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T. ОБОЛЕВИЧ
Папский университет Иоанна Павла II, г. Краков, Польша
ALL-UNITY ACCORDING TO V. SOLOVIEV AND S. FRANK.
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Проводится сравнительный анализ концепций всеединства, разработанных двумя наиболее известными русскими философами: Владимиром Соловьёвым (1853 - 1900) и Семеном Франком (1877 - 1958). Термин «всеединство» имеет древнюю философскую традицию, которая представлена в статье. В то же время это оригинальная идея русской мысли Серебряного века.
In this article the comparative analysis of the concept of all-unity of the two most famous Russian philosophers - Vladimir Soloviev (1853 - 1900) and Semyon Frank (1877 - 1958) is carried out. The concept of all-unity has an old philosophical tradition which is presented in the article. At the same time, it is an original idea of the Russian thought of the Silver Age (the end of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries).
Ключевые слова: всеединство, абсолют, Бог, религия, панентеизм, ученое незнание.
Key words: all-unity, Absolute, God, religion, panentheism, learned ignorance.
1. Soloviev's concept: the Bipolar Absolute
Both Soloviev and Frank taught about existence of some structure called all-unity which embraces all beings and guarantees their organic connection. Soloviev claimed that he is the author of the Russian term vseedinstvo («all-unity»). Nevertheless, in the history of the philosophy the analogical expressions we can find i.e. in the thought of Nicholas of Cusa who defined God as unus et omnia and omnia uniter1 or Schelling who used the term Allheit und Einheit.
We can get the roots of the concept of all-unity in the Greek philosophy, in the pre-Socratic views, and even deeper - in the old religious thought of China and India. Soloviev intentionally referred to the philosophical and religious tradition. In his first work entitled The mythological process in the ancient paganism (1873) he noticed that the ancient gods were understood as an expression of all-unity (to nav)2. In the later papers the Russian thinker used in this context the Heraclites' term sv Kai nav («one and all»)3. No doubt, Soloviev is not only an excellent metaphysician, but also a brilliant historian of philosophy.
Soloviev distinguishes all-unity (vseedinstvo) and all-one (vseedinoe) -properly the second and the first Absolute. The first Absolute is the Absolute in se which is «liberated» (according to the Latin word absolutum) from all beings and which is their fundament (mooKeijuevov). It is so called the «positive potency». In Soloviev's opinion, the first Absolute is a super-being: Superens or vnep6[vaiog]v4. He identifies Absolute with God and in his «non-academic» works La Sophia and The Philosophical Foundations of Integral Knowledge denotes it by the Kabalistic notion en-sof («non-something»)5. Since the first
Absolute is not «being», Soloviev called it «nothing». In the tractate La Sophia he introduced the term «non-being», which «had been used even by the orthodox theologians», also in Lectures on Godmanhood - the ancient notion uq ov6, but in A Critique of Abstract Principles he denied these definitions and replaced them by the term «nothing». This word does not express any «content» of Absolute, but indicates its transcendental character. Hence we can find the elements of negative theology in Soloviev's works. For example, Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Nicholas of Cusa7 treated Absolute as vnspov and vnepdvaiog, as a reality superior to essence (snsKsiva rov ovrog).
At the same time, the transcendent God needs the world in order to express His nature. The first Absolute as a positive potency of being supposes the existence of the empirical world. Soloviev writes that «God does not satisfy the eternal contemplation of an ideal essences, (...) but by act His will He stops on the each of them (...) and establishes it as an independent being»8. «The absolute substance necessarily and eternally divides itself in two poles: one as the principle of absolute unity, affirmed as such, the principle of liberty towards to any form, any manifestation and any being, and the other one as the principle or the productive form of the multiple being and of the phenomenal forms»9.
In this way Soloviev describes the second Absolute which is the principle of all things. It is denoted - in contradistinction to «nothing» - by the term «all», because besides divine element it contains a material one (Plato's materia prima). As a result, God is «nothing» and «all» - «nothing», for the reason that He is not «something particular», and «all», because He cannot be deprived of anything10. This definition wasn't new and, on the contrary, it was well-known in the mystical tradition.
Soloviev describes the first Absolute as the Spirit, whereas the second Absolute as Logos: it is the eternal foundation of the ideas that emerge in time in the shape of the empirical beings as Soul of world (anima mundi) or rngjuog vo^rog. Referring to Plato's dialogue Timaeus, Soloviev calls it «the second God».
As we remember, all-unity (materia prima) is a «negative potency» or poten-tia proxima essendi. This means that all-unity has tendency towards the actualization the ideas. Consequently, the second Absolute is in the permanent development, in the process of becoming (according to Soloviev this process the theory of evolution partially explains)11. «The idea of reality as a creative life, as manifesting its the essence creatively, reminds us of the German idealism, of Fichte, Hegel and Schel-ling»12 and the various theories of emanation. As a result, «there is no essential difference between God and the world. In other words, the «essence» of God and world is the same. (...) God himself endows each being with the power of self-consciousness - apart from which the whole of manifold reality could not become external to God. (...) The world is consubstantial with God»13.
The next scheme illustrates the metaphysical concept of Soloviev:
The first Absolute The second Absolute
All-one All-unity
Positive potency Negative potency / potentia proxima essendi
«Nothing» («En Sof») «All»
God Materia prima
Soloviev claimed that the bipolar concept of the Absolute allows him to explain the changing of the world without falling into pantheism which identifies the first Absolute with the second one (God with the world)14. Nevertheless, in Frank's opinion Soloviev's philosophy of all-unity is clearly of pantheistic character15, although most correctly it could be described as panentheism.
This position has significant epistemological consequences. Namely, So-loviev accepts possibility of direct, intuitive cognition of things, because they are rooted in the second Absolute. At the same time he declares that we could not express the first Absolute (God) adequately, for the reason that He «cannot be a subject of any definition»16. According to Soloviev, the Absolute is both transcendent and immanent. This ambivalence is conditioned ontologically. No doubt, Soloviev's metaphysics is not dualistic sensu stricto. Rather the thinker intended to construct a synthetic system and to connect «the ideal element with the material one, the principle of unity with the radical plurality of essences»17.
Frank also paid attention to the transcendent and immanent character of the Absolute, but justified his position in the another way. I will present Frank's concept in the next paragraph.
2. Frank's position: Absolute as the Unknowable
In his The Philosophical Foundations of Integral Knowledge Soloviev maintained that the bipolar concept of the Absolute is only «the fruit of a discursive character of our thinking»18. Hence we can consider his position «rather as the heuristic trick which allows to know the nature of the Absolute»19. However in other works of Soloviev we can read that the distinction between the first and of the second Absolute has a cosmological basis as well: the Russian philosopher, like Schelling, states that the empirical world had fallen away from God. The Universe (unum versum - «the opposite unity»20) is a disorder of all-union's elements. On the one hand, Soloviev tried to accord the unchangeable of God (the first Absolute) with the development of nature (which is established in the second Absolute). On the other hand, he did not harmonize the static aspect of the Absolute with the dynamic one. It is one of the weakest point of Soloviev's concept of all-unity.
Frank radically transformed Soloviev's doctrine, believing that the Absolute has totally simple (non-composite) nature. In An object of knowledge we
can find the next theses: «The absolute being is not a being-for-other, but being-for-itself. It is the being-for-itself which is prior to the difference in subject and object. It is total unity (...), life which experiences itself. Consequently it is immanent for itself and for us, because we directly participate in it»21.
Where Soloviev makes a distinction: the first Absolute and the second Absolute, that allows to show the difference between divine and natural element, and preciously characterizes them, Frank claims that ««true unity» (...) is absolute unity or all-unity»22 (or else «all-one»). The particular qualities of the empirical beings are not something ontologically different from the Absolute (substantially or - as Soloviev seems to say - «topologically», as a result of falling away from the primordial unity), but they are only the product of their cognitive identification. A concrete object exists just «for us», but as such it participates in the absolute unity, so it is not subject to any specification.
Nevertheless Frank as well as Soloviev pays attention to two aspects of the Absolute. Firstly, the Absolute itself is a total unity, entirety (in Soloviev's thought the first Absolute, or all-one expresses this feature). Secondly, the Absolute in its relation to the world is a plurality and a foundation of the particular attributes, so it could be compare with the second Absolute of Soloviev. As a result, the Absolute is «free» from any things and at the same time embraces all of them.
Yet a comparative analysis points to an important difference between Soloviev's and Frank's positions. Namely, contrary to Soloviev's opinion, Frank's Absolute is a perfect unity. The author of An object of knowledge does not make any ontological (even conventional) distinguishes in the Absolute, but he only demonstrates the variation of its cognition. Both all-unity ad extra, considering in its relation to the world, and all-unity ad intra - in its relation to the divine sphere - are not two separate polarities, but just the modi of the same absolute reality.
According to Frank, all-unity as such is not subject to the principle of identity which strictly defines an object as «this» and «not that». It is the reason that Frank describes all-unity as «a metalogical unity». The Absolute is the base of all predicates, but as such it is a «transdefinite» being (in this context Frank adds that the same thought was expressed in The Upanishads which the transcendent reality represented as neti-neti - «neither this or that»)23. As Frank wrote, «The sphere of «the unity» in essence is above the sphere of categories of identity and difference. Its relation to the domain of knowledge, which is expressed by the system of the definitions, does not subject to these categories, but it should be understood in another fundamental way»24.
The sphere of the Absolute is beyond the logical principle of identity and no definition or opposition (A and non-A) expresses it. Since Frank characterizes the Absolute as coincidentia oppositorum (the coincidence of opposites). The Russian thinker refers to the old philosophical tradition: The Upanishads, Heraclites, Plato, Neo-Platonism, the medieval mystic, the German idealism and especially Nicholas of Cusa25. Let us quote De docta ignorantia: «I give the
name «Maximum» to that for which there cannot be anything greater. But fullness (abundantia) befits what is one. Thus, oneness - which is also being - coincides with Maximality. But if such oneness is altogether free from all relation and contraction (respectu), obviously nothing is opposed to it, since it is Absolute Maximality. Thus, the Maximum is Absolute One which is all things. And all things are in the Maximum (for it is the Maximum); and since nothing is opposed to it, the Minimum likewise concedes with it, and hence the Maximum is also in all things»26.
The next name which Nicholas of Cusa applies to the Absolute (under the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Eriugena) is non-aliud -«not-other». In his commentary, the Russian philosopher explains that this notion means that the Absolute is prior to the distinction between idem and aliud -«this» and «other». In this way Frank, following Cusanus, tries to overcome the dualistic tendency which, for instance, we can find in Soloviev's thought. Frank admits that the Absolute is a totally simple being or - in Nicholas of Cusa's term - the precious Equality (aequalitas praecisa). Although Soloviev made an effort to show the unity and indivisibility of the Absolute, nevertheless his attempt concerned mainly the «first Absolute». A non-different non-aliud corresponds with Soloviev's Absolute in se, but not with the «Absolute-for-us» which is express in the form of the empirical beings. No doubt, «the Father of the Russian doctrine of all-unity» (Soloviev) was close to Cusanus' concept according to which «all is in God» (omnia in deo)27, but judged his view as «a very daring»28. Since Soloviev - as we have mentioned - tried to overcome the radical pantheism characteristic to Nicholas of Cusa, and distinguished all-one from all-unity.
At first Frank did not agree with Soloviev's solution. In An Object of knowledge he motivated his concept of the absolute being in the epistemological perspective, basing mainly on the analysis of cognition. In this work, he did not reflect on the origin and the nature of the world. Yet in the latest papers Frank also considered the problem of existence of evil in the world, putting a hypothesis that it is a result the enigmatic «cracks» in the all-unity29 (as Nikolai Berd-yaev noticed, «this is first of all a «crack» in the philosophy of All-Unity it-self»30). In his philosophical notebook, which Frank wrote during the Second World War, we can find some remarks that resemble to bipolar concept of So-loviev: «The first principle as Absolute is beyond of category of «the one» and «the second», «itself» and «its product». The difference between «the first» and «the second» is involved for the first time in the act of creative embodiment. The first principle by its embodiment makes a distinguish into Creator and creation (...). This distinguish and origin of diversity from unity is, first of all, the self-manifestation of the One in the plurality of «the world of ideas». (...) Besides of the diversity, «dramatization» also becomes: the created activity spreads from the One to the plurality, on the «monads». On the one hand, this activity creates the harmonic entirety, the organism. On the other hand, each
element becomes free (creative), what involves the possibility and necessity of collision between them»31.
The investigations led by Frank in the later period of his activity (like So-loviev) gradually proceeded in the direction of theodicy and theology. Frank leaves the radical monism and makes a difference between Creator and creation, although a bit weaker than Soloviev did. The concept of God as an Artist creating the world, and the idea of the strict connection between Creator and creation is deeply rooted in the German mystic tradition: in the thought of Angelus Sile-sius, J. Boehme, F. Baader, Schelling and - in the Frank's cause - in the poetry of Goethe, Rilke and the Russian lyricist, F. Tiutchev.
One of the most important names of the Absolute is «the Unknowable» (Nepostizhimoe). In this context Frank distinguishes «the Unknowable-for-us» (which is incomprehensible in the process of cognition for the sake of limit character of the notions), from «the Unknowable itself» that we'll never know. This distinction leads to several significant consequences. On the one hand, each act of cognition allows to penetrate the sphere of the Absolute -«The Unknowable». As Frank said, the absolute being «is not far for us (...). The reality as such - what is the most known, what surrounds us from all sides: the reality in which we live, move and exist - corresponds to the Unknowable. All what is understandable and comprehensible, all what we can express conceptually - is also rooted in the Unknowable and has sense only with the connection with it»32.
On the other hand, the only way to cognition of the Unknowable is the awareness of the impossibility of its cognition - learned ignorance, docta igno-rantia. Although Frank tries - opposite to Soloviev - to escape the metaphysical dualism, nevertheless he confesses some kind of epistemological dichotomy. Frank - strongly accenting the connection of the empiric, changeable beings with the Absolute - calls his and Soloviev's concept by the term «ideal-realism»33. According to this, the ideal element is in the foundation of the empirical reality.
3. Intuition as a way of cognition of the Absolute
According to Frank, the Absolute as such (or the first Absolute in So-loviev's concept) is unknowable. Nevertheless, it is the very Absolute that enables the cognition of things. How it is possible? Soloviev and Frank (and other Russian philosophers of the Silver Age) claimed that both the subject and the object of cognition are rooted in the all-unity. There is an immanent, ontological relationship between the subject and the object. Several times Frank and Soloviev illustrated their position using the metaphor of a tree (borrowed from Plotinus' Enneads): «The branches of the tree cross and combine in different ways. The branches and leaves touch one another by their external side. It is symbolizes the external knowledge [i.e., the empirical one - T.O.]. But the same branches and
leaves are connected by their common trunk and roots which deliver vital juices to them. This is the mystical knowledge or faith»34.
According to the Russian thinkers, we can perceive object of knowledge in the act of «faith», «mystical intuition» (Soloviev), «intuition of all-unity» or «intuition of an integral being as such» (Frank) which is an immediate experience of the absolute reality. It means, that «To know - in the all spheres of cognition - means (. ) to join empirical data of experience with all-unity, i.e. to perceive the traces of system of all-unity in the sense-data. (. ) «To know» something means to find its place in the eternal, all-embracing unity of being»35.
As Georges Florovsky wrote, «faith» («intuition») in the Russian philosophy «has an obvious existential priority; it gives the true assurance of existence (. ). Soloviev used the concept of «faith» in a very wide sense, in which it denotes almost the same basic «insight» into existence as the «intuition» of Bergson»36.
Kant considered only two causes of the «meeting» of the subject and object of cognition: «There are only two possible ways in which synthetical representation and its objects can coincide with and relate necessarily to each other, and, as it were, meet together. Either the object alone makes the representation possible, or the representation alone makes the object possible»37.
Soloviev and Frank proposed the third solution. In their opinion, the intimate relationship between subject and object in the Absolute is the cognition of the process of knowledge. Hence other Russian philosophers - Fr. Pavel Floren-sky and Nikolai Losski -called this concept «the philosophy of homoousians» (djuoovaiog).
4. Concept of universals in the light of all-unity
According to Soloveiv and Frank all-unity is a hierarchic organism. The ideas of genus contain the ideas of species. For example, the idea of «animal» includes the name of the species («man», «dog»), proper nouns («John», «Max») etc. Therefore the content of a singular thing is proportional to the content of their genus (and species). If the thing has a bigger extension, the intension of its idea is bigger as well. We should add that in the debate on universals Soloviev and Frank (as most of Russian philosophers) shared the position of concrete universals elaborated by Hegel and especially by the British neo-Hegelian idealists - B. Bosanquet and F. H. Bradley. According to this concept, the common in the different things (unus versus alia) is their foundation, the concrete (from con-crescere - «grow together») entirety. In Hegel's opinion, «The concrete and true, and all that is true is concrete, is the universality (...). But absolute universality is not to be thought of either as the universality of reflection, which is a kind of consensus or generality, or, as the abstract universality and self-identity, which is fashioned by the understanding, and keeps aloof from the individual. It is rather the concrete, self-contained, and self-referring universality, which is the sub-
stance, intrinsic genus, or immanent idea of self-consciousness. It is a conception of free will as the universal, transcending its object, passing through and beyond its own specific character, and then becoming identical with itself»38.
Also, Bradley claimed that «Absolute is, so far, an individual and a system»39. In Soloviev's and Frank's case, «concrete entirety» is all-unity containing all beings.
On the other hand, adhering traditional scholastic theory of universals, So-loviev wrote that the root of the endless polemics between nominalism and realism is the identification of ideas and notions although they belong to the different types of universals. Namely, the ideas anticipate the empirical beings, so they are univer-salia ante res («before things», according to realism). At the same time, the ideas are expressed by the general notions. Because the general notions do not exist independently, they are universalia post res («after things», in the term of nominal-ism)40. Obviously, all-unity contains both all the ideas the notions proper to them as well. Hence, from the realistic point of view all-unity is the supreme idea (Plato's idea of Good), whereas from the nominalistic position it is the foundation of being and notions. Frank agreed that universals considered as ideas are «before things» (ante res), and realized that in time they are «in things» (in rebus)41. As a result, Russian thinkers tried to bring together realism and nominalism.
5. Difficulties of the concept of all-unity
The concept of all-embracing universe proposed by the Russian philosophers and other idealists has some troubles. Let us remember Russell's critics of the Hegelian philosophy: «The view of Hegel, and of many other philosophers, is that the character of any portion of the universe is so profoundly affected by its relations to the other parts and to the whole, that no true statement can be made about any part except to assign its place in the whole. Since its place in the whole depends upon all the other parts, a true statement about its place in the whole will at the same time assign the place of every other part in the whole. Thus there can be only one true statement; there is no truth except the whole truth»42.
Russell opposed the tenets of the Russian philosophers by stating that in order to know the individual thing (i.e. its quality) there is no need to know its relation to the whole. Also James combated the holistic concept of cognition: «I left off by asserting my own belief that a pluralistic and incompletely integrated universe, describable only by the free use of the word 'some', is a legitimate
hypothesis»43.
Moreover, the rooting of the empirical world in the Absolute leads to disappearance of the border between the natural and the supernatural order. The ontological consequence of this situation is panentheism. In the epistemological aspect it means the identification of the cognition of the world with the cognition of God. This opinion was also shared Soloviev's contemporaries. For ex-
ample, Aleksander Vviedensky criticized him for the «mystification of cogni-tion»44. The same statement concerns Frank who frequently repeated the famous Hegelian thought that «the Absolute, or God the only object of philosophy»45.
In the conclusion, defending Soloviev's and Frank's position, we should say that Russian philosophers consciously referred to Platonic (and neo-Platonic) tradition trying to express their religious belief in that way. In addition, the concept of all-unity neither excludes the cognition of the particular elements nor exhausts the cognition of the Absolute transcended by the possibilities of reason.
References
1 De docta ignorantia, I, XXIV in: Nicolai de Cusa, Opera omnia, Lipsiae 1932, vol. I, p. 48.
2 Soloviev V. S., Mifologicheskijprotsess v drevnem yazychestve in: Polnoe sobranie sochinenij i pisem v dvadtsati tomakh [PSS], Moscow 2000-2001, vol. 1, p. 34.
3 Soloviev V. S., La Sophia in: PSS, vol. 2, p. 90/91; Filosofskie nachala tsel'nogo znanija in: PSS, vol. 2, p. 253; Kritika otvlechennykh nachal in: PSS, vol. III, p. 277. In the conclusion of The Crisis of Western philosophy Soloviev quoted the famous Heraclit's statement: Svva^ieg oXa Kai ovx oXa, auppepopevov Siapepopevov, avvaSov SiaSov, Kai eK navxwv sv Kai e£ evog navia (Krizis zapadnoj filosofiji (protiv pozivistiv) in: PSS, vol. 1, p. 138). Cf. Istoricheskije dela filosofiji in: Sobranie sochinenij Vladimira Sergejevicha Solovieva [SS], Brussels 1966-1970, vol. II, p. 403: ««All is one» is the first word the [Indian] philosophy». Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, V, 8, 4; Proclus, Elements of Theology, 1. See Khoruzhij S., Idea vseedinstva ot Geraklita do Bakhtina in: idem, Poslepereryva. Puti russkojfilosofiji, Saint Petersburg 1994, p. 32-66. Soloviev V. S., La Sophia in: PSS, vol. 2, p. 90/91; Filosofskie nachala tsel'nogo znanija in: PSS, vol. 2, p. 253; Kritika otvlechennykh nachal in: PSS, vol. III, p. 277. In the conclusion of The Crisis of Western philosophy Soloviev quoted the famous Heraclit's statement: Svva^ieg oXa Kai ovx oXa, auppepopevov Siapepopevov, avvaSov SiaSov, Kai eK navxwv sv Kai evog navia (Krizis zapadnoj filosofiji (protiv pozivistiv) in: PSS, vol. 1, p. 138). Cf. Istoricheskije dela filosofiji in: Sobranie sochinenij Vladimira Sergejevicha Solovieva [SS], Brussels 1966-1970, vol. II, p. 403: ««All is one» is the first word the [Indian] philosophy». Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, V, 8, 4; Proclus, Elements of Theology, 1. See S. Khoruzhij, Idea vseedinstva ot Geraklita do Bakhtina in: idem, Posle pereryva. Puti russkoj filosofiji, Saint Petersburg 1994, p. 32-66.
4 Soloviev V. S., La Sophia, p. 88/89.
5 Ibidem, p. 92/93; Filosofskie nachala..., p. 263. See Burmistrov K., Vladimir Soloviev i Ka-balla. K postanovke problemy in: Kolerov M. A. (ed.) Issledovanija po istoriji russkoj mysli. Yezhegodnik za 1998 god, Saint Petersburg 1998, p. 7-104.
6 Soloviev V. S., La Sophia, p. 88/89; Chtenija o Bogochelovechestve in: SS, vol. III, p. 135.
7 See i.e. Plato, The Republic, 509b: the Good is «beyond being»; Plotinus, Enneads, I, VII, 1: «The Good must, then, be the Good not by any Act, not even by virtue of its Intellection, but by its very rest within Itself» and V, V, 6: «the First cannot be thought of as having definition and limit»; Nicholas of Cusa, On learned ignorance, I, VI: ««being» (or any other name) is not a precise name for the Maximum».
8 Soloviev V. S., Chtenija o Bogochelovechestve, p. 137-138.
9 Soloviev V. S., La Sophia, p. 92-94 (trans. by M. De Courten, Sophia and the Longing for Unity, «The Journal of Eastern Christian Studies» 3-4 (2007), p. 248.
Soloviev V. S., Filosofskie nachala., p. 262; Kritika otvlechennykh nachal, p. 277.
11 Soloviev V. S., Opravdanije dobra in: SS, vol. VIII, p. 218-219. This motive of Soloviev's philosophy anticipates Teilhard de Chardin's thought. See Truhlar K. V., Teilhard und Solowjew. Dichtung und religiiöse Erfahrung, Freiburg-München 1966.
12 F. Ch. Copleston, Philosophy in Russia. From Herzen to Lenin and Berdyaev, Notre Dame 1986, p. 222.
13 Zenkovsky V., A History of Russian Philosophy, vol. II, trans. by G. L. Kline, London 1953, p. 500-501.
14 Soloviev V. S., Kritika otvlechennykh nachal, p. 285-286.
15 Frank S., Russkoje mirovozzrenije, trans. by G. Franko in: idem, Duchovnye osnovy ob-shchestva, Moscow 1992, p. 497. Cf. L. J. Shein (eds.), Reading in Philosophical Though, The Hague 1968, p. 26; J. Novotny, Vladimir Sergejevic Solovyov (1853-1900) in: P. Ambros (eds.), Vladimir Solovjov and United Europe: International Conference at 100th Anniversary of V. So-loviov Death (1853-1900), Olomouc 2000, p. 45: «The metaphysics, a global unity is formed in form of a neopantheism in the monistic line of Spinoza-Schelling».
16 Soloviev V. S., Kritika otvlechennykh nachal, p. 279.
17 Cf. Soloviev V. S., Metafizika in: SS, vol. X, p. 243.
18 Soloviev V. S., Filosofskie nachala..., p. 268.
19 Utkina N. F., Tema Vseedinstva vfilosofiji Vl. Solovieva, «Voprosy filosofiji» 6 (1989), p. 63.
20 Soloviev V. S., <Chernovik o Schellinge> in: PSS, vol. 2, p. 180. Zob. Rossija i Vselenskaja Tserkov', trans. by Rachinskij G. A. in: SS, vol. XI, p. 293: «what is non-divine [the nature -T.O.] is transposed or reverse [transposé ou renversé] Divinity»; Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 31: «All that proceeds from any principle reverts in respect of its being upon that from which it proceeds»; prop. 33: «Thus all things proceed in a circuit, from their causes to their causes again»; prop. 34: «Everything whose nature it is to revert reverts upon that from which it derived the procession of its own substance».
21 Frank S. L., Predmet znanija. Ob osnovakh ipredelakh otvlechennogo znanija in: idem, Pred-met znanija. Dusha cheloveka, Saint Petersburg 1995, p. 157.
22 Ibidem, p. 219.
23 Frank S. L., Nepostizhimoe in: idem, Sochinenija, Minsk - Moscow 2000, p. 459. Cf. Brihada-ranyaka Upanishad, III, 9, 26; IV, 2, 4.
Frank S. L., Predmet znanija, p. 196. See P. Modesto, Un filosofo russo contemporaneo. Semjon Ljudvigovic Frank, «Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica», vol. 50 (1958), p. 523-524.
25 Frank S. L., Predmet znanija, p. 204.
26 Nicholas of Cusa, On learned ignorance, I, II.
27 Cf. Gajdenko P. P., Nikolaj Kuzanskij i princip sovpadenija protivopolozhnostej, «Voprosy filosofiji» 7 (2002), p. 132.
28 Soloviev V. S., Nikolaj Kuzanskij in: SS, vol. X, p. 439.
29 Frank S. L., Niepostizhimoe, X, 3. See I. Krekshin, Metafizika zla (Prolegomeny k teoditsei v filosofijiposdnego S. L. Franka), «Voprosy filosofiji» 12 (2001), p. 128-139.
30 Berdyaev N., The book of S. L. Frank «The Unfathomable» («Nepostizhimoe»), trans. by Fr. S. Janos, <http://www.berdyaev.com/berdiaev/berd_lib/1939_446.html>.
31 Frank S. L., Mysli v strashnye dni (1943.02.04) in: idem, Neprochitannoe... Stat'i, pis'ma, vospominanija, Moscow 2001, p. 351.
32 Ibidem, p. 391.
33 Frank S. L., Niepostizhimoe, p. 381.
34 Soloviev V. S., Kritika otvlechennykh nachal, p. 296; S. L. Frank, Predmet znanija, p. 193; Dusha cheloveka in: idem, Predmet znanija. Dusha cheloveka, p. 601. Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, HI, 8, 10.
35 Frank S. L., Dusha cheloveka, p. 560-561.
36 G. Florovsky, Reason and Faith in the Philosophy of Solov'ëv, in: E. J. Simmons (ed.), Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought, Cambridge 1955, p. 286.
37 Kant I., Critic of Pure Reason, trans. by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, New York 1990, p. 72-73. 38.Hegl G. W. F, Philosophy of Right, trans. by T. M. Knox, New York 1967, § 7, 24. 39 Bradley F. H. , Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay, London 1897, p. 144. See H. B. Acton, The theory of concrete universals, «Mind», vol. 45 (1936), p. 417-431; «Mind», vol. 46 (1937), p. 1-13. Soloviev V. S., Filosofskie nachala..., p. 238; Chtenija o Bogochelovechestve, p. 67.
41 Frank S. L., Realnost' i chelovek, in: idem, S namiBog. Realnost' i chelovek, Moskva 2003, p. 147.
42 Russell B., A History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, New York 1945, p. 743.
43 James W., A Pluralistic Universe. Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College on the Present Situation in Philosophy, EBook #11984, <www.gutenberg.net>.
44 Vviedensky A., O misticizmie i kriticyzmie v teoriipoznanya Solovieva, in: D. K. Burlaka (ed.), Vladimir Soloviev: pro et contra, p. 195-200.
45 Cf. Frank S. L., Absolutnoe, trans. by A. G. Vlaskin, A. A. Yermichev, in: idem, Russkoye mi-rovozzreniye, Sankt-Peterburg 1996, p. 58; Filosofía i religia, in: P. V. Alekseev (ed.), Na pere-lome. Filosofskie diskussii 20-ch godov, Moskva 1990, p. 321.
В.В. ВАНЧУГОВ
Российский университет дружбы народов, г. Москва
ВСЕЕДИНСТВО В ЭТНОСОФИЧЕСКОМ КОНТЕКСТЕ: ОБРАЗЫ ЕВРОПЕЙСКИХ НАРОДОВ В РУССКОЙ ФИЛОСОФСКОЙ МЫСЛИ
На основе российского историко-философского материала предпринята попытка выявить этнософический материал, составить на его основе этнософические портреты, образы наций: «француз»; «немец»; «англичанин»; «европеец»; «русский» и др. В ходе обозрения реконструируются портреты(образы) различных народов(наций), которые формировались в интеллектуальной среде XIX-XX вв. и повлияли не только на философское сообщество, но и на массовое сознание.
Based on historical and philosophical data the author attempts to identify ethnosophical material produced by the Russia's thinkers and draws ethnosophical portraits on its basis, philosophical images of nations: ethnosophical portraits: «French», «German», «Englishman»; «European»; «American», «Russian». There are reconstructed portrait / images of different peoples / nations that have formed in the minds of Russia's intellectuals and at the same time was also influential on the mass consciousness.
Ключевые слова: этнософия, этнософический портрет, философский образ наций, философское страноведение, стереотип.
Key words: ethnosophy ethnosophical portrait, philosophical image of nations, the philosophical geography, stereotype.
Философия для цивилизации не только необходимый элемент, но и форма, в которой она находит свое существенное выражение. Как системообразующий фактор философия распространяется не только вширь (географически), но и «вглубь» цивилизации. Это движение «вглубь» проявляется в том, что время от времени среди интеллектуалов того или ино-
