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131
Zurab PAPASKIRI
D.Sc. (Hist.), Professor, Sukhumi State University
(Tbilisi, Georgia).
A QUESTION MARK IN THE HISTORY OF GEORGIAN-SELJUK RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE BATTLE OF MANZIKERT
Abstract
The author offers his own explanation of an extremely enigmatic piece of information found in an anonymous Georgian chronicle of the 11th century (Matiane Kartlisa or The Chronicles of Kartli): on the eve of the Battle of Manzikert, which occupies a special place in the history of the global confrontation between the Seljuk
Turks and Byzantium, Sultan Alp Arslan transferred the fortress of Gagi to Bagrat IV in exchange for the release of Emir Fadlon of Ganja.
Professor Papaskiri suggests that the great sultan and the king of Georgia allied on the eve of the Battle of Manzikert, which took place on 19 August, 1071.
KEYWORDS: Matiane Kartlisa, Seljuk-Byzantine relations, Alp Arslan, Bagrat IV, the Battle of Manzikert.
Introduction
The Seljuk Turks, the Seljuk world, and the Seljuk civilization form an important stage in medieval history. In the first half of the 11th century, the Oghuz Seljuks, after moving out of their Central Asian homeland, pressed far into the west and, by the mid-11th century, became the main political force in the Middle and Near East. From that time on, or to be more exact in the 1040s-1050s,
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when the Seljuk Sultanate1 emerged on the political scene as one of the powers to be reckoned with, the fates of many countries and peoples of this region became closely connected with the Seljuks. Georgia was no exception in this respect; the Seljuk warlords became aware of its existence in the 1030s,2 that is, as soon as the Seljuks reached the southern borders of the Caucasus.3
It is commonly believed that Georgian-Seljuk relations are best described as irreconcilable enmity. This is not true: armed clashes alternated with periods of relative lull; in some cases, the Georgians and the Seljuks managed to coordinate their actions to a certain extent on the international scene. This article deals with one of the cases of cooperation between the Georgian royal court and the Seljuk Sultanate; I rely on Matiane Kartlisa (The Chronicles of Kartli), a highly reliable Georgian source of the 11th century, to hypothesize that Sultan Alp Arslan and King of Georgia Bagrat IV entered into an alliance on the eve of the Battle of Manzikert.
I formulated this hypothesis in my monograph published in 19914 and based on Chapter III of my doctoral thesis on it.5 I later developed it in the Russian-language abstract of my thesis published under separate cover.6 I regret to say that despite several publications, the hypothesis has not yet caught the attention of even the best experts.7 This has forced me to present my hypothesis supported by fresh arguments and also some of my thoughts about Georgian-Seljuk relations on the eve of the Manzikert epopee to the First International Seljuk Symposium held by Erciyes University and the Research Center of Turkish World in Kayseri (Turkey) on 27-30 September, 2010.8 This article continues the cycle of my studies.
The Riddle of Matiane Kartlisa and Some Questions of Georgian-Seljuk Relations
The Battle of Manzikert is rightly described as a turning point "not only in the history of the Middle East, but also, to a certain extent, of world history."9 According to prominent Russian histo-
1 For more on the emergence of the state of the Seljuks, see: A.Yu. Yakubovsky, "Seldzhukskoe dvizhenie i turkmeny v XI v.," Izvestia ANSSSR, Department of Social Sciences, No. 4, 1937; B.N. Zakhoder, "Horasan i obrazovanie gosudarstva Seldzhukov," Voprosy istorii, No. 5-6, 1945; S.G. Agajanov, Ocherki istorii oguzov i turkmen Sredney Azii IX-XIII vv., Ashghabad, 1969, pp. 211-220; T. Hojaniyazov, Denezhnoe obrashchenie v gosudarstve Velikikh Seldzhukov, Ashghabad, 1977, pp. 11-18; T.T. Rice, The Seljuks in Asia Minor, Thames and Hudson, London, 1966; N.N. Shengelia, Seljuks and Georgia in the 11th Century, Tbilisi, 1968, pp. 266-302 (in Georgian).
2 According to one of the Georgian sources (see: F. Jordania, Chronicles and Other Materials on the History of Georgia, I, Tiflis, 1892, p. 169, in Georgian), in 1029, Georgian King Bagrat IV attacked the sultan and his army. Historians tend to doubt this information as improbable. It is commonly believed that the Georgians clashed with scattered Seljuk units no earlier than 1032-1034 (N.N. Shengelia, op. cit., pp. 172-173).
3 According to Armenian historians (Matteos Urhayetsi, Vardan), the Seljuks invaded the Caucasus for the first time in 1016. It was later established that the date was wrong and that the Seljuks had not been able to reach the region until 1032-1034 (see: S.G. Agajanov, K.N. Yuzbashyan, "K istorii turkskikh nabegov na Armeniiu v XI v.," Palestinskiy sbornik, No. 13/76, 1965, pp. 145-158; N.N. Shengelia, op. cit., pp. 165-170).
4 See: Z.V. Papaskiri, "Medieval Georgia on the International Scene," in: Foreign Policy Position of Georgia in the 1060-1080s, Metsniereba, Tbilisi, 1991, pp. 20-24 (in Georgian).
5 See: Z.V. Papaskiri, Mezhdunarodnoe polozhenie srednevekovoy Gruzii (70-e gody X—80-e gody XI vv.), Doctoral thesis in the form of an academic paper, Tbilisi, 1991.
6 See: Z.V. Papaskiri, "Ot Davida do Davida," in: Iz istorii mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii Gruzii. 70-e godyX-80-e gody XI vv., Tbilisi, 2001, pp. 92-95, available at [https://sites.google.com/site/zpapaskiri/publications-russian].
7 This has been confirmed by G.G. Alasania's article, which completely ignored my results (see: G. Alasania, "On the Early Experience of Relations between the Georgians and the Seljuk Turks," in: Georgian Oriental Studies, XII, Tbilisi, 2010, pp. 33-40, in Georgian). This is regrettable since this hypothesis is presented in a fairly popular summarizing publication about the history of Georgian diplomacy (see: M. Lordkipanidze, Z. Papaskiri, "Foreign Policy and Diplomacy of the Georgian State in the 11th Century," in: Essays on the History of Georgian Diplomacy, Vol. I, Tbilisi, 1998, p. 251, in Georgian).
8 See: Z. Papaskiri, "Manzikertskoe srazhenie i nekotorye aspekty gruzino-seldzhukskikh vzaimootnosheniy v nachale 70-kh godov XI veka," in: Uluslar Arasi Buyuk Selçuklu Sempozyumu, 26-30 Eylul, 2010, Erciyes Universitesi, Kayseri, 2010, pp. 227- 228 (abstract in Russian); Z. Papaskiri, "Malazgirt Muharebesi 11. Yuzyilin 70'li yillarinda Selçuklu-Gurcu lliçkileri," in: Uluslar Arasi Buyuk Selçuklu Sempozyumu, 26-30Eylul, 2010, Erciyes Universitesi, Kayseri, 2010, p. 228 (abstract in Turkish).
9 Sh.A. Meskhia, Didgorskaia bitva, Tbilisi, 1974, p. 46.
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rian of Byzantium Alexander Vasiliev, "from that time on Byzantium was no longer a world power of the Middle Ages."10 According to another outstanding Russian expert in Byzantine studies, the defeat at Manzikert was of "significant importance not only for Byzantium, but also for the entire Christian world."11 It is commonly believed that "this was when the question of the dominant power in the Middle East was clarified—for a long time the Seljuk Turks remained this power."12 As the East Christian Empire, Byzantium, "lost forever its name, its prestige, and its significance in Christianity and was no longer able to fight the Muslims."13 This was the turning point: the Byzantine Empire, too weak to contain the Seljuks, allowed them to reach the Sea of Marmara and the Mediterranean.14 This was when the Armenian territories were conquered, while the Seljuks established their diktat over Shirvan-Daruband.15
The Georgian Kingdom, the only Christian state in the region, found itself face to face with this huge Muslim power, a situation which did nothing for Georgia's international status. Logic suggested that the Georgian royal court should have extended all possible support to the Byzantine Empire to keep the rising might of the Seljuk Sultanate in check. On the eve of the Battle of Manzik-ert, however, King Bagrat and Sultan Alp Arslan had established quite friendly contacts. According to the anonymous Matiane Kartlisa (The Chronicles of Kartli), "the sultan dispatched his military commander Alkhaz, who persuaded Bagrat, in the name of the sultan, to make peace with Fadlon and let him return to his Ganja domains. The military leader left together with him. Bagrat received the keys to Gagi and the King of the Abkhaz captured Gagi."16 This means that Alp Arslan not merely refrained from punishing the Georgian king who had captured Emir Fadl II of Ganja,17 his key ally and vassal, but also rewarded the Georgian king with the fortress of Gagi.
Why was the sultan unexpectedly lenient toward Bagrat IV and his fairly provocative behavior? The sources offer no direct (or even indirect) explanations of this. Until recently, no one tried to find an explanation for Alp Arslan's courteous treatment of the headstrong king of the "Abkhaz." It seems that the powerful sultan of the Seljuks needed Georgian neutrality on the eve of the decisive battle with the Byzantine Empire. This episode should be placed in the wider background of Georgian-Seljuk relations in the 1060s-early 1070s.
I have already written that the Seljuks, who burst into world politics, tipped the balance of forces in the Middle East. In the 1040s-1050s, the Seljuk Sultanate (which occupied the present territory of Iran and the Southern Transcaucasia) was a strong power that long remained an important, if not the decisive, factor in international relations. The Georgian royal court became aware of the newcomers when they started pouring into the Caucasus in 1032-1034. From that time on, the Seljuks became a more or less constant factor of the Georgian state's political activity. This became clear in
10 A.A. Vasiliev, Lektsii po istorii Vizantiyskoy imperii, Vol. I, Petrograd, 1914, p. 348; S.B. Dashkov, Imperatory Vizantii, Moscow, 1996, available at [http://www.sedmitza.ru/text/434532.html].
11 F.I. Uspensky, Istoria Krestovykh pokhodov, St. Petersburg, 1900-1901, available at [http://enoth.narod.ru/Crusades/ Crusade_Usp01 .htm].
12 S.A. Meskhia, op. cit., p. 46.
13 P. Willimart, Mythe et réalité de la Guerre Sainte, Paris, 1972. It should be said that unlike the classics of Byzantine studies mentioned above, some academics do not believe that the defeat at Manzikert spelled a catastrophe for Byzantium or destroyed its military might (see: Cl. Cahen, "La campagne de Mantzikert d'apres les sourses musulmanes," Byzantion, Vol. 9, 1934, pp. 64-67; J.-Cl. Cheynet, "Mantzikert: un desastre militaire?" Byzantion, Vol. 50, 1980, pp. 432-434; A.S. Mokhov, "Vizantiyskaya armia v pravlenie Romana IV Diogena (1068-1071)," Antichnaia drevnost i srednie veka, Iss. 34, 2003, pp. 292-293.
14 See: N.N. Shengelia, op. cit., p. 269.
15 See: Ibid., p. 302; P.A. Topuria, States of the Eastern Transcaucasia in the 11th-12th Centuries, Tbilisi, 1975, p. 132 (in Georgian).
16 Matiane Kartlisa—Kartlis Tskhovreba. Georgian text, Prepared for publication on the basis of all main manuscripts by S.G. Kaukhchishvili, Vol. I, Tbilisi, 1955, pp. 313-314; Letopis Kartli, Translated, introduced, and commented on by G.V. Tsulaya, Tbilisi, 1982, p. 47.
17 See: Emir of Ganja-Arran Al Fadl II bin Abu-l-Asvar Shavur I (1067-1073).
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1037-1038 when, according to well-known Arab author Ibn al-Athir (the 12th-13th centuries), Bagrat IV, faced with the threat of Turkic invasion, had to retreat from besieged Tbilisi.18 In the 1040s, the Seljuks began gradually developing into a threat to their neighbors; their inroads in Armenia and Azerbaijan became regular, which forced the Georgian royal court to closely follow the situation in the Caucasus and even help others to stand up to the Seljuk aggressors. In 1040, for example, Bagrat IV sent a four-thousand-strong unit to help King of Lori (Tashir-Dzoraget) David I the Landless rebuff Emir of Dvin Abu-l-Asvar and return the occupied lands.19 Leader of the Georgian feudal opposition Liparit Baghvashi, Eristavi of Kldekari, was also involved in the all-out effort against the Seljuk Turks. The eristavi was an active participant in "all the marches of the Byzantines in the East."20 In 10481049, Bagrat IV fought the Turks together with Byzantium.21
At the turn of the 1050s, the Seljuks became even more active on the southern borders of Georgia; they repeatedly plundered the lands of Iberia,22 a Byzantine theme (the southern part of Tao) populated by Georgian tribes and captured by Basil II after the death of David III Kuropalates. Historical sources contain information that in the course of this military campaign, some of the Seljuk units invaded the Georgian state proper in Samtskhe and in the vicinities of Manglisi.23At that time, the Seljuks constituted no threat for Georgia: the Seljuk factor stabilized, to a certain extent, the Georgian state's international position and regulated its relations with Byzantium.24
The situation changed in the early 1060s when Bagrat IV, after defeating the feudal opposition led by Liparit Baghvashi, revived his active involvement in Eastern Georgia. From that time on, his foreign policy moves affected the interests of the Seljuks, who closely followed and responded to practically everything the Georgian king was doing on the foreign policy scene. The first such re-
18 See: P. Zhuze, Materialy po istorii Azerbaidzhana iz Tari al-Kamil (polnogo svoda istorii)Ibn al-Athira, Baku, 1940, p. 147; N.N. Shengelia, op. cit., p. 174.
19 See: R.M. Bartikian, "'Khronografia' Matfeya Edesskogo o Gruzii i gruzinakh," in: Vizantinovedcheskie etyudy, Dedicated to the 80th Anniversary since the Birth of Academician S.G. Kaukhchishvili, Tbilisi, 1978, p. 143; N.N. Shengelia, op. cit., p. 176.
20 I.A. Javakhishvili, History of the Georgian People, Book II of Collected Works in Twelve Volumes, Vol. II, Tbilisi 1983, p. 146 (in Georgian) (for more details, see: N.N. Shengelia, op. cit., pp. 179-195).
21 See: Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I, pp. 313-314; Letopis Kartli, p. 44 (see also: V.U. Kopaliani, Georgian-Byzantine Political Relationships in 970-1070, Tbilisi, 1969, p. 254); P.A. Topuria, op. cit., p. 195; M.D. Lordkipanidze, "Internal and External Political Position of Georgia between the 980s and the1080s," in: Essays on the History of Georgia, Vol. III, Tbilisi, 1979, p. 145; Z.V. Papaskiri, Emergence of a Unified Georgian Feudal State and Some Questions of Georgia's Foreign Policy Status, Tbilisi, 1990, p. 202 (all in Georgian).
22 Regrettably, historians sometimes fail to correctly interpret the term "Iberia" used by Byzantine authors (Michael Attaleiates and George Kedrenos) (see: M. Attaleiates, "History," in: Georgika VI. Information of Byzantine Writers about Georgia, The Greek texts with Georgian translations were published and commented on by S.G. Kaukhchishvili, Tbilisi, 1966, p. 24; G. Kedrenos, "Chronography," in: Georgika V, The Greek texts with Georgian translations were published and commented on by S.G. Kaukhchishvili, Tbilisi, 1963, p. 82. This term is frequently (and wrongly) associated with Georgia. For example, when commenting on information supplied by Scylitzes-Kedrenos that the Byzantine emperor had disbanded "the approximately 50-thousand-strong Iberian army" (G. Kedrenos, op. cit., p. 820), outstanding Russian Byzantine scholar Academician F. Uspensky rashly wrote that "earlier Georgia maintained a 50-thousand-strong army to protect itself against Asian plunderers" (see: F.I. Uspensky, Istoria Vyzantiyskoy imperii, Vol. 4, Ch. III, available at [http://rikonti-khalsivar.narod. ru/Usp4.3.htm], italics mine.—Z.P. ). Non-Georgian historians, who cannot always find their bearings in the state and political changes that went on in Georgia in the early 11th century, can be excused, but it is inexcusable for Georgian historians to identify Iberia as Georgia. I have in mind N. Shengelia's fundamental and valuable work on Georgian-Seljuk relations, in which the author applied information of Byzantine authors about the Seljuk inroads into "Iberia" to the rest of Georgia (N.N. Shengelia, op. cit., pp. 199-201). By that time, these lands no longer belonged to the Georgian Kingdom, so the developments there should not be used to assess the political status of the Georgian state proper. At the same time, the same author was quite right when he wrote that "these grandiose Seljuk attacks on Georgia's neighbors'" inevitably worsened the situation in the Georgian Kingdom (see: N.N. Shengelia, op. cit., p. 206, italics mine.—Z.P. ).
23 See: F.D. Jordania, K materialam po istorii Gruzii XI-XII vv., Moscow, 1895, p. 7; N.N. Shengelia, op. cit., p. 200, 206-207.
24 For more details, see: V.U. Kopaliani, op. cit., pp. 261-266; Z.V. Papaskiri, Emergence of a Unified Georgian Feudal State, pp. 203, 209.
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sponse took place in 1062 when Bagrat IV once more tried to capture Tbilisi; this time he planned to buy it back, according to Arabic author Ibn al-Faqih, from King of Kakheti Agsartan.25
The Muslim world did not like the Georgian king's plans and his possible control of Tbilisi; they liked even less what Ibn al-Faqih wrote about Bagrat IV's intention to "widen the mountain roads to make it easier for the infidels (Georgian Christians.—Z.P.) to reach the Islamic countries."26 The rulers of the Sultanate interpreted this, not without reason, as the Georgian king's preparations for new armed operations. It seems that from that time on Georgia became the main rival of the Seljuks in the Caucasus. In 1064, Sultan Alp Arslan organized the first of his big marches on Georgia; in the process, he plundered several regions in Southern Georgia and captured Akhalkalaki,27 yet failed to score the final victory. Puzzled by the Georgians' unexpected staunchness, he wisely preferred to seek reconciliation with the king.
Some Eastern authors, such as Ibn al-Athir and Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni,28 and some contemporary historians who accepted this information as reliable point out that Bagrat IV recognized the sultan as his sovereign and was prepared to pay "jizya." Rauf Huseyn-zade, a prominent Azeri specialist in the history of the Seljuks and an ardent supporter of this thesis, has stated peremptorily that "Bagrat IV took an oath of vassal allegiance, promised to pay jizya, and gave his niece's hand in marriage to Alp Arslan."29 The author repeated his conclusion about the vassal-sovereign relations between Bagrat and Sultan Alp Arslan elsewhere in the same monograph.30
Those who insist on this should offer their arguments. They proceed from what Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayini wrote: "The Georgian sent his ambassadors to the sultan with gifts, knocked at the door of reconciliation, and paved the road to self-justification. Temir al-Hajib and Aybek al-hass traveled together with the Georgian ambassadors from the sultan's camp. The sultan wrote to the king of Georgians that he should either adopt Islam or pay jizya and the [king] agreed to [pay] jizya"3 (ital-
25 See: R.K. Kiknadze, "History of Tbilisi in the 11th-13th Centuries According to Oriental Sources," in: Proceedings of the Institute of History, Vol. V, Part I, Tbilisi, 1060, pp. 113-114; Sh.A. Meskhia, "The Urban Community in Medieval Tbilisi," in: Selected Works, Vol. I, Tbilisi, 1982, p. 240; P.K. Ratiani, "Tbileli Berebi" (Revolt of People of Tbilisi in the 11th Century), Tbilisi, 1989, p. 14 (all in Georgian).
26 R.K. Kiknadze, op. cit., pp. 113-114.
27 See: Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I, p. 306; LetopisKartli, p. 45 (for more details, see: N.N. Shengelia, op. cit., pp. 219-225).
28 See: Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, Akhbar ad-daulat as-seljukiya (Soobshchenia o Seldzhukskom gosudartsve. Slivki letopisey, soobshchaiushchikh o seldzhukskikh emirakh i gosudariakh). Publication, translation, introduction, notes and appendices by Z.M. Buniyatov, Moscow, 1980, p. 50; P. Zhuze, op. cit., p. 121; N.N. Shengelia, "Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni about the March of Alp Arslan to Georgia and the Transcaucasian Countries," in: Studies of the History of Georgia and the Caucasus, Dedicated to the 80th Birth Anniversary of Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the Georgian SSR N.A. Berdzenishvili, Tbilisi, 1976, p. 90 (in Georgian). According to Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, this happened during the march of the Seljuk sultan to ar-Rum in the third ten-day period of February 1064 (Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, op. cit., p. 48). There are historians who, for some reason, insist on 1067 as the date of the march (see: R.A. Huseyn-zade, Kavkaz i Seldzhuki, Baku, 2010, p. 166).
29 R.A. Huseyn-zade, op. cit., p. 72. I cannot pass over in silence the far from accurate treatment by my esteemed colleague of information found in the Georgian chronicles. When writing that Bagrat IV had sworn allegiance to the sultan and "promised to pay jizya," Prof. Huseyn-zade referred to the French translation of Kartlis Tskhovreba and the work of Imad ad-Din al-Isfahani, which created the impression that the Georgian chronicler and the Arab author had written about one and the same fact. The French translation, however, only says that "De cette ville le sultan envoya une ambassade au roi Bagrat, pour solliciter son alliance et demander en mariage la fille de sa sœur" (Histoire de la Géorgie. Depuis l'Antiquité jusqu 'au XIXe siècle. Par M. Brosset. 1" partie, S.-Petersbourg, 1849, p. 328), which means: ".. .the sultan dispatched an envoy from Akhalkalaki to Bagrat to seek an alliance with him and marriage to his niece" (Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I. p. 307; Letopis Kartli, p. 73). The Georgian chronicle says nothing of the oath of vassalage. For more details about this and some other regrettable lapses in the otherwise valuable monograph, see: Z. Papaskiri, "Ob odnoy popytke ignorirovaniia roli i mesta gruzinskogo gosudarstva na mezhdunarodnoy arene v XII veke. Nekotorye zamechaniya na knigu Raufa A. Huseyn-zade Kavkaz i Seldzhuki," Kavkaz i Mir (Tbilisi), No. 14, 2012, pp. 60-83, available at [http://iberiana2.wordpress.com/caucasus/papaskiri/].
30 See: R.A. Huseyn-zade, op. cit., pp. 167-168, 229.
31 Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, op. cit., p. 50.
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ics mine.—Z.P.). All other Oriental sources (Ibn al-Athir's being the only exception32) that contain information, if any, about the sultan's first Georgian march do not confirm that the Georgian king swore allegiance to Alp Arslan. Al-Bundari told the story of how "Alp Arslan forced King of the Abkhaz Bagrat, son of Georgi, to ask for peace and to offer him his daughter's hand in marriage. Having accepted the presents, the sultan rewarded him with an aman. He then gave Nizam al-Mulka the Georgian princess's hand in marriage,"33 but said nothing about the Georgian king's vassal status. Another Arab author, Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, merely wrote that "the sultan married a daughter of King of Abkhaz Bagrat's sister."34
In fact, this is not the main argument. We should pay more attention to later events; information about them offers no evidence of the Georgian king's vassal status, it essentially refutes this possibility. This fully applies to an agreement on the marriage between the sultan and the king's niece35 (not daughter, as al-Bundari wrongly wrote).36 This marriage cannot be described as the sultan's halfhearted favor; it was King Bagrat's diplomatic success that consolidated his position in the Caucasus. In the context of the times, this conclusion looks logical.
According to Matiane Kartlisa, not everyone in the royal family approved of the arranged marriage between the sultan and King Bagrat's niece (a daughter of his sister)37: her parental uncle, King Kvirike of the Kingdom of Tashir-Dzoraget,38 was dead set against the match. The Georgian king used this disagreement as a pretext to capture the kingdom and enter its capital, Samshvilde. The chronicler said: "The Armenians submitted to Bagrat."39 This brought the Georgian king closer to his final aim: return of the old Georgian provinces Khunan-Samshvilde to the Georgian state.40 This bold move fortified Georgia's position in this part of the Caucasus and demonstrated the military might of the Georgian state. By the same token, this kept the Seljuk sultan from using force to punish the audacity of Bagrat IV in Tashir-Dzoraget. It is believed that the sultan responded by restoring Emir of Japaride in Tbilisi.41 It seems that Abu-l-Asvar organized a surprise attack on Georgia to cut short any further expansion of the king of the "Abkhaz" and "Kartvelians;"42 this was the same Abu-l-Asvar43 whom the sultan had earlier entrusted with control over the Caucasian political units.44 Bagrat IV responded immediately. According to Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, in 1067-1068, "the king of the Abkhaz namedBakrat raided al-Barda'a ... a city in the country of Muslims (italics mine.—Z.P.)."45 The sultan of the Seljuks could not tolerate this and in 1068 attacked Georgia.
I cannot agree with some of my esteemed colleagues who accept without reservations information of those authors (Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni and Ibn al-Athir) who wrote that Bagrat IV had
32 See: P. Zhuze, op. cit., p. 121.
33 Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, op. cit., p. 190.
34 Ibidem.
35 See: Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I, pp. 307-308; Letopis Kartli, p. 45.
36 See: Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, op. cit., p. 190, Chapter 13, Note 32, available at [http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus/ Selguk/frames2.htm].
37 See: Sibt ibn al-Jawzi confirms that the sultan sought the hand of the king's niece (not daughter) in marriage: "the sultan married a daughter of a sister of Bagrat, King of Abkhaz" (Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, op. cit., p. 190, Chapter 13, Note 32). According to Bar Hebraeus, another Arabic author, the sultan married a daughter of a sister of the "ruler of Georgia" (N.N. Shengelia, Seljuks and Georgia in the 11th Century, p. 226).
38 According to Armenian author Matteos Urhayetsi, the princess married to the sultan was not a niece of King Kvirike of Tashir-Dzoraget, but his daughter. For some reason, Urhayetsi did not mention the role of King Bagrat IV in the arranged marriage (see: I.A. Javakhishvili, op. cit., pp. 152-153; N.N. Shengelia, Seljuks and Georgia in the 11th Century, p. 226).
39 Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I, pp. 307-308; Letopis Kartli, pp. 72-73.
40 See: T.G. Papuashvili, The Kingdoms of Rans and Kakhs (the 8th-11th Centuries), Tbilisi, 1982, p. 247 (in Georgian).
41 See: Sh.A. Meskhia, "The Urban Community in Medieval Tbilisi," pp. 241-242.,
42 R.K. Kiknadze, op. cit., p. 115.
43 See: Abu-l-Asvar Shavur I bin al-Fadl (1049-1067) was ruler of Ganja-Arran.
44 See: N.N. Shengelia, Seljuks and Georgia in the 11th Century, p. 237.
45 Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, op. cit., p. 55; N.N. Shengelia, Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, p. 192; N.N. Shengelia,
Seljuks and Georgia in the 11th Century, p. 238.
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vowed allegiance to the Seljuk sultan and agreed to pay him jizya,46 a sign of the vassal-sovereign relations between them. There is enough information that in 1064-1068, between the first and the second Georgian marches of Alp Arslan, Bagrat IV did nothing to avoid confrontation and never agreed to compromises with the sultan (contrary to what N.N. Shengelia wrote in one of his books47), but pursued a fairly active policy in the Caucasus. In fact, on the eve of one of the Seljuk marches, the Georgian king was busy adding Kakheti-Ereti to his domains.48 The Turkish inroad forced him to cut short his operation and turn back.
We cannot exclude the possibility that the Seljuks arrived at the request of Agsartan, King of Kakheti. Confirmation of this surmise can be found in Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, who wrote that a Seljuk detachment pursued "the robbers of Abkhaz" (King of "the Abkhaz" Bagrat IV.—Z.P.) in the "district of Shaki;"49 moreover, King Agsartan hastened to bring gifts to Alp Arslan and vowed allegiance.50 On the eve of the march on the king of "the Abkhaz" and "Kartvelians," Sultan Alp Arslan had Agsartan, as well King Kvirike of Tashir-Dzoraget and emir of Tbilisi on his side.51 This means that the united Georgian state was the only real force able to stand opposed to the Seljuks; this also explains the sultan's grim determination to punish Bagrat IV.
Alp Arslan plundered Kartli for six weeks; then he moved his units into Western Georgia, plundered Argveti, and came close to "the fortress of Sveri."52 The Georgian king asked for a truce; Alp Arslan demanded tribute, but "because of the severe winter left without waiting for an answer". He nevertheless "laid his hands on Tbilisi and Rustavi and transferred them to Fadlon, the ruler of Ganja."53 Some historians think that he did this not because he did not trust their rulers—they were his loyal servants,54 but because he believed that Fadlon was the most reliable and strongest among them with much better possibilities for controlling the captured Georgian lands.55
Bagrat IV, in turn, could not accept the defeat and tolerate Fadlon's "evil deeds;" he gathered a large army and came to Tbilisi; unable to defend the city, the emir of Ganja fled, was captured, and taken to Telavi to King of Kakheti Agsartan. Fearing "persecution by the king of the Abkhaz56," the
46 See: G.G. Alasania has recently joined those historians who side with the Arabic authors (Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni and Ibn al-Athir). She is not absolutely convinced that the Georgian king fulfilled the conditions of the Agreement, but she has stated that "until 1067/8, the time of the second march of Alp Arslan, peace was ensured, probably by the payment of kharaj, an acceptable condition" (G. Alasania, op. cit., p. 38, italics mine.—Z.P.).
47 See: N.N. Shengelia, Seljuks and Georgia in the 11th Century, p. 390.
48 See: Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I. p. 309; LetopisKartli, pp. 45-46.
49 Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, op. cit., p. 55; N.N. Shengelia, Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, p. 192.
50 See: Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I. pp. 308-309; Letopis Kartli, p. 46; Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, op. cit., p. 56.
51 See: Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I. p. 310; Letopis Kartli, p. 46.
52 Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I. p. 309; Letopis Kartli, p. 46.
53 Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I. pp. 309-310; Letopis Kartli, p. 46.
54 See: Sh.A. Meskhia, "The Urban Community in Medieval Tbilisi," p. 242.
55 See: N.N. Shengelia, Seljuks and Georgia in the 11th Century, p. 244.
56 It is widely known that the Arabic, Persian, Byzantine and other sources of the 11th-13th centuries used the terms "Abkhazia" and "Abkhaz" when writing about Georgia and the Georgians (for more details, see: G. Japaridze, "Arab Names for Georgians and Georgia," in: Foreign and Georgian Terms for Georgia and Georgians, Tbilisi, 1993, pp. 132-134, in Georgian). Despite this, some authors tend to misinterpret information in which Abkhazia and the Abkhaz are mentioned. The following is the best illustration of the above: "In 1068, Fadl, on the sultan's insistence, undertook a march to Abkhazia; he was defeated and taken prisoner. The Abkhaz handed him over to the Georgian King Bagrat IV, who forced Fadl to renounce his claim to Tbilisi, Rustavi, and other Georgian cities" (see: K.V. Ryzhov, "Shaddadidy," in: K.V. Ryzhov, Vse monarkhi mira: Musulmansky Vostok. VII-XV vv. Handbook, Moscow, 2004, available at [http://interpretive.ru/dictionary/453/word/ shadadidy], italics mine.—Z.P.). An uninformed reader might think that the ruler of Ganja-Arran invaded Abkhazia and was taken prisoner by the Abkhaz, while Bagrat IV ruled another country (Georgia) and other people (Georgians). In fact he was "the king of the Abkhaz" ("the king of the Abkhaz named Bakrat" as Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni put it (see: Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, op. cit., p. 55). K. Ryzhov is not quite correct when telling the story. According to the Georgian chronicles, Fadl II was captured by "Isaak Toloshelis-dze aznaur from Meskheti (an area in Southern Georgia.—Z.P.)," who forgot that he was a subject of the king of the Abkhaz and that after seizing Fadlon, who tried to flee from the king of Abkhaz, he had to take him
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king of Kakheti handed Fadlon over to the Georgian king in exchange for two fortresses (Bochorma and Ujarma) the Georgian king had captured earlier.57 It seems that the king of Kakheti feared not only Bagrat IV, but also Fadlon, who, judging from what is written in Matiane Kartlisa, had already captured some of the border lands (Khornabuji and Aradeti) of the Kingdom of the Kakhs and Rans.58
With Fadlon out of the way, Bagrat IV occupied Tbilisi and appointed a certain Sitle-arab as city administrator. The Georgian king also "captured the fortresses of Rustavi, Partskhisi, Agarani, Grigol-tsmindani, and Kavazini"59 found mainly in Kvemo (Lower) Kartli.60 It was a "borderline area which Alp Arslan had transferred to Fadlon."61 This meant that Bagrat IV recaptured the lost initiative and began restoring his lost position in Eastern Georgia.
This dented Alp Arslan's authority, something which he could neither ignore nor tolerate. I have already written that instead of a punitive expedition to Georgia, the awesome sultan dispatched to Georgia his envoy "Alkhaz, who together with the sultan persuaded Bagrat to make peace with Fad-lon. He let him return to his domain in Ganja. The military leader left together with him."62 Bagrat IV was rewarded with "the keys to Gagi, and the king of the Abkhaz took Gagi."63 The Middle Eastern context of the time suggests why Alp Arslan demonstrated restraint when dealing with the audacious king of the Georgians. Let me explain.
The Military-Political and Diplomatic Reasons of the Sultan's Extraordinary Decision
In the mid-1060s, the Seljuks increased their pressure on the Byzantine domains in Anatolia gradually settled by the Turks.64 This forced the Byzantine rulers to concentrate on the situation to the east of their borders. After ascending to the Byzantine throne in 1068, Emperor Romanos Diogenes mobilized all available forces, tightened up discipline in the army, and pushed the Seljuks beyond the Euphrates in several consecutive military operations.65 Alp Arslan, fully aware of his weakening
to Bochorma for Bagrat. Instead, he hastened to move Fadlon to Agsartan in Telavi, who, apprehensive of persecution by the king of the Abkhaz, immediately took the prisoner to Khornabuji. After bringing Fadlon to Khornabuji, he surrendered it. Then he was sent to Aradeti, which was also surrendered to Agsartan. Unwilling to miss the opportunity to take Fadlon prisoner, Bagrat let the Kakhs keep Bochorma and Ujarma in exchange for Fadlon" (Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I, pp. 312-313; Letopis Kartli, p. 47, italics mine.—Z.P.). Regrettably, not infrequently, our Azeri colleagues, likewise, misinterpret the terms "Abkhazia" and "the Abkhaz" used in Oriental written sources; this is true of the most respected authors, such as Academician Z. Buniyatov (see: Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, op. cit., p. 190) and R. Huseyn-zade (see: R.A. Huseyn-zade, op. cit, pp. 57-58, 69, 106, 190) (for more details, see: Z. Papaskiri, "Once More on the Meaning of the Terms 'Abkhazia' and 'the Abkhaz' in Oriental Written Sources," in: The Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Relations. The Past, Present and Future. Materials on the Inter-University Scientific Conference of Professors, Lecturers, and Students of Gori State University and Sukhumi State University dedicated to Independence Day of Georgia, Tbilisi, 2011, pp. 97-101, in Russian).
57 See: Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I, pp. 311-312; Letopis Kartli, p. 47.
58 See: Ibidem.
59 Ibidem.
60 See: N.A. Berdzenishvili, "On Toponymy of Ancient Tbilisi (Agarani)," in: N.A. Berdzenishvili, Problems of Georgian History, Vol. I, Tbilisi, 1964, p. 308; idem, "The Problems of Historical Geography of Bolnisi," in: Problems of Historical Geography of Georgia, Vol. II, Tbilisi, 1964, p. 42 (both in Georgian).
61 P.A. Topuria, op. cit., p. 199.
62 Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I, p. 313; Letopis Kartli, p. 47
63 Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I, p. 314; Letopis Kartli, p. 47.
64 See: G.G. Litavrin, "Vnutripolitichesky krizis v kontse XI v. i vneshnepolitichesky razgrom," in: Istoria Vizantii, Vol. II, Moscow, 1967, pp. 283-284; N.N. Shengelia, Seljuks and Georgia in the 11th century, p. 248.
65 See: N.N. Shengelia, Seljuks and Georgia in the 11th century, p. 250.
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position in Anatolia, had no choice but to move once more on Byzantium; the sultan was in haste: one of the sides in the sharp political disagreements in Egypt had asked for his help.66 In 1070, the Seljuks moved their troops to the west; they entered Byzantium from the territory of Azerbaijan and took Manzikert in one day. This was the beginning of a grandiose campaign crowned, on 19 August, 1071, by the Seljuks' impressive victory at Manzikert.67
This means that in the late 1060s, when Bagrat IV was pressing forward in Eastern Georgia, when he drove Fadlon away from Tbilisi and captured several fortresses, Alp Arslan had much more important concerns, i.e. the decisive attack on Byzantium. It seems that he had no choice but to deal cautiously with Bagrat IV. His previous experience (the first and second marches on Georgia) had taught him that force was not always the best option. This time he had to keep in mind the possibility that Bagrat IV might side with Byzantium in the coming clash. In short, confrontation with the Georgian king on the eve of a large-scale military campaign would have been a major diplomatic blunder.
At first glance, a joint Georgian-Byzantine march against the Seljuks looked quite possible. By that time, relations with Constantinople had stabilized partly thanks to a dynastic marriage between Michael VII Doukas, son of Emperor Constantine X, and Mariam, daughter of Bagrat IV.68 The sources contain no information about military-political cooperation between the two countries; however, we cannot ignore, together with V. Kopaliani,69 the possibility of their joint actions against their common enemy. The government of Romanos Diogenes might readjust the relations between Bagrat IV and Constantine Doukas. The new emperor had every reason to fear Michael Doukas, whose father-in-law, Sebastos Bagrat, might support his claim to the throne.70 Romanos Diogenes was hardly happy to see how the Georgian king and the Doukas dynasty were establishing dynastic ties. In the context of the mounting Seljuk threat, the Roman emperor had to be more flexible: he did not need complications with the Georgian state, a potential ally of Byzantium in its struggle against the Seljuks.
The political situation in Byzantium after the death of Constantine X shaped by the confrontation between new Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes and the relatives of still young Emperor Michael Doukas71 (son-in-law of Georgian King Bagrat IV) could have affected the relations between Kutaisi and Constantinople; at least it stirred up concerns among the Georgian political leaders. The fact that belligerent Romanos IV Diogenes faced a fairly strong opposition from the Doukas dynasty raises no doubts.
There is another fully justified opinion that when Romanos IV Diogenes was proclaimed emperor, the position of the Doukas dynasty and its leader, Caesar John Doukas (the younger brother of Emperor Constantine X), weakened to the extent that they were gradually "squeezed out of civilian
66 See: T.T. Rice, op. cit., pp. 31-32; N.N. Shengelia, Seljuks and Georgia in the 11th century, p. 250.
67 For more details, see: N.N. Shengelia, Seljuks and Georgia in the 11th century, pp. 253-265.
68 For more details, see: I.M. Nodia, "Gruzinskie materialy o vizantiyskoy imperatritse Marfe-Mariam," in: Vizantinovedcheskie etyudy, pp. 146-155.
69 See: V.U. Kopaliani, op. cit., p. 279.
70 For a long time (until Alexios Komnenos), the title of sebastos was limited to the emperors (see: L. Tavadze, "The Title of Sebastos in the Georgian Political Realities," in: Proceedings of the Institute of Georgian History at the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Vol. II, Tbilisi, 2011, p. 165, in Georgian); the fact that it was conferred on the Georgian king was extremely important: Constantinople accepted the Georgian state as an equal partner in international relations.
71 Historians have every reason to agree that after the death of Constantine X, his widow Eudokia "managed to preserve the right to the throne for her son Michael and the dignity of co-rulers for her younger sons." From this it follows that "Diogenes was recognized as an emperor with no legally confirmed advantages over the underage children of Constantine X" (A. S. Mokhov, Vizantiyskaia armiia i pravlenie Romana IV Diogena, p. 277, italics mine.—Z.P. ). This means that Michael Doukas was officially accepted as emperor immediately after the death of his father Emperor Constantine X, while Romanos IV Diogenes, the new husband of Eudokia, was a de facto co-ruler. It is surmised (J.-Cl. Cheynet, "Des traces de dictature a l'epoque meso-byzantin," in: Actes de la Table Roude reunie. Paris, 27-28 September 1984, Paris, 1988, p. 110) that he was elected emperor in line with the "old Byzantine tradition according to which an underage successor to the throne was given an experienced and influential general to fight external enemies." Nicephorus II Phocas (963-969) and John I Tzimiskes (969-975) can serve as an example (see: A.S. Mokhov, op. cit., p. 277, footnote).
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administration," although, on the whole, their influence "was not completely destroyed."72 In fact "Romanos IV had other ill-wishers at the court" who "after a while ... joined forces with the closest circle of Caesar John to set up a party determined to remove Diogenes from the throne (italics mine.— Z.P.)."73 This context makes it absolutely clear that the perfidy of some of the generals (Andronikos Doukas and Nikephoros Bryennios in particular, who "at the height of the battle of Manzikert" pulled out their troops to give "the Seljuk sultan a chance to take the emperor prisoner") was but one of the links in a long chain of events leading to the dethronement of the unwelcome emperor.74 We cannot exclude the possibility, therefore, that Georgia too wanted Romanos IV Diogenes out of the way to ensure the political future of the crowned spouse of the Georgian king's daughter.75 This probably pushed Bagrat IV and the new Byzantine emperor apart,76 something which played into the hands of the Seljuk sultan on the eve of the decisive attack on the empire. This explains Alp Arslan's seemingly unexplainable position caused, quite logically, by his firm determination to prevent an anti-Seljuk Georgian-Byzantine military and political alliance.
The above suggests that Alp Arslan's diplomatic favors were intended to keep Bagrat IV out of the future clash with Byzantium. To be more exact: Alp Arslan's passivity (or even more) in the conflict between Bagrat IV and Fadlon was caused by the political developments in the Middle East and the mounting confrontation with Byzantium. In the early 1070s, Bagrat IV was absolutely free in his military-political moves. Toward the end of his rule, he had to move once more against Fadlon, who "violated his oath and intercession of the great sultan" and captured the fortresses of Kavazini and Agarani.77 Bagrat IV lost no time in responding: he liberated one of the fortresses and organized a large-scale march on Ganja together with "Dorgolel, king of Ovsy, and forty thousand Ovsy and, under the command of his son Giorgi kuropalates, plundered Ganja."78
The king of the "Abkhaz" and "Kartvelians" consolidated his authority still further while Alp Arslan paid no attention to this operation.79 The fact that King of Ovsy Dorgolel was actively involved in the march against Fadlon means that his kingdom, the most powerful political unit of the Northern Caucasus, belonged to the orbit of the Georgian state's foreign policy interests. Their joint march on
72 A.S. Mokhov, op. cit., p. 277.
73 Ibid., p. 278.
74 See: Ibid., p. 293.
75 Georgian political circles repeatedly interfered in Byzantine domestic policies. David Kuropalates, a powerful ruler of Tao, sent his troops to the empire twice during his reign, in 979 and 989 (for more details, see: Z.V. Papaskiri, Emergence of a Unified Georgian Feudal State..., pp. 27-37 and Bibliography), as well as during the reign of Giorgi I, who sided with the rioters determined to remove Basil II (for more details, see: ibid, pp. 117-118, 121-123, and Bibliography).
76 Some of the sources pointed out that the Georgians were also involved in the battle of Manzikert, which does not contradict our statement. First, only Michael Attaleiates, out of all Byzantine sources (which are much more reliable when it comes to the ethnic composition of the Byzantine troops fighting at Manzikert), mentioned "Iberian stratioti" (see: A.S. Mokhov, op. cit., p. 294, italics mine.—Z.P.). They cannot be described as Georgian armed units because they belonged to the theme of Iberia, an administrative unit of the Byzantine Empire. Information supplied by Arab author al-Bundari about the "Abkhaz" (without doubt subjects of the King of "the Abkhaz" Bagrat IV), hired by the Byzantine emperor together with Khazaras, Ruses, Kypchaks, Georgians, and others (see: Sadr ad-din Ali al-Huseyni, op. cit., Chapter 18, footnote 16, available at [http://www. vostlit.info/Texts/rus/Selguk/frames3.htm]), disagrees with the general context and contradicts information supplied by other Arab sources, to say nothing of Byzantine sources. It is much more preferable to rely, in this context, on other Arab sources: Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, who wrote that the Byzantine army consisted of "Armenians, Persians, Pechenegs, Oghuz Turks, and Franks" (see: Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, op. cit., Chapter 18, p. 58) and Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, who mentioned "100 thousand Georgians/jurji" (see: Sadr ad-Din Ali al-Husayni, op. cit., Chapter 18, Footnote 16), by whom he meant Georgians from the theme of Iberia and said nothing about "the Abkhaz."
77 See: Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I, p. 314; Letopis Kartli, p. 47.
78 Kartlis Tskhovreba, Vol. I, p. 315; Letopis Kartli, p. 47.
79 Some think that "after establishing themselves in Transcaucasia, the Seljuks, who no longer needed the Shaddadids and their military support, learned to treat their might with suspicion" and that the blows the Georgian king delivered at Fadl II weakened "the state of the Arranshakhs and played into the hands of the Seljuks (K.V. Ryzhov, op. cit). It seems, however, that this "passiveness" relates much better to the sultan's Byzantine policy.
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Ganja showed that the Georgian state played the main role on the anti-Seljuk front in the Caucasus and that, despite the crippling Seljuk inroads, it remained the leading political force in the Caucasus.
Conclusion
My analysis of the sources and historiography, as well as my interpretation of what was happening on the Byzantine-Seljuk front on the eve of the battle of Manzikert, provide a fairly plausible explanation of why the otherwise belligerent sultan retreated from his previously confrontational policy toward the audacious Georgian king. In the late 1060s, when Bagrat IV carried out his offensive operations in Eastern Georgia, which directly infringed on the military and political interests of the Seljuk sultan, the latter was tied down by preparations for the final offensive on the Byzantine Empire. He had to show caution when dealing with Bagrat IV, a potential ally of Byzantium. There is every reason to believe that his unexpectedly friendly gesture, instead of a punitive expedition, was caused by his desire to keep Georgia away from an imminent global clash with Byzantium.
