead to its "lightening": but it is recognized even after it has gone, after it disappeared as the object of ordinary knowledge, and it still remains weighty in its factuality. Here it is important for Bakhtin that such a primary disappeared and remained thing is Jesus Christ. "The world from which Christ has departed will no longer be the world in which he had never existed; it is, in its very principle, a different world." [Bakhtin 1993, 16] The discourse about the departed Christ, living in the sacrament, is inspired not so much by the Gospel itself as by the reasoning of Vasily Rozanov about Raskolnikov in his interpretation of Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor (1894): "He had crossed to another shore, he had left all people apparently to go to a place where he would have no one with him but the murdered woman. It was as if the mystical knot of his being, which we conventionally call the "soul," has been joined by an imperceptible bond to the mystical knot of another being whose outer form he has smashed" [Rozanov 1972, 57]. If Raskolnikov smashes the outer form, then Christ miraculously splits his body, preserving living efficacy as opposed to Raskolnikov's crime, while the mystical connection between the living and the dead in both cases turns out to be a continuation of this non-being in the world. Thus, knowledge of Raskolnikov was contrasted to cognition as to the only way to take something seriously with the soul, while for Bryusov, as a skeptic, any, even the most pitiful science, was serious. Here Bakhtin probably polemized against an episode from The Fiery Angel, where the very facticity that the world without Christ can become the same world as the world before Christ was defended by Faust and Mephistopheles, as representatives of science, in opposition to the naive popular belief, which sees in all things a magical empathy, and therefore the irreversible action of Christ, on the animals and the elements non minus than on humanity:
Mephistopheles' sharpness caused general disappointment. However, after a short time, the seneschal of the castle turned to the doctor with the following question:
- You, highly esteemed doctor, have traveled a lot. Explain to us, is it true that the ashes of that donkey, on which Jesus Christ entered Jerusalem, rests in the city of Verona? And that another donkey, on which the prophet Balaam once rode, is still alive and kept in a secret place in Palestine to bring Elijah from heaven on the day of the second coming?
Again the answer was taken by Mephistopheles, who said:
Новый филологический вестник. 2021. №1(56). --
- We, my dear sir, have not checked the facts about which you speak, but why should the Balaam donkey not be immortal if donkeys have not been translated among people for millennia? [Брюсов / Bryusov 1909, 202]
Thus, "cognition" in the sense of Bryusov meant just the absence of any responsible relationship between the Inquisitor and the victim. The acceptance of the values of the particular sciences meant for him that there would be no mystical connection between crime and punishment. In the poetry, Bryusov allowed the adoption of a common mystical connection of everything, but one that makes the personality of the subject himself, the poet, answerable in the sense of high official (and in the Soviet times Bryusov became a kind of minister of literature!). Whereas for Bakhtin, these connections of responsibility do not just imply the privileged position of the poet (he recognized only "parasite" subject, as Bibikhin said), but only the privilege of Christ. Therefore, he interpreted any dependence of the writer from the topic or patterns as an obsession, like a seizure. While Bryusov attributed a state of possession and cognition only to the heroine of the novel to support the protagonist's intrigue of the novel, identifying knowledge with the practical use and reducing salvation to the nov-elistic use of suffering as a moment of cognitive subjectivity.
Taking into account this novel context allows us to cope with, perhaps, the greatest bewilderment of Bakhtin's commentators, how the argument about the priority of the other over the self is related to the fact that Christ demanded to equate them, "Love your neighbor as yourself' (Matthew 22:39), and not to give any priority. "I love another, but cannot love myself; the other loves me, but does not love himself. Each one is right in his own place, and he is right answerably, not subjectively" [Bakhtin 1993, 46]. Explanations of L. Gogotish-vili [Бахтин / Bakhtin 2003, 484], that the wonderful presence of being does not allow me, evaluating this being, into the realm of self-love, falling in love only with myself, are unconvincing: Gogotishvili seems to mean only the European novel, not taking into account the ancient Eros and Christian Agape. The explanation of N. Bonetskaya is more persuasive, she sees in Bakhtin's ideas refraction of Russian neo-kantianist professor A.I. Vvedensky's works on the impossibility of denying the spiritual life in me, and the possibility of denying me in others [Бонецкая / Bonetskaya 1994, 20], then there is no room left for self-love if everything in moral attitude is occupied by mental life. But why only Vvedensky? Bryusov's contexts put everything in its place: Bryusov already understood poetic disincarnation, with the refusal to treat things as useful and practical, as an opportunity not to value "I" like a knot of practices and evaluations. All the priviledges of "I" according to Bryusov could only be restored by complex constructions of novelistic seduction. But in the Keys of Secrets Bryusov already spoke about love, which already undermines the usefulness of "I" in favor of love as leaving no room for self-love. "There are many things in the world that are completely useless for people, such as beauty, and that in their lives they themselves constantly perform acts that are completely useless, they love, they dream." [Bryusov 1904, 4]
Bakhtin directly continued this linking of disembodiment and imperative nature of values, but he understands this link not as a moment of novelistic intrigue, but as a moment of deification. Bakhtin says, as in many places of his work, "As disembodied spirit, I lose my compellent, ought-to-be relationship to the world, I lose the actuality of the world," [Bakhtin 1993, 47] that is, I find myself in a situation where the belief in the world is so weak that I cannot believe in my self. But two phrases before he noted: "Of course, when we speak of all historical mankind, we intonate these words; we cannot detach ourselves from a particular emotional-volitional relationship to them; they do not coincide for us with their content/sense; they are brought into correlation with a unique participant and begin to glow with the light of actual value." [ibid.] (italics are Bakhtin's). Bakhtin's metaphor "the light of value" is frequent in this treatise, meaning that "I" also suddenly became at least partially visible, but precisely in the situation when the thinking of an object became participatory thinking when any thought about humanity turns out to be participating in its activities. Although this metaphor is rooted in symbolism, where the rapprochement or identification of the soul / life with the light / lamp / luminary was normal among the atheist / sceptical symbolists from Maeterlinck to Rolland: but of course, the rapprochement of souls and history owes to the famous poem The Lanterns (1904) by Bryusov, in where this unification of the experience of souls and the experience of epochs has culminated.
Thus, Bakhtin really relied on Bryusov, but not as a theorist of symbolism, but as a thinker thinking metaphors, who could reconsider the relationship between norm and pathology and shift the practical boundaries of life-building. But Bakhtin interprets all the psychological aspects of Bryusov's theory not as for psychological, but as directed at overcoming theoretical patterns for the sake of discovering the subject of salvation, which is different from the subject of theoretical self-consciousness. Bryusov allows one to perceive the declarations of Rozanov and other Russian thinkers not as a program of life-building, but as teaching about Christ as a savior overcoming value orders. Bryusov's progressivism and skepticism turned out to be that moment of a paradox when participation and involvement need to be understood not in an everyday sense, but as part of a key life choice.
REFERENCES (RUSSIAN)
1. Бахтин М.М. Собрание сочинений: в 7 т. Т. 1. М.: Русские словари; Языки славянской культуры, 2003.
2. Бибихин В.В. Слово и событие // Бибихин В.В. Слово и событие. Писатель и литература. М.: Издательство Университета Дмитрия Пожарского, 2010. С. 66-84.
3. Бонецкая Н.К. М.М. Бахтин в двадцатые годы // Диалог. Карнавал. Хронотоп. 1994. № 1. С. 16-62.
4. Брюсов В.Я. Ключи тайн // Весы. 1904. № 1. С. 3-5.
5. Брюсов В.Я. Огненный ангел. М.: Скорпион, 1909.
6. Казеева Е.А. Бахтинская рецепция творчества В.Я. Брюсова // М.М. Бахтин в современном мире. Саранск: Издательство Мордовского университета, 2016. С. 186-191.
7. Клинг О.А. Теоретико-литературные идеи русских символистов и М.М. Бахтин // Новый филологический вестник. 2020. № 55 (4). С. 18-31.
8. Bakhtin M. Art and Answerability // Art and answerability: Early philosophical essays / Ed. M. Holquist, V. Liapunov. Austin (Texas): University of Texas Press, 1990. P. 1-2.
9. Bakhtin M. Toward a Philosophy of the Act / Transl., notes by V Liapunov, M. Holquist. Austin (Texas), University of Texas Press, 1993.
10. Bakhtin M. The Duvakin Interviews, 1973 / Transl. Marinova M., ed. Grachev Slav et al. Lewisburg, Bucknell University Press, 2019. Kindle edition.
11. Berdyaev N. The Philosophy of Inequality: Letters to My Contemners, Concerning Social Philosophy / Tr. Janos Fr. Mohrsville, PA : Frsj Publ., 2015.
12. Berdyaev N. The Crisis of Art / Tr. Janos Fr. S.l.: Frsj Publ., 2018.
13. Marinova M. The Art and Answerability of Bakhtin's Poetics // Mikhail Bakhtin's Heritage in Literature, Arts, and Psychology: Art and Answerability. Lanham, NY: Lexington Books, 2018. P. 41-61.
14. Rozanov V.V. Dostoevsky and the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor / Translated Roberts Spencer E. Ithaca (N.Y.), Cornell University Press, 1972.
REFERENCES (Articles from Scientific Journals)
1. Bonetskaya N.K. M.M. Bakhtin v dvadtsatyye gody [Bakhtin in the 1920s]. Dialog. Karnaval. Khronotop, 1994, no. 1, pp. 16-62. (In Russian).
2. Teoretiko-literaturnyye idei russkikh simvolistov i M.M. Bakhtin [Theoretical and Literary Ideas of Russian Symbolists and M.M. Bakhtin]. Novyy filologicheskiy vestnik, 2020, no. 55 (4), pp. 18-31. (In Russian).
(Articles from Proceedings and Collections of Research Papers)
3. Bakhtin M. Art and Answerability. Holquist V, Liapunov V. (eds.). Art and answerability: Early philosophical essays. Austin (Texas), University of Texas Press, 1990, pp. 1-2. (In English).
4. Bibikhin VV. Slovo i sobytiye [Word and Event]. Bibikhin V.V Slovo i sobytiye. Pisatel' i literatura [Word and Event. Writer and Literature]. Moscow, Pozharsky University Press, 2010, pp. 66-84. (In Russian).
5. Kazeyeva E.A. Bakhtinskaya retseptsiya tvorchestva V.Ya. Bryusova [Bakhtin's Reception of Creativity of V. Bryusov]. M.M. Bakhtin v sovremennom mire [M.M. Bakhtin in the Contemporary World]. Saransk, Mordovia State University Press, 2016, pp. 186-191. (In Russian).
6. Marinova M. The Art and Answerability of Bakhtin's Poetics. Mikhail Bakhtin's Heritage in Literature, Arts, and Psychology: Art and Answerability. Lanham, NY: Lexington Books, 2018, pp. 41-61. (In English).
(Monographs)
7. Bakhtin M. Toward a Philosophy of the Act. Transl., notes by V. Liapunov, M. Holquist. Austin (Texas), University of Texas Press, 1993. (Translated from Russian into English).
8. Bakhtin M. The Duvakin Interviews, 1973. Transl. Marinova M., ed. Grachev Slav et al. Lewisburg, Bucknell University Press, 2019. Kindle edition. (Translated from Russian into English).
9. Berdyaev N. The Philosophy ofInequality: Letters to My Contemners, Concerning Social Philosophy. Tr. Janos Fr., Mohrsville, PA : Frsj Publ., 2015. (Translated from Russian into English).
10. Berdyaev N. The Crisis of Art. Tr. Janos Fr. S.l.: Frsj Publ., 2018. (Translated from Russian into English).
11. Bakhtin M.M. Sobraniye sochineniy [Collected Works]: in 7 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Russkiye slovari Publ.; Yazyki slavyanskoy kul'tury Publ., 2003. (In Russian).
12. Rozanov V.V. Dostoevsky and the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor. Translated Roberts Spencer E. Ithaca (N.Y.), Cornell University Press, 1972. (Translated from Russian into English).
Alexander V. Markov, Russian State University for the Humanities.
Dr. Habil. in Philology, Full Professor, Department of the Cinema and Contemporary Art Studies, Faculty of the History of Art. Research interests: theory of literature, intellectual history.
E-mail: [email protected]
ORCID ID: 0000-0001-6874-1073
Марков Александр Викторович, Российский государственный гуманитарный университет.
Доктор филологических наук, профессор кафедры кино и современного искусства факультета истории искусства. Научные интересы: теория литературы, интеллектуальная история.
E-mail: [email protected]
ORCID ID: 0000-0001-6874-1073
