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ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
2017.03.004. ANATOLY KHAZANOV. SYRIAN TRAGEDY: WHAT GAMES ARE THE TIGERS PLAYING? // "Konfrontatsia mezhdu Zapadom i Rossiei: s kem vy, strany Azii I Afriki?" Moscow, Ivran, 2016, P. 5-17.
Keywords: the military coup, the confessional minorities, Sunni, Shiites, Alavism, Christians, Druses , the principle "takyya", Syria, the Asad regime, Kurds, "Damascus Spring".
Anatoly Khazanov,
Dr.Sc. (Hist.)
Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS
The author of the article characterizes the Syrian Arab Republic as multi-confessional and multi-ethnic, located in southwest Asia, on the Mediterranean coast, where half of the population is Sunni, about 25% Shiites, 12% Alawites and 10% Christians. In 2011 there were 20.8 million people in Syria, but to date about 13 million people have fled the country.
As a result of the military coup and the rise to power of the Alawite Hafez Asad in 1970, representatives of the confessional minorities were appointed to all senior positions in the country (Alavism is a small offshoot of Shiite Islam, contrasting itself with the Sunnis.)
The author notes that the power is in the hands of the Sunnis in almost all the Arab states, and they are making every effort to establish the Sunni regime in Syria. The rich Arab
monarchies of the Persian Gulf openly interfere in the internal affairs of the country, violating the delicate balance established by the efforts of the Asad regime in this multi-confessional and multiethnic country and fueling the situation in the once-calm Syria.
The author writes that Hafiz al-Asad managed to establish relations with representatives of the Sunni class in business and relied on them in his policy. Thus, there was and is an opportunity to establish a dialogue between Sunnis and Shia Alawites in Syria. The situation is only aggravated when external actors violate the sovereignty of the country, pursuing their own mercenary aims and interfering in its internal affairs.
As for the Christian community of Syria, many of its members support the Asad regime, realizing that they will lose the religious freedoms granted by Asad as soon as the Islamists seize power in the country.
Druses are the most cohesive ethno-confessional community in Syria. Their creed is a mixture of beliefs of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. They practice the principle "takyya", i.e. any druse has the right to fictitiously accept the belief of others, keeping his true faith in his soul. Druses are actively engaged in the work of state institutions, and they fully support Asad's authority.
Kurds are mostly Sunni Muslims, with their own language and culture. They live in the territories of four countries - Turkey, Syria, Iran, Iraq. And they have been subjected to harassment for a long period In all these countries. Kurds were constantly oppressed by the Asad government. They are in opposition to both the ruling Baath Party and Arab nationalism in general, and to the rebels.
The author notes the difficult situation in which Bashar Asad turned out after being elected president. On the one hand, he was subjected to pressure from his father's supporters, on the other hand, from people who expected new democratic reforms from the president. In March 2001, Bashar Asad made it clear that
national unity, the Baath Party, the armed forces and the course of H. Asad were not subject to condemnation and criticism. The society was put under total control.
"Damascus Spring", the Syrian "thaw" ended in Syria, barely having time to start. The security forces and, above all, the special services again began to play a dominant role in the country. B. Asad revived the model and style of leadership of the country, which adhered to his father. He focused on the development of the economy of Syria. However, the economic situation of the country remained extremely difficult, as the economy was based on an inefficient public sector, and oil reserves quickly dried up. At the same time there was merging of the party-state and military elite with the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. Corruption has penetrated into all spheres of the state apparatus.
It is not surprising, the author writes, that the country was covered by protest movements in 2011. During 2013-2014, the situation began to move rapidly towards a full-scale civil war. Various armed groups opposed the B. Asad regime in Syria, starting from the most moderate groups and Ending with the most radical.
The moderate wing of the opposition is represented by the liberal-minded Syrian intelligentsia, advocating for democratic reforms, a multi-party system, and freedom of speech against the monopoly of the power of the Alavite Asad clan.
In 2011, on the territory of Syria, the "Free Syrian Army" (FSA) was created - the largest armed force in the ranks of the opposition. The ideological basis of FSA is the worldview of a secular-nationalist character.
Russia does not consider FSA a terrorist organization. Furthermore, the FSA has provided information about the location of a number of objects of the ISIS. The author writes that Russia is conducting negotiations with it on joint actions against ISIS. Asad is not against it. FSA does not disdain racket, taking
from the local population a kind of tribute to the "cause of Allah".
The radical wing of the opposition is represented by a number of extremist Islamic terrorist organizations.
The Islamic Front of Syria (IFS), founded in July 2012, seeks to overthrow the regime existing in Syria and establish a civilized Islamic society in the country. It is a Syrian version of the Jihadist Salafism, and its difference from Al-Qaeda is that most of its members are Syrians.
The Jabhat al-Nusra organization does not have global ideological plans but is more focused on combating the Asad regime, unlike ISIS, the most significant armed force. The author writes about ISIS that the wild Middle Ages are revived before our eyes, and it is going to dictate the conditions in which we all should live.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS now) arose against the backdrop of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the U.S. command dissolved the army of S. Hussein, and began the formation of a new Iraqi army.
The soldiers of the army of Saddam Hussein and members of the Baath party formed the backbone of ISIS. In 2006, the group declared "Islamic state of Iraq", which includes 8 provinces, inhabited by Sunnis. The militants from the Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (now ISIS), associated with Al-Qaeda, have terrified even the soldiers of the Free Syrian Army with their atrocities. Asad and the Iranians threw the fighters of the Lebanese Shiite organization Hezbollah to the front to defeat them: the Shiite fanatics had to be set up against the Sunni fanatics.
ISIS is becoming a recognized leader of the radical antiWestern part of the Islamic world more and more, attracting radical Islamists from different countries. It is no longer limited to the goal of establishing a caliphate in any one Arab country, but seeks to cover all the territories with the Muslim population.
The author notes that the U.S. does not depart from its short-sighted policy of eliminating the regime of Bashar Asad, not regulate its relations with Iran and does not do everything to attract Sunnis to the ranks of fighters with ISIS in Iraq and beyond.
In 2014, ISIS proclaimed the Islamic Caliphate. This quasistate has great wealth. It receives more than $ 1 million a day from oil production and export, selling it to Turkey, Jordan and other countries. The slave trade also brings great profits to Islamists. In addition, the wealth of the Caliphate is also built on the legalized robbery of the local population. ISIS already has a clear administrative structure and it is divided into "emirates" and "vilayets" with the capital in Syria's Rakka.
The author writes that the U.S. has razed the Middle East with its ill-conceived policy, and ISIS is a direct product of their policies in the region. Regional and extra-regional actors are involved in the Syrian conflict. The whole region of the Middle East has now split into two camps. The Shiite countries are on the side of Asad, and the Sunni countries are against him.
Turkey has the second largest land army in NATO. Ankara has its ambitions in the region, which in the past was a part of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey's position is largely related to the Kurdish problem.
Iraqi Shiites - the militants of the "Mahdi Army" and Badr's Brigades, as well as the militants of the Lebanese Shiite organization Hezbollah are fighting along with the Syrian army on the side of the Asad regime. Hezbollah (the "Party of Allah") is supported by 3 million Lebanese Shiites and occupies one of the first places on the list of 28 terrorist organizations, published by the U.S. in early 2001.
Iran stands firmly on the side of Asad, considering the Asad regime in Syria and "Hezbollah" as its main allies in the Middle East. The goal of Iran is to strengthen the Shiite community in Syria, it seeks to create and lead the coalition of Shiites of Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, SA, Yemen, Bahrain, Lebanon and
Syria, controlled by Hezbollah, and further to the Gaza Strip (Palestine), where the Palestinian organization "Hamas", which is allied with Iran, is in power. The creation of the axis of the pro-Iranian forces caused an unprecedented aggravation of the Sunni-Shiite confrontation in the region.
The author characterizes the positions of the countries opposing the Asad regime on the Syrian question:
The position of Qatar on the Syrian crisis is related to the dream of the Qatari emir to eliminate the Asad regime, which prevents him lay a gas pipeline from Qatar to Turkey through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, SAR and then to the final destination - to the European consumer. Since Doha would be able to fulfill its primary strategic goal - to remove Russia from the markets of South-Eastern and Eastern Europe and Turkey.
Saudi Arabia is considering Syria as an ally of his eternal enemy - Iran. Riyadh fears that if Bashar Asad wins, Iran will become the leader in the region. At the same time, ISIS activity provokes serious concern in Riyadh.
The author notes that the military presence of Russia, its participation in the war in Syria, has become an unpleasant surprise for the U.S. and further he explains how the positions of extra-regional actors primarily Russia and the U.S. are conditioned.
The author lists the goals of Russia and the United States.
The goals of Russia: Do not be an outsider on the world stage and once again become one of the leading actors. To prevent the strengthening of ISIS and other terrorist organizations which pose a potential threat to the security of the Russian Federation and the CIS countries. Provide a Russian military presence in the Syrian port of Tartus, so that the Mediterranean Sea does not become the internal sea of NATO. Support our old ally - B. Asad and his regime. Save Syria as a traditional market for the sale of Russian weapons.
The U.S. aims in the Syrian crisis: To eliminate the regime of B. Asad, to proceed to the destruction of the Iranian regime
then, hated by Washington. To create disruptions in the world energy market to raise oil and gas prices and to "choke" with these high prices its main competitor in the world market -China. To create chaos in the Middle East in accordance with the American concept of "managed chaos" in order to ensure the dominance of the United States in this most important strategic region of the world. To provide orders for the military-industrial complex, since to satisfy the requests of influential arms magnates. Barack Obama and the Democratic Party needed some impressive successes on the foreign policy front on the eve of the elections.
The author does not doubt that although ICIS has not yet suffered its defeat, the spring that set in motion the ISIS Islamist army has already burst.
Author of the abstract - N. Ginesina
2017.03.005. KHRISTINA TURINSKAYA. LIBYA. IS THE RETURN TO FEDERALISM POSSIBLE? // "Asia i Africa segodnia", Moscow, 2015, № 8, P. 18-23.
Keywords: Libya, federalism, disintegration, autonomy, unitarianism, M.Gaddafi, H. Haftar, Islamic extremists.
Khristina Turinskaya,
Ph.D. (Hist.),
Institute for African Studies,
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, RAS
The author writes that one can observe the general increased interest in federalism and the desire to change the principles of statehood in the face of growing instability in many countries, the emergence of new foci of separatist movements. Modern Libya is one of the examples of the return, or turning anew to the federal idea.
