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ANOTHER BAD YEAR FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. RELATIVE SUCCESSES OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
Andrei Porotnikov
Summary
The year 2013 saw the first surfaced effects of degradation of the country’s defense capacity: the deployment of a Russian airbase in the territory of Belarus actually means that the Belarusian ruling regime has lost a large part of independence as an international entity. Despite popular statements on strategic partnership and indestructible alliance, Russia takes no interest in promoting Belarus’ defense capabilities, being only focused on its own military purposes. The current defense policy of Belarus shows that the government lacks a clear understanding of what must be done in the defense sector, which is one of many manifestations of the overall strategic myopia of the regime.
Trends:
• A continuing decline in the human resource capacity;
• Increased dependence on Russia in matters of defense, although Moscow is not always reliable as an ally;
• Futility of Russia’s attempts to build up the defense capacity of the Collective Security Treaty Organization as a military-political bloc;
• Availability of foreign markets as an engine for sustained development of the Belarusian military-industrial complex.
Strategic partnership: who out-haggles who
The joint session of the Defense Ministries of Belarus and Russia held on April 23, 2013 was the most important event of the year. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced the plan to deploy a Russian airbase in Belarus. The Russians thus indicated their reluctance to make it a joint base under the combined or (especially) Belarusian command.
The Belarusian leadership was obviously not very inspired by the idea of sharing the airfield. The pay gap between the Russian and Belarusian armies was one of the points, as it could discredit the policy of the Belarusian regime. However, as a bonus for the
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airbase, the Russian side promised to provide Belarus with four S-300 air defense battalions in 2014.
An on-duty squad of four Su-27 fighters of the Russian air force arrived to the airbase in Baranovichi in early December. The Russian crews come under command of Belarusian officers, and they most likely will until an intergovernmental agreement on the Russian airbase in Belarus is signed1. The bargaining over the Russian airbase in Belarus goes on and the whole situation remains uncertain.
It was announced earlier this year that the promised S-300 would be handed over to the Belarusian side in 2015 at the earliest. Moscow staked interest in the base by deploying the first fighters. It is thus clear that any decision on the Russian airbase in Belarus will be preeminently political, rather than practical from the point of view of defense needs. The significance of the base for the national defense is largely symbolic, because the planes are too few to cope with massive tasks. The fact that the Defense Ministry of Lithuania regarded the deployment of the Russian military in Belarus as a political act rather than a military threat confirms that the military value of the Russian airbase in Lida is close to nothing* 2.
The situation with the airbase reflects the dual nature of Belarusian-Russian defense cooperation. On the one hand, both are objectively determined to join efforts. On the other hand, both often disregard principles, and it would be an exaggeration to describe their interaction as well-organized.
The long-standing question about who would command the Belarusian-Russian joint regional air defense system was finally answered last year when Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Commander Major General Oleg Dvigalev took the chief’s office. Minsk and Moscow had been bargaining over the joint system for years. Lukashenko endorsed the agreement (de-
Russian air force crews to rotate on combat alert duty in Belarus // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://www.belta.by/ru/all_news/ soclety/Ekipazhl-VVS-Rossll-budut-na-rotatslonnoj-osnove-prlbyvat-v-Belarus-dlja-nesenija-boevogo-dezhurstva_i_654237.html.
Lithuanian Ministry of Defense: New Russian airbase in Belarus does not pose greater military threat // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http:// www interfax.by/news/belarus/132825.
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cree No.65) as late as February 13, 2012, although the defense ministers of both countries signed it on February 3, 2009. The commander’s functions are quite insignificant in peacetime: he is in charge of coordination of actions and proposals for the air defense development and possible operational use of the system. In time of war, the commander is vested with the authority to manage the force. All major decisions thus shall be made on the basis of consensus. The fixed-term agreement covers a period of five years, which means that its extension will be a matter of bargain again.
The third and the last battery of the Russian-made Tor-M2E surface-to-air guided missile system came to Belarus in December3. Formation of an air-defense battalion, the best equipped one in the Belarusian army, was completed. The question is how it will be batched, specifically with respect to Russian electronic warfare algorithms: the letter ‘E’ stands for ‘export’ that implies a limited capability of the weapon.
The Tor-M2E supplies started in 2011 amid a financial crisis in Belarus. It is yet unknown whether Belarus is paying for them. The supplies can therefore be regarded as Russian military-technical aid. The amount of the Russian aid is however irrelevant in terms of substantial progress in rearmament: air-defense battalions are basically supposed to be provided/ purchased every year.
On December 25, Belarus and Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement on military-technical cooperation for the period until 2020, which allows domestic defense industry entities to supply products to Russia. This was envisaged by an agreement between Lukashenko and Putin in September 2012 in Sochi, which actually was limited to engagement of the Belarusian light industry4.
The training of the Belarusian military in Russia is far from being satisfactory either. Belarusian cadets and officers are treated as foreigners, which restricts their access to information to a certain extent. The number of cadets sent to Russia is going
3 Third battery of Tor-M2 has arrived in Belarus // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://www.belta.by/ru/all_news/soclety/Tretja-batareja-ZRK-Tor-M2-pribyla-v-Belarus_i_654220.html.
4 See: http://file-rf.ru/analltlcs/842.
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down, although, in some specific areas, education in foreign institutions is preferable anyway.
West-2013
The j oint military exercise West-2013 was held September 20—26 in Belarus and Russia. The event was stage-managed well and sometimes looked like an exhibition performance, which followed a thorough rehearsal. The Belarusian phase was focused on purely defensive actions in conditions of a virtual local interstate armed conflict. The terms ‘terrorists’ and ‘illegal armed groups’ were used for reasons of political correctness. Military units of a neighboring state acted as a simulated enemy.
The Belarusian defense industry used the exercise to test some prototypes in a near-real setting and to advertise products of the Belarusian military-industrial complex, such as unmanned aerial vehicles. Heavy multiple artillery rocket systems Smerch and UAVs Grif were presented in a joint exercise for the first time. The military also announced that the UAV helicopter INDELA-I.N.SKY was capable of engaging targets by fire and made a presentation of Belarusian-Russian Berkut-2 and Burevestnik UAVs with a 290 km action range5.
There were two important points in what concerns West-2013. Firstly, the Belarusian military gained experience in force projection by sea: a unit of the 103rd mobile brigade was delivered from St. Petersburg to Kaliningrad by assault landing ships. Secondly, the exercise revealed a serious lag in technology intensiveness of the Belarusian military, which the Russian media immediately stressed with genuine pleasure. The showcased prototypes were mostly intended for demonstration and only few of them actually enter the inventory.
Aviation: an incidental upgrade
The plan to set up production of next generation helicopters MSB-2 at the Orsha Aircraft Repair Plant, a controlling stake
See: Platform for defense innovation // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://www.vpk.gov.by/news/comm_news/1817/
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in which belongs to Ukrainian J SC Motor Sich, was announced in 2015. Upgraded helicopters Mi-8MSB and MSB-2 were presented in September in Minsk. Attending the event was presidential chief of staff Andrei Kobyakov. Mi-8MSB’s were quickly certified in Belarus with their future export to foreign markets in mind.
In June, the allies agreed to set up production of components for Russian aircrafts (both military and civil) at the Minsk Aircraft Repair Plant on the initiative of the Russian side6.
Over the second half of the year, the Belarusian leadership was making attempts to handle the crisis situation in the air force. An upgrade of the national air force’s MiG-29 was supposed to be resumed in September at the 558th Aircraft Repair Plant, which suggests that no new jets will be supplied in the near future despite the plans voiced at the highest level throughout 2012—2013.
The Belarusian defense industry has all technical capacities required to make all-purpose strike aircrafts out of MiG-29. The financial capacities to provide a massive and profound upgrade are open to question now.
The situation with Su-27 of the Belarusian air force has become complicated. Defense Minister Yuri Zhadobin said on August 28 that Su-27’s were not removed from the inventory, but only taken out of operation. In N ovember, Air Force and Air Defense Commander Dvigalev said that Su-27 jets were taken out of service because their operation cost too much. He thus informed that Su-30 fighters (a modernized version of Su-27) were considered as a replacement. Few days later, during a visit to the airbase in Baranovichi, Lukashenko said that the withdrawal of Su-27 from the air force pool was premature.
All this looks like an attempt to fill up a gap left by the pulled out two dozen Su heavy fighters, which have been standing idle since 2011. This attempt became particularly determined after the probability of the deployment of a Russian airbase got strong. Important is that the Belarusian authorities ignored the
See: Belarus ready to host production of spare parts for Russian planes // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://www.interfax.by/news/ belarus/132909
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fact that the problem is not only in the aging of the aircrafts, but also in their shortage.
CSTO: the ‘music’, which no one wants to pay for
It was announced in February 2013 that the Joint Staff of the Collective Security Treaty Organization was going to be reinforced by units in charge of the management of joint troops, military air and special operations forces. A reconnaissance unit in the Joint Staff was also planned. However, nothing of this was done in 20137. Moreover, by the end of the year, the situation with the CSTO Joint Staff was described as critical8.
On September 20—25, Belarus hosted a joint exercise of the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) titled ‘Interaction 2013.’ The event was purely propagandistic, as the training was held at the battalion level. According to the scenario, extremist groups penetrated into a CSTO member state to destabilize situation. Only four out of six CSTO members — Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan and Armenia — provided their troops, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan only delegated field officers to the exercise headquarters.
Equipping of the CSTO RRF was discussed October 22 in Moscow. No concrete decisions were made due to financial stringency in the member states and Russia’s inability to provide them with material support to the extent necessary. The plans to rearm the CSTO RRF date back to 2009 and remain shelved for the most part.
Army: a ‘natural’ decline
Underfunding has been the key problem of national defense. The defense budget in 2013 increased 25.8% year-on-year, with inflation at 21.8% in 2012 and 16.5% in 2013. In fact, the defense spending remains nearly the same.
Limited funding and the lack of a rational ideological base
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CSTO Joint Staff; see: http://www.odkb-csto.org/authorized_organs/ files/buklet.pdf.
See: CSTO Joint Staff will be ‘Russian’ // [Electronic resource] Mode of access: http://evrazia.org/news/29060
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make it impossible for the Defense Ministry to solve the staffing problem. The ministry has to resort to palliative measures. For instance, officer ranks are awarded to warrant officers after three-month training courses, women are given access to certain positions, and reserve officers are being recalled. In 2013, over 1,000 commissioned slots were filled by substitutes, including more than 500 warrant officers, who may be promptly promoted to officers. Several amendments to the law on conscription and military service, which, among other things, raise the conscription age to 35, initiated by the Defense Ministry are called to solve the staffing problem9.
In November, Deputy Finance Minister of Belarus Mikhail Yermolovich confirmed plans to reduce the size of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense. The reduction was observed throughout the year. The 302nd air defense brigade was discontinued in March. A reorganization of the territorial defense system, including optimization of the structure and strength of territorial troops, was announced in September. The word ‘optimization’ should not be misleading: it means a troop reduction. By doing so, the government admitted problems in territorial defense, which independent analysts used to point out before, and which the Defense Ministry fiercely denied. The number of territorial troops reaching 120,000 people is totally unrealistic, as training of so many soldiers is impossible with this budget. Neither is their mobilization in wartime. Moreover, there are not enough active officers to manage the troops.
Military industrial sector: a contribution to exports
The national defense industry prioritized boosting of exports in the past year. Military exports are relatively small and almost invisible against the background of GDP-forming export industries (petrochemical, potassium, iron and food).
Belarus stepped up military-technical cooperation with Asian states, such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Bangladesh,
Law on Conscription and Military Service; see: http://pravo.by/main. aspx?guid=3871&p2=2/349
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Myanmar, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam, and continued intensive cooperation with China.
The country displays genuine willingness to sell not only military hardware, but also to share technology and set up joint production with the most promising partners10 11. Joint ventures abroad will make it possible to fully employ domestic enterprises engaged in the manufacture of component parts, and support further research projects in this area because significant procurement volumes inside Belarus are highly unlikely due to budgetary limitations.
In 2013, the State Military-Industrial Committee was channeling investments into development and manufacture of innovative products. A half of over 80 research and development projects were successfully implemented. They include the development of multipurpose unmanned aircraft systems with an operational range of up to 100 km, radio communication equipment, automotive vehicles, navigation aids, and special purpose electronic equipment.
Formation of prices for state procurement remained a constraining factor11. The relevant agencies spoke about price formation inadequacy and delayed payments by the Defense Ministry.
Conclusion
The process of creation of the Belarusian-Russian joint regional air defense system shows that no prompt decisions on the Russian airbase in Belarus should be expected. Three years may pass between the signing of the agreement and its approval by the Belarusian side. Russia’s military-technical assistance will not go beyond actions aimed at securing its own interests. It specifically concerns airfields, depots, air defense, telecommunication
10 See: Belarus and Vietnam have agreed to step up military-technical cooperation // [Electronic resource]: http://www.vpk.gov.by/news/ comm_news/1627/
11 Areas, goals and ways to upgrade scientific (research and production) companies for the period until 2015 discussed at a session of the State Military Industrial Committee of Belarus; see: http://www.vpk.gov.by/ news/comm_news/16.
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and management facilities. Russia takes no interest in building up Belarus’ defense capacity.
The CSTO remains a powerless interstate institution in the post-Soviet area. Its members (except Russia) do not show interest in enhancement of its capability. There is no reason to believe that something will change in the near future.
Surprising as it may seem, Belarus’ status of a high-tech defense products exporter limits its opportunities when it comes to Third World markets as those countries mostly request military equipment and weapons that can be mastered without profound knowledge and previous education.
In general, expectations of the national military-industrial complex are over-optimistic, because, due to the low capacity, its future as a national economy leader is an impossible ambition. Its progressive but slow advance and modest presence in the world market are much more likely in this situation.
